Sanctuary (or perhaps just area) denial operations at the Afghanistan village level

[Ken White]

My point is simply that insurgency (violent political struggle within a state) and conventional warfare (violent political struggle between states) are different.

Doh. Of course they are. I think Surferbeetle says that quite well...

My points were and are that the difference is a policy, not a military issue and that COIN no more goes against human nature than is effective conventional warfare "at the essence..." of it. If that statement were remotely true, we would have more conventional wars, not fewer as is the historic trend. You then say:

When tasked to help suppress an insurgency...say to that Civilian leader is along the lines of :

"Yes sir, we can help solve this problem; but understand that the fact that we are faced with an insurgency is a pretty damn good indicator that the government is failing a significant segment of the populace in a major way. So lets meet back here in two weeks. I'll have 2-3 solid COAs on how the military can assist in the operation and you should have a good idea as to how you plan to address the failures of governance that brought us to this sad point where you are prepared to employ our military against our own populace. I'll also have with me a letter of resignation that I hope I won't have to submit, but if your position is that you simply want the military to punish that segment of the populace that dares to act out, you will need to find another man for the job."

You obviously live in a dream world. First, the mantra that poor governance is the cause of all insurgency has been refuted by many here over the past few months -- that is a dangerous misperception. While that is frequently touted by the insurgents as 'their' reason it often is far from the truth and that FACT is amply demonstrated by the number of successful insurgencies where the new government is worse than the one it replaced...

Secondly, you try to tell the average Politician who thinks he's in charge that you'll get back to him in two weeks and see how far that flies. Telling him or her that to acknowledge their failures flies in the face of your own logic:

"Also that politicians are better at seeing the faults in the actions of other nations governments than they are in their own."

Threats by military people to resign are welcomed by politicians; that way they can reach down and get compliant folks to the top...

My points not only are directly related to yours, you implicitly acknowledge with this:

At no point did I address the differences of the military aspect of either of those two types of political conflict; merely that the military should be aware of differences of the political nature between the two, and not apply a one size fits all solution.

that my initial statement was and is correct:

"Warfare is not at all complex -- policy pertaining to warfare is quite complicated. That is true of MCO and COIN -- and all other variants..."

Thank you for your support.

[Surferbeetle]

I would like to emphasize some of the deep and subtle insights made so far on and compare them with a 'real-time' report regarding the interdependencies of the trinity of governance, economics, and security...

"Warfare is not at all complex -- policy pertaining to warfare is quite complicated. That is true of MCO and COIN -- and all other variants..."

Thank you for your support.

...and from Dr. Marc Tyrrell

The more I think about this, the more convinced I am that the assumption of the existence of a "state" as real in and of itself lies at the heart of much of our problem with the current conflicts we are fighting. We are required by cultural and inter-social conventions to act as if "states" exist but, when we do, we have a nasty tendency to assume they are real, and that leads to all sorts of problems and operational paradoxes when our cultural assumptions about what a "state" should be and how it should act run up against other peoples assumptions. This type of "the emperor has no clothes" realization is even more readily apparent when we kick out the existing "state" and put in a new one.

From today's Washington Post by Blaine Harden: In N. Korea, a strong movement recoils at Kim Jong Il's attempt to limit wealth (H/T to Daniel Drezner)

It was an unexplained decision -- the kind of command that for more than six decades has been obeyed without question in North Korea. But this time, in a highly unusual challenge to Kim's near-absolute authority, the markets and the people who depend on them pushed back.

Grass-roots anger and a reported riot in an eastern coastal city pressured the government to amend its confiscatory policy. Exchange limits have been eased, allowing individuals to possess more cash.

The currency episode reveals new constraints on Kim's power and may signal a fundamental change in the operation of what is often called the world's most repressive state. The change is driven by private markets that now feed and employ half the country's 23.5 million people, and appear to have grown too big and too important to be crushed, even by a leader who loathes them.

[Bob's World]

Doh. Of course they are. I think Surferbeetle says that quite well...

My points were and are that the difference is a policy, not a military issue and that COIN no more goes against human nature than is effective conventional warfare "at the essence..." of it. If that statement were remotely true, we would have more conventional wars, not fewer as is the historic trend. You then say:You obviously live in a dream world. First, the mantra that poor governance is the cause of all insurgency has been refuted by many here over the past few months -- that is a dangerous misperception. While that is frequently touted by the insurgents as 'their' reason it often is far from the truth and that FACT is amply demonstrated by the number of successful insurgencies where the new government is worse than the one it replaced...

