The Future of Logistics

[davidbfpo]

I am working on a 2 page paper on 'The Future of Logistics?' I am interested in your opinions on the topic and am looking for any material on this subject. Thank you in advance for your comments.

From an "armchair" outsider on the 'The Future of Logistics' a lot depends on whether you are considering a conventional campaign (HIC), COIN or expeditionary conflict or being at peace (in garrison)?

For all manner of reasons commitments to immediate action, whether HIC or COIN, rarely lasts a short time and along comes a far from "light" campaign logistics "tail" - with PMC and host nation(s) help of course. That is what needs to be considered - hard - and clearly presented to decision-makers. Look how long outsiders have been in Bosnia.

Can a "light" campaign be logistically supported, reliably from regional resources and the "tail" kept small? We know a "hi-tech" war is not logistically "light", just look at the two Gulf Wars.

If the US / another national defence budget was reduced - like Canada and France did - what capability for logistics is retained? Some idea of the time-scales involved in restoring capability should be in the paper.

[SethB]

I think that David is on the right track with his discussion of tail.

And more importantly, you have to link time and logistics. Building up enough supplies for an invasion can take months. The less stuff you take the faster you can act.

[Chris jM]

but this document here, although USAF-centric, appears relevant to the discussion at hand.

I stumbled across it while searching for information on command in the RFC but immediately thought of this thread.

The only caveat I would put on it is that I am of the belief that the policy for just-in-time logistics (championed in the form of a vignette in this journal) failed to adequately sustain the US ground forces in Iraq, 2003 and was phased out as another over-hyped concept... maybe someone could confirm this?

However, in terms of historical examples and logistical bywords, I imagine this may be of some help.

http://www.aflma.hq.af.mil/lgj/old%2...202006_cor.pdf

[Fuchs]

Armour journal or so had a nice article some time ago - something about breaking the tether of fuel. That was a nice start.


By the way, I've got a question since the membership here is multinational:

Q: In which countries is it usual to have a detachment of the field unit at field depots to organise, reserve and prepare supplies for the truck convoys of their field units?

I'm thinking of receiving requests, preparing custom pallets full of spare parts, preparing a map of where the needed supplies are and guiding the truckers to the supplies & assist with loading/unloading?
I have the impression that this is usually not organic to field units, but rather the job of rather neutral, not so motivated supply clerks of the field depot units.

Another question:

Q: How 'normal' are convoy security units internationally?

As I understand some countries assign scouts, AT Plts and others in makeshift solutions for convoy security.

That may work half-satisfactorily in COIN, but what's about great, mobile wars?

[Chris jM]

I'll try and put some feedback here for the NZ/ commonwealth model - hopefully anyone will correct me if I go wrong.


Q: In which countries is it usual to have a detachment of the field unit at field depots to organise, reserve and prepare supplies for the truck convoys of their field units?


At the rifle company level the CQMS (Company Quatermaster - an infantry SSgt who acts as the under-study of the CSM while acting as the chief point of contact for all stores stuff) is often allocated veh/ convoys to organise and arrange for resup. Doctrinally they are supposed to stay with the F Ech (the coy) but my experience in FOBs and on exercises is that they practise a high degree of mobility, and often push themselves back to the A Ech when organising supply.


Q: How 'normal' are convoy security units internationally?

As I understand some countries assign scouts, AT Plts and others in makeshift solutions for convoy security.

That may work half-satisfactorily in COIN, but what's about great, mobile wars?

I'm not going to swear this is true, but I have spoken to both US and NZ MP's and they both believe it is their doctrinally enshrined right to escort convoys and control/ provide route security.

Now, what great insights and commentary have you got on this topic Fuchs?

[Fuchs]

Now, what great insights and commentary have you got on this topic Fuchs?

???

I'm working on a kind of successor model for armoured recce (independent, well-rounded Coys), and the wheeled version could very well provide security as a break from its more straining, more risky jobs.


I'm doing research in regard to the logistics topic because I have little faith in the German doctrine and its makeshift solutions because of the lack of mobile warfare testing on the operational scale (and because of other reasons).

One cheap answer to supply woes is that I propose a standard road range requirement of 1,000 km for all vehicles in units meant for 'up front' employment in mobile warfare. That would buy a few days and push the culminating point considerably.
It's a primitive and quite easily feasible technical solution to a quite stubborn organizational problem. Even upgrading old vehicles for 1,000 km road range works if you want to have it.

[MattM]

Note: A collection of thoughts which applies to NATO and PAC allies military forces. I had no plan to turn this into a feasible essay.

Military logistics provide support and sustainment to military operations.

Therefore, the future of military logistics is driven by the future of military operations and the sufficient and effective provision of support to those operations.

Military operations most frequently focus on Major Theater War, High Intensity Conflict, and Counter Insurgency operations. A refined understanding will include intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to the suite of military operations.

A discussion on the future of military operations is most readily accessed with high level doctrine such as Fourth Generation War & Network Centered War, Operational Maneuver from the Sea, and the Air Expeditionary Forces.

