What would you change about current ops in Iraq?

**marct** · 08-16-2006

Hi Tom,

Thanks for the response. I seem to be having problems with my browser today and this is the third time I'm trying to post a response. I think I'll write them in notepad and then cut and paste them from now on

....

In all honesty, I really hate the term "cultural sensitivity" - probably because it is a very politically charged fad in academia that seems to mean "I'm as good as you are" (said in a whiney voice). I far prefer the term "culturally aware" or something similar, just to avoid the PC quagmire.

Funny you should mention Fiasco - I just finished it last night. I think that Ricks does a fantastic job of highlighting the problems in both strategic thought, operational planning and pre-deployment training.

On your two points, I would definately agree. I usually have a similar discussion with my students when I'm trying to communicate something from a culture that they aren't familiar with, although I also try and invert those questions as well - "How do you think" and "What are your motivations?". That way, it is possible to identify overlaps and commonalities of interest as, at the least, the begining point of an ongoing discussion/collaboration.

I think your point about the ongoing development of the individual soldier as a rational, thinking being is a really crucial one. The ability to analyze a situation and take appropriate action is absolutely crucial to everyone, be they soldier, politician or civilian. Being able to "step into the mind" of your opponent, i.e. looking at their motivations as well as their behaviours, is absolutely crucial. Musashi makes that point in the Third Book of the Book of Five Rings, as does Sun Tsu.

When you were mentioning "voodoo analysis", I just had to laugh. I have read way too many academic papers that had absolutely brilliant analyses that were totally off base because the analyst never considered either their own motivations and biases or those of the speaker. I used to have one particular article that I would give my students that really highlighted that - a gorgeous, methodologically rigorous psychology paper that clearly proved that everyone who didn't agree with a particular Christian denomination was demon haunted

. Unfortunately, I have noticed similarities with some of the analyses coming out of Iraq.

Marc

**Culpeper** · 08-17-2006

Originally Posted by nichols

This is the key to success. It doesn't matter where you are or how fluent you are in a language. When the local people see this grass roots level activities, they respond accordingly.

The kick in the teeth is that we have been talking about the Strategic Corporal for some time, Distributed Operations for about two years now but we as a military are still attached to the base/PX/shower embellical cord mentality of WW II.

My first change would be to eliminate all types of troop formations and close order drill.

These have the effect of cognitively teaching the troops the herd mentality.

The Marines have some experience at this.

Combined Action Companies (CAC).

"These Marines entered into the life of the village where they were assigned, and became an integral part of its defenses. To the Popular Force platoons they could offer training in weaponry and tactics, and effective communications -- vital for supporting fires or reinforcements; and to the communities involved, they offered a very real Marine-to-the-people civic action program, including medical aid." The Marines in Vietnam 1954-1973: An Anthology and Annotated Bibliography. USMC, 1973, 49.

Also, known as Combined Action Platoons and Combined Action Program.

The Marine Corps’ Combined Action Program and Modern Peace Operations-Common Themes and Lessons

The mixed performance of U.S. forces in recent low intensity conflicts or "small wars", i.e. Vietnam (counterinsurgency) and Somalia (peace operation), has been due in part to a failure to understand the political, economic, social, and cultural factors at work in the area of operations. The Combined Action Program (CAP) of the Vietnam War has been frequently cited by military historians as an example of a successful small wars operation, this because the CAP did have cultural aspect. The U.S. Marine Corps-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) portion of the 1992-1995 UN operation in Somalia was successful partly because it applied lessons learned from Marine Corps small wars experience from the Central American "Banana Wars" of the 1930's and the CAP in Vietnam.

**SWJED** · 08-17-2006

Originally Posted by Culpeper

The Marines have some experience at this.

Combined Action Companies (CAC).

Much more on CAP / CAC in our very own SWJ Reference Library in the Vietnam War - U.S. / Allies section. CORDS too...

**zenpundit** · 08-19-2006

Provide significant incentives in terms of pay and promotion for FL skill acquisition in critical languages (Pashto, Arabic, Urdu, Farsi, CA Turkic languages, Chinese)

Increase the proportion of NCO's relative to officers and enlisted men.

Increase the number of field officers for the CIA D.O., particularly those without diplomatic cover. Ditto for DIA

Apply the the principle of "jointness" to Mil-IC-State- Aid agencies

Accept that intervention tasks requires a military that emphasizes career specialization in a particular region as welll as military skill-sets. No, every man is not an FAO but 30 years (mostly) in the Mideast/CENTCOM creates enough " old hands" in case of major actions.

The next "occupation", wherever it is, begins with a proper military governorship before we start screwing around with P.R. facades

And then I will part the waters....

