Entropy has laid it out correctly.

In January 2008, MND-North held a conference on Reconstruction for Military and PRT actors.

MG Hertling's big point: If my orders now include reconstruction, and support or reconstruction, I need a plan to do that, or to know what the plan is to align my plan to it.

The week before, a big VTC was held at which TF Brinkley produced its "Plan" for recconstruction of Iraq. Disappointingly, it was like a generic textbook 101 edition of economic development, and had little use or purpose for ground direction. The consultant's answer was, we figured you would be responsible for ground-truthing our recommendations.

For the conference, the entire Embassy staff---Phyllis Powers (OPA Director) on down made presentations---each agency and department describing what they did.

After a few very disappointing Q&A's from the audience, MG Hertling took the mkie and clearly explained the problem. He ran a division of capable people with resources whose mission was now to deliver and/or support reconstruction and stability operations. They function on plans, and need to know what the civilian plan is to coordinate to and support it. What is the plan?

Stunning silence for a few minutes.

He asked again, looking directly at the OPA director. More silence.

Then he said. I need a plan to accomplish my mission. If you don't have a plan to reconstruct Northern Iraq, I need to create one. More silence.

Then he explained that, absent any plan form them, he would create one.

That's where and when the authorization, commitment and resources came to develop the research, analysis and strategies for Northern Iraq stability and reconstruction.

MND-North's entire operation yeilded and contributed to it. NGA got task orders. Systemic and synchronized strategies began. "Helicopter diplomacy" began---using MND-North helos to bring ministers to the problems. And conferences were held: Energy, Development, Water, etc... and things started moving.

Entropy's point: If they don't ask, they don't get. If they do, they do.

But, unlike Iraq, where there was one Crocker and one Petreaus working hand in glove, Afghanistan has many actors, and, many plans, and, I assume, no centralized responsibility chain equivalent to that of an MND CG in Iraq. "If everybody is in charge, nobody is!"

So, is MG Flynn really having the same "conversation," but at the higher level?

If so, does it create the watershed for resources that Hertling set off in Northern Iraq, or is it less than that?

How can the top intel officer indicate that his intel folks are reading tea leaves, and his field commanders reading the news accounts for current info, without a major signal to the White House and its civilian agencies that there is a huge gap between meaningful strategies and ground truth?

Entropy is right, but the question should not have ended with the intel folks.

Steve