MG Flynn (on intell mainly)

[Pete]

Tom Ricks' blog includes the following commentary from a major working on counterterrorism issues at the Pentagon:

We are currently involved in an insurgency in Afghanistan against a force that is routinely better informed than US forces. The enemy provides a painful example of doing more with less. What's that you say? In the age of information dominance are we not the standard bearers for information gathering and sharing at the speed of light? Yes, we are in the academic sense of having forms to fill out, processes to follow, and more systems than we can efficiently use. We must be dominant because we have a line and block diagram for every occasion. Unfortunately, we focus on the form far more than the function of intelligence.

The entire piece is available using the link below:

http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts...uck_here_s_why

[Steve the Planner]

Pete:

In civilian life, I do court testimony as an expert.

I'm currently preparing muy reports and testimony for a very complex government case that has been going on for ten years, so I am sitting here going through mountains of records, evidence, underlying court rulings, and trying to develop a deep and richly-supported analysis against the realization that whatever I write or testify to will be grilled to death by two economics professors on the other side armed by the largest law firm in the world.

All kidding aside, the case is about money and government authority---no lives on the line whatsoever, and, ten years from now, no one will ever remember it.

It really is incredible that, where lives are on the line in such a complex circumstance, the so-called warfighter support is so poor.

I have written (or should I say: overwritten factual inaccuracies) in Wiki too often to know the limits of some of the electronic sources.

What's really funny to me in expert testimony matters, too, is that increasingly I see opposing counsel working from electronic research in regulatory cases. The applicable regulation comes up one section at a time despite that a regulation must be read across its entirety. So often, the next section alters the intent and meaning of the last, and they miss that.

E-lawyers versus the old guys that review a printed copy of the entire regulation, which they read cover to cover before developing any positions.

Oh, Brave New World!

[Steve the Planner]

Pete cites Tom Ricks piece from a Major Nathan Murphy (intel sucks: Here's why).

In his report, the Murphy describes the pressures for quick answers, and the frequent Googling for answers.

One of MG Flynn's criticisms was the lack of relevant provincial/district political/administrative information.

I have a specific interest in provincial/district boundary shifts, particularly in and around national border areas, so I decided to compare what I know to what I could google.

I have a composite map of provinces and districts in Afghanistan and Pakistan which I use to follow events in all these places. The one I use shows the district of Delaram in Farah,with an asterisk that Afghanistan does not formally accept the transfer of Delaram from Nimruz to Farah.

Despite the asterisk, the Census Bureau clearly shows the transfer of the 20,000 residents from Nimruz to Farah four years ago, so somebody accepts it.

Anyway, I wiki-ed the two provinces. For Nimruz, the wiki provincial boundary map includes Delaram in Nimruz, but doesn't list Delaram as one of its districts, nor its component population.

For Farah, it does not show Delaram as one of oits districts or the population of Delaram in its component counts.

Both wiki cites claim to use the 2005 Census, but, probably because the changed circumstance didn't conform with their data transfer, Delaram just disappeared.

Farah/Nimruz, like Uruzgan/Daykundi is one of those places of recent changes. 1970's era maps for Nimruz show it extending up to include Lash-e Juwayn (adjacent to Iran and now a part of Farah), so both provincial boundaries have changed by one hundred miles or more.

When there is not much development/administration going on, these "minor" changes and discrepancies don't seem to matter, but become very important if you want to do something like plan and extend government services.

Particularly, if a place like Delaram, adjacent to Washer and Nad Ali districts in Helmand, is only a short hop (so to speak) from places like Now Zad. Great to have a "hole in the wall" or nonexistent district nearby if you are traveling off-the-record.

So wiki is nice, but it isn't always accurate, or timely.

(Yes, I'll update it when I get a chance).

Steve

[Steve the Planner]

SWJ has published an article containing the detailed outline of the new Host Nation Information program.

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=9504

Setting aside the jargon, acronyms and flow charts, the issues, now are:

First, does the system create new and actionable insights into the situation?

Second, how do those insights find their way into application, staffing, activity organization, and, in the end, actions?

In Iraq, our purpose in structuring and assembling this type of information was in order to find a framework for synchronized and properly targeted actions in the post-conflict reconstruction environment.

What resulted was were several key understandings. First, that there had not been an effective plan and course of action. Second, that there needed to be one, and that it must be heavily driven by Iraqis, and based on sound hierarchical actions, and sustainable strategies.

