Are we caving to AQ threats?

[marct]

Hi Tequila,

Personally I doubt very much whether any portion of those audiences care very much whether the U.S. embassy in Yemen is open for business or not.

I agree, on the whole none of them (us) do give a FF. What I think is important, however, is not that it did close, but the reasons why it closed and the changes in perceptions that come from that.

Besides, the embassy is actually closed, according its own website. They're not taking appointments, either.

Yup. Which, IMHO, is too bad.

Now if CM or yourself know a good reason as to why they should remain open besides IO purposes, I suppose you'd better let the DSS know. Note that the British and French have closed their embassies as well. It might pay to remember that AQAP launched a major complex attack on our embassy in 2008 to include an attempted storming, so it's not like there isn't some history here.

Other than IO? Well, I might say "appearances", but that should, in all fairness, fall under the same general rubric. As to the history, yeah, I know there was an attempted storming. Wasn't the embassy strengthened, though?

There's a big difference between "caving" and taking sensible precaution. And what exactly are we "caving" in to? Did AQAP demand that we shut our embassy temporarily for security reasons?

I agree, there is a big difference. I suppose that what we are really talking about is where is that line drawn, and how are the decisions both arrived at and communicated.

[davidbfpo]

Personally I doubt very much whether any portion of those audiences (British, Canadian & Australia) care very much whether the U.S. embassy in Yemen is open for business or not.

Regarding the UK I would say that the long established Yemeni community, a mix of "newcomers" and mainly IIRC born in the UK, will have a view; yes, it is a small ethnic group and a mix of north and south factions. I suspect a closure will not be a surprise as they remain well connected "back home". I understand there is some trade, business and other interests.

[Tom Odom]

As I expected

U.S. Embassy in Yemen Reopens After Threat

The United States embassy in Yemen reopened on Tuesday, a day after Yemeni forces reportedly killed two Al Qaeda militants believed to be behind a threat that forced U.S. and European missions to close.

[Tukhachevskii]

If you look at the first paragraph of the CBC story, the implication is that the US is running away because of a (failed) threat.

I've argued in other places that there is a serious difference in perception of what exactly constitutes the AO between Western and AQ perceptions and, to me at least, I think that this type of action will be spun by AQ and their fellow travellers both as a tactical victory and as continuing "proof" that the US is "weak".

Exactly what I was thinking (but was beat to it). For AQ any retrograde manouevre on the part of the "Allies" is a victory; especially in Yemen. I remember going to both embassies (UK and US) and being struck by their high levels of protection in terms of physical barriers and troops deployed to defend them (who all seemed much better fed and equipped than regular Jaish Al-Yemeni). But we cannot forget that in Arab culture the stronger you are percieved the more respect you are accorded (there was a pretty good article on this in SWJ a while ago). Your average Yemeni drives around with Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein wheel covers on their spare tyre on their cheep Chinese (and ex-Jap) SUVs. (Remember, for the Yemeni's Bin laden is "one of us" and his victories are, vicariously, their victories). Your average Yemeni is also deeply resentful (while being simultaneously being strongly attracted to) the US (i.e., "yankee go home...and take me with you"). Anything that "looks" like we flinched/blinked is as good a victory for AQ as is actual physical combat. OTOH, "closing" the embassies could all be directed at domestic audiences to reinforce "wartime spirit" (or morale as JDP-2 UK Defence Doctrine puts it) at a time when support from civilians on the home front for continued ops in Iraq/Afghanistan is flagging (especially when we may even be considering action against Iran).

[Stan]

A quick read over at State's website among other things reveals...

... the Department's main goals: protecting the U.S. and Americans;

There's a big difference between "caving" and taking sensible precaution. And what exactly are we "caving" in to? Did AQAP demand that we shut our embassy temporarily for security reasons?

The idea that an embassy is anything resembling a security outpost is way off base. If they have credible information enough to get both mission chiefs to recommend/accept closing the missions, they made the right call.

Echoing Tequila and Tom - Although we don't have an Arab presence, I can't count how many times in the last 15 years the Embassy here closed their doors for no other reason than to reduce potential risk.

