Concur, which is why I said "primarily," - since who else would be likely to lead any coalition force against Iran?Originally Posted by UrsaMaior
Israel
The Palestinians
Two States
Neither, some other State or people rule.
Neither, mutual destruction.
One State, two peoples
One State, one people (intermarriage)
Wilf is on the point
For the first time we agree. If the iranian regime is so completely out-of-control as Cohen and others suggest, why is it and (has been) acting so cautiously (and in some cases ingeniously) in the last couple of years? Any system that is not interested or uncapable of organising its survival will show signs of it in the long term. As I see the mullahs do EVERYTHING in their power to survive as long as possible. Knowing Israel (its history, its capabilities and the Samson-plan) they are very well aware of their limits.
The only thing where I dont agree with you wilf that a nuclear Iran limits not only the US's but all other countries power projection ablilties (including Israel's). One thing I am sure it does not worth a war in the gulf with all its attached implications (oil, US troop presenence etc.). There are a million other ways then sabre rattling to reach sensitive points.
Nihil sub sole novum.
Concur, which is why I said "primarily," - since who else would be likely to lead any coalition force against Iran?
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Good points Wilf. IMO, Israeli strategic policy is in serious need of overhaul. I think Israel still operates under the doctrine that it can't significantly influence the intent of its enemies, only their capabilities.
You'd not be alone in that. This is view of some very influential, and smart, IDF officers, but as I frequently ask them, "why?"
You have to differentiate the "Strategic argument" from the "Strategic reality." The strategy of protecting the state has never failed. Could it have been done better? Maybe. Has it been done well enough. Definitely.
At the simple heart of Israeli defence doctrine is the simple aim of visiting greater degrees of harm on anyone trying to harm Israel.I think Israel still operates under the doctrine that it can't significantly influence the intent of its enemies, only their capabilities.
Has that mostly worked? Yes.
Is it sustainable? Dunno.
Could it be fine tuned to deliver better results? Probably.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I demand proof or at least a source.
Iran seems to be of rather small relevance to the Palestinian issue, Saudi-Arabia, Egypt and even Syria seem to be much more relevant.
Basing (questionable conventional or unnecessarily close unconventional) forces that far away and behind the Suez Canal/Gibraltar would look excessively stupid to me.
To sum it up: Your assertion sounds like an Israeli rumour to me.
The Iranians certainly provide support to Hamas, both directly and via Hizbullah. However it is not clear that they have any substantial influence at all.
Any possible agreement that establishes a Palestinian state will, in any case, explicitly prohibit any deployment of foreign forces in Palestine (aside from an international force to facilitate and monitor implementation).
There is, as always, good discussion of Iranian WMD issues ongoing at Arms Control Wonk.
They mostly come at night. Mostly.
- university webpage: McGill University
- conflict simulations webpage: PaxSims
Fair enough. Perhaps it is more accurate to say, it seems highly likely that the Iranians are looking exert enough influence to base substantial rocket, and other forces on the West Bank, should Israel withdraw.
As concerns proof or a source, this is a common assessment from within the IDF, and is the source of Netanyahu's comments about the West Bank being a de-militarised zone. By Iranian forces, I mean Hezbollah, who have so far tried to base rockets in Gaza, and Sinai. - It is therefore logical they seek to do the same in the West Bank. The best defence against this is the Jordanians, but the current situation in Jordan, as in Egypt cannot be guaranteed.
Influence is always hard to gauge, and what we see now, may not be the case in three years time. - but my point being, Hezbollahs extra-Lebanon ambitions are bad for everyone in the region, bar Iran.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Is the iranian leadership smart/lucky/nefarious/suicidal?
Keeping Iran honest
Iran's secret nuclear plant will spark a new round of IAEA inspections and lead to a period of even greater transparency
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisf...nt-inspections
Nihil sub sole novum.
Ritter's analysis contains some serious factual errors that negate most of what he says in that piece.
Could you be more specific please. I am leaning towards the opinion that the iranians are playing a ouble game, yet I cant verify it.
