War between Israel -v- Iran & Co (merged threads)

[JJackson]

In light of bourbon's post above you may enjoy this from 2005 'Past Arguments Don't Square With Current Iran Policy'
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...2005Mar26.html

Which I found as a footnote in this ( http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/Iran_102307/...and_Engage.pdf ), which is one of the better reports I have read on the subject. I checked out the footnote as it was the source for the rather surprising claim the US had approved plans for Iranian uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities which I had not previously been aware of.

The best document I have read so far is http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.u...trikeswork.pdf which has an excellent section on all the sites in Iran (hat tip davidbfpo & Jedburgh for that one).

The final link is to the latest IAEA interim report
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/h...iaeareport.pdf

And now for my question. As their is so little hard data and so much speculation when addressing important questions like 'how close is Iran to achieving reliable working centrifuge cascades?' we are often left with 'expert opinions' and in this area that is often from a think tank or similar. My problem is it seems to be getting harder and harder to find any kind of purportedly independent analysis that is really that. I am looking for a simple way to try and check out if the 'XYZ peace and freedom institute', or similar, are for real or a wholly funded by Lockheed's PR company. Can you help? I did find this http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=SourceWatch which is a Wiki trying to do pretty much what I need but when I tried to use it I found it had not yet got much data in it - at least not on the groups I was interested in.

[SteveMetz]

Published by the American Foreign Policy Council and McCormick-Tribune Foundation. I'd be happy to pass along a .pdf to anyone interested (it's too big to upload here).

Executive Summary

Today, the Islamic Republic of Iran looms large on the agenda of policymakers
in Washington. Over the past several years, it has become clear that the Islamic Republic is pursuing a massive, multifaceted endeavor to acquire a nuclear capability—and that it is making rapid progress toward this goal, despite pressure from the world community. Yet Iran’s nuclear program is just part of a larger picture. The Islamic Republic’s enduring support for terrorism, its growing and pernicious regional role, and its radical, uncompromising ideology currently also pose serious challenges to the United States, its allies and American interests in the greater Middle East. So far, policymakers in Washington have failed to muster an adequate response on any of these fronts. As a result, the Islamic Republic has gained precious time to entrench itself in Iraq, expand its support for terrorists and bring added permanence to its nuclear effort. The logical conclusion of the current status quo is a mature Iranian nuclear capability, continued Coalition casualties in Iraq, and emboldened terrorist groups across the region. If it hopes to avoid such an outcome, the United States must harness all the elements of national power into a strategy that focuses on three concrete goals vis-à-vis Iran: counterproliferation, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency. This will require:

Diplomatic and informational efforts aimed at:
• educating the American public about the contemporary threat posed by the
Islamic Republic;
• enhancing existing broadcasting into Iran;
• expanding the reach of Western ideas within the Islamic Republic;
• leveraging new sources of media to better communicate with the next
generation of Iranian leaders;
• delegitimizing the current Iranian leadership;
• empowering regime opponents and;
• speaking clearly to the Iranian regime about the costs associated with their
continued rogue behavior.

Intelligence initiatives geared toward:
• reviving human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities within Iran;
• better accessing allied information on Iran;
• restructuring and reforming the existing intelligence bureaucracy to better
respond to—and coordinate against—the Iranian regime and;
• forging a new legal framework for intelligence operations that provides greater latitude for efforts to “get smart” on Iran.

Economic measures such as:
• exerting greater pressure on Iran’s trading partners;
• enforcing unilateral sanctions against countries and companies that continue
to do business with the Islamic Republic;
• considering the imposition of embargos and blockades, particularly on Iran’s
vulnerable energy sector and;
• elevating divestment efforts from the state to the federal government level.
Military measures, among them:
• conducting a comprehensive assessment of Iran’s operational and tactical
vulnerabilities;
• building the capacity for unconventional warfare within Iran;
• targeting Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal as a way of downgrading its offensive
and nuclear capabilities and;
• severing Tehran’s ties to its terrorist proxies—with force, if necessary.

