Motivation vs. causation

[jmm99]

Hi Dayuhan et al,

My two centavos worth since I cite two posts.

We may be on the same page.

As close as I can come, AQ is waging global special operations warfare. If you want to say they are waging global unconventional warfare, that's OK since AQ's operations take place in areas it regards as "eneny-occupied" territory. See this post:

Hi John - part 2

As to "global", but not "insurgency" (except as part of the toolkit), see this post:

You're moving in the right direction

Those are my current best shots at the 25m target.

Regards

Mike

[Dayuhan]

As close as I can come, AQ is waging global special operations warfare. If you want to say they are waging global unconventional warfare, that's OK since AQ's operations take place in areas it regards as "eneny-occupied" territory. See this post:

I can agree with that. The problem I have with calling AQ an insurgency is that the term seems to invoke a reflexive "COIN" response, which in turn assumes a set of conditions that I don't believe are pertinent to this particular problem.

[Bob's World]

Nice to see more people noticing that "Global Insurgency" is a concept that probably confuses and hinders efforts against AQ far more than it helps.

Consider the following items that AQ lacks:

1. A state.
2. A populace.

Makes it kind of hard to hold a decent insurgency when you are lacking the two key ingredients. Like conducting a Global Margarita party, except without Tequila or Limes...

But one needs neither a state nor a populace to conduct UW. One only needs the will to incite and support insurgency among the populace of another's state, and the means to do so. The current information age provided AQ the Means to develop a UW network that incites and supports insurgency among Sunni Muslim populaces in a wide range of countries. To include your own, where ever you might currently be.

If you feel the urge to conduct COIN, I suggest, like charity, you begin at home. Ensure the populace of your own country is experiencing "Good Governance." That every significant segment of the populace perceives itself to be included; to be respected and have justice under the law; to have legitimate and effective means available to them to address their grievances and participate fully in the governmental process. That is good COIN. Do this and you will immunize your populace from possible infection from those like AQ who would come to your home and conduct UW for their own selfish, political ends.

COIN is typically waged in the countryside of lands far away; but Insurgency is won and lost in one's very own capital cities. Insurgency in the Philippines will fade when the Government in Manila finally decides to provide good governance to all of its populace equitably. Similarly in Kabul and Afghanistan.

When one can see COIN as simply governments doing what governments are supposed to do, day in and day out; with the military component of COIN only being implemented when the civil governance has lost control and needs some assistance, one is prepared to prevail. To think of COIN as warfare that is caused by insurgents is to let our politicians off the hook for their failures. Good COIN is “peacefare.” It denies Causation; and when Causation is denied, Motivation falls flat.

[Dayuhan]

Nice to see more people noticing that "Global Insurgency" is a concept that probably confuses and hinders efforts against AQ far more than it helps.

I noticed that about 30 seconds after reading the term for the first time. It took that long because I had to read it several times to convince myself that I was seeing what I thought I was seeing. Unfortunately, I was.

But one needs neither a state nor a populace to conduct UW. One only needs the will to incite and support insurgency among the populace of another's state, and the means to do so. The current information age provided AQ the Means to develop a UW network that incites and supports insurgency among Sunni Muslim populaces in a wide range of countries. To include your own, where ever you might currently be.

I wouldn't say AQ has been terribly successful at this. I think they've been more successful at using pre-existing insurgencies as tools and cover than they have at actually generating or exacerbating those insurgencies. In most cases where AQ is involved in local insurgency it is the local issues, not the AQ agenda, that drive the insurgents to fight.

COIN is typically waged in the countryside of lands far away; but Insurgency is won and lost in one's very own capital cities. Insurgency in the Philippines will fade when the Government in Manila finally decides to provide good governance to all of its populace equitably. Similarly in Kabul and Afghanistan.

In the Philippines probably true, though I wouldn't be holding my breath: Manila has neither the capacity nor the will to govern Mindanao effectively. in Afghanistan, I suspect we're discussing good governance when the actual problem is non-governance. To have a good government you have to have a government first, and I'm not sure the assemblage in Kabul qualifies. if it can't govern at all it certainly can't govern well, and our calling it a government doesn't make it one.

