Yemen - a catch all thread for 2007-2011

[IntelTrooper]

are you saying someone in Kabul is in love with the figure "30"? How does ISAF know how many taliban died in such and such attack?

It does raise a lot of questions. To get this level of fidelity between the reported numbers, it must be at the ISAF/USFOR-A level. In the vast majority of these strikes, I find it doubtful that anyone was counting bodies afterward.

I can tell you that in Pakistan the PAF's figures for airstrikes are more varied, but totally unreliable. My friends tell me that they make up the figure almost literally by pulling it out of a hat (or their ass, as the case may be). I find that the taliban themselves are much more scrupulous about reporting losses (though they in turn exaggerrate their successes by factors of 100 or more)...

I think you're pretty spot on there.

[davidbfpo]

Mike F is right to indicate Yemen alone is clearly mission creep and one link suggests the on the ground presence was not requested by the Yemeni government, but used as an indicator of "being willing to help" in the GWOT.

Amidst all the furore in the USA over AQ camps etc in the Yemen it would be difficult for Congress and the Executive IMHO to accept any limits on the size and more of any involvement.

Watch and wait. Or Keep It Small & Simple.

[davidbfpo]

The UK Prime Minister chimes in:

Mr Brown also wrote about the rising importance of Yemen as "both an incubator and potential safe haven for terrorism". "Pushed out of Afghanistan and increasingly dispersed over the mountains of Pakistan, al-Qaeda's affiliates and allies - in ungoverned or under-governed areas like parts of Yemen, The Sahel and Somalia - have raised their profile," he said. He said the UK was already one of Yemen's leading donors and it was increasing support to its government through intelligence assistance, training of counter-terrorism units and development programmes.

Link that includes this passage:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8436758.stm

[davidbfpo]

An article by Jonathan Winer, ex-State Dept., on the immediate options in the Yemen and background. I only cite two paragraphs:

President Saleh's strategy for the future of his country is to secure power for his son, who recently turned up as the receipient of corrupt funds from a telecomms company in a U.S. criminal bribery case. The question for the U.S. and other governments is whether it is smart to invest in Yemen's security forces through training and assistance aimed at countering terrorism at the very time that Yemen has been brought to a critical phase of instability due to President Saleh's misrule.

Before getting further into support of President Saleh's regime, conrete tests may be in order. Work with Yemen to identify the locations of Naser Abdel-Karim Wahishi and former Guantanamo detainee Saeed Ali Shehri, two leaders of Al-Qaeda in Yemen. Add in the current address in Yemen of Anwar al-Awlaki, whose calls to action helped to inspire the Fort Hood terrorist murders, and who was nearly killed by a US drone December 24. Carry out raids (by drone or in person) to punish, incapacitate, arrest, and deter. Repeat as needed. Successful operations will surely result in continued international assistance, facilitating help to those who deserve something better than a failed state. If instead, critical counter-terrorist operations with Yemen experience leaks and failures, with the al-Awlaki's surviving raids to continue their threats to public safety, other strategies may be needed, including ones that are not predicated on members of the Saleh family being in charge of the country forever.

Full article: http://counterterrorismblog.org (currently lead article)

[Tukhachevskii]

As-Shabab to send fighters to Yemen;
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp...85D5tb1bE3esdw

Anwar Al-Awlaqi survives airstrike;
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/awlaki...ory?id=9455144

Yemeni security forces raid AQ hideout and arrest 1;
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/...n6037640.shtml

See also the excellent http://armiesofliberation.com/

[SWJ Blog]

Yemen’s Strategic Boxes

Entry Excerpt:

Yemen’s Strategic Boxes
by Dr. Lawrence E. Cline

Download the full article: Yemen’s Strategic Boxes

As happens episodically, Yemen is once more in the news. The December 2009 raids on al Qaida with some level of US support – together with Saudi intervention in the north of Yemen and the abortive Delta flight bombing claimed by al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen – have re-emphasized Yemen’s importance in regional and international security.

One problem with much of the analysis of Yemen is that it tends to emphasize the country’s impact on external security. Particularly within the US, the stress has been on al Qaida’s operations in and from Yemen. Although perhaps justified in terms of overall US strategy, this limited view of issues within Yemen that affect its internal security can create strategic myopia. Ultimately, these broader internal issues are crucial in how well and how willing the government of Yemen will cooperate with other countries.

From Sana’a’s perspective, there are three critical ongoing threats to internal security. Al Qaida certainly is one, but the other two – the Houthi uprising in the north and political unrest in the south around Aden – probably are viewed with considerably more concern by the Yemen government. Although each threat is significant in its own right, the possibility of overlap among them in the future is even more worrisome. These specific threats are even further exacerbated by a long list of broader social, economic, and political stressors, all of which impact on Yemen’s capability to respond adequately.