**Ray** · 08-20-2006

Much of what is bandied about currently on cultural sensitivity is often easy to say and impossible to do. We cannot make cultural experts of every soldier; we have enough challenges making sure that our soldiers are trained and proficient in their specific and general skill sets.

First off is that my comments are based on the Indian experience and it is not for me to comment on the environment faced by the US Army. It is just sharing experiences.

India is a vast country with is multi ethnic, multi lingual with multiple customs and tradition and multi religious. The dialects change with every districts

Therefore, there is no common denominator as such when cultural sensitivities and lingual differences are being confronted.

The Indian Army has practically quelled the insurgencies in the North East and is still battling the cross border terrorism in Kashmir, though on a much lower threat than before. This is because of the exacting requirements to win the hearts and minds (it is often stated that we are combating terrorism with one hand tied behind our backs).

In my long stint in Kashmir, I found that it was essential to impress upon and teach the soldiers the culture of the place they are operating in as also some were taught the language (and in Kashmir, there are many languages and cultures). We had classes pre induction as also ongoing while in the Insurgency area. While one cannot state that 100% responded to the teaching in the manner desired, yet because a large majority did, we were able to interact and because of the same, we obtained favourable results.

I feel it is absolutely essential to know the culture and language (smattering, if nothing else) of the people where one is operating in.

I daresay that the American soldiers are better educated than the Indian soldiers, though these days all Indian soldiers have to be high school pass.

In so far as the skills that the Indian Army has to apply itself to is again multi-dimensional since tactics change for each type of environment the soldiers have to operate it - high altitude, mountains, hills, plains, deserts, jungles, plains with Ditch cum Bunds and so on. All ranks have to be proficient in operations for each of these environment.

**Steve Blair** · 08-21-2006

Outstanding input, Ray! I, for one, am always interested in the experiences other armies have had with this type of warfare. And, for the reasons you pointed out, I would expect that the Indian army might have many lessons to share. Thanks!

**RTK** · 08-28-2006

1). Basic and AIT would include Rosetta Stone language training like the officer basic course and captain's career courses are including now.

2). The state department would leave the Green Zone.

3). The Army would begin to think of FID and IDAD as principles of COIN, not just SOF core missions.

4). That everyone in the Army would know what the acronyms in point 3 mean.

5). Brigade commanders would put out a reading list 1 year before deployment (like H.R. McMaster did with 3 ACR).

6). That Brigade commanders and below would read the reading list.

7). That we'd teach our soldiers that kinetics don't win COIN.

8). That we, as leaders, have the balls to fire subordinate leaders if they suck. That includes Division commanders firing brigade commanders.

9). That we, as troop commanders and above, would do a better job at promoting the good deeds done daily through the media.

10). That SECFOR companies and American soldiers didn't have to guard trucks with 31 flavors for superFOBs from Kuwait.

11). That SuperFOBs would disappear and the firebase concept was embraced, like it was in Tal Afar.

**SSG Rock** · 08-28-2006

Your deployment orders are being published now.

**Jimbo** · 09-24-2006

Better screening of advisors for foreign militaries

Pre-deployment training would have instruction with how to work with host-nation forces

devlopment of training plan for national police forces/paramilitaries (something we do poorly)

Agreement and execution of inter-agency responsibilities in the COIN fight.

**CaptCav_CoVan** · 11-14-2006

I was a member of the first Combined Action Company (later called Combined Action Platoons or CAPs, also know as the Combined Action Program) in Phu Bai when it was started in Auguest 1965. We took two squads of volunteers who were interviewed and screened, and paired them up with the Popular Force Platoons in Phu Bai 3 and Phu Bai 4. The Marines lived right in the village (we had a grass and tin hooch) with sandbagged defensive pits outside. We spent the days training the PFs and the evenings going out on patrol with them. Another FO and I shot in concentrations around the villages at the direction of the village chiefs. The chiefs gave each concentration a name, like "Mongoose" or "Rat". We worked up the coordinates for each of the concntrations and had them posted in the FDC and FSCC. We had Vietnamese liaison officers who stood watch in the FDC and were in communication with the village chiefs through Motorola radios. When the village chief wanted illumination, he called in the animal name of the concentration and the word "light." When he wanted HE, he called in the animal name of the concentration and "boom." By having our troops living in the village, 3/4 also had a a ready reaction force, including tanks, that could be deployed since the villages were only 2 klicks away, and we could bring down arty on any target around the village. I have proposed to several general officers to the idea of formally establishing a CAP program in Iraq. So far, only 3/1 had anything resembling a CAC, and they Marines did not stay with the forces at night. We shall see....