Secondly, you try to tell the average Politician who thinks he's in charge that you'll get back to him in two weeks and see how far that flies. Telling him or her that to acknowledge their failures flies in the face of your own logic:Threats by military people to resign are welcomed by politicians; that way they can reach down and get compliant folks to the top...

My points not only are directly related to yours, you implicitly acknowledge with this:that my initial statement was and is correct:

"Warfare is not at all complex -- policy pertaining to warfare is quite complicated. That is true of MCO and COIN -- and all other variants..."

Thank you for your support.

Ken,

While I have tremendous respect for the SWJ community, and certainly there are many very keen insights posted here, I offer just this in response to your middle point of:

"the mantra that poor governance is the cause of all insurgency has been refuted by many here over the past few months -- that is a dangerous misperception."

So, because you and a handful of others disagree with a theory it becomes a "dangerous misconception?" You may have taken the recent Ken White thread a bit too seriously. If I claimed that everything I either didn't understand or disagreed with "a dangerous misconception" I'd be a bit of a lunatic.

No, it may not be 100% accurate, but I've yet to find a better theory and I've been looking, and listening. Are there exceptions where a small group with a distinct agenda takes on the government in a country where the populace is largely satisfied with the goodness of governance? Sure. But that's not insurgency as it lacks the key ingredient to be an insurgency: popular support. Where does popular support come from? The populace. When does a popualce support such movements? When it feels it is a better option than what they are getting from the current team, and when they also feel they have no way within the law to exercise that change.

If I am considered a bit of a lone ranger on this, that is a position I am quite comfortable with. I'm sure my thoughts will continue to evolve, and I suspect yours will as well.

Bob.

[jmm99]

Hi Bob,

You and I have had a low level (decibels) discourse on your "good governance" and "self-determination" concepts from the gitgo. Some agreement; some disagreement.

I think you need to clarify this statement:

from BW
No, it may not be 100% accurate, but I've yet to find a better theory and I've been looking, and listening. Are there exceptions where a small group with a distinct agenda takes on the government in a country where the populace is largely satisfied with the goodness of governance? Sure. But that's not insurgency as it lacks the key ingredient to be an insurgency: popular support.

Now, my knowledge of the Malay "insurgency" in far southern Thailand is based only on what I've read from Kilcullen, from which I gleaned:

1. Viewed from an all-Thailand viewpoint, the Malays are a "small group with a distinct agenda" which is "taking on the government in a country where the populace is largely satisfied with the goodness of governance" as to the Malay issue.

2. Viewed from the Malay enclave, the Malays are a large group in that enclave with the "distinct agenda" of "self-determination", where the Malay populace is largely dissatisfied with the "goodness of governance" as to the Malay issue.

So, are the Thailand Malays an "insurgency" ? From whose viewpoint do you measure "good governance" ?

I've made it clear that I regard "governance" as an integral factor in the Political Struggle. But, as Bill Moore has made clear in a number of posts, governance is only one factor in that political effort (which BTW is not the Politik that drives both the political and military efforts to a common end goal).

Regards

Mike

[Schmedlap]

If I am considered a bit of a lone ranger on this...

I am closer to your position, kemosabe, than I am to the opposing view. But, I have two problems with the following excerpt.

Are there exceptions where a small group with a distinct agenda takes on the government in a country where the populace is largely satisfied with the goodness of governance? Sure. But that's not insurgency as it lacks the key ingredient to be an insurgency: popular support. Where does popular support come from? The populace. When does a popualce support such movements? When it feels it is a better option than what they are getting from the current team, and when they also feel they have no way within the law to exercise that change.

1. Popular support - how does one define this?

2. The notion of feeling a movement is "a better option than what they are getting from the current team" - is this to suggest that the populace thinks as one system or brain, rather than just a bunch of people reacting to short-term fears?

[Ken White]

So, because you and a handful of others disagree with a theory it becomes a "dangerous misconception?" You may have taken the recent Ken White thread a bit too seriously. If I claimed that everything I either didn't understand or disagreed with "a dangerous misconception" I'd be a bit of a lunatic.

or because others do not agree with you, it is a dangerous misperception because as you say:

No, it may not be 100% accurate, but I've yet to find a better theory and I've been looking, and listening. Are there exceptions where a small group with a distinct agenda takes on the government in a country where the populace is largely satisfied with the goodness of governance? Sure...