Download the full article: Yemen’s Strategic Boxes

Lawrence E. Cline, PhD, is an associate professor with American Military University, and a contract instructor with the Counterterrorism Fellowship Program, Center for Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School. He has worked in over 25 countries with this program in national counterterrorism strategy development. He is a retired Military Intelligence officer and Middle East Foreign Area Officer, with service in Lebanon, El Salvador, Desert Storm, Somalia, and OIF.



--------
Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[Charles Martel]

Sure seems like it when we close our Embassy in Yemen and announce that it was due to fears of AQ retaliation for our support of the Yemeni government (http://tinyurl.com/y9mhuxb).

Strategic Communication is the intersection of our actions and our messages, and this action cannot send a more clear message to our adversaries -- although we, our allies, and civilized people across the world are pounding you at every turn, your threats will make us cower inside our outposts in the countries that need our support the most.

I know the counterargument -- DoS aren't Soldiers and are not sent there to be attacked -- but aren't they there to represent the US and doesn't retreating within our ramparts give AQ the psychological advantage over us? We need, among other things, to reassure our valiant allies that we will stand with them throughout the fight. Do we do that when we close our doors? Did YM close down in response to the many threats and actual attacks they have experienced?

Sometimes, the More You Protect Your Force, the Less Secure You May Be

[Cavguy]

We have to be careful here. Just because Yemen's so-called "government" (which controls 1/3 of the country) is ostensibly anti-AQ doesn't mean they're worth backing.

The current ruler of Yemen routinely describes all his potential enemies as AQ in order to get assistance to jail/attack/kill them. While AQ is a real presence, not all the rebels in Yemen are AQ, as they are involved in a civil war.

Backing a thug regime under the "enemy of my enemy is my friend" rule hasn't generally worked well for us in the long term, and generally has spawned more terrorists willing to attack the US because we undermine our own stated commitment to democracy and human rights. As a reporter I know said:

do you want to take the side of a dictator against his people? do you want to be identified with that dictator and with his victims? then dont be surprised when they try to blow up your planes

I don't fully agree with the above, but he has a point. I say caution before wading into a civil war we don't fully understand under the banner of chasing AQ.

[Cavguy]

What the Yemen?

http://securitycrank.wordpress.com/2...hat-the-yemen/

Which brings us back to that CNAS report. As Jane Novak is quick to point out, the Yemeni government is its own worst enemy: oppressive, violent, discriminatory, capricious, and predatory. CNAS recommends propping them up in order to stave off a broader civil war that might destabilize neighboring countries. Does this make sense? Sana’a has a ton of problems, all of which seem to relate back to its refusal to integrate outlying portions of the population into the political, social, and economic mainstream. Does that seem like the kind of government we want to support and prosper?

There are many ways the U.S. can play a positive role in Yemen. Propping up a failing regime just because it pinky swears to go after al Qaeda, however, is not one of them.

(emphasis mine)

[MikeF]

What the Yemen?

Agreed. Before we start worrying about FID, SFA, or economic aid to other states, we should fix our own dysfunctional organizational structures. If a dad walks into any agency and says, "I think my son is a danger to himself and others," then he should not get a visa to the US. Period. IMO, this lack of communication and information flow is one of our biggest problems.

[davidbfpo]

From The Guardian (UK) by a British Muslim, Ed Husain of the Quilliam Foundation, in a wide ranging article:

Yemen is not a willing home to al-Qaeda – it is victim to an ideology exported from neighbouring Saudi Arabia. In our desire to blame and, eventually, bomb, let us not forget the other Yemen: one of the last bastions of traditional, serene Islam. Yemeni Sufis have been imparting their version of normative Islam for centuries through trade and travel. Hundreds of British Muslims have been studying in Yemen's pristine Islamic institutions. They have returned to Britain connected to an ancient chain of spiritual knowledge and now lead several Muslim communities with the Sufi spirit of love for humans, dedication to worship, and service to Islam.

For me, empowering and supporting this Yemeni Islam against the rigid, literalist, supremacist Wahhabite ideology of our Saudi allies in Riyadh is a sure recipe for eventual victory. But will we dare upset the House of Saud? It seems unlikely. President Obama literally bowed before the Saudi king in London last year.

We are now being told that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) runs terrorist camps and this justifies "pre-emptive strikes" on Yemen. But what is AQAP except leading Saudi terrorists – Naser al-Wahishi and Said al-Shihri – who have now set up shop in Yemen, with a ragtag army of 200 men? Who is Osama Bin Laden except a Saudi who wanted political reforms in his own country, failed, and then turned his guns on the western backers of the Saudi regime?

Oh, yes the author has clearly stated views on Saudi Arabia.