The doctrine found in those tomes forecasts the following:

• 80% of the worlds population lives in Littorals: great cities, well-populated coasts, and the intersection of trade routes
• Armed conflict among state and non state actors begin with a breakdown of the present order, whether beneficial to western powers or not
• Armed enemies will most likely not be a trained army, but volunteers defending the tribe, clan, religion, or company
• Civilians will be in close proximity to enemy fighters and allied forces
• Enemy forces will exploit media and employ NCW elements against allied forces

The Past

The Cold War military logistics foot print was centered on the following:

• Massive fuel stores, ammunition storage, and maintenance efforts for armor and mech divisions in Europe
• Massive fuel stores, aviation ordnance, and forward repair point for naval surface forces on two great oceans, and the Mediterranean sea
• Massive fuel stores, controlled air space, and incredible expensive repair parts for bomber wings and fighter wings all over the northern hemisphere

The current military operations environment has done away with those elements, yet the conversion is still ongoing and not yet complete.

The Present

Conflict

COIN efforts in AFG and Iraq have relied heavily on contract and third nation support to build and establish forward operating bases. The previous capabilities to provide this logistics support was eliminated from force structures during the early nineties military draw down. Military transportation and maintenance became the focus for the forward push of energy and supplies. The convoy is the classic soft underbelly of the military juggernaut, and this weakness has been exploited by enemy forces. There is a great Marine Corps Gazette article (at the home page) on the preparation of motor transport forces.

Industry – Arsenal of Democracy

Cold War industry was desirable and offered adequate cash flow for a manufacturing enterprise. Presently, few companies not already entrenched in military procurement would want build a business case for the low margins in military contracting. Obsolescence and diminishing sources for manufacturing are major concerns, and challenges are continuing to unfold.

Much expertise and support for military logistics came from DOD civilians working throughout the world. As the numbers and labor rates became prohibitively expensive to support these depots and think tanks, DOD initiatives have turned to contractors to provide support that traditionally would have been done by military personnel at a repair or storage depot. For 2009, the DOD awarded 71 contracts totaling $5 B was awarded to provide functional support to military systems. Risk is to the contractor, instead of creating a Mil / DOD infrastructure. This is commensurate with the draw down of an equivalent DOD support force.

Many commercial, of the shelf items are superior to military goods for rugged field use. Even components of unique military goods (tanks, aircraft, vhf land radios) may have superior elements which are a commercial offering (gps guidance interface, fuel filtering, antenna structuring). However, the commercial offering may not want a product lifespan of more than 3 years; where as military procurement may not be able to identify, implement, and distribute that product in the commercial lifespan.

The Future

MOST IMPORTANT: The US will not commit forces but will supply specialized goods and military expertise to the conflict party less distant to western ideals. Expertise may include air and orbital coverage of the battle space.

Future military opeations will REMAIN away from massive aerospace environments and deep water ship posturing. Common humanitarian efforts in conflict space will become quite normal. Thus, logistics will focus on the movement of transport and base camp items for COIN operations. Military equipment will be built with high MTBF and will be id’d for rebuild or repaired in country by contractor support.

The manufacturing base for military equipment is shrinking. Electronic components either come from overseas or a very expensive from boutique US sources. Base metals essential for metallurgy and alloy creation are only feasibly extracted outside the US. The feasibility to hire experts with appropriate credentials for DOD support is becoming more difficult every year.

Challenges identified during two COIN fights in CENTCOM may point to the future of operations for military logistics. Much will remain the same, yet these may be tangible improvements:

• Bulk Fuel is expensive and difficult to move forward. Large military vehicles may improve usage by employing diesel / electric technologies already well proven in locomotives and mining machinery.
• Electricity was insufficient for CENTCOM base camps. The generator fielding plan was often grossly over sized and thirsty as compared to radio / sensor size and location. 115 / 230 VAC is often not a good choice for field equipment. 48V DC allows for better use of fuel cells and PV / Battery arrays. Grid tying in a COIN environment is not a sensible solution.
• Base camp gear. The military is very good at field expedient equipment (3 – 45 days) and building cantonment areas (18 – 60 months). The spectrum between these two is desperate for planning, expertise, and equipment. The equipment items for the mobile surgical hospitals were a noted failure.
• The transformation from motor transport convoys to combat logistics patrols was essential and must be retained. Future efforts should move off of hardball and establish routes with a smaller civilian exposure. This methodology should also apply to coastal (Africa) and inter island waterways (Indonesia).

Sources to consider: Operational Maneuver from the Sea, Defense Acquisition University website, search on OIF logistics

[Firn]

One cheap answer to supply woes is that I propose a standard road range requirement of 1,000 km for all vehicles in units meant for 'up front' employment in mobile warfare. That would buy a few days and push the culminating point considerably.
It's a primitive and quite easily feasible technical solution to a quite stubborn organizational problem. Even upgrading old vehicles for 1,000 km road range works if you want to have it.

Achieving this goal by reduced fuel consumption would be best for all the cascading effects down the supply chain, but even getting that 1000 km road range would give the units through greater autonomy far more flexibility and mobility and could reduce considerably the strain on the (fuel) supply chain due (far) larger refueling intervals - and once again the positive effects should cascade through the system.

Firn

P.S: @MattM: Interesting take, maybe I will comment on it later.