The United States stands at a crossroads. It has become increasingly evident that security and stability in the greater Middle East, as well as American objectives there, hinge upon America’s ability to confront and defuse the strategic challenge posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran. And yet, our capacity to do so is rapidly dwindling. Soon, America will be left with just two options: to allow Iran to “go nuclear,” thereby cementing the expansion of its radical revolution, or to use military force to prevent it from doing so. A comprehensive, multifaceted strategy that employs all elements of American power is needed to prevent such a choice. Such an approach is outlined in the pages that follow. Our hope is that American policymakers will use
the limited time that remains to implement it wisely.

[JeffC]

JJackson:

Iran signed the NPT in 1968, which permits signers the ability to perform unranium enrichment and doesn't exclude dual-use. They're still beating that drum today.


As to finding a truly independent thinktank, I'm afraid that's an impossible quest. Every institute is funded by somebody with a point of view. Some are more balanced then others, but that's a matter of perspective. My suggestion is to try to get a consensus from multiple sources and then apply some of your own common sense.

[JeffC]

[QUOTE=SteveMetz;32638]Published by the American Foreign Policy Council and McCormick-Tribune Foundation. I'd be happy to pass along a .pdf to anyone interested (it's too big to upload here).

Wow, a bit too Right-wing for my taste. How do the authors even begin to justify the second sentence of that Executive Summary, which reads: "Over the past several years, it has become clear that the Islamic Republic is pursuing a massive, multifaceted endeavor to acquire a nuclear capability—and that it is making rapid progress toward this goal,"?

Iran's been working towards becoming a nuclear power since before 1960 and is a signer of the NPT which assures them the right to have nuclear power for civilian purposes. And what evidence do the authors have to support the statement that Iran is "making rapid progress toward this goal"? The IAEA certainly doesn't have that evidence yet.

Then there's this quote:
"The logical conclusion of the current status quo is a mature Iranian nuclear capability, continued Coalition casualties in Iraq, and emboldened terrorist groups across the region."

That's the only conclusion that the authors can arrive at? How about a more likely scenario that Iran does provide the remaining information about it's enrichment program to the IAEA; that it joins with the GCC in a pan-Arabic nuclear energy pact and outsources it's enriched fuel needs to Switzerland? (all of which are under discussion now).

And then there's "expanding the reach of Western ideas within the Islamic Republic". Talk about Ethno-centrism in action.

Thanks but no thanks, Steve.

[bourbon]

My problem is it seems to be getting harder and harder to find any kind of purportedly independent analysis that is really that. I am looking for a simple way to try and check out if the 'XYZ peace and freedom institute', or similar, are for real or a wholly funded by Lockheed's PR company. Can you help? I did find this http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=SourceWatch which is a Wiki trying to do pretty much what I need but when I tried to use it I found it had not yet got much data in it - at least not on the groups I was interested in.

politicalfriendster.com
Discover the Networks - covers the left and Islamic groups
Activist Cash - good source that covers alot, from the Center for Consumer Freedom (which in reality is a shell for a big lobbying firm)
Right Web - covers individuals, organizations and companies on the right

[bourbon]

December 12, 2007: National Intelligence Estimate Key Judgments: Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities, Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

Key Judgments

A. We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program; we also assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. We judge with high confidence that the halt, and Tehran’s announcement of its decision to suspend its declared uranium enrichment program and sign an Additional Protocol to its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement, was directed primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran’s previously undeclared nuclear work.

• We assess with high confidence that until fall 2003, Iranian military entities were working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons.

• We judge with high confidence that the halt lasted at least several years. (Because of intelligence gaps discussed elsewhere in this Estimate, however, DOE and the NIC assess with only moderate confidence that the halt to those activities represents a halt to Iran's entire nuclear weapons program.)

• We assess with moderate confidence Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons program as of mid-2007, but we do not know whether it currently intends to develop nuclear weapons.

• We continue to assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Iran does not currently have a nuclear weapon.

