Ok, I've read the piece now and there is some good and bad. I can't comment extensively at present so, for now, some bullet points:
1. The Good: I liked the focus on Commander responsibility and the fact that Commanders set intelligence requirements. The bad: If Commanders are responsible for intelligence and if they are not, as the authors seem to indicate, providing proper guidance to support COIN, then why all the negative waves at the intel community? One example of many: "The U.S. intelligence community has fallen into the trap of waging an anti-insurgency campaign rather than a counterinsurgency campaign." The intelligence community fell into that trap? Who is the tail and who is the dog here?
2. The Good: The report does a good job identifying many of the systemic problems. The Bad: Most solutions offered are unnecessary reinventions of the wheel. Example: Bandwidth should not be an issue for transmitting narrative reports from the field - you can't tell me we don't have the bandwidth to transmit a few pages of text daily.
Even if there is no bandwidth available, there are more efficient ways to get info from the field than sending people out to collect it by hand. We used to do this before we had all these fancy intel IP-based networks. You pop a disc into the theater mail system, or you mail actual paper containing written or typed reports! We can get stairmasters out to BFE Nuristan but we can't get a disc or some paper to HHQ without sending someone out to collect it? I don't buy it.
Additionally, we don't need a massive proprietary database to store information - all we need is info posted in web format and accessible by a search tool like google (and regardless, the best tools are made by enterprising junior folks in-house). All one needs to do is provide every unit a web-space where they can upload their text reports and any images (with metadata!) - search engine spiders will take care of the rest.
Alternatively, we already have wiki's that are ready to use but remain are largely unused and maintained by a few evangelists - mostly on their own time. To turn them into information clearing houses, all that's required is one order to institutionalize them along with a small staff of editors & researchers to maintain it.
3. The Good: "Information centers" focused on "white" information. The bad: The paper says these need too be staffed by civilians. How is ISAF/USFOR-A going to get national agencies to cough up the bodies and buy-in to this idea? Does the military really need outside analysts, over which it will have no operational control, to analyze and disseminate information derived from military units on the ground?
The biggest take-a-away issue I get from this paper is the lack of information sharing. This IS a real problem and information at the lowest levels is not shared or retained. Inteltrooper - your anecdote about meetings with locals and asking the same questions is no surprise to me and is an illustrative example of this. It just seems to me that is an easy fix - hold Commander's accountable for sharing information up the chain to senior Commanders and HHQ and provide a proven, existing and easy way to help them do so. Structural solutions that require buy-in from agencies outside the military are unnecessary and ill-advised. This is one area where KISS can go a long way.
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