If the "government" is perceived as an externally imposed entity that is not likely to outlast external support backed by questionable commitment, it's not likely to attract much support. The key issue is not that governance is good or bad, but of acknowledgment that a legitimate government exists. That's why I suspect that in Afghanistan we're not seeing an insurgency fighting a government but an armed competition to fill a perceived political vacuum.

[Bob's World]

concur. What each populace requires of its governance is unique to that populace. As to your last point that goes to heart: Legitimacy. No government perceived as lacking legitimacy in the eyes of its own populace is likely to prevail when faced with a determined insurgency.

Said another way: If one is going to commit the blood, treasure, and reputation of their nation in the support of the government of another that is facing insurgency, ensure it is perceived as legitimate before the first drop, penny, or promise is spent.

Or said another way: If one backs an illigitimate government against an insurgency, expect that those same insurgents will target you as well. Particularly if they perceive that what legitimacy that government does have comes more from you than from sources that they recognize.

Also that "Official" does not necessarily mean the same as "Legitimate." In the eyes of the afgan people they probably recognize that the Karzai government is "official." Few, however, see it as "legitimate."

[slapout9]

concur. What each populace requires of its governance is unique to that populace. As to your last point that goes to heart: Legitimacy. No government perceived as lacking legitimacy in the eyes of its own populace is likely to prevail when faced with a determined insurgency.

Said another way: If one is going to commit the blood, treasure, and reputation of their nation in the support of the government of another that is facing insurgency, ensure it is perceived as legitimate before the first drop, penny, or promise is spent.

Or said another way: If one backs an illigitimate government against an insurgency, expect that those same insurgents will target you as well. Particularly if they perceive that what legitimacy that government does have comes more from you than from sources that they recognize.

Also that "Official" does not necessarily mean the same as "Legitimate." In the eyes of the afgan people they probably recognize that the Karzai government is "official." Few, however, see it as "legitimate."

So it all comes down to De Oppresso Liber (to liberate the oppressed). The original purpose that Special Forces were created in the first place.

[Dayuhan]

concur. What each populace requires of its governance is unique to that populace. As to your last point that goes to heart: Legitimacy. No government perceived as lacking legitimacy in the eyes of its own populace is likely to prevail when faced with a determined insurgency.

Said another way: If one is going to commit the blood, treasure, and reputation of their nation in the support of the government of another that is facing insurgency, ensure it is perceived as legitimate before the first drop, penny, or promise is spent.

Or said another way: If one backs an illigitimate government against an insurgency, expect that those same insurgents will target you as well. Particularly if they perceive that what legitimacy that government does have comes more from you than from sources that they recognize.

Also that "Official" does not necessarily mean the same as "Legitimate." In the eyes of the afgan people they probably recognize that the Karzai government is "official." Few, however, see it as "legitimate."

I agree... but I have to point out, again, that our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were not initiated in order to support a government, legitimate or otherwise, against insurgency. They were initiated to remove governments we found distasteful. Having succeeded in that, we then faced a situation where there was no government at all. That's a very difficult position to be in: a government installed by an occupying power is going to be perceived as illegitimate and not recognized as a government, but if the occupying power leaves without putting together some kind of government the probable result is a takeover by whatever armed force is left after the intervention. If armed force is distributed the likely outcome is civil war, with intervention by all manner of self-interested actors.

Compounding the problem is the tendency of the intervening power in these cases to pursue legitimacy in the eyes of its own constituents in its own country, rather than in the eyes of the occupied populaces. In order to justify intervention and make it appear legitimate the US government promised to pursue transitions to an electoral democracy along American lines, which may have been what the American populace wanted to hear but may not have been a very practical approach to the problem at hand. Of course the American people also wanted an intervention of limited duration, ideally with a fast withdrawal, and nobody seemed willing to tell them that these objectives were mutually exclusive.

If there's any lesson to be learned from all this it is that people who contemplate future regime change efforts need to put a lot more effort into realistic assessments of the challenges implicit in a post regime change environment. It's easy to say we made mistakes, and by any criteria we did, but I'm not convinced that any alternative course of action would have provided a quick magical transition to a functional government that was perceived as legitimate by all of the competing populaces in the picture. The task parameters were just not realistic from the start.

