MG Flynn (on intell mainly)

[Steve the Planner]

David:

The quote from Sempel is from the CNP conference in November.

Rex:

We are back to the same issue. If the Afghan government does not step up and become effective in at least 80% of the country, and, at the least, reasonably acceptable to a majority 60%+ in each, then we are chasing our tale.

Today, NATO has appointed the British Ambassador as it's Supernumary. No clue how that might relate/conflict with the current civilian effort, but the hope is that during tomorrow's one day conference in London, all things left unresolved for the last decade will miraculously resolve themselves since the newly-elected Karhzai government is on board (unlike the old one that wasn't very well thought of.

Morning is security and international cooperation. After lunch is sub-national governance. Take heart. It will be a completely new day on Friday.

The conference streams world wide so you can watch the miracles live and in color (with the usual internet stutters and delays).

Steve

PS- Sure wish I wasn;t on the same page with MG Flynn--a tough row to hoe.

[Entropy]

I linked to this presentation in the thread on MG Flynn's report a couple of weeks ago.

Rex,

It seems to me that it is entirely possible that neither side can win: that the international community cannot defeat the insurgency or build a stable, functional, Afghan government that can assure security and exercise effective control over large parts of the country, while the Taliban cannot (given both their ethnic and sectarian opponents, as well as rivals within the Pashtun community) capture Kabul as they did in September 1996.

That's pretty much where I've been for a couple of years now. Personally, I think Afghanistan is ungovernable in its present state. It's frankly depressing.

[William F. Owen]

"The Afghan insurgency can sustain itself indefinitely' at least in terms of arms and ammunition, funding, and recruits." Now, that is a pretty grim portrait. Of course, the Taliban are not supermen, they have weaknesses and, according to Flynn, they are not yet a popular movement throughout the country. (moving on)

But he does make it clear what he is thinking: 'Taliban strength is the perception that its victory is inevitable; reversing momentum requires protecting the population and changing perceptions'.

Sorry you cannot have it both ways. If you cannot defeat the Taliban you cannot protect the population. Strategy is limited by tactical reality. To me the subtext here is "We do not know what to do. We might loose."

a.) Placing physical barriers on the Pakistan boarder is possible, and proven to work.
b.) Surely the strategic objective is to withdraw and let the ANA/ANP kill the Taliban? If the Taliban are so good, why not just let the ANA/ANP use the same methods to defeat them, just funded and equipped by NATO?