• Tehran’s decision to halt its nuclear weapons program suggests it is less determined to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005. Our assessment that the program probably was halted primarily in response to international pressure suggests Iran may be more vulnerable to influence on the issue than we judged previously.


B. We continue to assess with low confidence that Iran probably has imported at least some weapons-usable fissile material, but still judge with moderate-to-high confidence it has not obtained enough for a nuclear weapon. We cannot rule out that Iran has acquired from abroad—or will acquire in the future—a nuclear weapon or enough fissile material for a weapon. Barring such acquisitions, if Iran wants to have nuclear weapons it would need to produce sufficient amounts of fissile material indigenously—which we judge with high confidence it has not yet done.

C. We assess centrifuge enrichment is how Iran probably could first produce enough fissile material for a weapon, if it decides to do so. Iran resumed its declared centrifuge enrichment activities in January 2006, despite the continued halt in the nuclear weapons program. Iran made significant progress in 2007 installing centrifuges at Natanz, but we judge with moderate confidence it still faces significant technical problems operating them.

• We judge with moderate confidence that the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon is late 2009, but that this is very unlikely.

• We judge with moderate confidence Iran probably would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame. (INR judges Iran is unlikely to achieve this capability before 2013 because of foreseeable technical and programmatic problems.) All agencies recognize the possibility that this capability may not be attained until after 2015.

D. Iranian entities are continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could be applied to producing nuclear weapons, if a decision is made to do so. For example, Iran’s civilian uranium enrichment program is continuing. We also assess with high confidence that since fall 2003, Iran has been conducting research and development projects with commercial and conventional military applications—some of which would also be of limited use for nuclear weapons.

E. We do not have sufficient intelligence to judge confidently whether Tehran is willing to maintain the halt of its nuclear weapons program indefinitely while it weighs its options, or whether it will or already has set specific deadlines or criteria that will prompt it to restart the program.

• Our assessment that Iran halted the program in 2003 primarily in response to international pressure indicates Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and military costs. This, in turn, suggests that some combination of threats of intensified international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its security, prestige, and goals for regional influence in other ways, might—if perceived by Iran’s leaders as credible—prompt Tehran to extend the current halt to its nuclear weapons program. It is difficult to specify what such a combination might be.

• We assess with moderate confidence that convincing the Iranian leadership to forgo the eventual development of nuclear weapons will be difficult given the linkage many within the leadership probably see between nuclear weapons development and Iran’s key national security and foreign policy objectives, and given Iran’s considerable effort from at least the late 1980s to 2003 to develop such weapons. In our judgment, only an Iranian political decision to abandon a nuclear weapons objective would plausibly keep Iran from eventually producing nuclear weapons—and such a decision is inherently reversible.

F. We assess with moderate confidence that Iran probably would use covert facilities—rather than its declared nuclear sites—for the production of highly enriched uranium for a weapon. A growing amount of intelligence indicates Iran was engaged in covert uranium conversion and uranium enrichment activity, but we judge that these efforts probably were halted in response to the fall 2003 halt, and that these efforts probably had not been restarted through at least mid-2007.

G. We judge with high confidence that Iran will not be technically capable of producing and reprocessing enough plutonium for a weapon before about 2015.

H. We assess with high confidence that Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so.

[JeffC]

December 12, 2007: National Intelligence Estimate Key Judgments: Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities, Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

Sweet vindication.

I wonder what Michael "Iran with the bomb, or bomb Iran" Ledeen will have to say about it.

[Ken White]

same folks who five years ago said Saddam DID at the time have WMD...

[Ron Humphrey]

I,m not sure if I got this straight or not.

They don't have a weapons planning program anymore but they are getting closer to enriching uranium and they have bigger and better missles.

They don't have a weapons planning program any more, but
Achoomini jiadd has made it very clear to everyone in that region and elsewhere that they will be a nuclear power(hint,hint) and most of those countries aren't exactly acting like they are not worried.

