Sanctuary (or perhaps just area) denial operations at the Afghanistan village level

[jcustis]

Bumping this with an edit to the main list in post #18. I was reading a Kimberly Kagan piece in Foreign Policy and began to think about the insurgent's use of shape-clear-hold-build (or some other similar flow) as a continuum to organize his efforts.

We probably need to understand where he is in the process, as there are certain nuances to our approach based on that.

[Surferbeetle]

CNAS, 4 Jan 09: Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan by Major General Michael T. Flynn, USA, Captain Matt Pottinger, USMC, Paul D. Batchelor, DIA and discussed in greater detail here at SWJ.

The U.S. intelligence community has fallen into the trap of waging an anti-insurgency campaign rather than a counterinsurgency campaign. The difference is not academic. Capturing or killing key mid-level and high-level insurgents – anti-insurgency – is without question a necessary component of successful warfare, but far from sufficient for military success in Afghanistan. Anti-insurgent efforts are, in fact, a secondary task when compared to gaining and exploiting knowledge about the localized contexts of operation and the distinctions between the Taliban and the rest of the Afghan population.There are more than enough analysts in Afghanistan. Too many are simply in the wrong places and assigned to the wrong jobs. It is time to prioritize U.S. intelligence efforts and bring them in line with the war’s objectives.

From a SAM's paper entitled Civil Information Management in Support of Counterinsurgency Operations: A Case for the Use of Geospatial Information Systems in Colombia by Major José M. Madera, United States Army Reserve

This section presents the primary research question of this monograph as determining the potential value of using Geospatial Information Systems to assist the Government of Colombia’s counterinsurgency efforts and thus provide a framework for determining the value of using GIS as a tool in other counterinsurgency settings. After a discussion of the doctrinal and conceptual background that informs the project, it discusses the methodology, limits, and delimitations of the project. The following chapter provides a conceptual framework for understanding counterinsurgency and the critical role terrain plays in it.

Google Earth KML programming link

KML is a file format used to display geographic data in an Earth browser such as Google Earth, Google Maps, and Google Maps for mobile.

[Infanteer]

shape-clear-hold-build

Why "shape" - isn't that just an implied task of "clear"?

[Ron Humphrey]

Why "shape" - isn't that just an implied task of "clear"?

Its usually a pretty good practice to think through and understand what you expect to do and how you expect to do it before actually doing it.

Situation dependent of course.

Also helps to remember that to assume it's implied in clear holds the very high likelihood that the particular operation is approached more in a what do I want to make happen as opposed to what needs to happen to facilitate"X" and what might help to influence it that direction.

[Steve the Planner]

Beetle:

Major Madera does a great job in providing an overview of CIMS -Civilian Information Managament Systems as:

demographics, economics, social constructs, political processes, political leaders, civil-military relationships, infrastructure notes, non-state actors in the area of operations, civil defense, public safety and public health capabilities, the environment.31 In short, CIMS capture the sort of information that paints a clear picture of the ecology of insurgency.

If he were updating this 2006 paper, I would suggest that he add: cadestral/property ownership (What MG Flynn calls out), and the basic topo, soil type and hydro data sets for cursory reconstruction/manuever stuff.

In Iraq, we used roads and bridges (with identification of the agency responsible for the component-state, provincial, local), ag components (the whole value chain for each applicable sector), reconstruction assets (asphalt & cement plants), major industrial/economic components, and important government activities (schools, clinics)/repair facilities.

Other special purpose maps "might" have included appointed/elected official's homes (for a variety of reasons).

Key thing in Iraq and Afghanistan, where UN demographics were used, was to set up shape files for each census boundary, even if political boundaries may have changed since. Important to, is to integrate real time, refugee, and pop displacements best estimates whenever you can suck them in.

As much as you can get whenever you can get it.

I'll cross post this on the Fixin's thread.

Steve

Citation from SurferBeetle:

"From a SAM's paper entitled Civil Information Management in Support of Counterinsurgency Operations: A Case for the Use of Geospatial Information Systems in Colombia by Major José M. Madera, United States Army Reserve"

[Surferbeetle]

From the USAID Business Growth Initiative website

USAID’s Office of Economic Growth of the Bureau for Economic Growth, Agriculture and Trade (EGAT/EG) has established the Business Growth Initiative (BGI) project to promote best practices in enterprise development as a critical element for Economic Growth. BGI will serve as a key element in building a Community of Practice for Enterprise Development, both within USAID and its development partners and among the broader development community worldwide.

