War between Israel -v- Iran & Co (merged threads)

[slapout9]

I think we might have a viable plan if Cavguy is backed up by Ken White and his endless capacity for ass-kicking.

Link to the Ken White Video
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U18VkI0uDxE


"Stay Thirsty My Friends"

[Ken White]

don't like beer and am definitely not interesting. Must be some Dude from north Alabam, up around Fort Payne...

[Ron Humphrey]

This whole lack of "what you want" end-state thing seems kinda confusing to me.

Doesn't pretty much everyone agree that any desired end-state would be;
Don't want to have to be concerned about something major going down by them or someone they supply that would lead to much larger issue's?

In so far as what to do-

Wouldn't it seem that the closer they get without indication of change or at least predictability of consequence the viable counters become less and less numerous and more kinetic in nature?

Last question; is it actually likely that the Iranian Govt or the Revolutionary Guard doesn't realize this?

[JMA]

This whole lack of "what you want" end-state thing seems kinda confusing to me.

Doesn't pretty much everyone agree that any desired end-state would be;
Don't want to have to be concerned about something major going down by them or someone they supply that would lead to much larger issue's?

It seems we live in an everything is negotiable world.

The wishy washy "well we wouldn't like them to have a nuke but we are not going to lift a finger to prevent it" attitude seems to prevail in certain quarters... and that sends out the wrong message to the Iranian regime. Like ostriches they bury their heads in the sand... saying problem, what problem?

[Dayuhan]

It seems we live in an everything is negotiable world.

What's being negotiated, and with whom?

Before we commit ourselves to a goal, we have to assess whether we have the means at hand to achieve the goal, whether the goal is achievable with the resources and within the time frame we're willing to commit to it, whether the expected cost justifies the expected benefit, and what the possible costs of unintended side effects might be. Only when those assessments are made can a realistic decision be made on whether or not the goal is worth pursuing.

The assumption that air strikes will necessarily stop the Iranian nuclear program remains completely unsupported... and if they won't (which is likely), what will? Do you expect the US to invade and occupy Iran to prevent them from getting a nuke? If so, are you willing to pick up the tab? It's not like we can afford it...

[JMA]

Before we commit ourselves to a goal, we have to assess whether we have the means at hand to achieve the goal, whether the goal is achievable with the resources and within the time frame we're willing to commit to it, whether the expected cost justifies the expected benefit, and what the possible costs of unintended side effects might be. Only when those assessments are made can a realistic decision be made on whether or not the goal is worth pursuing.

I understand that you just don't want any action taken against Iran for some or other reason (which you are not prepared to divulge).

Soldiers will tell you that once an aim has been selected you carryout a formal military appreciation which follow follow this sequence:

· Review of the Situation.
· The Aim to be Attained.
· Factors Affecting the Attainment of the Aim.
· Enemy Courses of Action that Affect the Attainment of the Aim.
· Courses of Action Open to us to attain the Aim.
· Selection of the Best Course to Attain the Aim.
· The Plan of Action

Israel would have fewer courses of action available to them as a result of their own military limitations and the risk from "enemy courses of action" including Russian defence of the facilities.

The US on the other hand would have no problem in providing a number of courses available to achieve the aim. These would include courses of action other than the use of nuclear weapons, and probably a number of courses of action which would not result in the release of radioactive fallout. In fact it would be a walk in the park for the US military.

So it is not a question of it can't be done. It can. All that remains is the question of whether there is the political will in the White House and Congress to carry it out. This together with how much public pressure the chattering classes and naysayers can bring to bear on the politicians.

The assumption that air strikes will necessarily stop the Iranian nuclear program remains completely unsupported... and if they won't (which is likely), what will? Do you expect the US to invade and occupy Iran to prevent them from getting a nuke? If so, are you willing to pick up the tab? It's not like we can afford it...

Now you show your ignorance of the use of or the threat of the use of or the limited use of military action. The scenario planners at the Pentagon will know which buttons to push. Your scare and fear mongering may work at some town-hall meeting but will be laughed at by those who know a) where the facilities are located which need to be neutralised, and b) the capabilities of the weapons selected to do the job. Killing the Iranian nuclear programme is not the challenge you make it out to be.