Link:http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisf...security/print

From the US FP blog:

In 2010, ...perhaps the implosion of Yemen into an al Qaeda haven.... For all the talk of American decline, the world will still be looking to Washington for leadership when these ticking bombs explode.

Link:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...1/04/tick_tock

By a student studying Yemen:

The United States has not helped matters. Washington's continued insistence on seeing the country only through the prism of counterterrorism has induced exactly the results it is hoping to avoid. By focusing on al Qaeda to the exclusion of nearly every other threat and by linking most of its aid to this single issue, the United States has only ensured that al Qaeda will always exist.

Instead of imploding, Yemen is going to explode. And when it does, Yemen's problems of today are going to become Saudi Arabia's problems of tomorrow. This is already foreshadowed by Saudi involvement in the northern conflict and al Qaeda strikes from Yemen into the kingdom. By the time Obama and his team cobble together a smarter response, the time for prevention will have passed and their only option will be mopping up the mess.

Link:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...e_to_qaedastan

[JarodParker]

David, thanks for editing the title and modifying the threads.

Cavguy, I think one of the president's aides should recite your comment to him (or possibly "her" in the future) every morning.

We have to be careful here. Just because Yemen's so-called "government" (which controls 1/3 of the country) is ostensibly anti-AQ doesn't mean they're worth backing.

The current ruler of Yemen routinely describes all his potential enemies as AQ in order to get assistance to jail/attack/kill them. While AQ is a real presence, not all the rebels in Yemen are AQ, as they are involved in a civil war.

Backing a thug regime under the "enemy of my enemy is my friend" rule hasn't generally worked well for us in the long term, and generally has spawned more terrorists willing to attack the US because we undermine our own stated commitment to democracy and human rights. As a reporter I know said:



I don't fully agree with the above, but he has a point. I say caution before wading into a civil war we don't fully understand under the banner of chasing AQ.

By a student studying Yemen:
Quote:
The United States has not helped matters. Washington's continued insistence on seeing the country only through the prism of counterterrorism has induced exactly the results it is hoping to avoid. By focusing on al Qaeda to the exclusion of nearly every other threat and by linking most of its aid to this single issue, the United States has only ensured that al Qaeda will always exist.

Instead of imploding, Yemen is going to explode. And when it does, Yemen's problems of today are going to become Saudi Arabia's problems of tomorrow. This is already foreshadowed by Saudi involvement in the northern conflict and al Qaeda strikes from Yemen into the kingdom. By the time Obama and his team cobble together a smarter response, the time for prevention will have passed and their only option will be mopping up the mess.
Link:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...e_to_qaedastan

The article does a good job of outlining some of the issues, but fails to offer a solution or even suggest options. I need to know, whom should we be throwing money at, whom should we bomb and how soon can we implement a "surge" strategy?

"Welcome to Qaedastan" - btw, great use of the "stan" suffix by the author.

[wm]

The background for the current issues in Yemen go back to at least the 1960s and probably much earlier (like centuries ago). I was monitoring the North Yemen (Yemen Arab Republic [YAR],Yemen, Sana'a)/South Yemen (People's Democratic Republic of Yemen [PDRY], Yemen, Aden) debacle back at the start of the 80's. During the mid-60s, Nasser's Egypt/UAR got hooked up in the region (70,000 troops or so, publicly reported) in a quagmire that has been described as Egypt's Viet Nam, with the Saudis "playing" on the other side.

We have to be careful here. Just because Yemen's so-called "government" (which controls 1/3 of the country) is ostensibly anti-AQ doesn't mean they're worth backing.

The current ruler of Yemen routinely describes all his potential enemies as AQ in order to get assistance to jail/attack/kill them. While AQ is a real presence, not all the rebels in Yemen are AQ, as they are involved in a civil war.

I'm not quite sure I agree completely with this assessment of Saleh and his government.
Even if it is correct, the "So what?" question immediately come up. What should be done about his "bad" government?
Involving one's nation in the internecine struggles of other emerging/struggling states is not morally or legally required, barring specific treaty obligations. "Civilized" nations could choose not to choose in this situation (as most did for all intents and purposes in Bangladesh in 1971 and Biafra from 67-70 for example). How Yemen figures significantly in America's national security is unclear (to me at least). Anarchist wackos could (and do) get training all over the world. Maybe we ought to offer "special" UAV-based assistance to Spain to suppress the ETA/Basque movement--after all they might train and dispatch a terror bomber to blow up a plane, train, or automobile in the US in order to make a political statement, too.

[davidbfpo]

Worth checking: http://www.ginnyhill.co.uk/ and the short intro says:

Ginny Hill is a freelance journalist and filmmaker, writing and broadcasting on the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. She has worked in Djibouti, Egypt, Gaza, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Somaliland and Yemen.
Ginny is the author of Yemen: Fear of Failure, a Chatham House briefing paper (pub. 1998).

