Zero-Defects Mentality

[Cavguy]

Was the zero defects of the 1990s merely the unofficial resurrection of an old term?

Pete,

"Zero defects" was in colloquial use when I entered service in 1997 to describe the post-drawdown culture. It was an unofficial term to describe the perfection field grade officers felt was expected in order for promotion to higher grade. It grew to greater levels of absurdity resulting in a pre-9/11 attrition crisis among junior officers fed up with the army's culture. A good overview of the problem is the Army's own report on the problem from 2001 here:

WHAT THE FIELD TOLD US
OS-5. The soldiers interviewed in the field transmitted their thoughts in clear text and with passion. They
communicated the same passion and dedication for selfless service to the Nation and the Army as any
generation before them. Pride in the Army, service to the Nation, camaraderie, and Army values continue to
strongly influence the decisions of officers and their spouses to make the Army a career. However, they see
Army practices as being out of balance with Army beliefs. Below is a summation of what they said:
• While fully recognizing the requirements associated with a career in the Army, officers consistently made
comments that indicate the Army Culture is out of balance and outside their Band of Tolerance. They cited
the following examples:


 There is an undisciplined operational pace that affects every facet of Army life. Officers characterize it
as too many short-term, back-to-back deployments and exercises, trying to do too much with available
resources, too many non-mission and late taskings, too many directed training events, and senior leader
“can do” attitudes that put too much on the plate. This impacts predictability in their professional and
personal lives and the lives of their families.


 The Army expects more commitment from officers and their families than it currently provides.


 The Army is not meeting the expectations of officer cohorts. Junior officers are not receiving adequate
leader development experiences. Many captains and majors do not perceive a reasonable assurance of a
future because of the Army’s CGSOC selection policy. Many retirement eligible lieutenant colonels and
colonels do not feel valued for their experience and expertise.


 Top-down training directives and strategies combined with brief leader development experiences for
junior officers leads to a perception that micromanagement is pervasive. They do not believe they are being
afforded sufficient opportunity to learn from the results of their own decisions and actions.


 There is diminishing, direct contact between seniors and subordinates. This is evidenced by unit
leaders who are often not the primary trainers, leaders who are often not present during training, leaders
who are focused up rather than down, and leaders who are unwilling to turn down excessive and late
taskings. This diminishing contact does not promote cohesion and inhibits trust.


 Most officers have not fully embraced the current officer efficiency report. They do not like the term
center of mass, forced distribution, and senior rater profile management strategies.

• In the area of leader development, the field raised the following issues:


 Personnel management requirements drive operational assignments at the expense of quality
developmental experiences.


 Officers are concerned that the officer education system (OES) does not provide them the skills for
success in full spectrum operations.

• In the area of training, officers said:


 The CTCs are a great training and leader development experience, one the Army must sustain.


 Army training doctrine is fundamentally sound, but must be adapted to reflect the operational
environment and the tools required to train in that environment.


 Units cannot execute home station training in accordance with Army training doctrine because of the
undisciplined application of that doctrine, resource shortages, and limited training aids, devices, simulators,
and simulations (TADSS).

OEF/OIF has temporarily forestalled the deep cultural issues the report highlights. Much debate @ CGSC centers over when/whether the late 90s zero-defect culture will return to the Army.

[Entropy]

Just to add to Cavguy's excellent comment, the same zero defect mentality existed in the other services during the 1990's drawdown and, at least in the Air Force, it's continued to an extent in recent years with additional manpower cuts.

[Pete]

Thanks. I remember reading a newspaper report about that study at the time it came out. In 1994-95 as a DoD contractor I went to the Persian Gulf three times with medical logistics soldiers--they were good people, but all the stuff about their "excellence" and how "outstanding" they were seemed pretty overdrawn. It seemed pretty much like the same Army I had been in, even though I had been field artillery.