In a friendly country like Estonia, information funnels into the Country Team from law enforcement and the host government daily. The ultimate decision rests with the Embassy, but there have been instances where limited operations or temporary closure was recommended.

Closing or limiting the Embassy's operations simply reduces US and local employee exposure. Riots and social upheaval are no fun, and the walls and windows around the embassy are not some sort of force field

I suppose that what we are really talking about is where is that line drawn, and how are the decisions both arrived at and communicated.

I wished I had a better answer for you Marc. Fact is, even here in snowy paradise the communicated closure or limited operations is rather fuzzy and generates all kinds of rumor with the US expats and local population.

I'm certain Yemen will be handsomely rewarded under any number of programs such as counter terrorism, non-proliferation and security assistance.

[tequila]

Anything that "looks" like we flinched/blinked is as good a victory for AQ as is actual physical combat.

Really? So have we just scored a crushing victory over AQ by reopening the embassy?

I'm betting the "average" Yemeni does not actually tool around with bin Laden tire covers, nor does he know or care much that the U.S. and U.K. embassies were closed briefly this week.

I achieved this bit of inside knowledge by polling the Yemeni families who own two of the local bodegas around my neighborhood. See, I'm at least as reliable as Tom Friedman now.

[wm]

The United States embassy in Yemen reopened on Tuesday, a day after Yemeni forces reportedly killed two Al Qaeda militants believed to be behind a threat that forced U.S. and European missions to close.
(Emphasis added.)

Amazing what a difference a single word makes. Suppose instead that line from Fox News had read like the following:

"After choosing to close temporarily, the US Embassy in Yemen reopened on Tuesday, a day after Yemeni forces reportedly killed two Al Qaeda militants believed to be behind a threat to U.S. and European diplomatic missions in the country. To lower risks of injury both to Yemeni citizens with business at or around their embassies as well as to embassy employees, the US and British Embassies had ordered temporary closures."

[Fuchs]

Amazing what a difference a single word makes. Suppose instead that line from Fox News had read like the following:

"After choosing to close temporarily, the US Embassy in Yemen reopened on Tuesday, a day after Yemeni forces reportedly killed two Al Qaeda militants believed to be behind a threat to U.S. and European diplomatic missions in the country. To lower risks of injury both to Yemeni citizens with business at or around their embassies as well as to embassy employees, the US and British Embassies had ordered temporary closures."

Translations make an even greater difference. I read about a withdrawal of the diplomatic personnel elsewhere.

[Stan]

Jeez, Wayne, I swore you'd go for the old "broken water mains"

Amazing what a difference a single word makes. Suppose instead that line from Fox News had read like the following:

[Stan]

Translations make an even greater difference. I read about a withdrawal of the diplomatic personnel elsewhere.

Indeed, Fuchs. In such instances the phrase "withdrawal of diplomatic personnel" takes on a different meaning.

The withdrawal of an ambassador for example is little more than a symbolic act of protest. Withdrawal of all diplomatic personnel from an embassy is however rare.

The host country can deem a member of the embassy Persona non Grata, but the often and typical recourse is reciprocal expulsion. Which, accomplishes nothing IMO

According to the Vienna Convention, the ambassador is easily expelled, but the embassy is inviolable... Just ask the Iranians

[Tom Odom]

According to the Vienna Convention, the ambassador is easily expelled, but the embassy is inviolable... Just ask the Iranians

or the Zairois...

[Fuchs]

Maybe it would have been smart to simply close the embassy for a few days "for repairs" and to hire some craftsmen to do something, but most importantly to be visible.

The whole thing looks like an unexpected PR disaster to me. Next time they'll be more careful.

[tequila]

The whole thing looks like an unexpected PR disaster to me.

Again, in what way is this a disaster?

I wish I wrote this, but it's pretty apropos:

I’m quite sure I could beat LeBron James in a game of one on one basketball. The game merely needs to feature two special rules: It lasts until I score, and as soon as I score I win. Such a game might last several hours, or even a week or two, and James would probably score hundreds and possibly thousands of points before my ultimate victory, but eventually I’m going to find a way to put the ball in the basket.