[Rex Brynen]

They've been posted before, but here are two CSIS studies of the feasibility of military action against Iranian nuclear facilities by Israel or the US:

Iranian Nuclear Weapons? The Options if Diplomacy Fails (April 2006)

Outline of Study on an Israeli Strike on Iran's Nuclear Facilities (March 2009)

The military bottom line is that a military strike would do very serious damage to Iran's nuclear capacity.

However, a strike would not preclude the Iranians rebuilding/dispersing/hardening a renewed and more serious nuclear program, might not prevent them from crash-building a weapon (especially if some enrichment facilities or stockpiles are unknown to the attacker), and would not preclude them from developing CBW capabilities as a deterrent to future attacks. The latter are largely political issues of how Iran would choose to respond to the attack.

This is aside, of course, from any retaliatory action Iran might take (attacks on Gulf oil facilities and exports, massive support to the Taliban, encouragement of Hizbullah attacks against Israel, support for transnational terrorism).

[bourbon]

So it is not a question of it can't be done. It can. All that remains is the question of whether there is the political will in the White House and Congress to carry it out. This together with how much public pressure the chattering classes and naysayers can bring to bear on the politicians.

It is not in the national interest of The United States of America to launch a military strike on Iran. The potential costs outweigh the potential benefits for America. A nuclear armed Iran is not a significant threat to the US.

There is currently an ongoing information operation by a foreign power to influence the American public and “chattering classes” into supporting a military operation against Iran. The pressure of the forces supporting a strike on Iran, is greater than whatever pressure that the forces that are opposing can bring.

[Entropy]

So it is not a question of it can't be done. It can. All that remains is the question of whether there is the political will in the White House and Congress to carry it out.

That's an unsupported and untrue assertion. The chances of success all depend on the aim. If it's destruction of the Iranian program, that is one thing air strikes can't do. If the aim is to degrade their nuclear capabilities then that might be possible if our intelligence is good enough. Of course Iran is fully aware of our air capabilities and there's no possibility of strategic surprise, so they will surely have taken steps to preserve their capabilities.

You can look at Desert Storm for an example. Despite almost 1000 strikes against various NBC targets we did little but degrade their capabilities. We only struck 2 out of 20 nuclear-targets - we didn't know the others existed. In short, one of the biggest air campaigns in history not only failed to "destroy" those programs, but only succeeded in degrading them temporarily.

And if you read the various testimony and reports (Rex links to just a few), no one with any credibility on the subject actually believes that air strikes along can destroy Iran's program. Therefore, that is not a means that will achieve your stated aim.

And one other thing to keep in mind. The Israeli destruction of Osirak in 1981 was what prompted Saddam to pursue a fast-track to a uranium-based weapon. Prior to that, nukes were kind of a neat idea and potential long-term goal. Osirak, since it was under safeguards, was more of a hedge and method to get access to technology that a plant specifically designed to produce plutonium for an existing weapon's program. The Osirak strike changed that and afterward resources were poured into an effort to make nuclear weapons. One of the myths of the Osirak strike is that it prevent Saddam from building a plutonium weapon - that turned out to be wrong.

So you might want to consider the effect of actions that fall short of destroying Iran's capabilities. In other words, one really should make sure that a particular action does not precipitate the very thing that action is purported to prevent.

[Ken White]

It is not in the national interest of The United States of America to launch a military strike on Iran...

...The pressure of the forces supporting a strike on Iran, is greater than whatever pressure that the forces that are opposing can bring.

I'm not sure about that last, though. I think the opponents will win mostly due to numbers and simply because, as you say, a nuclear Iran is not a threat to the US. I believe most will see little sense in doing something inimical to our interests to only perhaps help out someone else and in an effort that, As Entropy says and Rex noted, would probably do far more harm than good -- and that not just to the US...

[Dayuhan]

Soldiers will tell you that once an aim has been selected you carryout a formal military appreciation which follow follow this sequence:

People who make policy will tell you that after this process the aim has to be reviewed again to assure that benefits exceed costs and that risk is manageable. We don't do blank checks, and shouldn't. "At all costs" is a nice catchy phrase but not consistent with reality.