It is simply inaccurate and misrepresents history and if one is a strategic planner and one plans on what one admits is an even slightly flawed assumption, then I suggest it becomes potentially dangerous and if one admits it's a misrepresentation -- or a hyperbolic statement if you prefer -- then I suggest my tag is valid.

If I am considered a bit of a lone ranger on this, that is a position I am quite comfortable with. I'm sure my thoughts will continue to evolve, and I suspect yours will as well.

I'm sure that is an accurate statement, our thinking will evolve. Nothing wrong with being a Lone Ranger but one does need Silver Bullets for that role.

We all use hyperbole to make points. Nothing wrong with that. I do believe, however, it is critical to not believe ones own hyperbolity.

[Bob's World]

2 points, then I am signing off to focus on more pressing items.

1. Yes the movement in Thailand is an insurgency. The percentage of the populace is small, but the issues of poor governance that are perceived by the geographically concentrated Muslim populace are pervasive in that community. If 5% of a county's populace perceives it is not receiving good governance and they are dispersed across that country, you don't have much likelihood of insurgency. Note also that the Thai insurgency is what I would classify as a separatist insurgency. They don't want to change the entire country, they recognize that is unlikely and want to be released. If the Thai government wants to resolve it they need to either annex of that chunk of land and resident populace; or address the issues giving rise to the perceptions of poor governance.

Quirky little movements rise and fade, or persevere in their quirky little communities, but never burst into insurgency regardless of the strength of ideology or the dynamicism of leadership when embedded within a populace that is generally experiencing good governance. These things are ever present in all societies. It is only when governance fails that the medium is created within a populace for such sparks to ignite into a conflagration.

WWII was conceived in Versailles, not some Munich beer hall; and GWOT was conceived in the US policy decisions not to roll back Cold War controls in the Middle East at the end of the Cold War as it did in Europe; and not in some cave in Afghanistan. Conception isn't evil, often it is just ignorance or negligence; but those arguments won't relieve one from a judgment of a duty to deal with the consequences in the world court any more than they will in family court. Far easier to blame it on the bastard child that emerges for being born, but that won't truly solve the problem as it ignores the roots of it all.


Lastly, while I have fielded several "I don't agrees", a few "I don't think sos" and a couple of "what about's"; no one to my knowledge has put on the table a single example of a single insurgency that does not fit within my construct. I've been looking for such examples diligently myself, but to no avail. But I'm not here to argue, I have been here in the pursuit of thinking that will help preserve my nation and aid it in the pursuit of its interests in a manner that are not perceived as onerous to those around her.

My personal quest continues.

[Firn]

Before moving back to the topic, I will just want to bring an example in CvC's timeframe to show just how difficult it is to divide the phenomenon war into clearly defined elements.

During the Napoleonic wars the Austrian crownland Tyrol was ceded by Austria to the French ally Bavaria. It has been the ambition of many a Bavarian ruler and the largest part of it's population spoke a similar German dialect, a large part an Italian dialect and a relative small one Raetoroman (Ladin). All shared the same catholic faith, and the rural population had a similar way of life.

However liberal reforms and Austrian victories brought up the whole country and to a differing degrees the different communities against the French and their puppets which were the legitimate rulers of the land. Due to the strong will of the population, political organisation, widly dispersed and famous skill in markmanship, good armament and the mountains the insurgents were able to inflict very severe defeats on the forces of the government and their French allies. The Austrian Empire aided their former crownland little, but used of course their will to fight to their advantage. After new defeats the Austrians would cede Tyrol again which would rise up and drive the new rulers out again after having found the right occasion. This would repeat itself 4 times in a single year, until the fourth times only part of the leaders and the militias would meet head on with the main body of the enemy, as many felt betrayed by Austria. (The last three times an open battle against the main force had worked just fine).

So how can we define this wars? COIN, counter-counter-revolutionary wars, (multi)nationalist uprising, (defensive) people's war, a (small) war to support the main effort ?

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The link provided by Slapout provides some very interesting insights. The need of organisations skilled in the techniques employed by law enforcement and the secret services to operate effectively against the (more political) moves of the enemy is obvious. While the military has, due to the situation on the ground to shoulder most of the weight it is difficult to swallow that perhaps far more suited and experienced members and organisations have seemingly not been used in sufficiently intensive and skilled manner.