Nihil sub sole novum.
Sure, sorry!
Ritter says the "subsidiary arrangements" (aka Code 3.1) to Iran's comprehensive safeguards agreement is the same thing as the additional protocol to the NPT. They are quite different. For more, read this. A relevant quote:
The modification to Code 3.1 is not, as some have claimed, related to the Additional Protocol (presumably this confusion resulted from the fact that Iran accepted the modification to Code 3.1 at the same time as it announced it would provisionally implement the Additional Protocol). To clarify: the requirement to conclude Subsidiary Arrangements stems from Article 39 of Iran's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/214). The request to states to modify Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements is not contained in the Additional Protocol. Indeed, every non-nuclear-weapon state with significant nuclear activities—including those with no Additional Protocol—has now agreed to the modification to Code 3.1.
Got it thanks.
Nihil sub sole novum.
Admittedly the debate in general circulation overflows with black-white dissonance, but it's my impression few if any professionals assume Iran is completey irrational and therefore cannot be deterred. In fact, I thought the real debate revolved around what yardstick of reality Iranians use to estimate risk vis a vis their adversaries. To be crude about it, we can't dismiss the fact that Israel obviously estimates her own nuclear force is either insufficient or to vulnerable to adequately deter Iran; we wouldn't be having this discussion otherwise. Let's say Americans judge that a strong US-Israel relationship and a nuclear umbrella may ultimately deter Iran. Israel, on the other hand, may estimate that Americans are insufficiently solemn about obligations we have yet to even put in a treaty.
True, but that ends the day the threat emerges. If it does.b.) It could well be suggested that threat of Iranian WMD has done nothing but benefit Israel in terms of maintaining a number of "flag ship" programmes which would otherwise have been under threat.
Assuming that is Iran's intention, how do we know that the leadership accepts your reasoning? In fact, given Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon and Gaza, her thirty year track record of seeking peace agreements with her Arab neighbors, and the sheer amount of international pressure to move forward on a Palestinian state, its conceivable Iran has reasoned that the Israelis will eventually cave. Once again, no reason to assume the Iranians are irrational, but we do need to consider how their actions hint at their perception of the strategic reality.c.) The other issue being avoided is how Iranian interference in Israeli security, de-facto dams any prospect of a Palestinian State, since it is Iran's aim to control any Palestinian Government, in order to base forces within the Palestinian state.
This same reasoning easily applies to Israel...only Israel doesn't have a deep frontier of oceans and continents separating her from Iran.d.) Iranian WMD is primarily a strategic issue for the US, in terms of it's ability to project power in the region - and that has security implications for Israel, as does any interference in Middle East strategic dynamics.
PH Cannady
Correlate Systems
Israel has somewhere between 100-200 warheads. That is sufficient.
The whole point is Israel is not worried about "detering Iran." It is worried about the shift in strategic balance, concerning the US. The US also has enough Warheads to deter Iran, but seems equally worried.
The reasoning simply comes from an intent and a capability. Nothing more. Who says the key players in Iran will be their in 18 months time?Assuming that is Iran's intention, how do we know that the leadership accepts your reasoning?
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
What is the evidence of that? My understanding is that Israel is deliberately vague about whether it has nuclear weapons.
Added:
Just saw this at information dissemination: http://www.informationdissemination....09/israel.html
One last comment: I'm assuming that Israel would strike with aircraft - if so, how would Israel be able to strike Iran without us knowing about it and cooperating? Don't we still control airspace over Iraq? Wouldn't Syria, Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia have the capability to thwart any attempts to use their airspace? Given the wide margin for error in an attack on Iran (negotiating airspaces of unfriendly neighbors) wouldn't Iran likely have enough early warning to defend? Or do we think Israel is going to lob long-range missiles?