The US on the other hand would have no problem in providing a number of courses available to achieve the aim. These would include courses of action other than the use of nuclear weapons, and probably a number of courses of action which would not result in the release of radioactive fallout. In fact it would be a walk in the park for the US military.

So you say, without providing any evidence to support your assertion. Others, here and elsewhere, say otherwise. Why should we assume that your opinion means more than theirs?

[Dayuhan]

I understand that you just don't want any action taken against Iran for some or other reason (which you are not prepared to divulge).

You seen rather devoted to a fundamentally flawed assessment of the decision process. We do not simply select a goal and do whatever is necessary to achieve it. We can't.

We have many goals, all over the world. We have limited resources and capacities. Goals have to be prioritized and resources assigned where they are most likely to accomplish something.

Assume we have a goal, and we have a proposed method of achieving that goal. Before pursuing that proposed method, we have to realistically assess:

1. The importance of the goal
2. The probable costs of the proposed method
3. The probability of success
4. The probable risks and potential for unexpected costs
5. The resources we are prepared to devote to the pursuit of this goal

If these assessments do not come up positive, it's not worth pursuing the goal.

I wonder if you're overlooking some of the likely consequences of air strikes on Iran. A few of the more probable ones...

The impact on Iranian domestic politics would be immediate and significant. You can expect the populace to rally behind the existing leadership, completely undercutting the domestic opposition and building the power base of the most radical and most anti-American factions. The Iranian regime's determination to gain a nuclear capacity would be reinforced.

It's also generally accepted that Iran aand its proxies have the capacity to stir up considerable trouble in Iraq, which could add substantially to the expense, duration, and complexity of our engagement there.

Iranian military forces certainly cannot directly engage US forces and survive, but it is likely that they could cause enough trouble in the Arabian Gulf to add a large risk premium to oil prices for an extended period of time. Iran doesn't have to defeat the US in battle: if they can push the price of oil over $100/bbl for 6 months, given the current state of the global economy, they are quite likely to produce another global recession, possibly even a depression.

So, to divulge the reason (I thought it obvious), I don't support military action against Iran at this time because the probability of success is unacceptably low and the ratio of probable cost to probable gain is extremely unfavorable.

[bourbon]

I'm not sure about that last, though. I think the opponents will win mostly due to numbers and simply because, as you say, a nuclear Iran is not a threat to the US. I believe most will see little sense in doing something inimical to our interests to only perhaps help out someone else and in an effort that, As Entropy says and Rex noted, would probably do far more harm than good -- and that not just to the US...

I hope you are right.

[JMA]

Cole,

Obviously one can come up with any number of scenarios where the US might do this or that tactical action in a hypothetical war with Iran. My point was simply to demonstrate the "all options are on the table" rhetoric is needlessly counterproductive because all options are not on the table. We're not going to send Cavguy to lead an armored column to Tehran. We're not going to nuke the place. There are, in other words, a lot of options that are "off the table."

Now you do understand that for the military contingency planners everything remains "on-the-table" don't you?

For the politicians to whom lies, deception and deceit come easily they may well not be prepared to admit that. The Pentagon would be remiss to not cover all the possible bases.

I speak of a number of plans that could be utilized to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon and there is no doubt that the US is capable of doing that in a number of ways.

I do not speak of a specific plan as I have enough military background to realise that coming up with a detailed plan is the outcome of a comprehensive military appreciation and planning cycle. If you were a soldier you would know this.

It starts with the Oval Office providing the Pentagon with the aim in a clear and comprehensive but precise form. It should answer the question, "what exactly do you want us to do?"

Settling on a comprehensive and precise aim is normally (90%) of the time very difficult for civilian politicians to achieve. Therefore it is often necessary and indeed probably required for an exercise as complex as the Iran option for a full process to be undertaken to assist in establishing the aim.

Invariably there are some conditions imposed which will affect how the aim may be achieved. These are termed "limitations". In the case of this Iran scenario they may be (for example) that, "there will be no use of nuclear weapons and no action which may result in the release of radioactive material into the atmosphere etc.

The planners will then proceed to work out a number of plans to achieve the aim within the scope of the given limitations.

They may well return to state that there is no possible plan that will succeed in achieving the aim given the imposed limitations. The President will then need to review the limitations he imposed upon the planners or accept that it can't be done. On the other hand they may come up with three or four possible plans and recommend the best of them.

