MG Flynn (on intell mainly)

[Steve the Planner]

Tom Ricks played his usual role of devil's incitor with a report from one of those unnamed experts that, within five years, Iraq would be carved up by Syria, Turkey and Iraq. Like he really believed that could be possible.

Of course, Afghanistan is a whole different thing. Who knows what could come out of a true national Loya Jirga.

The mark of genius is the ability to simultaneously maintain two opposing ideas in your head (some old quote)

If the Ambassador is correct that our 2010 focus will be aligning with the majority of Taliban, it certainly will raise the threshold for genius in the field.

In Iraq, the best way to get started on a relationship with provincial, local officials was to let them vent about the problems they experienced from the Americans, then start talking about solutions.

Problem was that, all too often, their problems were both accurately identified, and caused by the Americans. (Sometimes the locals do not what they are talking about).

Great to have all the answers before you get there, and to be immune from any learning or independent experience---oh, the unexamined life. The good news is that once State puts out that the Taliban are our friends, your Khandahar "colleague" will be on board with that, too. but not until.

Is it 1984 yet?

[Hacksaw]

"He asked again, looking directly at the OPA director. More silence.

Then he said. I need a plan to accomplish my mission. If you don't have a plan to reconstruct Northern Iraq, I need to create one. More silence.

Then he explained that, absent any plan form them, he would create one."

Hmmm...

for what it's worth... I wrote a plan for the stabilization and reconstruction of Northern Iraq on behalf of MG Petraeus Apr-May 2003.... It was the chewy of choice in the day (chewy = planner's product that the commander gives to visiting dignitaries as one would give a "chewy toy" to a dog)... not sure might even still have it (but unlikely since I've been retired for a couple of years...

I had recently spent 6 mths before the 101st initial deployment to Iraq on TCS assignment to CENTCOM... as you might expect I tried to use my connections to find out what was out there as a larger plan for me to link our plan to.... answer none existed (since I've ran across a couple of ARCENT Planners who insist a plan did exist, never saw it myself)...

So I staffed the plan with the Dept of Soc Sci at USMA and whomever they wished to share it with for a sanity check... not perfect, but I bet it wasn't that far out from what you developed....

Ironically, while I didn't participate in the writing of FM 3-24... and Petraeus really didn't provide any significant vector adjustment... for the most part it operationalized 3-24...

Does that mean I was well inside Petraeus head (a scary place I can assure you )... or did it mean we both looked at the situation similarly and came to same logical conclusions... I've often wondered...

[Steve the Planner]

Every time we looked at a problem in 2008, I wondered how many time that same problem had been looked and a plan made.

1AD HQ had been around Bgahdad, Diyala, etc..., so they all knew the background---made a huge difference.

What was the biggest diff between 03 and 08? DoS.

But I tried to explain to some of the DoS folks that when a unit leaves, it takes everything with it. Some transitioning, but it really is "another group, another year." They never did get it.

Difference was we were on "Last Call," so we got done what we had to to make the transition work...

Go figure...

That's what I think about this Fixing Intel, too. It is not just about fixing one piece for one unit, but developing some kind of "process" that can continue and evolve (and be trusted and contributed to---up and down). Otherwise, it is just a report or plan from one bunch, forgotten by the next.

And where does it reside? I think the report has it right---at Division commands as the Goldilocks choice. Not too high, not to low.

[reed11b]

Not the most original thought I am sure, but, is part of the problem that we are trying to get "quantity" of information, without creating a sorting formula to prioritize what information is critical and needs to be acted on or shared? Minus a clearly defined mission, or better yet, a plan of action, how is the intelligence community supposed to be able to figure what information is critical and how to sort it? Isn't timely information more important then "complete" information too late? Or do we still believe on a subconscious level that modern technology should allow us to see and know all? Sorry for the rambling post, but to summarize, to fix intelligence, you need an effective way to determine and sort quickly what information is relevant and to whom it goes. In order to begin to create this "formula" you need to know what the plan or basis of action is. The clearer the plan of action the easier it is to create an intelligence plan to support it. (Note*: It is perfectly OK to have multiple plans of action, in fact, many small clear plans is preferable to one big fuzzy plan IMNSHO). SO, what specifically is the mission priority for intelligence to support? Go from there.
Reed