The U.S. military's experience with insurgencies spans its history from the American Revolution to its recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. The current geostrategic environment is fertile for global insurgency, primarily the threat of radical Islamic extremists who have learned to leverage 21st century technologies to enhance their strategic power projection capability. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has recognized these emerging threats, has labeled them as irregular security challenges, and appears to have prioritized them ahead of traditional conventional challenges. Dr Stephen Metz and LTC Raymond Millen, analysts at the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, have described the current period as an "age of insurgency," similar to the period 1950s to 1980s, and indicate that this period will continue for the next several decades. To meet these challenges, civilian and military leaders and planners must change the way they think about the complex challenges of prosecuting a counterinsurgency campaign. Strategic policy makers must question the viability of achieving victory over a global insurgency or just managing it to some acceptable level. In the end, leaders and planners must review and, where necessary, refine or adapt their strategy, operational concepts, doctrine, and organizations to address the global insurgency environment. When doing so, they must lift the right lessons from history and be cautious not to provide prescriptive solutions but principles. DoD transformational efforts only partially address the current gap between strategy and capabilities.
PURPOSE
This paper will examine the adequacy of current U.S. counterinsurgency strategic policy, operational concepts, and doctrine and then through analysis of two case studies, the British Army in Malaya 1948-1960 and the United States Army in the Philippines 1898-1902, provide insights for strategic leaders and planners and proposals for inclusion in future doctrinal updates.
Recent operations have exposed gaps in our current strategic policy. Senior leaders interviewed after the end of major combat operations indicated that the Army and DoD sought to develop counterinsurgency strategy early in the war, but other elements of government were unprepared. They claimed that no strategic policy guidance was available to the commanders in Iraq so military operations could be coordinated with strategic policy objectives for the country.
Counterinsurgency: Relearning How to Think
Bookmarks