Enterprises are the engine of economic growth. Enterprise development entails setting the framework to assist business ventures of all sizes to grow and employ more people. Firms do that by improving levels of production, accessing new markets, meeting international technical standards, improving marketing operations, obtaining greater returns on investments, and increasing revenues and profits. The nurturing of entrepreneurship through business education, business services of all types, business association development, policy advocacy, finance and market information is part of that process.

USAID Case Study:

CASE STUDIES IN ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT IN POST-CONFLICT SITUATIONS BOSNIA – PHILLIPINES – AFGHANISTAN TECHNICAL BRIEF NO.4

This brief presents three examples of enterprise development in post-conflict environments: Bosnia, Philippines, and Afghanistan. Through these cases, the brief highlights critical factors that an enterprise needs to succeed in a post-conflict environment. While each post-conflict environment is unique, this brief also draws out commonalities across the three cases and suggests good first principles for donors and enterprise development practitioners when offering support to enterprises in a post-conflict environment. Specifically, a central theme across all three cases is the importance of risk mitigation for businesses in a post-conflict environment. This brief highlights strategies that businesses and enterprise development practitioners have used to successfully manage risk in post-conflict settings.

USAID Handbook

Agricultural Recovery for Resilience -- A Preliminary Framework

Section four contains sample agriculture recovery assessment questions to asses the seven identified framework areas. These assessment questions support personnel of USAID Missions and the USAID/EGAT/AG office when assessing and designing agriculture recovery programs in post-crisis situations such as post-conflict, natural disasters, pandemics and governance failure. Furthermore, the questions are designed to be asked during Phase 2 of the recovery cycle, in other words during the transitional phase of reconstruction, rehabilitation and institution-building. The questions focus on the agriculture sector even though it is recognized that other activities such as macroeconomic policy and pro-poor initiatives should be implemented along with sub sector initiatives.

From the GTZ: Sustainable Economic Development in Conflict-Affected Environments: A Guidebook

The German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) has thus commissioned the GTZ sector projects ‘Innovative Approaches for Private Sector Development’ and ‘Crisis Prevention and Conflict Transformation’ to explore the links between conflict, peace and economic development conceptually, and practically through conflict-sensitive SED interventions in various partner countries.

This comprehensive Guidebook on Sustainable Economic Development in Conflict affected Environments synthesises that work and contributes to the current international efforts, in particular of the Donor Committee for Enterprise Development (DCED), to improve economic development approaches in these difficult conditions. It explains the challenges of working in a conflictive environment and guides development practitioners towards successful project planning, implementation and monitoring.

ADT Handbook

The Center for Army Lessons Learned has just released CALL publication 10-10, Agribusiness Development Teams (ADT) in Afghanistan Handbook.
This handbook is a product of the National Guard Agribusiness Development Team coordination office with input from current and previously deployed ADTs.
Agriculture accounts for 45 percent of Afghanistan's gross domestic product and is the main source of income for the Afghan economy. Over 80 percent of the Afghan population is involved in farming, herding, or both.

[jcustis]

Why "shape" - isn't that just an implied task of "clear"?

Good question. I can easily envision the clear, hold, and build components. "Shape" gets to be a bit more dicey, and can of course lead to a wide range of interpretation.

[Infanteer]

To me, I picture Clear, Hold, and Build as phases - just like Mao's three phases. A counterinsurgent can (and will) be in different phases in different places at one time and should expect different areas to move along this scale in either direction, just like Mao did. The three are not a checklist of what needs to be done, but rather signify what sort of tactical activity will be most important in your AO.

Adding extra stuff like "Shape" is just making a simple construct complex so a staff officer can fit more powerpoint slides into his presentation. If left unchecked, I could see "R"(emove all IEDs) and "M"(eet with local powerbrokers) being thrown into the mix....

My opinion of course - take it for what it's worth....
Infanteer

[Bob's World]

Western Doctrine has become a bit "phase-obsessed" of late. What can be a helpful organizational construct in general, can in fact, become a mental straitjacket as well.