They don't have a weapons program anymore, but I don't remember
reading about the one time at band camp where they burned or lost all of the designs, plans ,etc that they had come up with when they did have a nuclear weapons program

Long and short-

Talk a lot, pressure a lot, don't forget to bring your big cousin with you if you plan on staying in the area for long.

[bourbon]

November 15 IAEA Board of Governors report by ElBaradei:

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 and 1747 in the Islamic Republic of Iran (PDF)

F. Summary

39. The Agency has been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. Iran has provided the Agency with access to declared nuclear material, and has provided the required nuclear material accountancy reports in connection with declared nuclear material and activities. Iran concluded a Facility Attachment for FEP. However, it should be noted that, since early 2006, the Agency has not received the type of information that Iran had previously been providing, pursuant to the Additional Protocol and as a transparency measure. As a result, the Agency’s knowledge about Iran’s current nuclear programme is diminishing.

40. Contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities, having continued the operation of PFEP and FEP. Iran has also continued the construction of the IR-40 and operation of the Heavy Water Production Plant.

41. There are two remaining major issues relevant to the scope and nature of Iran’s nuclear programme: Iran’s past and current centrifuge enrichment programme and the alleged studies. The Agency has been able to conclude that answers provided on the declared past P-1 and P-2 centrifuge programmes are consistent with its findings. The Agency will, however, continue to seek corroboration and is continuing to verify the completeness of Iran’s declarations. The Agency intends in the next few weeks to focus on the contamination issue as well as the alleged studies and other activities that could have military applications.

42. Iran has provided sufficient access to individuals and has responded in a timely manner to questions and provided clarifications and amplifications on issues raised in the context of the work plan. However, its cooperation has been reactive rather than proactive. As previously stated, Iran’s active cooperation and full transparency are indispensable for full and prompt implementation of the work plan.

43. In addition, Iran needs to continue to build confidence about the scope and nature of its present programme. Confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme requires that the Agency be able to provide assurances not only regarding declared nuclear material, but, equally importantly, regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. Although the Agency has no concrete information, other than that addressed through the work plan, about possible current undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, the Agency is not in a position to provide credible assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran without full implementation of the Additional Protocol. This is especially important in the light of Iran’s undeclared activities for almost two decades and the need to restore confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. Therefore, the Director General again urges Iran to implement the Additional Protocol at the earliest possible date. The Director General also urges Iran to implement all the confidence building measures required by the Security Council, including the suspension of all enrichment related activities.

44. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.

[tequila]

JeffC - The same people who viewed it as politically advantageous to pimp the Iranian nuclear threat will continue to do so. Casting dark hints of treason, incompetence, and Chamberlain-esque appeasement at the less-alarmist elements of the American intelligence community is old hat to them - they did it over Iraq, and they will now do it over Iran. Some have been doing it since the "Team B" days. For them facts and intelligence do not really matter - what matters is that our various rotating enemies are irredeemably evil and thus will always have the worst intentions, the worst weapons, and the most dangerous capabilities.

[Ken White]

a lot of folks involved with a lot of different agendas. While there are elements of truth in what you said, there are those who have quite different agendas playing in the game. You linked to the old Team B bit -- that's an example of bending one way -- there are also those who bend the other way.

It ain't simple and I look forward to your interface with the intel community at echelons above reality.

[bourbon]

JeffC - The same people who viewed it as politically advantageous to pimp the Iranian nuclear threat will continue to do so. Casting dark hints of treason, incompetence, and Chamberlain-esque appeasement at the less-alarmist elements of the American intelligence community is old hat to them - they did it over Iraq, and they will now do it over Iran. Some have been doing it since the "Team B" days. For them facts and intelligence do not really matter - what matters is that our various rotating enemies are irredeemably evil and thus will always have the worst intentions, the worst weapons, and the most dangerous capabilities.

Leo Strauss and the World of Intelligence. (By Which We Do Not Mean Nous). Gary J. Schmitt and Abram N. Shulsky, 1999. (PDF)

[Norfolk]

Not only did I use a lot of Strauss's works for my studies in university, but my M.A. advisor had Leo Strauss as his Ph.D. advisor. I asked him a couple of times about Strauss, and even after 30 years, it was clear my M.A. advisor was still impressed by Strauss.