So to think that any possibility would not be considered because some civilian thinks it won't work or doesn't make sense is laughable. In addition the chattering classes would also clearly not be privy to all the information and intelligence that would be available to the Pentagon planners. So it is really difficult to understand on what these analysts base their comments.

To make comments like sending Cavguy up the road to Tehran is a comment which quite frankly shows a lack of understanding and respect for the skill and competence of those involved in such a planning cycle.

The bottom line is that I don't get to decide what remains on the table and you don't get to decide what is off the table.

The problem if one exists lies not in the Pentagon but rather with the Oval Office, the White House and Congress. You voted for them, you get what you deserve.

[JMA]

It is not in the national interest of The United States of America to launch a military strike on Iran. The potential costs outweigh the potential benefits for America. A nuclear armed Iran is not a significant threat to the US.

This few lines is based on what? You just personally believe this or have you some basis on which you base these comments?

I put it to you that your position is pretty tenuous.

There is currently an ongoing information operation by a foreign power to influence the American public and “chattering classes” into supporting a military operation against Iran. The pressure of the forces supporting a strike on Iran, is greater than whatever pressure that the forces that are opposing can bring.

I would say to you that Israel unlike the US and probably Iran due to land mass will not survive a nuclear strike. A response would be pointless as there would be no Israel. Israel learned when they sat in their bunkers while 40 Iraqi scuds rained down on them that their nuclear deterrent counted for nothing when confronting a desperate dictator in a corner. The world was sold a line of crap that Israel was protected by Patriot Missiles per kind favour of Uncle Sam when the success rate of the Patriot was next to zero. I don't know how the US convinced Israel to stay out of the war but will bet my bottom dollar that Israel learned that the can't bank on the US in a time of need.

Israel will settle the matter if the UN or the US does not.

Your opinion seems to be that Israel is expendable. Further that a disruption to Middle Eastern oil supplies to the US of around 2.5-3 million barrels per day would not affect the US nor be in its interests to secure. Interesting train of thought.

[Rex Brynen]

A response would be pointless as there would be no Israel. Israel learned when they sat in their bunkers while 40 Iraqi scuds rained down on them that their nuclear deterrent counted for nothing when confronting a desperate dictator in a corner.

Not so much. Deterred by Israel, Iraq made no effort to use CBW warheads. Instead it used largely ineffectual HE warheads on highly inaccurate SCUDs for largely symbolic attacks, resulting in only two Israeli deaths. The marginal damage done to Israel clearly didn't pass the threshold where Israeli leaders felt that there was anything to gain by striking back themselves, and let the coalition do it for them.

Were a future Iran to nuke Israel, Israel would certainly retain sufficient second strike capability to level every major Iranian population centre, and then some.

[Entropy]

JMA,

They may well return to state that there is no possible plan that will succeed in achieving the aim given the imposed limitations. The President will then need to review the limitations he imposed upon the planners or accept that it can't be done. On the other hand they may come up with three or four possible plans and recommend the best of them.

So to think that any possibility would not be considered because some civilian thinks it won't work or doesn't make sense is laughable. In addition the chattering classes would also clearly not be privy to all the information and intelligence that would be available to the Pentagon planners. So it is really difficult to understand on what these analysts base their comments.

I'm an ex-Navy Air Force guy who has participated in real-world contingency planning. I know the process. What I am saying is that air strikes aren't going to get you there. We can wreck a lot of things in Iran with air power - we can pretty much destroy their air force, navy, air defense and economy, but the idea that air power can take out Iran's nuclear program is wishful thinking. Air strikes won't get you there - all they'll do is degrade Iran's capabilities. This isn't Entropy's classified assessment or Entropy blowing smoke or Entropy lacking the cajones. The Chairman of the Joint Chief's has publicly said the same thing, the SECDEF too, as have numerous military experts on the topic and others who are in positions to know.

I mean really, airstrikes on Iran have been discussed for at least the past six years. No doubt there has been much contingency planning during that period. We've also had six years of Israel threatening to "do something" but of course, they're not capable of taking the nuclear program out either (unless they use their nukes - and all I can do is pray they are not that stupid). If Israel thought it could succeed with air strikes it would have shut up and done them long ago.

