What would you change about current ops in Iraq?

[Steve Blair]

I would say again that the firebase syndrome came directly from Vietnam and the perceived need to keep a draftee army "fat and happy" in the basecamps when not out slogging through the bush. Not only is it damaging to building relationships with the local populace, it raises the cost of any involvement dramatically. Base camps don't just spring out of thin air. They take money to build and troops to man and guard. Drawing from the historical examples, a four company battalion in Vietnam had to leave at least one company on "palace guard" at any given time. One quarter of the combat strength was unavailable for operations, or things like CAP and RD.

There is an enduring myth that American troops cannot live in the field without their running water, Internet cafes, and ice cream. Though it's been proven time and again that they can live in the field, and often do so very effectively, the base camp has been very hard to get away from.

[Merv Benson]

Steve,

My recollection of firebases in Vietnam is of isolated hill tops with a few 105's and sandbagged bunkers. Troops were dependent on choppers bringing in supplies including water. It was definitely nothing like the forward operating bases in Iraq. It was really a way to control space with a minimal amount of force. My company cleared the way for the installation of one of the first on Dong Ha Mountain where we also found the 75 mm pack howitzer that was used to harass Camp Carrol. I think that pack howitzer is in a Marine museum now.

[slapout9]

Good observation merv. They were called firebases for a reason. Also I never saw a General Officer wear a Miami Vice shoulder holster like some of them do now. The nickname for this holster by Police officers was a "Jackass Rig." Wonder if this why we are loosing??

[Steve Blair]

Steve,

My recollection of firebases in Vietnam is of isolated hill tops with a few 105's and sandbagged bunkers. Troops were dependent on choppers bringing in supplies including water. It was definitely nothing like the forward operating bases in Iraq. It was really a way to control space with a minimal amount of force. My company cleared the way for the installation of one of the first on Dong Ha Mountain where we also found the 75 mm pack howitzer that was used to harass Camp Carrol. I think that pack howitzer is in a Marine museum now.

This certainly happened with the Marine Corps and some units of the 101st that operated in I Corps, but if you get down to some of the Army organizations in III Corps there was a different mentality. Perhaps I should have used the term base areas or something similar as opposed to the combat fire base, which was often a rather sparse operation (especially in the period after 1968 when the First Cavalry Division began using battalion-sized camps that were only opened for a few days and then closed out). However, the same could not be said of the more developed complexes around Saigon. I think what we may be seeing now is that same mindset, but they happen to be using more "combative" names.

[979797]

Troop formations and close-order drill are a good thing for transitioning civilians into soldiers. You gotta have it for your conventional combat units.

What you need for counterinsurgency though are units that can act independently and with initiative. A captain (or even staff NCO) who is presented with a crisis of perhaps strategic proportions and is given the ability to resolve it without having to "call the six". From an Army perspective, Special Forces has this capability (although I've heard some friends there lamenting how "big Army" is slowly sinking its claws into the organization).

The only way to graduate soldiers to the level I'm talking about are to train 'em hard as recruits first. I feel that the current Army basic training regimen and syllabus is woefully lacking in this regard. The Marines still kick our ass in this category. Once seasoned with a few hard years in a line unit, they can be ready to move into special units that are given latitude in operational planning and decision-making and are free from micro-management.

I also think soldiers serving here (at least the squad-level leadership and up) need REAL cultural training. I'm not talking about the silly "Arabs consider the left hand dirty" type kindergarten ####. I mean the real, in-depth "how does an Arab think and feel" GRADUATE-LEVEL type knowlege. Why do our leaders still make decisions and assesments based on western education and values? For all you "Boydists" out there, you cannot get inside the enemy's OODA loop thinking like a westerner. You get inside it and think LIKE AN ARAB THINKS!!

