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  1. #1
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    So we are training analysts fundamental concepts afte they arrive in theater? Why aren't heads rolling?

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    Council Member Surferbeetle's Avatar
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    We continually see excellent analysis of various areas of operation which describe components of the economic, governance, and security picture to which we allocate substantial blood and treasure to assess, describe, and influence. Our institutional knowledge is currently embodied in people however, and when they rotate out of positions of influence on regularly scheduled intervals, our forward momentum is lost until the newly arriving cohort has learned old lessons anew. Some would say that the promise of digital Knowledge Management is similar to Gutenberg’s printing press; people will only clamor for it if they have first-hand knowledge that it produces something of value that is easy to distribute and use.

    A working unclassified common operational picture of an area of operation is within our grasp and it does not require starting from scratch to build something new. Instead, we could require that all personnel who are preparing to head out into theater must have a common training/educational experience with respect to the topic of civil information management. The training cohort would include Military E1 to O-10, DOJ/USDA/USAID/OGA GS-12 to GS-15 as well as SES, DoS FS-09 to FS-01, all contractors, and NATO partners. A 16 hour training block could be required of all and all would use an existing system, designated as the digital Knowledge Management system of record for the civil information portion of campaign, to work through an exercise in which previously gathered unclassified PMESII (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information) and ASCOPE (Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, and Events) must be used to resolve a situation in a measureable way.

    Although not a silver bullet, unity of effort in the realm of Knowledge Management would be enhanced by requiring this common training/educational experience of all participants in the campaign. Economies of scale could be acheived by using the resulting after actions review comments process to continually improve the digital Knowledge Management system of record for the civil information portion of the campaign as each cohort goes through the initial training event and at regular intervals out in the field.
    Sapere Aude

  3. #3
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    Default Hi Steve

    Curious about why in this:

    from SB
    .... Military E1 to O-10, DOJ/USDA/USAID/OGA GS-12 to GS-15 as well as SES ...
    training for mil goes down to E1, but for civ agencies goes down to GS-12 (roughly = O-4). Are GS-11 and below untrainable ?

    I expect you have some rationale.

    Regards

    Mike

  4. #4
    Council Member Surferbeetle's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
    Curious about why in this:


    training for mil goes down to E1, but for civ agencies goes down to GS-12 (roughly = O-4). Are GS-11 and below untrainable ?

    I expect you have some rationale.

    Regards

    Mike

    Mike,

    Glad to see you are up, about, and sharp as ever.

    Could be wrong and mea culpa if so, however it is my observation in my small piece of the battlefield that on the civilian side GS-12 + (or equiv) are commonly out and about...

    As to the trainable question, I myself started as a GS-3 back in the day, most anyone is trainable it's the positions/opportunities/grades that are limited.

    Best,

    Steve
    Sapere Aude

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    Default Kinda thunk this ...

    from SB
    Could be wrong and mea culpa if so, however it is my observation in my small piece of the battlefield that on the civilian side GS-12 + (or equiv) are commonly out and about...
    was the rationale. Which I guess could bring up the question of where we would be if the military force consisted only of MAJs and above.

    As a practical matter, the civilian "force" is pretty much limited to the provincial level and above. It doesn't have the Willies and Joes to handle my little villages and hamlets. Is that observation about correct ?

    Regards

    Mike

    PS: looking at your DoS link, I find featured: Provincial Reconstruction Team Advisor (ASO), SALARY RANGE: 73,100.00 - 113,007.00 USD /year ... SERIES & GRADE: AD-0301-3/3; and Provincial Reconstruction Team Senior Advisor (ASO), SALARY RANGE: 102,721.00 - 153,200.00 USD /year ... SERIES & GRADE: AD-0301-IV/IV.

    Where do those fit (approx.) into the GS pecking order ?

    DoS's Office of the Legal Adviser basically is looking at GS-11 for regular, just out of law school hires and up into GS-15 for non-government laterals:

    Compensation and Benefits
    Attorneys are paid according to the General Schedule for Federal employees. For recent law school graduates with less than 1 year of relevant legal experience, the standard appointment is at GS-11, step one. Candidates with at least one year of experience, such as judicial clerks, will be appointed at GS-12, step one. Non-government laterals are appointed at the grade level (up to GS-15) and step that they would have earned had they joined the Office directly from law school. On a case-by-case basis, we may be authorized to compensate a newly appointed attorney with “superior qualifications” at a higher step level. Attorneys at the GS-11 level may be appointed at up to step 10 in their salary grade. The possible step increase varies for the higher grades. Salary levels for laterals from other Federal agencies are based on their current grade and step.
    Last edited by jmm99; 02-21-2010 at 08:40 PM. Reason: add PS

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    Mike:

    Your question:

    "PS: looking at your DoS link, I find featured: Provincial Reconstruction Team Advisor (ASO), SALARY RANGE: 73,100.00 - 113,007.00 USD /year ... SERIES & GRADE: AD-0301-3/3; and Provincial Reconstruction Team Senior Advisor (ASO), SALARY RANGE: 102,721.00 - 153,200.00 USD /year ... SERIES & GRADE: AD-0301-IV/IV."

    The answer is that they don't really. These are all term-assignment specialists whose links to any Common Operating Procedure or institutional framework was always tenuous at best. The first thing you learn about the State Department is how many people genuinely dislike/compete with each other within the organization. But all gather together around outsiders. Term-assignment folks are outsiders, even more so since Mr. Hoh's resignation. Just another of the many out-of-sync organizations and actors.

    Beetle's points about a COP are on target, but, if you create one: (1) How do you institutionalize it so that it continues to build and be supported?; and (2) How do you operationalize it?

    Right now, Afghanistan is a place of many actors, many actions, but little cohesive or sustainable traction or results. Militaries, civilians, internationals, NGOs.

    Hit Marjah; drop in stability and "government in a box;" move to the next square. Come back to Marjah in two years.

    So, what do you do with a COP if, for example, the first cut identifies deep structural and organizational divisions?

    The problem as I continue to see it from MG Flynn's critique is that Intel has become disconnected from both the field and the actors.

    It is not that some guys in some room didn't do a good job, and need to improve what they do in that room. It is that nobody has a clearly and effectively linked path between viable intel, actors and actions. (it is a very deep strategic problem that is not going to be solved in that hut in Kabul)

    Better intel must be grounded in operations to become both effective, and sustainable. More action drives the COP; more COP drive the actions. Iterative and inter-active feedback systems.

  7. #7
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
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    Default Fixing Intel: Implementing MG Flynn's SOICs

    Taken from al Sahwa blogsite a commentary: http://al-sahwa.blogspot.com/2010/03...mg-flynns.html

    A recent report written by the RC-West SOIC Director provides an excellent summary of their efforts to stand up one of these SOICs in Western Afghanistan.
    There is a potential problem with the report al Sahwa cites, 'The Stability Operations Information Center (SOIC) Comprehensive Understanding for Comprehensive Operations' by Regional Command (RC) West SOIC Director; there are two copies available via Google: on Cryptome:http://cryptome.org/dodi/af-soic-2010.pdf and ScribD (which SWC does not use). Neither has clear markings as to released to the public and some diagrams used are marked Unclassified / FOUO (the lowest US classification?).

    The report and commentary are a reasonable read and will read again to follow better.
    davidbfpo

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