That said, I never found anything particularly noxious about Strauss's works; I simply found them to be either brilliant restatements of the Classics, or very illuminating commentaries on some trends in modern political philosophy. I suspect some of the "Straussians" may have done better if they'd took some of Strauss's own teachings a little closer to heart, or at least understood them rather better. Neo-conservatism, like any ideology, is just so much nonsense.

[JeffC]

JeffC - The same people who viewed it as politically advantageous to pimp the Iranian nuclear threat will continue to do so. Casting dark hints of treason, incompetence, and Chamberlain-esque appeasement at the less-alarmist elements of the American intelligence community is old hat to them - they did it over Iraq, and they will now do it over Iran. Some have been doing it since the "Team B" days. For them facts and intelligence do not really matter - what matters is that our various rotating enemies are irredeemably evil and thus will always have the worst intentions, the worst weapons, and the most dangerous capabilities.

It's already happening, and by people that I expected better from.

[Ron Humphrey]

It's already happening, and by people that I expected better from.

I never find it unexpected, nor surprising that politicians will be politicians. What I often do fail to grasp is how those who carry the burden of responsibility for protection seem so easily drawn off the path of reasoned caution when it purtains to actions and intent of foriegn entities.

I am pretty sure noone really thinks Iran as a country(different from governance) wants to blow up Israel or us. I do however think it only prudent that we look at history when it relates to what those in governance tend to do when they are suffering issues within their own playground which cannot be addressed internally without signifigant changes to existing protocol.

World War I - Pick your Country
WWII- about the same

First although some might wish to bite into this as opportunity to analyze our own circumstances I would simply say that although there may be some similarities we at least have the ooportunity to actively engage in what happens.

In reference to Iran however, considering the absolutely stunning successes they have had in economic and social governance one can only imagine how they can expect to continue in power unless they bring something different to the table and quick.

I humbly refer back to my earlier posting and ask the same questions.

[JeffC]

In reference to Iran however, considering the absolutely stunning successes they have had in economic and social governance one can only imagine how they can expect to continue in power unless they bring something different to the table and quick. I humbly refer back to my earlier posting and ask the same questions.

I don't pretend to understand the mindset of anyone who lives in a Theocracy in the Middle East, however I can relate to Ahmadinejad playing the fool as regards his nation's "supposed" nuclear weapons capabilities in order to raise his bargaining position with the White House. After all, it worked for North Korea, so why shouldn't it work for his country? This is the explanation that George Friedman (STRATFOR) gave in his blog post yesterday about why the 2005 and 2007 NIE's flip-flopped on Iran, and I think it makes perfect sense. The bottom line is that when you strip away all the B.S., Tehran's ruling clerics are smarter negotiators then anyone in the West has given them credit for. They don't want a war. They want what we will give them in exchange for not building something that they've managed to convince our "brain-trust" that they've got.

[Watcher In The Middle]

Originally posted by JeffC:

The bottom line is that when you strip away all the B.S., Tehran's ruling clerics are smarter negotiators then anyone in the West has given them credit for. They don't want a war. They want what we will give them in exchange for not building something that they've managed to convince our "brain-trust" that they've got.

....for Iran. What they have gotten so far out of all of this is a ratcheting up of economic sanctions, along with a concerted effort by the West (US, in the lead) to cripple Iran's economic access to capital (at least through the IRGC).

The real problem is that IF the 2007 NIE is valid in it's conclusions (and again, assume it is valid), there is actually (from a political viewpoint) greater justification for continued, if not increased economic sanctions against Iran, with the goal of further extending out their development cycle in any attempts to develop a nuclear capability.

From a purely political standpoint (if I'm a pol) with the 2007 NIE being out there, I don't want military intervention, but I certainly want to make sure that Iran knows that any path they take toward developing a nuclear capability will be as expensive and drawn out as it can possibly be (with our complements).

