Because that's when they developed the doctrine (although it was a process that began after World War I). I take it seriously because it was there. They also had effective measures in place as early as 1917. Deciding to ignore it (as some Luftwaffe commanders certainly did) doesn't mean they didn't have the doctrine. And because AAC efforts worked in some places and cases doesn't mean they actually had good doctrine, no matter what the postwar spin might claim.Originally Posted by Fuchs
If you look at the AAC, they had a vested interest in making interdiction and strategic bombardment work, because that was part of their cornerstone for an independent air force. CAS...not so much. But to get back to Ganluv's question, there were a number of reasons why Allied ground commanders appeared 'squirrely' about using CAS. Coordination wasn't always idea, communications weren't always great, and sometimes the aircraft just weren't made available. When it worked, it tended to work OK (with some exceptions). The sad thing is that little of that was actually preserved in the postwar period and had to be relearned.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
You know, the invasion in Normandy and reconquering of France was not an all-U.S. effort... the empire's air power over France '44 was greater than what the Luftwaffe had on disposal at its best times, too.
Montgomery's forces were still known to be rather slow during their advance.
I never said that it was an all-US effort. I was speaking to Ganluv's question, and my experience lies more with the AAC (hence my focus on its response and doctrinal/ideological preferences). If you've got some relevant research/experience with the RAF and its CAS doctrine, please feel free to add to my comments on the AAC. The more, the merrier!
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Here one can disagree:
1) MvC used data sets which were provided by Dupuy, who listed and analysed battles in Italy 1943 and found a higher effectiveness of German forces, independent of type. Have you better data, that refute Dupuy's?
(In hard science I provide better data or shut up :-))
2) The overall approach is valid on base of Dupuy's data. I agree that your approach would give additional insight, but this does not change the valid basic concept and would be IMHO a different project.
3) McC's comparisonon of US forces of 1943/44 and German structures of 1941/42 is flawed, he should have analysed the 1943 units in Italy. Especially the depleted officer/NCO corps.
4) Some of his conclusions are wrong.
5) However, many of the tables and comparisons (secondary data) presented by MvC are still very valuable even when I disagree with some conclusions he draw from them.
He may be correct or wrong; his approach is a poor one and was likely based with the reception among anglophone readers in mind.*
As a general principle you should use datasets that have as few as possible secondary influence factors. He basically took totally noisy samples instead of using much less noisy samples as would have been available if he had used exclusively U.S.Army-related or exclusively German army-related sources.
I do not remember any of the advanced empirical tools from his books, nothing as complicated as the statistical suff used in econometrics on comparably noisy datasets, for example. Nowadays you wouldn't get a diploma in economics if you made an econometric diploma dissertation with a noisy dataset and as simple statistical analysis. It would be considered as a no-show job.
In short, he wrote at best an inspiring popular science book. His other works weren't more advanced either.
*: A criqitue of the methodology does not require a counter-argument or -analysis concerning the facts.
Last edited by Fuchs; 03-13-2012 at 10:33 AM.
Sorry, I think you miss the point:
MvC did not use own data, but ones provided by Dupuy, so he lives or dies with the quality of Dupuys data. Do you assume or have evidence that Dupuys data are fawlty?
Frankly, why should Dupuy use only US or German data, that would be poor methodology. You use reliable US data for the US side and German for the German side.
You miss the point about noise and why only one side should be used to extract the desired insight.
I explained that already and it's pointless to repeat that, though.
Anyway how would one describe the Stuka attack on the Metaxa line? It was of course a relative special case of CAS against a modern bunker systems in very difficult terrain in support of mountain troops with rather limited bunker-busting firepower at their disposal.
Last edited by Firn; 03-13-2012 at 08:50 PM.
... "We need officers capable of following systematically the path of logical argument to its conclusion, with disciplined intellect, strong in character and nerve to execute what the intellect dictates"
General Ludwig Beck (1880-1944);
Speech at the Kriegsakademie, 1935
The doctrine behind such actions is not CAS, but Schwerpunkt; the scharfes Zusammenfassen (difficult to translate; 'decisive resolute concentrating' maybe). The German military did a lot f unusual things (including the air attack orchestra at Sedan) when it betted on success in one small area for an operational purpose. Air power can move its focus by hundreds of kilometres in a matter of hours or a day, and consequently the Luftwaffe has been called upon even for purposes it did not usually meet.
By the way; a bit more related to the official topic:
http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot....ale-kinda.html
I guess we could fill pages discussing the phenomena visible in this short clip...
Something like what the Greeks did at Gaugamela?
If you don’t read the newspaper, you are uninformed; if you do read the newspaper, you are misinformed. – Mark Twain (attributed)
Alexander followed rather the U.S. idea of a CoG; he went for the critical vulnerability without truly massing his forces at a point (other than companion cavalry).