There is a lieutenant in my supported unit who is a company XO. He was amazed at the books in my PSYOP team's collection and he wanted to read them. #### that I thought was basic-level stuff that my team and I had read or at least looked at and discussed. I have the advantage of a team member who serves on a congressional staff as a middle-eastern specialist, but still... what sort of prep work had this LT been doing apart from an NTC rotation and checking off the blocks on a CTT worksheet?

On the bright side though, in the same company, is a staff sergeant who trades books with me all the time. So, there is always hope...

I perused the board in which everyone here introduces themselves and was disappointed to see so few who wrote "I'm an active-duty Army infantry (or armor, or FA, or whatever) officer/NCO in Iraq thirsty for knowlege and looking to truly win the counterinsurgency fight here." There are so many who are "former" or "retired" and this is well and good. Especially for the guys who served in 'Nam. There are many lessons to be drawn from that conflict and can be applied here (as well as many that can't). But this board should be overwhelmed with current leaders who are looking for more answers and bouncing ideas off eachother. God knows we have enough access to the Internet.

Anyway, I'll step off my soapbox (or, rather shut off my loudspeaker).

[SWJED]

I also think soldiers serving here (at least the squad-level leadership and up) need REAL cultural training. I'm not talking about the silly "Arabs consider the left hand dirty" type kindergarten ####. I mean the real, in-depth "how does an Arab think and feel" GRADUATE-LEVEL type knowlege.

Well said...

[CPT Holzbach]

There is a lieutenant in my supported unit who is a company XO. He was amazed at the books in my PSYOP team's collection and he wanted to read them. #### that I thought was basic-level stuff that my team and I had read or at least looked at and discussed. I have the advantage of a team member who serves on a congressional staff as a middle-eastern specialist, but still... what sort of prep work had this LT been doing apart from an NTC rotation and checking off the blocks on a CTT worksheet?

On the bright side though, in the same company, is a staff sergeant who trades books with me all the time. So, there is always hope...

Hey 979797, would you be able to list some of those books here? I'd love to hear what you consider must-reads. And on a side note, your location says "Rustamiyah". Does that mean FOB Rustamiyah, Baghdad? If so, how are things going there? I was stationed there with 3ID through 2005. Lemme know how stuff is going there.

[jcustis]

979797,

I've read both of your posts and think they are spot on!!! Welcome to the forum...

[marct]

I also think soldiers serving here (at least the squad-level leadership and up) need REAL cultural training. I'm not talking about the silly "Arabs consider the left hand dirty" type kindergarten ####. I mean the real, in-depth "how does an Arab think and feel" GRADUATE-LEVEL type knowlege. .... For all you "Boydists" out there, you cannot get inside the enemy's OODA loop thinking like a westerner. You get inside it and think LIKE AN ARAB THINKS!!

There is a lieutenant in my supported unit who is a company XO. He was amazed at the books in my PSYOP team's collection and he wanted to read them. #### that I thought was basic-level stuff that my team and I had read or at least looked at and discussed. I have the advantage of a team member who serves on a congressional staff as a middle-eastern specialist, but still... what sort of prep work had this LT been doing apart from an NTC rotation and checking off the blocks on a CTT worksheet?

979797, you've got some really good points here. I guess that my main questions would be a) how do you go about doing it and b) how do you sell it institutionally?

Back in WWII, there was a concerted effort to get inside the heads of the Japanese. Given that the traditional methods of doing ethnographies couldn't be used, Ruth Benedict pioneered a new method - "culture at a distance" (see The Chrysanthemum and The Sword). This method allowed her to get a gut-level (i.e. internal, "intuitive") understanding of Japanese culture that was worth a lot more than a Western, intellectual knowledge based understanding (i.e. typical graduate level stuff, at least in Canada).

The start of this methodology, however, was with reading the "basic level stuff", followed by a sensory immersion into everything she could find (language, film, food, clothing, etc.). From what I have seen, which I will admit is woefully inadequate , I get the feeling that, barring Maj. Gen Mattis' 2003 work towards this, there seems to be very little work on institutionally supporting this type of training for troops going on regular deployments. Is it possible that the LT you mentioned is from a unit where the emphasis is on "real military training, not that fuzzy ####"?