[Dayuhan]

Now you do understand that for the military contingency planners everything remains "on-the-table" don't you?

Everything is not on the table. We're not going to go nuclear and we're not going to invade. We know it and the Iranians know it.

Your opinion seems to be that Israel is expendable. Further that a disruption to Middle Eastern oil supplies to the US of around 2.5-3 million barrels per day would not affect the US nor be in its interests to secure. Interesting train of thought.

An alternative opinion might be that a nuclear-armed Iran could be contained in the same way that the nuclear-armed Soviet Union was contained, or China, or North Korea... by the assurance that first use of the weapon would result in absolute destruction. It's worked before.

Given the Israeli capacity for retaliation and the lack of any possible gain to Iran even if a strike on Israel were successful, an attack on Israel doesn't seem a likely eventuality.

I'm an ex-Navy Air Force guy who has participated in real-world contingency planning. I know the process. What I am saying is that air strikes aren't going to get you there. We can wreck a lot of things in Iran with air power - we can pretty much destroy their air force, navy, air defense and economy, but the idea that air power can take out Iran's nuclear program is wishful thinking. Air strikes won't get you there - all they'll do is degrade Iran's capabilities. This isn't Entropy's classified assessment or Entropy blowing smoke or Entropy lacking the cajones. The Chairman of the Joint Chief's has publicly said the same thing, the SECDEF too, as have numerous military experts on the topic and others who are in positions to know.

Thank you; I hope that is clear enough to settle that issue.

[JMA]

Not so much. Deterred by Israel, Iraq made no effort to use CBW warheads.

So they had them after all. Who else have you shared this with?

Instead it used largely ineffectual HE warheads on highly inaccurate SCUDs for largely symbolic attacks, resulting in only two Israeli deaths.

They had an alternative to these HE warheads?

The symbolism was that the scuds can hit Israel at will and when someone has a CBW (or nuclear) warhead Israel will have a real problem.

The marginal damage done to Israel clearly didn't pass the threshold where Israeli leaders felt that there was anything to gain by striking back themselves, and let the coalition do it for them.

Yes I would love to know exactly (not through idle speculation) what the US used to convince Israel to sit on its hands.

Were a future Iran to nuke Israel, Israel would certainly retain sufficient second strike capability to level every major Iranian population centre, and then some.

This sounds interesting. You know this for sure or are you just guessing? You have some sources for this?

Now what leads you to believe that Israel will wait to retaliate with a second strike?

You may have missed the fact that twice (1981 in Iraq and 2007 in Syria) Israel has carried out strikes on nuclear facilities. What leads you to believe that Israel will fail to respond this time?

[JMA]

JMA,

I'm an ex-Navy Air Force guy who has participated in real-world contingency planning. I know the process.

That is not evident in what you have posted on this thread.

What I am saying is that air strikes aren't going to get you there. We can wreck a lot of things in Iran with air power - we can pretty much destroy their air force, navy, air defense and economy, but the idea that air power can take out Iran's nuclear program is wishful thinking. Air strikes won't get you there - all they'll do is degrade Iran's capabilities. This isn't Entropy's classified assessment or Entropy blowing smoke or Entropy lacking the cajones. The Chairman of the Joint Chief's has publicly said the same thing, the SECDEF too, as have numerous military experts on the topic and others who are in positions to know.

I appeal to you to maintain some emotional discipline.

You will not be able to ascertain what air power will or will not be able to achieve unless you have knowledge of the aim. On what aim (with what limitations) do you base these defeatist statements on?

I mean really, airstrikes on Iran have been discussed for at least the past six years. No doubt there has been much contingency planning during that period. We've also had six years of Israel threatening to "do something" but of course, they're not capable of taking the nuclear program out either (unless they use their nukes - and all I can do is pray they are not that stupid). If Israel thought it could succeed with air strikes it would have shut up and done them long ago.

Like with the other guy maybe you missed that the Israelis have done something twice before (1981 - Iraq, 2007 - Syria). Now what makes you think they will do nothing this time around?

If you are going to get involved with unemotional contingency planning you need to get beyond prayer and unsubstantiated assumptions. (Seriously)