The original Schwerpunkt is more like Epaminondas' oblique order at Leuctra even though it occasionally did hit a strong point, which is not required for the German post-1871 interpretation of a Schwerpunkt.
Last edited by Fuchs; 03-14-2012 at 01:08 PM.
I'd like to take this back to the original issue of combat particpation. The initial issue deals with soldiers in actual combat....whether or not they fight. I've not noticed any reference to those who avoid getting into the fight at all despite years of training for "the fight".
I bring this up because I've seen many, both officers and NCOs, who've avoided deploying to Iraq or A'stan. In some cases, these have been infantry officers (active duty) with all of the cool-guy badges, schools, and assignments. I have yet to figure out what motivates them to avoid combat participation despite all of their preparation.
Thoughts?
Reason and knowledge.
You forgot...
Lack of principle. Or ethical lapse. Either is also appropriate.
Neither of those apply if reason tells them that these wars serve no purpose for the nation (a not really far-fetched conclusion).
Especially those who joined pre-2001 with the idea of actually serving and defending their country - instead of the constant nonsense bullying and meddling of the last ten year - may be prone to rejecting deployments, having seen too much of the reality.
Según me dicen, one’s relationships with those in his/her unit tend to be the single most important motivating factor for those in combat situations. If that is indeed the case it should hold true in spite of and possibly even more strongly because of one’s own assessment of the grander design.
If you don’t read the newspaper, you are uninformed; if you do read the newspaper, you are misinformed. – Mark Twain (attributed)
The path followed by a Marine
I'm not competent to speak personally to this topic.
I offer the following as one path an officer might consider even though he has reached the firm conclusion that the war is lost. The Marine was Bill Corson (CAP's Formative Years) (emphasis added):
The context of the reference (why he went) occurs earlier in the speech:It (this decision [by MACV]) can be used to prove that our use of the CAP concept, beginning in 1966, was doomed to ultimate failure because it was at least two years too late. I knew that before I went to Vietnam, but I agreed to take on the job because, as I mentioned above, my purpose was to save Marine and Vietnamese lives. Lives, in my opinion, that would have otherwise been lost in the pursuit of a futile military and political strategy.
Food for thought on the positive side.The search for a measurement of success for the CAP program is elusive. Remember, the United States lost the war. Did the CAPs make a difference? The answer is an unhesitating YES! On the quantative side there are many thousands of Vietnamese alive today who would have either not survived the war or been able to procreate if not for the CAPs. On the qualitative side, the young men who exceeded my greatest hopes, and those of Lew [Walt] and the Brute [Krulak], were forever changed for the better by their experience in "their" hamlets. One cannot attend a CUVA reunion without a sense of pride in knowing men such as those kids. In recent years some wives and children have attended our reunions. My conversations with those folks are treasured memories.
Regards
Mike
We will have to disagree on that.
First, neither you nor they nor I are really in a position to determine what serves the nation's purpose. We can have an opinion but that's all it will be, an opinion. That, to me, is not adequate to make a decision to abrogate an oath no one made you take...
More importantly and pertinent, service is voluntary. No one has to take the oath but if you take an oath, you either live with it or do not, period.Nonsense it may be but that's not the call of those who elected to serve. If one is not willing to play by the rules (when they are easily available for all to see and know...), one should seek another game.Especially those who joined pre-2001 with the idea of actually serving and defending their country - instead of the constant nonsense bullying and meddling of the last ten year - may be prone to rejecting deployments, having seen too much of the reality.
Just like marriage, you don't have to say "I do" but once you do that you either work it out honorably or you do not -- and that is NOT advocating blind obedience; I was disobedient a bunch of times -- but I did not fail to do what I said I would even opr go where competently ordered when I disagreed with what was required. On two occasions I was told to do things I thought were very wrong, I refused and that was the end of that.
Reason -- and logic -- are important. Honor is an intangible. All are needed for humans. Knowledge is also important -- it can also be deceptive. It's been my observation that a number of very intelligent, erudite people are about half as smart as they seem to think they are. Those are the folks that tend to think the rules or norms do not apply to them.
Shows they really aren't all that smart; the norms always apply...
ganulv has it right. Voluntarily assumed responsibility should trump both logic and reason
Last edited by Ken White; 03-15-2012 at 01:16 AM.
I'd be interested on where you found these. I haven't seen them. The deployment avoiders I've seen over the last 10 years have generally been CSS junior enlisted with external issues, often those that joined AFTER the war started.
Interesting comment.
I would be interested to hear why some who join during 'wartime' seek to avoid combat service.
I would have thought it would have been that some of those who joined a peace time army (for all the wrong reasons) may wish to avoid a combat tour.
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