Good books on COIN?

[Cavguy]

Hi Tom,

Quick question.



Why is Krepinech's book still considered controversial? When I read it, I thought it was a monograph on organization change (or lack there of) of big Army fighting small wars. I could understand why it would have upset some people twenty years ago, but I don't know why it is still a hot-button issue. It didn't seem like the author was pushing an opinion or revisionist history on Vietnam rather just showing how bureaucracies are slow to adjust.

Mike

Read Jaffe's "The Fourth Star" pp 62-66. It talks about how Vietnam was very emotional for senior leaders in the 1980's, who felt they had won the war except for those politicians and hippies. Suggesting the Army and its conduct might also be at fault was unacceptable, especially by a non-vet, junior major in the 1980's.

Others, such as COL Gentile, attack it for ignoring the conventional threat the NVA possessed, among other more general criticisms that COIN doesn't work as a strategy.

I wrote on the seminal role the book played in my own COIN "awakening" here. Having read others I see its flaws more clearly, but still think it is an excellent and damning work with merit. Key quote below:

When I returned to Germany in 2004, fresh from my first 15-month tour in Iraq, I was convinced there had to be a better way to fight this kind of conflict. A year of operations in Baghdad and three months fighting the first Sadr rebellion made it clear to me that our strategies and methods were inadequate to meet the demands of the environment. Looking down the military history and theory aisle, I spotted a worn black book with a Huey helicopter depicted on the front. It was titled, somewhat generically, “The Army and Vietnam.” The dust jacket discussed how the Army had failed to adapt to the environment in Vietnam. Knowing Vietnam was our last fight against an insurgency, albeit in a very different context, I checked out the book — the first time anyone had done so since 1991.

...

I have read few books in my life where reading the contents angered me. I found myself angry not at Krepinevich’s words, but because it often seemed I could simply strike “Vietnam” in the text and replace it with “Iraq” and the narrative would have been the same. Like the Army in Vietnam, we focused on large-scale operations to shape our area, believing that if we killed or captured all the enemy in our sector, we could go home. We failed to realize the fight was for the loyalty of the population, which we had placed secondary to engaging the enemy in battle. For example, as I left Iraq in 2004, we were leaving bases close to the population, the opposite of what was successful in counterinsurgency practice. I was irate because I couldn’t believe that my superior officers, graduates of institutions such as the School for Advanced Military Studies at the Command and General Staff College, Army War College and similar institutions would make the same basic mistakes the Army made 40 years ago and repeat them to a fault during the early years of Operation Iraqi Freedom. I now know that the Army, either through action or neglect, purged itself of those hard-won lessons between 1973 and 2003. Likewise, we remained institutionally ignorant of the hard lessons the French and British learned in their own small wars. As a result, we squandered our first year in Iraq, conducting counterproductive operations that were at odds with historically successful counterinsurgency principles.

Only correction was that I didn't have the book in front of me when I wrote it, and thus called the Chinook on the cover a Huey.

[Seabee]

Christian Jennings, Mouthful of Rocks, Modern Adventures in the French Foreign Legion I put this one on the COIN list as a "bucket of cold water" for those that get too enamored of the Legion. I do not mean that the Legion is not a great fighting force; it is but it does have its own "religion," one acceptable to few. I met Chris Jennings in Rwanda where he was freelancing as a reporter. His description of himself in this book is quite accurate.

Hi,

I would agree that one should be careful about putting the legion on a pedestal, but very much disagree that it is acceptable to few.

Jennings was simply a very bad soldier. I did not know the man, but I know men who served with him.

I served with men LIKE him.

In any army there is a certain kind of soldier that always attracts the wrath of the NCOs... I think we all know the type.

The thing is, in the Legion, up until the end of the 90s at least, what the "wrath" of an NCO was, was largely left up to the imagination of that NCO.

Are there abuses? Yes. I have seen guys "shaved" with a lighter, the odd blow or kick, sleep deprivation etc. etc... but the NCOs usually know the limit.

Jennings was picked on, miserable and ran home to write a book. poor boy... he was probably bullied at school as well.

personally, I was white, middle class and joined with 2 thoughts.. keep your mouth shut and do what you are told... In the legion, as with most armies, it is usually enough to get you through life without problems.

Just my 2c....

P.S. Jennings was there in a dry time... in the 1980s there was not a lot of operational stuff, late 1980s were "stir crazy" time... in the 90s you were overseas very often ... it is the best way to be, operational units have less problems within the ranks.

Tha makes 4c...
;-)