Our national government and almost all of the establishment media have decided to play a similar game, which could be called Terrorball. The first two rules of Terrorball are:

(1) The game lasts until there are no longer any terrorists, and;

(2) If terrorists manage to ever kill or injure or seriously frighten any Americans, they win.

[JarodParker]

IMO the US government had three options…

1) To not temporarily close the embassy in the face of what was deemed to be a credible threat and possibly hand AQ a real “flag draped caskets (both indig and western)” type of victory in hopes of denying them an obviously arguable “PR victory.”
2) To temporarily close the embassy without disclosing the reason or fabricating one altogether (ie – closed for repairs). At which point, the real reason would be leaked to the press and the government ends up with egg on its face. While AQ still gets the supposed “PR victory.” Maybe it’s me, but it seems that some government officially can’t go from here to there without anonymously babbling need-to-know information to reporters. So why risk it?
3) Close the embassy, give the real reason but keep it vague, knowing that FOX, MSNBC and AQ will distort the message to fit their agenda. The next press release (if any) should just read, “move along folks, nothing to see here.”

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Tom

As I expected


Quote:
U.S. Embassy in Yemen Reopens After Threat

The United States embassy in Yemen reopened on Tuesday, a day after Yemeni forces reportedly killed two Al Qaeda militants believed to be behind a threat that forced U.S. and European missions to close.

Tom,

This closes the discussion my opinion, the system worked exactly has it should have. I suspect a lot of these discussions are prompted by the likes of Rush Limbaugh, Glen Beck, and others who play the attack dog role by accusing the administration of being weak, and some unfortunately some folks buy into it. Weak or not, the closing of Embassies for short periods of time to sort through security issues (as noted above) has been a standard practice for years by all administrations. Department of State can chalk up a win on this one.

[Tom Odom]

Posted by Tom



Tom,

This closes the discussion my opinion, the system worked exactly has it should have. I suspect a lot of these discussions are prompted by the likes of Rush Limbaugh, Glen Beck, and others who play the attack dog role by accusing the administration of being weak, and some unfortunately some folks buy into it. Weak or not, the closing of Embassies for short periods of time to sort through security issues (as noted above) has been a standard practice for years by all administrations. Department of State can chalk up a win on this one.

Agreed on all

Best

Tom

[Tukhachevskii]

Really? So have we just scored a crushing victory over AQ by reopening the embassy?

I'm betting the "average" Yemeni does not actually tool around with bin Laden tire covers, nor does he know or care much that the U.S. and U.K. embassies were closed briefly this week.

I achieved this bit of inside knowledge by polling the Yemeni families who own two of the local bodegas around my neighborhood. See, I'm at least as reliable as Tom Friedman now.

Just some quick thoughts to clarify what I meant in the previous post...

First of all I have no idea what a Bodega/s is/are. I hope you will enlighten me.

Secondly, lets examine things from the PoV of a Yemeni and how he would understand the chain of events (having actually lived there for nine months I think I am, respectfully, best placed to know how they think if only in limited form).

1) Our glorious Son of Islam (the Underwear bomber) outsmarts the US and tries to blow-up a US airliner on Christmas day (or kafir day). He fails. No matter. It is jihad all the same (see Metrics 1, 2, 3, 9 below)

2)US “panics” and closes embassy in Yemen (where a previous attempt by AQ of Arabian Peninsula had failed just short of the main gates). Ha! They run if we sneeze! Not at all like China.

3) Yemeni government- the takfiri collaborationist government of Ali Abdullah Saleh and his gang of GPC cronies who are all on the US payroll -“claim” to have killed an AQ “mujahedeen”. We don’t believe them, of course, because they make claims about everything. Besides, if “they” have killed anyone its probably one of my tribal cousins. That irks me no end.

4) US reopens embassy.