[Bob's World]

I agree... but I have to point out, again, that our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were not initiated in order to support a government, legitimate or otherwise, against insurgency. They were initiated to remove governments we found distasteful. Having succeeded in that, we then faced a situation where there was no government at all. That's a very difficult position to be in: a government installed by an occupying power is going to be perceived as illegitimate and not recognized as a government, but if the occupying power leaves without putting together some kind of government the probable result is a takeover by whatever armed force is left after the intervention. If armed force is distributed the likely outcome is civil war, with intervention by all manner of self-interested actors.

Compounding the problem is the tendency of the intervening power in these cases to pursue legitimacy in the eyes of its own constituents in its own country, rather than in the eyes of the occupied populaces. In order to justify intervention and make it appear legitimate the US government promised to pursue transitions to an electoral democracy along American lines, which may have been what the American populace wanted to hear but may not have been a very practical approach to the problem at hand. Of course the American people also wanted an intervention of limited duration, ideally with a fast withdrawal, and nobody seemed willing to tell them that these objectives were mutually exclusive.

If there's any lesson to be learned from all this it is that people who contemplate future regime change efforts need to put a lot more effort into realistic assessments of the challenges implicit in a post regime change environment. It's easy to say we made mistakes, and by any criteria we did, but I'm not convinced that any alternative course of action would have provided a quick magical transition to a functional government that was perceived as legitimate by all of the competing populaces in the picture. The task parameters were just not realistic from the start.

I believe that if there was a better understanding of the concept of Causation for insurgency in the U.S.; then we would have taken very different courses from what we instead embarked upon. I won't second guess the guys who made the decisions; but I think if they had been a bit more informed as to the nature of what they were attempting to manipulate through force of arms; they would have made better choices.

Fact is though, at that time you had Ph.D.'s ranting about Isalmism and the Caliphate; Intel guys looking hard for a state-based threat and pinning the WMD tail on our favorite Donkey Saddam; No one in DC second guessing the validity of our own post-cold war policy and how it might be contributing to the growing violence being directed back at the US; and EVERYONE wanting to exact a healthy dose of American-style revenge on someone; and to return our lives here at home back to normal.

That was then, this is now. The question is, what do we do now?

There are still plenty clinging to concepts and policies that have dug us an 8-year deep hole, be it out of loyalty, stubborness, or just what must be very rose colored lens perspectives. I think a clear order has been given to turn the ship around; I just don't know that we've picked a new heading yet.

[Ken White]

...In order to justify intervention and make it appear legitimate the US government promised to pursue transitions to an electoral democracy along American lines, which may have been what the American populace wanted to hear (Note 1) but may not have been a very practical approach to the problem at hand (Note 2). Of course the American people also wanted an intervention of limited duration (Note 3), ideally with a fast withdrawal, and nobody seemed willing to tell them that these objectives were mutually exclusive (Note 4).

Good post. Note 1 - Few did. Note 2 - Inane if not insane. Note 3 - True; as they most always have and will; most of all they want success, preferably quickly. Note 4 - Absolutely and probably the Bush admins greatest failing and certainly the part that spread much egg on the face of everyone in DoD and the Army in particular...

...The task parameters were just not realistic from the start.

True, two valid tasks; retribution for 9/11 (Not necessary for some societies but quite important for the ME / south Asia) and notice to the ME to stop the attacks on US interests around the world. Regrettably, flawed execution blunted both messages. Fortunately, the recipients understood the message in spite of the errors even if most of the European hearth did not. Both operations will most likely (almost certainly, I believe) eventually be successful in achieving those goals but it sure didn't have to be this hard.

Your principal point is the takeaway:

If there's any lesson to be learned from all this it is that people who contemplate future regime change efforts need to put a lot more effort into realistic assessments of the challenges implicit in a post regime change environment.

I'd go a step further and say said assessment should result in a determination to not remove such regimes, ever. Just punish those who harm US interests in various ways. We can do that, have done it in the past and we really do that fairly well.

OTOH, we do not do the FID / Stability Operation / 'Nation Building' thing at all well -- mostly for the reasons you cited earlier in another post -- and never have, Small Wars and the Marines in the Caribbean and Central America, the Army in the Philippines included. Not least because we simply do not have the patience for it and are not willing to spend the time for that budding nation to grow.

[Entropy]

Dayuhan,

All great points. I think one could argue that Afghanistan remains in a state of civil war.