The results were a simplification of focus on clearly identified first-things-first: security, water, energy and power (the preconditions for any future successful efforts). From there, US DoD resources to see, assess, travel, and plan/engineer were used to systematically assess and prioritize project needs (roads, bridges, fuel movement, water & wells, etc...); CERP and other resources were targeted consistent with the priorities (and Iraqi sourced projects were not CERPed in order to focus US funding away from duplication of Iraqi activities. Then, after identifying the Iraqi implementing agencies (mostly national ministries), the MND-N CG implemented a process of "helicopter diplomacy" to substantially reconnect the ministries to the provinces, and link the ministries with the problems.

One critical factor behind the Iraqi strategy was the recognition that relevant Iraqi agencies and leaders had twice rebuilt their country from two devastating wars, and one of which was done under hugely restrictive sanctions. This may not be the case in Afghanistan.

In my view, the effort in Northern Iraq in 08 was to identify the way through to improved post-reconstruction, which, in that circumstance, identified Iraqi-focused solutions to connect Iraqi provinces and ministries, and deliver to them (not us) the knowledge, responsibility and power to move forward on their own. This may not be practical in Afghanistan.

The questions in Iraq were answered there, and thpose answers dictated specific solutions and actions.

If the new information systems answers the same basic questions, what will the answers be, and how we they drive solutions in Afghanistan?

Clearly, it is unlikely that the answers should be the same. Let's see what they learn...

[davidbfpo]

'Babatim' has commented on MG Flynn's report, as an "on the ground" commentator and outside officialdom worth reading IMHO: http://freerangeinternational.com/blog/?p=2479

(My added emphasis)This white paper is full of good things but all good things must come to an end and at the end of this paper there are no good things which I can detect.

He then adds a comment by a regular poster on the blog, by an in-country US intelligence analyst:

I read MG Flynn’s paper as well, and while he makes some excellent points, he failed to mention that part of the reason our intelligence sucks is that all our collectors are mostly stuck on the FOB. That’s why we’ve become so hooked on technical intelligence. The kind of relevant intelligence that Flynn yearns for comes from meaningful interaction with the populace, period. In my experience with Afghans, especially Pashtuns, if you suddenly roll up into their village with your MRAPs, Star Ship Trooper suits, and “foreign” interpreters (even if your terp is from Afghanistan, if he’s not from the neighborhood, he’s “foreign”), they will tell you two things: jack and sh*t. We are reminded constantly that Afghanistan is a country broken by decades of war; no one trusts one another. But trust is only obtained by building meaningful relationships with people, and our current force protection policies make the process of building rapport impossible. As I sit here at my desk, on an unnamed FOB in Regional Command East, I would dearly love to grab a few of my soldiers and head out to the local market to see what’s going on in town today. Perhaps I could report back to my leadership that local farmers are concerned about a drought next year because of the light snowfall this winter, or that the mullah down the street is preaching anti-coalition/government propaganda. I’d get this information from shop keepers and kids that I’ve built a relationship with over the past few months. But I cannot just walk off the FOB because that would be the end of my career. Instead, I’m going to check out BBC.com, call a couple guys I know like Tim, and continue to be disgruntled that I have NO idea what’s going on outside my FOB.

I think relationship building has featured before on many Afghan threads.

[Ken White]

The one precludes the other. You'd think someone would tumble to that simple little fact...

Excellent catch, David.

[Pete]

The following comments on the Flynn report are by Adam L. Silverman, Ph.D., a civilian analyst who was imbedded with the 1st Armored Division in Iraq:

I have sat in meetings dealing with this issue where the question was repeatedly brought up: "how come we don't have any information from this area?" Looking at the part of the map being referred to the simple response is that there is no military presence in the area, which means no PRT, no CA, and no HTT there either. Provincial Reconstruction, Civil Affairs, and Human Terrain members work very hard, but even they can't bring back primary source data from places that no one is operating in.

My second concern is that the military in general, seemingly derived from military intelligence, has two negative reinforcing dynamics: if you needed to know it you already would and if I know it and you don't, then I'm more powerful than you. Operationally relevant knowledge management will never be effective, regardless of the system that is put in place, until or unless this dynamic is broken! My third concern is that aggregation and collection of data into a centralized location, is still not going to solve the problem. The operational side of the House, whether hungry for information for non-lethal operations or intelligence for lethal ones must be fed!

The entire piece can be read using the link below.

http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts...feed_the_beast