5) Salih is in cahoots with the hated and vile United States of Kafiroona (this merely proves what we suspected all along) therefore I will shift support (if I haven’t already) to Islah, will continue ignoring the various groups operating in my midst, which I support tacitly or overtly and to which my son belongs, pray for the speedy victory of AQ and the destruction of the Takfiri government of Salih.


Yes. We blinked. Yes. We reopened our (UK and US) embassies. No. It did nothing to prove our resolve or courage (thereby undermining what Joseph Nye called Soft Power). In a culture in which honour, prestige and face have been taken to their logical extremes we have handed them a propaganda victory on a plate by “blinking” while simultaneously proving whatever conspiracy theory they may have fastened onto (and there are many). I have every reason to believe Saleh’s government acted in the manner it did, by (allegedly) “killing” an AQ member, to prevent even the talk of US involvement in Yemen (which would destabilise it) by committing an act which, by perceiving to “help” the US, will increase tension in Yemen and thus ultimately ......destabilise it. Saleh gets to wring more money out of the US (having proved that previous aid is being put to “good” use) which he will then use to pay off the major tribal confederacies, and anyone else whose feathers were ruffled, and stay in power a little while longer. Meanwhile his Political Security Organisation will continue to “allow” the escape of AQ members (amongst others) as they did (in)famously in 2006 while clamping down on domestic reformers (after all, he needs the tribes and their AQ/Foreign Fighter friends to eliminate the Houthi rebellion in the north). I do not call that a victory but a net loss. The previous attack on the US embassy was neutralised by Yemeni forces (with the aid of the 4 dshka armed Toyota pickups that dot the entrance). The internal reception of that event in Yemen was disassociated from the US. Causally nothing the US did in Yemen (or the ongoing Iraq/Afghan imbroglios) justified it and thus the Yemeni’s (gov and people) could compartmentalise the episode. The fact that Yemenis died (including newlyweds) actually helped the government gain a degree of legitimacy (a miracle in itself) when its forces killed those concerned. Meanwhile, at the US embassy it was business as usual. “Damn it”, Moe Yemeni thought, “these people are practically immovable. Either I plan something awesome or I give up the idea altogether and go back to my hut and chew Qat”. So, yes, the closure was, in my unlearned eyes at least, a monumental failure in strategic communication/signalling.

Thirdly, we have a problem in defining the meaning of “Victory”/”Success”. We have NO common strategic vocabulary with our opponents (hell, we didn’t even have one with the Soviets during the Cold War, even though, ostensibly, they spoke “our language” culturally speaking...deterrence anyone?). Our metrics are qualitatively dissimilar/diametrically opposed. Our enemy’s metrics have been ably explored and explained by J. B. Cozzens, ‘Victory from the Prism of Jihadi Culture’, Joint Forces Quarterly, No. 59, 2009;

Metric 1 Victory can be understood as the perpetuity of fighting

Metric 2 Victory is found in obeying the obligation to fight Islam’s enemies, not in the outcome of battle.

Metric 3 The Institutionalisation [actually, rather more a case of the maintenance] of a culture of martyrdom is a victory.

Metric 4 Victory comes by pinpointing Islam’s enemies through the refining process of Jihad, and thus maintaining its identity.

Metric 5 Establishing pride, brotherhood and unity in the face of threats to the Ummah is a form of victory.

Metric 6 Creating a parity of suffering with Islam’s enemies- especially the Jews and crusaders-is a victory.

Metric 7 Victory is seen in the maladies afflicting God’s enemies, especially economic recession and natural disasters.

Metric 8 The presence of Miracles in Jihad foretells of Victory for the Mujahedeen

Metric 9 The promotion of the heroic template is itself victory.

The closing of the embassies is equivalent to what the social psychologist Albert Bandura called “vicarious reinforcement” (the actions of others, when seen to result in positive outcomes, Makes those actions appealing or reinforces such CoA). In terms of these metrics and the war of ideas our closing of embassies sends the wrong signals to our foes and means that, IMO, we lost this bout.

