If by domestic and international pressure you mean the public pronouncements of various diplomats from the UN, the EU and so forth, or public demonstrations of the usual anti-war variety, then absolutely these have no impact on Israeli policy.

However, I believe Israeli policy is subject to pressure from both within and without. I'll start with the domestic side. Firstly, the Israeli body politic is famously divided: "Israel has three opinions for every two Israelis." While folks showed remarkable unity early in the crisis, that unity has since faded. Moreover, it is not reflected in the Knesset where no single party holds a majority. Kadima, the "ruling" party, may well have lost its mandate the moment Hezbollah crossed the border (before any fighting even began). In a very real sense, this war was fought to regain Kadima's political power to withdraw from the West Bank. That's one reason for the air power emphasis, to show that threats to Israel could be controlled without controlling the land around it.

Another source of pressure is from an Israeli desire to avoid casualties. This is admirable, but can hamstring operations that call for daring - it makes you fight like a coward even if you aren't.

There is also a great public demand to "do something" to rescue any Israeli hostages. Wonderful, but fewer hostages might be taken if Tel Aviv was willing to stand fast in the face of such outrages. As it is, thousands (mostly innocent civilians in Gaza and Lebannon) have died in an ineffectual attempt to secure the release of three men who may already be dead.

There is very strong public pressure not to show weakness or negotiate with terrorists or Arabs in general.

There is also strong pressure to keep fighting short. This is both political and economic - the IDF relies on reservists to supply much manpower and those reservists can't work if they're fighting, also fighting cuts into Israel's significant tourism industry.

All of this strongly shaped the fighting, and will shape future wars involving Israel. Yes, Arab strategists are very well aware of the above.

On the international side, Israel is unconcerned by the pronouncements of Chirc, Kofi Annan, etc. However, the slightest whisper from George W. Bush and they'll sit up and take notice. The IDF gets 20% of its budget and a lot of big ticket weapons from the US, it would be a grave strategic loss to endanger that. Moreover, Israel did not seek to engage either Syria or Iran at this time. They could not afford to escalate the fighting to a level that would demand their direct involvement.

I think you can agree that Israel, the Kadima government and the IDF are in fact subject to outside opinion as well as domestic concerns - and a brief examination of those concerns illustrates a number of apparently erroneous tactical decisions in the fighting. The reliance on airpower and artillery, operating from buttoned up armored vehicles, the lack of long range planning and especially the weak diplomatic efforts by Israel to secure its soldiers are all at least partly the result of both domestic and international concerns. Israel had to fight, but the IDF had one hand tied behind its back from the beginning.