MG Flynn (on intell mainly)

[BayonetBrant]

The threats aren't always those of direct bodily harm. The "threat" might be that the local populace doesn't have enough water.

The problem is that we've drawn a ring around the S2 and declared him the "Threat Guy" when much of the info that matters is not his - it's the S9's. Unfortunately, the S9 is just seen as a sidekick to the S2 who just dumps occasional useful nuggets to him.

The commanders need to shift who they're asking for info as much as the intel guys need to shift what they collect, and the S9 needs to seriously assert himself as the keeper of the info MG Flynn says is actually important.

And Bob - how often did the S9 already have the info that the commander was banging on the S2 about (or should have been banging on him about)?

[Steve the Planner]

Right.

If the S9 didn't have it, he could easily get it.

As a dumb-ass DoS civilian reconstruction guy stumbling around a Division Command in Iraq in Jan 2008, it took a little while to figure out who, in a mil structure, had the best reconstruction info.

At COB Spiecher, I was introduced at a conference and made some comments about locating things needed for reconstruction planning.

As I walked out, two guys came up and explained that they did targeting: One said: I do kinetic targeting. The other said: I do non-kinetic targeting.

So, I went to visit them at the Div HQ.

Obviously, they had mapped and located a lot of stuff to either blow up or not. It was ahiuge amount of good stuff.

Then, as I walked through the building, the Div Eng folks opened their doors: roads, bridges, electrical systems. There wasn't a whole lot that they didn't have in their sphere, or terrain didn't have access too.

By the time I got to S9/CA, they were tracking agriculture, economics, etc..., etc...

No offense, but, for my purposes, there was only a little that S2 had that I needed. Everybody else was so helpful and contributing that, like them, I could run the risk of having so much information that a Tower of Babel could begin to grow.

Same at MND-C, etc...

What I learned was that 90% of anything I needed to know was there. It just hadn't been asked for for my purposes or format. Getting to 99% was just a moderate effort.

Funny thing is that when you went "upstairs" to the Palace (and even to Al Faw), they had a lot less quality info, and what MNDs knew was not trickling up, mostly because they seemed to be focused on sending out and collecting answers to specific requests rather than wandering around to see what was known.

All the info flow, but without adequate wisdom flow...

And it didn't take long to figure out why. Short-tour rotating collection folks there were fixatedon (and swamped with) creating monthly reports, building information, not knowledge. They got their accountabilities in.

How to fix it?

Steve

[Surferbeetle]

The problem is that we've drawn a ring around the S2 and declared him the "Threat Guy" when much of the info that matters is not his - it's the S9's. Unfortunately, the S9 is just seen as a sidekick to the S2 who just dumps occasional useful nuggets to him.

The commanders need to shift who they're asking for info as much as the intel guys need to shift what they collect, and the S9 needs to seriously assert himself as the keeper of the info MG Flynn says is actually important.

And Bob - how often did the S9 already have the info that the commander was banging on the S2 about (or should have been banging on him about)?

Lets agree and say that we would like our taxpayer funded commanders to have a holistic understanding of the AO which our Democracy has sent them to. Presumably this holistic understanding would, at minimum, include actionable knowledge about the security, economic, and governance systems. Presumably we are structured, with the resources we have (total number of mil & civ USA, USMC, USN, and USAF), to support this desire. Lets consider how we are currently allocating DoD capital to provide our commanders with the holistic knowledge that they need for the AO.

Resources or Capital can be defined as "assets available for use in the production of further assets" and classified as land, labor, capital goods, and in some cases knowledge.

How much DoD capital is allocated to analyzing and interacting with each of the security, economic, and governance systems of an AO? Is a 94%, 3%, 3% split a fair estimate?

How much capital is allocated to the Army Band? Is it larger or smaller than the amount of DoD capital allocated to to analyzing and interacting with economic, and governance systems of an AO?

What existing structures can provide knowledge concerning the economic, and governance systems of an AO? I would say that includes all US troops who work outside the wire, (infantry, SF, MTT's, the S9/CA-bubbas, the S2 bubba's, etc.) contractors who work outside the wire (HTT's etc.), reachback folks in the US, and most importantly the locals who live in the AO.

So, how are we allocating existing DoD capital to collect, process, and deliver this knowledge about about the security, economic, and governance systems to those whose job it is to complete the mission in the AO?

The larger picture which needs to be considered is how the USG as a whole is allocating it's capital (DoD, DoS, DoJ, USAID, etc.) in order to develop the knowledge to shape the security, economic, and governance systems of the AO of concern. Understanding what structures receive capital help us to understand what type of solutions are provided/desired....

[Ken White]

My experience mirrors his on the IC fascination with PROVEN threats -- and noting that they are reluctant to discuss possible threats. As one guy I knew once said, "They want to write history..."

I've gotten about an equal mix of bad and good threat info over the years and only from the rare and quite exceptional (in the good sense of the word) J/G/S2 / MI Det or unit any useful cultural or populace info.

Intel Trooper: I believe they are commonly referred to as "Half Fast Spooklets"

You're also correct in that the 'system' wants to be threat centric. I believe because that way it's hard to say that the system erred. Thank you for being one of the good guys who pushed that envelope...

Surferbeetle's right -- we have a major priority problem in funding and degree of support from on high.

[Steve the Planner]

First, we are in awe of having comments from the illustrious Ken White.

Second, the problem goes way beyond the military.

The ground military is, in fact, the only current information source available for governmental collection and interpretation of the situation in Afghanistan.

The so-called three Ds (defense, diplomacy and development) are not equally shared.

If anybody actually believes that the CIA has a complete Common Operating Picture for Afghanistan, I have bridge I'd like to sell them. They just don;t do that kind of deep background information stuff.

NGA does geo-physical and sat/mapping stuff, but is too small and under-resourced to build Big Pictures, or even penetrate small ones like cadestral mapping.

DoS has no serious or deep country-level or below analytical capabilities, and USAID only has contract managers (and is in the limbo of awaiting a determination of its future under State).

So, if the ground military does not have the COP, nobody has it. And it is a house of cards (maybe) until one emerges---fortune telling is not a COP.

I really think that there are a lot more components to this than meet the eye.

How could the White House have a clear picture of an end game, if the basic info for it doesn't exist?

How can the hodge-podge of State/UN/USAID/NGO/FAS actors synchronize any meaningful actions on the civilian side?

There were actually three shots fired last week at Afghanistan. One from the UN "assistance" mission chief (serious risks of failure from lack of synchronized efforts), one from CSIS/Cordesman (winning battles, losing the war), and one from the guy that the whole-of-US-government is looking to for answers (McChrystal/Flynn).

The two new "implicit" impositions on the military must be recognized: (1.) as the only governmental source for relevant US ground truth; and (2.) under COIN, to develop an intel framework way beyond instant threat levels.

Talk about a challenge.

Steve