Haiti (Catch all)

[Jedburgh]

ICG, 18 Jul 07: Consolidating Stability in Haiti

Haiti’s security and stability remain fragile. President René Préval has endorsed national policies for security, police, justice and prison reform, but a weak state and decades, if not centuries, of institutional abandonment, make implementation slow, difficult and uneven. His first real success has been the dismantling of the toughest gangs in Port-au-Prince, but for this to be sustainable a community-friendly Haitian National Police (HNP) needs to be built under the security umbrella provided by the UN peacekeepers (MINUSTAH), infrastructure and economic opportunity must appear in the capital’s poor neighbourhoods, and comparable recovery and reconstruction have to be extended across the country....

[Jedburgh]

ICG, 14 Dec 07: Peacebuilding in Haiti: Including Haitians from Abroad

The UN mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) will not stay forever and, in any case, cannot be made responsible for solving Haiti’s manifold and deep-seated problems. The absence of adequate professional staff, sufficient financial resources and efficient management at all levels of government has delayed structural reforms and economic and social programs. The country needs institutional strengthening prior to its transition from President René Préval to his successor after the elections in 2011 – also the likely outside limit for MINUSTAH’s mandate. Otherwise, political polarisation along traditional cleavages will reappear, as will the risk of conflict. Training civil servants and increasing their salaries are important but insufficient to produce the advances Haitians are demanding. A serious and sustained initiative to include three million Haitians living abroad could overcome historic nationalistic mistrust of outsiders, bring a missing middle class within reach and help Haiti escape its “fragile state” status.....

Complete 34 page paper at the link.

[John T. Fishel]

Having worked on Haiti with respect to both PKO missions (1994 & 2004) I find myself dubious yet hopeful. Clearly, people can change. The Rene Preval of today is different from the man who took over the presidency in 1995. He seems to be wiser as well as older.

That said, the predatory culture of Haiti will not change overnight. But it must change if Haiti is ever to emerge from being the basket case of the Americas. In the process, Haitians will need to learn that to succeed they must help themselves. They cannot continue to rely on the UN or anyone else to give them handouts. I have been to a lot of poor countries (and poor regions in countries) in Latin America. But never have I been in a place like Haiti where people simply felt entitled to being given what they desired without having to work for it. The following anecdote describes what I mean: I was in a market and shopping for haitian crafts. I finally found a product I liked and bargained (briefly) for it. As I walked away with it, I was accosted by other craft sellers who said to me, "You bought from him, therefore you owe me your business."

So, while I hope that Preval and MINUSTAH have begun to chnge the Haitian culture, I remain dubious.

Cheers

JohnT

[Jedburgh]

USIP, 1 Sep 08: Haiti: Confronting the Gangs of Port-au-Prince

Summary

- Although ostensibly criminal in nature, the gangs of Port-au-Prince were an inherently political phenomenon. Powerful elites from across the political spectrum exploited gangs as instruments of political warfare, providing them with arms, funding, and protection from arrest.

- Beginning in 2006 and reaching its culmination in February 2007, the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) conducted a series of successful military and police operations against armed gangs, based in sanctuaries in Cité Soleil and other urban slums, that had terrorized the populace. The campaign resulted in the arrest of principal gang leaders and some eight hundred of their followers.

- UN operations followed a public announcement by Haiti’s president, René Préval, that the gangs must “surrender or die,” and a private request to the United Nations to take armed action. Préval’s call for action came after efforts to negotiate with the gangs proved futile.

- Antigang operations involved the Haiti National Police (HNP), the country’s only security force. HNP support for, and direct engagement in, these operations was essential to their success. Haitian police SWAT teams arrested most of the gang leaders.

- Although the UN assaults resulted in civilian casualties and extensive property damage, the great majority of Cité Soleil residents surveyed believed that the UN crackdown was justified.

- If MINUSTAH had not been willing and able to confront the gang threat, the likely consequences would have been the collapse of the Préval administration and the failure of the UN mission. The United Nations must be capable of mounting assertive operations to enforce its mandates, and it can succeed in such operations under the proper conditions if it summons the necessary resolve. MINUSTAH’s success in confronting the gang threat suggests that the conditions needed for successful mandate enforcement include unity of effort among mission leadership, local buy-in and support, actionable intelligence to guide operations, effective employment of Formed Police Units (FPUs), integrated planning of military, police, and civilian assistance efforts to fill the void left by the displacement of illegal armed groups, and holistic reform of, and international support for, the legal system.

[Jedburgh]

ICG, 18 Sep 08: Reforming Haiti's Security Sector

Operations led by the UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSTAH) largely disbanded armed gangs in the slums of Haiti’s cities in early 2007, but security and stability are far from consolidated. The failure to provide an immediate, visible peace dividend once the gangs’ hold was broken was a lost opportunity the still fragile country could ill afford. Now new threats are appearing. Serious crime persists, especially kidnapping and drug trafficking, and in the absence of a sufficiently large and fully operational police force and functioning justice and penitentiary systems, it threatens to undermine political progress. This was evidenced by the fall of Prime Minister Jacques-Edouard Alexis’s government following April 2008 protests and riots against high living costs. Security sector reform (SSR) is essential to stabilisation but has been plagued by serious institutional weaknesses.....

[Jedburgh]

CIGI, May 09: Security Sector Reform Monitor: Haiti

Inside

• Introduction

• Where There’s a Will...

• Judicial Reform

• Penitentiary Reform

• Police Reform

• Overview of Haiti’s Security Environment

• Concluding Observations

• Works Cited