Another question, again coming from my ignorance, is given that you have such a great library and obvious expertise in the area, are you tasked with any in-field training? I'm asking, because one of the roles that Anthropologists traditionally played when working with non-Anthropologists was as in-field trainers in both the local culture and, perhaps more importantly, in the attitudes and perceptions of how to analyze and get to know a local culture.

Marc

[Tom Odom]

Marc,

Much of what is bandied about currently on cultural sensitivity is often easy to say and impossible to do. We cannot make cultural experts of every soldier; we have enough challenges making sure that our soldiers are trained and proficient in their specific and general skill sets.

979797 as a PSYOP guy is in the business of anticipatory analysis of the enemy. My business as a foreign area officer was heavily oriented in that regard per your discussion of immersion training. see http://www.tamu.edu/upress/BOOKS/2005/odom.htm for my experiences in that regard.

still 979797 is absolutely correct: we do need to prepare our soldiers to think and open their minds when they deal with foreign cultures. for that matter, we need to prepare some senior leaders as well (I was reading Tom Ricks' Fiasco last night).

I start with 2 basic rules:

They (fill in the culture) don't think like you do

They (fill in the culture) have an agenda in everything they do with you

If I can get those basics across, then the listener can began on the right track rather than mirroring.

It also cuts back on assuming everyone loves or hates us. Ricks book has a fantastic discussion of walking with a patrol as its members tell him how much the Iraqis love Americans. He parallels it with insights gained from the locals via interpreters (I assume) that say exactly the opposite.

Hopefully as a soldier develops he will continue to develop and broaden his analytical framework so that he truly starts to think like his enemy (or ally). The same applies in strategic and tactical intelligence analysis. getting inside a guy's head starts with understanding his mental framework is different. it is remarkable to me the number of analysts who balk at looking at motivations and intentions. they dismiss it as voodoo analysis, preferring discussions of recorded actions and speeches. My response is that it is voodoo. It is the voodoo that I do if I wish to anticipate what my opponent is likely to do. Merely digesting actions and spoken communications is history.

Best
Tom

[marct]

Hi Tom,

Thanks for the response. I seem to be having problems with my browser today and this is the third time I'm trying to post a response. I think I'll write them in notepad and then cut and paste them from now on ....

In all honesty, I really hate the term "cultural sensitivity" - probably because it is a very politically charged fad in academia that seems to mean "I'm as good as you are" (said in a whiney voice). I far prefer the term "culturally aware" or something similar, just to avoid the PC quagmire.

Funny you should mention Fiasco - I just finished it last night. I think that Ricks does a fantastic job of highlighting the problems in both strategic thought, operational planning and pre-deployment training.

On your two points, I would definately agree. I usually have a similar discussion with my students when I'm trying to communicate something from a culture that they aren't familiar with, although I also try and invert those questions as well - "How do you think" and "What are your motivations?". That way, it is possible to identify overlaps and commonalities of interest as, at the least, the begining point of an ongoing discussion/collaboration.

I think your point about the ongoing development of the individual soldier as a rational, thinking being is a really crucial one. The ability to analyze a situation and take appropriate action is absolutely crucial to everyone, be they soldier, politician or civilian. Being able to "step into the mind" of your opponent, i.e. looking at their motivations as well as their behaviours, is absolutely crucial. Musashi makes that point in the Third Book of the Book of Five Rings, as does Sun Tsu.

When you were mentioning "voodoo analysis", I just had to laugh. I have read way too many academic papers that had absolutely brilliant analyses that were totally off base because the analyst never considered either their own motivations and biases or those of the speaker. I used to have one particular article that I would give my students that really highlighted that - a gorgeous, methodologically rigorous psychology paper that clearly proved that everyone who didn't agree with a particular Christian denomination was demon haunted . Unfortunately, I have noticed similarities with some of the analyses coming out of Iraq.

Marc