With the combat outposts and the efforts of their personnel under constant enemy watch there is a glaring need to have also more covert elements working to create a huge and yet fine net to recruit, observe, identify, filter, control, target, and so on. There are many ways and possibilities to aid this efforts, many of them are most likely already already in field, some not, but so far the effort to counter the infiltration and subversion seems to have been not strong enough. This is especially true when it comes to the cooperation between the coalition and the Afghan government/leaders/organisations.


Firn

P.S: It certainly surprised me how strictly the insurgents in the mentioned case study devided the military and political organisations and tasks.

[marct]

Hi Bob,

2 points, then I am signing off to focus on more pressing items.

1. Yes the movement in Thailand is an insurgency. The percentage of the populace is small, but the issues of poor governance that are perceived by the geographically concentrated Muslim populace are pervasive in that community.

Personally, I think this is playing definition games. I have no problem with that, but it's always a good idea to be up front about it since I have a feeling that definitions, and how they are constructed and used, are at the heart of much of the apparent "disagreements" with your model.

Broadly speaking, there are three major types of definitions:

1. "Crisp" definitions of the either / or type. Usually based in some form of nomonological-deductive model, they are "certain" or "yes/no" types. As a note, people tend to us this form most often even if they have no idea if it is the correct form for when and where they are using it. Take a look at the accuracy of eyewitness testimony for an example of this .
2. "Fuzzy" or probabilistic definitions. These are usually presented either as probabilities - e.g. "I'm pretty sure it's an insurgency; say 80% - or, much less likely but more accurately, "it has certain characteristics in common with accepted definitions of insurgency, but several that are either not there or only in minimal form".
3. Plausible definitions. These tend to be used when people are trying to figure out concepts, constructs and just what they should be looking for. So, for example, if you were to look at the case of various and sundry national liberation movements in Quebec during the past 50 years, why didn't an open insurgency develop? All of the hallmarks were there: a distinct culture, poor governance, a different language and religion (on the whole), popular support for separation, etc.

Normally, all of these definitions tend to be used together but towards different ends so, for example, when you are talking about the Thai insurgency

If 5% of a county's populace perceives it is not receiving good governance and they are dispersed across that country, you don't have much likelihood of insurgency. Note also that the Thai insurgency is what I would classify as a separatist insurgency. They don't want to change the entire country, they recognize that is unlikely and want to be released. If the Thai government wants to resolve it they need to either annex of that chunk of land and resident populace; or address the issues giving rise to the perceptions of poor governance.

What this indicates to me is that you are dealing with a whole slew of different concepts. Pulling them apart, you've got

1. a rough model relating to the likelihood of an insurgency happening that draws on size of the group and dispersion of the group at a purely geographic level.
2. you switch levels between a nation state and a local community, and
3. you ascribe motivation back to perceptions of poor governance.

Now, the issue of governance is, as I think we would all agree, tricky. My suspicion is that the motivation is only partly related to the quality of the governance and much more related to the perception of the legitimacy of the governance. Key point here is that you appear to be conflating "good", which is qualitative and probabilistic, with "legitimate" which tends to be more "crisp".

Quirky little movements rise and fade, or persevere in their quirky little communities, but never burst into insurgency regardless of the strength of ideology or the dynamicism of leadership when embedded within a populace that is generally experiencing good governance. These things are ever present in all societies. It is only when governance fails that the medium is created within a populace for such sparks to ignite into a conflagration. (emphasis added)

Now, that "never" is a crisp definition. Really? How about the American Revolution? What it comes down to again is definitions and you appear, to be using a tautology on "good" where if an insurgency happens then it must have been due to "not good" governance.

Lastly, while I have fielded several "I don't agrees", a few "I don't think sos" and a couple of "what about's"; no one to my knowledge has put on the table a single example of a single insurgency that does not fit within my construct. I've been looking for such examples diligently myself, but to no avail.

If you are looking for an example, try Algeria which had a very low initial support for the insurgency there. If you want another example, check out the various Jacobin revolts; the motivation has to do more with legitimacy than with effectiveness of governance structures. I would also strongly urge you to look at cases where they have crappy governance, and yet don't have a continuing situation of insurgency. Basically, what I am getting at is that you need a really good definition of "governance" that is probabilistic rather than crisp.

But I'm not here to argue, I have been here in the pursuit of thinking that will help preserve my nation and aid it in the pursuit of its interests in a manner that are not perceived as onerous to those around her.

No worries, Bob . Some day, we need to get a bunch of us together in a convivial intellectual setting (aka a bar or brew pub), and really try to thrash out a decent "fuzzy" model of this - I'll buy the first round .

Cheers,

Marc