Often it is far more helpful to think of your operations in terms of what phase YOUR OPPONENT is in, in a given area, with a given populace, perhaps even time of day. Particularly this is true for COIN, which, by definition is a counter to another's operations.

Instead of thinking in terms of I need to get from Shape to Clear to Hold to Build (becuase you can do all of those things in theory and not affect what phase the insurgent is in a single, significant bit); it is to my way of thinking far more instructive to have your intel guys (hey, after all they love to brag how intel drive ops...) produce a product for you that shows you what phase the insurgent is in across your battlespace.

In this village or district they may be in phase I during the day, but surging to phase II at night. In this city they may be in high phase 0. In a district along historic ratlines in the mountains they may well be in Phase II 24-7. The goal never being to get your own operation to "Build," but rather to reduce the insurgent operations among critical populaces first, but expanding to everywhere, to Phase 0. This does not mean an end to insurgent activity, merely that you have reduced violence to below the socially acceptable level for that particular culture and populace, and have brought the populace within the ability of the civil governance to serve without military assistance.

Perhaps that is too disorderly for a SAMS trained planner to work with; but insurgency by its nature is disorganized and such an approach not only lends flexibility to ones operations, but it also has a built in exit strategy. You can even build a color coded overlay for your map that shows Green (ph 0), Amber (ph1), Red (Ph 2) and Black (Ph 3) regions. This allows you to explain to politicians, the media, and the populace back home, that you are not here to FIX (build?) the country, but merely to bring the situation within the realm of civil capacity.

[Infanteer]

Western Doctrine has become a bit "phase-obsessed" of late. What can be a helpful organizational construct in general, can in fact, become a mental straitjacket as well.

Often it is far more helpful to think of your operations in terms of what phase YOUR OPPONENT is in, in a given area, with a given populace, perhaps even time of day. Particularly this is true for COIN, which, by definition is a counter to another's operations.

Good points,

To me Clear, Hold, Build should, as mentioned above, be reflective of what the enemy is doing; if I have a large concentration of insurgents who have executed local government officials and are taking over a village, then I have clearly moved into a different situation, regardless if I was making progress the day before; and getting back on track may not even require a period of "Hold" if insurgent influence was minimal. This should simply serve as a construct for how to orient your focus ("Ok, I'll have to put the well project on hold and start shooting out some ambush patrols...."). To avoid the straight-jacket approach, these phases should be seen, as pointed out, as very fluid. It is not simply a matter of A-B-C-D-E and boom, you have victory, but rather how you intend on countering the insurgent at that particular point in time and space....

As much as "what the enemy is doing" should impact what you are doing, I think the key is "how are enemy actions impacting the locals" and that will ultimately define what "phase" you are in. Is greasing the local IED team really going to be the sign that you're defeating the insurgency? I've seen many assessments that say "Yes! We got 'em!" only to be disappointed when the next cool-named dude brings a few of his cousins up and starts the same cycle over again in a week or so.

Now, I may be lambasted as a "COIN-ista" pop-centric, unoriginal fad-chaser just regurgitating FM 3-24, but Colonel Jones has a point. If insurgents are laying bombs on my roads and I was continually shooting them, I could say I was stuck in the early stages of a counterinsurgency effort until the cows came home; the enemy will most likely do this until you leave and his movement has (hopefully) regressed into a criminal enterprise. If the locals are not throwing rocks at you and actively supplying you with information then you are probably making progress. Enemy activity against you can be quite consistent for long periods of time, but when a local leader friendly to government forces disappears, it should be a telling indicator of the potential for problems down the road.

Anyways, I'm off to read about Lawrence of Arabia....

Infanteer

[jcustis]

Instead of thinking in terms of I need to get from Shape to Clear to Hold to Build (becuase you can do all of those things in theory and not affect what phase the insurgent is in a single, significant bit); it is to my way of thinking far more instructive to have your intel guys (hey, after all they love to brag how intel drive ops...) produce a product for you that shows you what phase the insurgent is in across your battlespace.

Excellent points BW, and something I have been trying to get at with this thread all along.

You can even build a color coded overlay for your map that shows Green (ph 0), Amber (ph1), Red (Ph 2) and Black (Ph 3) regions. This allows you to explain to politicians, the media, and the populace back home, that you are not here to FIX (build?) the country, but merely to bring the situation within the realm of civil capacity.