[tequila]

1) A bodega is a Spanish slang term for a neighborhood corner store in the boroughs of New York City. More commonly used in the outer boroughs than in Manhattan, unless you're in Harlem or north of 110th St.

Secondly, lets examine things from the PoV of a Yemeni and how he would understand the chain of events (having actually lived there for nine months I think I am, respectfully, best placed to know how they think if only in limited form).

2) I lived in Iraq for 8 1/2 months, but I don't think I'm nearly as well tuned into the thoughts of the average Iraqi youth (as if there was such a thing) as you are into the Yemeni. I suppose I'll just have to take your word for it.

[Stan]

Just some quick thoughts to clarify what I meant in the previous post...

Hey Tukhachevskii !
Quite a set of quick thoughts and a very nice post !

Permit me a short but precise response based on more than a decade in Embassy life in some of the most inhospitable places on earth...

Yes, we are to an extent culturally challenged when it comes to considering some subliminal message we're sending regardless of the action or event.

So what exactly happens in that fish bowl called an Embassy ?

Theoretically speaking a threat is received: The Country Team is mustered and the subject beaten to death and a show of hands.
"Stan, what say you?"
"Sounds off the mark, but I'm not willing to take responsibility for 500 that would perish if they blow the building, SIR !"
"RSO, what say you?" Dito, SIR !
And it goes from there 13 to 15 iterations of DITO and the decision is done.
The CMD makes the call, notifies DOS and the Embassy personnel and the building is closed, or operations limited for the prescribed length of time. Employees and expats are reminded to stay off the streets, etc.

Closing or limiting the Embassy's operations simply reduces US and local employee exposure. Riots and social upheaval are no fun, and the walls and windows around the embassy are not some sort of force field

The closing of the embassies is equivalent to what the social psychologist Albert Bandura called “vicarious reinforcement” (the actions of others, when seen to result in positive outcomes, Makes those actions appealing or reinforces such CoA). In terms of these metrics and the war of ideas our closing of embassies sends the wrong signals to our foes and means that, IMO, we lost this bout.

I can only guess that Albert never served a day in a hostile environment responsible for the lives and well-being of others in an Embassy. I assure you that looking at your dismembered team members is far more horrific than some "loss of face" with the enemy...

... when they in fact scored zilch by blowing a building when nobody was home

[Bill Moore]

Posts by Tukhachevskii

lets examine things from the PoV of a Yemeni and how he would understand the chain of events (having actually lived there for nine months I think I am, respectfully, best placed to know how they think

I find this statement to be extreme and that is putting it lightly. I have lived overseas for many, many years in different countries and don't pretend to understand how the average anyone thinks. Based on post, the average Yemeni is a jihadist, which is highly doubtful. The average anybody simply doesn't give a flying hoot if a foreign embassy closes for a day. If you work in the Embassy you're confusing your issue with everyone's. I'm sure someone in Yemen was hurt in a vehicle accident today, outside their family and friends, no one cares. Oh my fellow pissant jihadis, the evil West has closed their embassies for "a day", so they could then hunt down and kill our operational cell, but darn it, they closed the Embassy for a day". I suspect the AVERAGE Yemeni couldn't give a flying hoot either way.

Our metrics are qualitatively dissimilar/diametrically opposed. Our enemy’s metrics have been ably explored and explained by J. B. Cozzens, ‘Victory from the Prism of Jihadi Culture’, Joint Forces Quarterly, No. 59, 2009;

Your point here is well taken, and it does seem to define one of our major theorical challenges since 9/11, but surely you're not suggesting we dance to their music? I advocate continuing to dance to our music instead by telling them to kiss off, we're going to live our lives the way we desire, and by the way, unlike these wingnuts, we value human life, so yes we'll take appropriate security measures while our security forces hunt them down and kill them. We're not conducting jihad, we're fighting those who are. And we sure as hell have demonstrated our courage as a nation on multiple occassions.

We risk our lives because of what we believe in, not because were cowards who cowardly commit suicide while killing innocents because they're looking for an easy way to paradise and virgins. Don't forget who the cowards really are.