And if Iran did in fact reverse their trend toward developing a nuclear capability in 2003, and it can be even partially attributed to the effects of economic sanctions at that time, well, what's the reason for the West to discontinue those?

I mean, if the goal for Iran was to deal something that was mostly all smoke & mirrors for something tangible, well, looks like that deal is blown. The 2007 NIE just blew that type of deal away.

I'm looking at this from a pol standpoint and trying to figure out where all the 80% who are pretty much in the middle of the road are going to go with all of this.

Thoughts?

[Norfolk]

Originally posted by JeffC:


....for Iran. What they have gotten so far out of all of this is a ratcheting up of economic sanctions, along with a concerted effort by the West (US, in the lead) to cripple Iran's economic access to capital (at least through the IRGC).

The real problem is that IF the 2007 NIE is valid in it's conclusions (and again, assume it is valid), there is actually (from a political viewpoint) greater justification for continued, if not increased economic sanctions against Iran, with the goal of further extending out their development cycle in any attempts to develop a nuclear capability.

From a purely political standpoint (if I'm a pol) with the 2007 NIE being out there, I don't want military intervention, but I certainly want to make sure that Iran knows that any path they take toward developing a nuclear capability will be as expensive and drawn out as it can possibly be (with our complements).

And if Iran did in fact reverse their trend toward developing a nuclear capability in 2003, and it can be even partially attributed to the effects of economic sanctions at that time, well, what's the reason for the West to discontinue those?

I mean, if the goal for Iran was to deal something that was mostly all smoke & mirrors for something tangible, well, looks like that deal is blown. The 2007 NIE just blew that type of deal away.

I'm looking at this from a pol standpoint and trying to figure out where all the 80% who are pretty much in the middle of the road are going to go with all of this.

Thoughts?

Very much agreed that the NIE's revelations pretty much blow away Iran's diplomatic options (other than total "capitulation" - a la Libya), and may severely constrain even those of the U.S.

As for what way the more or less undecided 80% go, I offer the following possibilities:

1. There's a media brawl between opponents and proponents of an attack on Iran as they duke it out on international TV and each goes for the hard sell on their position.

2. The US, and perhaps others', media more or less go along as they did in 2003 and help to persuade enough people that there is a grave, direct, and imminent threat to the survival of the West if Iran's atomic capabilities are not completely and permanently eradicated, leading to enough popular "support" for said.

3. This is just another shot in the behind-the-scenes war that the military brass and senior intelligence officers are waging against the current Administration in an attempt to block/hinder/forestall/stave off, etc., any new war or major combat operation that the latter may be contemplating. As such, they may be more events like this one in the weeks and months to come until the issue is decided one way or the other.

In any case, I fear that if this was a case of number 3, that the exercise may have backfired in the longer-term even as it takes the wind out of the sails of the man-o'-war momentarily. And given the long silence in Congress until the last couple days on the matter of a military strike upon Iran, I'm not sure that there is the political will there to vigorously oppose said. Time will tell. And the undecided 80% will mostly bend whichever way the prevailing political and media winds blow.

[JeffC]

Thoughts?

The U.S. isn't the only player in this game. The heavy hand that the U.S. has played, has helped create a sympathetic ear for the member nations of the GCC, who Iran has approached for a Pan-Arab union for nuclear energy development. Every nation in the Middle East is interested in nuclear power as an energy source, and that's what Iran is going to wind up with. Last year, Germany and other members of the U.N. Security Council were offering Tehran a package of economic incentives to stop its HEU program. Switzerland has offered to provide the nuclear fuel for Iran and other Middle Eastern nations that want nuclear power if Iran will stop its enrichment program (which it can barely do anyway).

Iran doesn't need a nuclear arsenal today. It has China and Russia for that. And frankly, with the release of the NIE, neither China nor Russia will support an increase in economic sanctions against Iran, and they clearly don't care what Washington thinks. From Tehran's perspective, Iran has come out ahead in all of this.