Another excellent point. Fiddling in/around the BUILD phase, and wringing our hands over what part the host nation is playing, seems to be kicking our ass at the moment. Heck, it's been kicking our ass the entire time, with the analyses I've seen of our disjointed development efforts.

[MikeF]

First, JCustis- good luck downrange brother. As time allows from the day-to-day business of doing the good work, let us know what your thinking in terms of theory and practice.

Second, I meant to address this question a while ago. If I'm successfull, hopefully, I'll encompass it in my next series of essays, but for now, here's an attempt in this thread.

Why "shape" - isn't that just an implied task of "clear"?

No. Shape is a separate phase. In reality, the collective "we" does a poor job of shaping. Remember, in a denied area of sanctuary, we do not know what is going on. Doctrinally, we have many terms to describe this process- IPB (Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield), Reconnaissance, and Survellaince.

Ultimately, we're just trying to figure out what we know and what we don't know. Throughout this phase, which remains simultaneous in later efforts, we seek to answer:

What do we think we know? What is actually going on? Who is fighting whom? Who is the enemy? What does the enemy think they know? What does the enemy want? What do the people need? What is the enemy's weakness? What are we missing here?

One way of approaching these answers to define facts and assumptions for MDMP is the following:

SHAPING THE ENVIRONMENT
1. Prepare a General Area Survey (HTTs, past opsums, past intsums, past data, current physical and human terrain).
2. Talk to the stakeholders past, present, and future.
3. Develop a Hypothesis on the problem definition.
4. Conduct Reconnaissance and Surveillance to test hypothesis.
5. Based on the collection of evidence (R&S), define your environment.
6. Develop your plan.
7. Conduct influence operations (propaganda, deception, and disruption operations) to set the conditions for clearance.

v/r

Mike

[Infanteer]

No. Shape is a separate phase. In reality, the collective "we" does a poor job of shaping. Remember, in a denied area of sanctuary, we do not know what is going on. Doctrinally, we have many terms to describe this process- IPB (Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield), Reconnaissance, and Survellaince.

Maybe I'm just guilty of applying Occam's Razor too severely, but that just seems to fit into the "Clear" for me - you gotta know what you're clearing out first. I say this as I've seen "Define" added to the "COIN phase-orama-looks-real-good-on-a-slide" acronym as something you do before you "Shape" and "Clear".

I'm more of a KISS principle guy and all of this detracts from the simplicity of removing an overt insurgent presence from an area, protecting it against a relapse, and then building local capacity to deal with future threats and subversion. Clear, Hold and Build represents that to me; someone said on these forums that we get too stuck in phases and don't recognize these activities as "indicators of what my enemy is doing" but instead stick to them as some arbitrary milestone to victory(TM).

Defining and shaping are implied tasks of the whole fight - something you should be doing at all times of the small wars fight. The enemy is going to change, especially after you move forces into an area, attack his network, and start attacking his legitimacy in the eyes of the locals.

...as well, the natural way of fighting in Afghanistan makes the whole idea of phases very hard and borderline useless; perhaps a better model that addresses the ebb and flow of the summer fighting season would be more useful. You may be clearing in July what you held and built in February; one should never make assessments on where you're at in this country during the winter.

[MikeF]

Maybe I'm just guilty of applying Occam's Razor too severely, but that just seems to fit into the "Clear" for me - you gotta know what you're clearing out first. I say this as I've seen "Define" added to the "COIN phase-orama-looks-real-good-on-a-slide" acronym as something you do before you "Shape" and "Clear".

I'm more of a KISS principle guy and all of this detracts from the simplicity of removing an overt insurgent presence from an area, protecting it against a relapse, and then building local capacity to deal with future threats and subversion. Clear, Hold and Build represents that to me; someone said on these forums that we get too stuck in phases and don't recognize these activities as "indicators of what my enemy is doing" but instead stick to them as some arbitrary milestone to victory(TM).

Defining and shaping are implied tasks of the whole fight - something you should be doing at all times of the small wars fight. The enemy is going to change, especially after you move forces into an area, attack his network, and start attacking his legitimacy in the eyes of the locals.