Not updated daily, but may offer a different viewpoint.

[Pete]

Today's Los Angeles Times has a commentary piece on Yemen by Richard Fontaine and Andrew Exum. I didn't see it mentioned in the SWJ Blog or Roundup.

The Nigerian Islamist who allegedly attempted to detonate a bomb on a Christmas Day flight to Detroit, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, has brought Yemen once again into the spotlight as a breeding ground for terrorists. Abdulmutallab is thought to have trained with Yemen's Al Qaeda affiliate, and the group has claimed credit for the failed attack.

Click below to read the entire piece.

http://www.cnas.org/node/3931

[wm]

The LA Times piece that Pete posted the CNAS link for seems to display the marvelous illogic of at least some US policy advisors. First the article indicates the source of the Yemenis' problem:

Yemen's economy depends heavily on oil production, and its government receives the vast majority of its revenue from oil taxes. Yet analysts predict that the country's petroleum output, which has declined over the last seven years, will fall to zero by 2017. The government has done little to plan for its post-oil future. Yemen's population, already the poorest on the Arabian peninsula and with an unemployment rate of 35%, is expected to double by 2035. An incredible 45% of Yemen's population is under the age of 15. These trends will exacerbate large and growing environmental problems, including the exhaustion of Yemen's groundwater resources. Given that a full 90% of the country's water is used for agriculture, this trend portends disaster.

Then it provides a recipe for how to use American aid:

Over the weekend, Obama pledged to double aid to Yemen, but this money must be spent strategically. Several areas are ripe for foreign help, including training and equipping counter-terrorism forces, bolstering border security and building the capacity of the coast guard, expanding counterinsurgency advice to the Yemeni government and expanding programs focused on basic governance and anti-corruption.

Conspicuous by its absence is any suggestion that the Yemini government and people use the money to come up with a sustainable economy. Is anyone else out there confused, befuddled or bemused?

Seems that rather than buying swords, a better approach might be to beat the ones already on hand into plowshares. But perhaps that would be in opposition to the proven pop-centric COIN technique of "clear, hold, and build."

[davidbfpo]

Just found this in The Daily Telegraph (UK): http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...-al-Qaeda.html

Raises some interesting points I'd not read recently in the links here.

[wm]

Just found this in The Daily Telegraph (UK): http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...-al-Qaeda.html

Raises some interesting points I'd not read recently in the links here.

Try this 2004 article from Infantry Magazine for identifying an apparently longstanding (since at least the 1962 Yemen Civil War) connection between Iraq and Yemen. The author makes some very interesting other points, none of which can I verify without doing a bunch more research, but they certainly make interesting reading and may shed a whole new light for folks on the origins of some of America's issues in the Middle East. Perhaps the JFK/LBJ administrations may well have screwed up stuff in SW Asia/MENA as badly as they did in SE Asia.

[slapout9]

William Engdahl on the oil transportation choke point and why we are concerned about Yemen.



http://www.engdahl.oilgeopolitics.ne...int_yemen.html

[wm]

William Engdahl on the oil transportation choke point and why we are concerned about Yemen.http://www.engdahl.oilgeopolitics.ne...int_yemen.html

Might want to do a little extra source validation on Engdahl--his claims to expertise seem sketchy, to me at least.

When looking into the Adelphi publications that the Engdahl article cites, one will note a few interesting things: the two exploration tracts are in what used to be South Yemen; neither has shown any tangible results from E&P efforts, only potentiality based on an understanding of the area's geology and its similarity to two other areas with notable fields (Hassi
Messaoud in Algeria and Bach Ho offshore Vietnam); and that Adelphi sold off its 8.5% share in one of those 2 parcels. With regard to this last point, one wonders why they would do that if it is likely to be such a great future oil source.

Additionally, controlling the Bab el-Mandab "choke point" could become moot if the one believes Engdahl's 15-year-old claim from the

well-informed Washington insider that Yemen contained “enough undeveloped oil to fill the oil demand of the entire world for the next fifty years.”

The oil could be piped to either side of the choke point, or both, using existing pipleines from the Marib-Shabwa basin or into the Gulf of Aden from the existing Masilh basin pipeline (which would avoid transiting the chokepoint for deliveries to China). And, compared to the Straits of Hormuz, one should consider another significant point regarding the Bab el-Mandab chokepoint: a work-around exists for seaborne transit of oil were it closed--sailing around Africa's Cape of Good Hope. Also worth noting is the following extract from an interesting 2004 summary article on oil choke points here

The Bab el-Mandab could be bypassed (for northbound oil traffic by using the East-West oil pipeline, which traverses Saudi Arabia and has capacity of 4.8 million bpd. However, southbound oil traffic would still be blocked.