Last edited by Schmedlap; 09-29-2009 at 09:20 PM. Reason: Added stuff
And not more than 400, but it's sufficient if and only enough if it survives. I don't know what Israel's done to her three SSKs or how far her indigenous cruise missile program, but off the shelf each Dolphin has magazine space for 16 Harpoon missiles. I don't know enough to estimate the survivability of her Jericho forces in the face of an Iranian first strike, but if Israel managed to produce 200-400 lb high yield warheads, and if she can deliver them at such a range that she doesn't need to deploy her submarines to the Gulf first, she may be able to put a gigaton of second strike power to sea that is essentially invulnerable. Still we can't simply make that assumption, and we can't simply say that Israel should reasonably believe or does believe she has a proper strategic deterrent.
I don't doubt Israel and the US are worried about the full spectrum of implications emanating from a nuclear armed Iran, but I'm not ready to dismiss that Israel at least fears that her current nuclear forces alone are insufficient to indefinitely deter Iran from lunging towards the worst case scenarios.The whole point is Israel is not worried about "detering Iran." She's worried about the shift in strategic balance, concerning the US. The US also has enough Warheads to deter Iran, but seems equally worried.
Not sure what changing players has to do with how Iran estimates Israel may react to a Muslim bomb vis a vis Palestine. What I do know is that Iran has pursued its missile program aggressively for two decades while at the same time Israel is making major concessions on the Palestinian issues. I don't see how its a foregone conclusion that Iran perceives acquiring nuclear weapons as damning her interests in Palestine.The reasoning simply comes from an intent and a capability. Nothing more. Who says the key players in Iran will be their in 18 months time?
Last edited by Presley Cannady; 09-30-2009 at 12:37 AM.
PH Cannady
Correlate Systems
Assuming Israel's nuclear forces are solely fed fissile material from sources we know about, we can estimate the maximum number of minimal yield warheads she can produce from the amount of nuclear fuel she could conceivably divert to a weapons program. 200-400 is an upper limit, and given that simple arithmetic suggests at least a gigaton force.
PH Cannady
Correlate Systems
An Iranian nuclear capacity would certainly have implications for Israel, but I think it would be an error to assume that Israel is the only reason why the Iranian leadership might pursue a nuclear capacity. They have other regional ambitions as well, and a nuclear capacity would provide a deterrent shield behind which other ambitions might be pursued.
For example, it's entirely possible that in a not too distant future the US could be largely withdrawn from the region and reluctant to go back in. Iraq could be devolving into civil war. In such circumstances, if Iran chose to intervene in Iraq - to protect oppressed and threatened Shi'a of course - a nuclear capacity would be an important way to cement a fait accomplii and deter any potential response. Holding the deterrent card would make it possible for the mullahs to be much more assertive in the region.
That's one scenario, we can all think of others. We shouldn't limit ourselves to the assumption that an Iranian nuclear capacity would necessarily be used against Israel or placed in the hands of terrorists.
Why mount Nuclear Warheads on Harpoon and fire them from an SSK?
While obviously classified it seems most likely that Israel's "Special Weapon" is Jericho 2 and 3 ICBM mounted in hardened missile silo's all over Israel - same as the US and in some cases a generation plus based purely on more recent construction.
I can take a pretty good guess at 7 such sites, dispersed from end to end of the country. An Iranian capability of successfully strike all these successfully is extremely unlikely.
- but to ask the exam question, again, to what purpose? What Iranian policy could be successfully progressed by striking Israel?
Israel reason to possess Nuclear weapons is purely as a defence against land invasion, and to deter the use of Chemical Weapons against the civilian population by another state.
Another issue constantly avoided is that Israel "may or may not" have nuclear weapons. Now everyone knows that this is a game, but if you claim not to have Nukes, you are logically bound to exclaim dismay about someone else getting them.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Yes they would probably need to overfly Iraq. Even if they could somehow do it without US approval, I doubt very much that we would escape blame/retaliation. For a very detailed analysis of strike options (outdated now that the facility at Qum is out, but they targeted the centrifuges at Natanz, the heavy water reactors at Arak, and the uranium conversion facility at Isfahan) check out "Osirak Redux" in International Security.
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