...as well, the natural way of fighting in Afghanistan makes the whole idea of phases very hard and borderline useless; perhaps a better model that addresses the ebb and flow of the summer fighting season would be more useful. You may be clearing in July what you held and built in February; one should never make assessments on where you're at in this country during the winter.

Infanteer,

I believe it was Bob's World that made the comment

"that we get too stuck in phases and don't recognize these activities as "indicators of what my enemy is doing" but instead stick to them as some arbitrary milestone to victory."

I distinctly remember that post and it stuck with me for a bit. I agree or at least can relate to much of what your saying so I don't think our views are too off. I'll attempt to readdress some of your points for clarity.

I'm more of a KISS principle guy.

Totally agree for an operations order. I've never giving an order that could not be dictacted through radio transmissions. In fact, probably 70% of all orders that I've ever given were on the radio. Clear and concise; however, IMO, design and the orders process is different. When we are intellectually lazy, then we come up with stupid soundbites like "speed kills" that minimize the greater challenges that we will face. During the problem solving phase, the questions are broad and complex, and we must tackle difficult courses of action IOT come up with a simple plan.

I say this as I've seen "Define" added to the "COIN phase-orama-looks-real-good-on-a-slide" acronym as something you do before you "Shape" and "Clear".

I honestly don't care for cool slides that look good. I've been working with presentations that provide "Aha" moments to junior leaders. Things that work.

Defining and shaping are implied tasks of the whole fight.

If that works for you, then great. From my experience, the US Army oftentimes does not take the time to do detailed and considerable reconnaissance. These implied task become assumed task, and we know what happens when you assume . I simply like to use "shape" first because it reminds one to attempt to define and understand the environment before jumping in.

something you should be doing at all times of the small wars fight.

Agreed as I said in my previous post, "which remains simultaneous in later efforts." You're always doing recon and surveillance IOT to guage the enemy and populace reactions to your actions.

I hope this clarifies my position to some degree.

v/r

Mike

[Ken White]

I honestly don't care for cool slides that look good.

I totally agree but many -- perhaps too many -- seem to do so...

From my experience, the US Army oftentimes does not take the time to do detailed and considerable reconnaissance.

Change that to:

'The US Army rarely takes time to do sensible and adequate reconnaissance.'

and I'd agree...

These implied task become assumed task, and we know what happens when you assume .

True dat.

I simply like to use "shape" first because it reminds one to attempt to define and understand the environment before jumping in.

Just a thought -- doing so can often lead one to forego the define portion and therefor try to 'shape' something one doesn't fully understand.

Simply put one should understand as much about a problem as is possible before one attempts to solve it. The Clausewitzian quote appropriate is "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking." That's macro. One could use the US invasion of Iraq as a prime if large example.

On a micro , tactical and operational, level, our impatience and unwillingness to do thorough reconnaissance does untold damage constantly. That is, regrettably, the US Army way.

[MikeF]

Here's an example of how things could be a bit different if we better understood the environment (H/T Gulliver and the Inkspots crew).

In a WSJ letter to the editor, Major Tim Connors explains what he learned in Korengal.

I was a member of the first U.S. patrol to enter the Korengal Valley in 2002, so I read Bing West's explanation for our retreat from there with some interest ("The Meaning of the Korengal Retreat," op-ed, April 23). Mr. West concludes that our efforts were thwarted by "Islamic extremism and tribal xenophobia."

The Korengalis I knew were not predisposed to join an extremist fight against Western outsiders. Nor were they naturally inclined to be our friends. Our aggressive tactics, focused exclusively on rooting out Taliban and al Qaeda fighters, drove them into the enemy's camp. A patient approach of relationship-building, relatively minor infrastructure improvements and a firm commitment not to interfere with the wood trade on which the Korengalis rely for their livelihood might have won a steadfast ally. In the long run, the Taliban and al Qaeda, outsiders themselves, have nothing to offer Korengalis but extremism and xenophobia. Perhaps after ending our permanent presence there, we will be better positioned to win that argument.

The only way to determine the proper approach (direct or indirect) prior to intervention is through the art of reconnaissance and surveillance.

On an unrelated note, Maj Connors bio is here, and he has written and advised police forces on counterterrorism along the same lines as LAPD's John P. Sullivan and SWJ's own Slapout. He's I guy that I look forward to reading more about.

[MikeF]

I totally agree but many -- perhaps too many -- seem to do so...Change that to:

'The US Army rarely takes time to do sensible and adequate reconnaissance.'

and I'd agree...True dat. Just a thought -- doing so can often lead one to forego the define portion and therefor try to 'shape' something one doesn't fully understand.

Simply put one should understand as much about a problem as is possible before one attempts to solve it. The Clausewitzian quote appropriate is "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking." That's macro. One could use the US invasion of Iraq as a prime if large example.

On a micro , tactical and operational, level, our impatience and unwillingness to do thorough reconnaissance does untold damage constantly. That is, regrettably, the US Army way.

As usual, good points Ken. I guess that's what we're all trying to figure out- how do we describe "describe?"

[Infanteer]

I hope this clarifies my position to some degree.

Roger,

I guess my viewpoint is a bit of a reactionary stance against concepts which seemed to be added to thought models that don't really add much to the model itself but seem to be tacked on because they brief well. Not saying that was your intent and I agree with your points.

I just begin to wonder if concepts lose clarity when more things get stacked onto them like define, shape, enable, etc, etc.

To me, most of the defining and shaping is done during the "Hold" phase - you've sent the bad guys packing (or underground), locals are returning, and a "normal" pattern of life is beginning to occur. This is where you should be able to uncover the grievances of populations and the root causes of local insurgency movements. Little defining and shaping is done when you clear because most locals are keeping their heads down to avoid getting caught in the crossfire.

My 2 cents.

[MikeF]

I guess my viewpoint is a bit of a reactionary stance against concepts which seemed to be added to thought models that don't really add much to the model itself but seem to be tacked on because they brief well. Not saying that was your intent and I agree with your points.

I understand your frustration. It seems like once words or concepts get routinized into a bureaucracy, then they become "talking points" that are overused or take away from the original meaning. For example, Malcolm Gladwell's Tipping Point. Gladwell's study was actually very technical in the phenomena of epidemics, and he chose to describe it in prose. Now, the term is used to describe anything.

Moving on, JCustis gives us an interesting example that we can further analysis to find some understanding of what shape and recon are...

I would already adjust the model to break the question down to a more individual level, and ask what the individuals on the insurgent side are fighting for, and attempt to define the nature of the problem by analyzing the ideological, financial, and cultural (like any issues of badal) aspects at the individual fighter level. Attacking the problem at the micro level can have some value as the effect accumulates.

This is what I described to my scouts as recon in the human terrain. This transition was fairly simple for my guys when properly translated. I would suggest that this is the first step just to get out and talk to the people. Develop a dual personal and professional relationship, the former hopefully assisting with the latter. However, now one has a host of other considerations that they must learn discretion and discernment when determining whom to trust. Particularly in a denied area, trust and truth are often elusive.

-What is this individual's motive or incentive to tell me the truth?
-What does he want from this engagement?
-Why is he willing to talk to me?

When striking up conversation, we must remember or find out what the perception of the locals is of us and their relationships with each other. In my experience, a lot of the "intel" we received was merely rumor or disinformation designed to force our intervention on a competing family, tribe, or town. I'm not sure if this is something that can be taught or if it's just one of those things that you learn through practice and trial and error.

To me, most of the defining and shaping is done during the "Hold" phase - you've sent the bad guys packing (or underground), locals are returning, and a "normal" pattern of life is beginning to occur. This is where you should be able to uncover the grievances of populations and the root causes of local insurgency movements. Little defining and shaping is done when you clear because most locals are keeping their heads down to avoid getting caught in the crossfire

This is a very good point. I think that "clear" is merely a means to getting a foothold in the village. The real work and heavy lifting comes during the "hold" phase, but we have to have some mechanism to determine how or if we should go in at all.

As Ken White said,

Just a thought -- doing so can often lead one to forego the define portion and therefor try to 'shape' something one doesn't fully understand.

That's why I think we need a definitive phase prior to clear. Through covert tactical reconnaissance (going in at night and observing) or discreet messengers and negotiations, we may find a better way to have access to the village other than driving there and establishing a patrol base. Shape may not be the precise term. Maybe it's simply investigate.