Combat Participation

[Firn]

Personally I have not seen any American Soldiers shy away from fighting, but as Ken mentioned in the more elite units such as SF and the Airborne Infantry there is a warrior culture which reduces the likelyhood of that happening. A friend many years ago said there are no better warriors than the Americans, Brits, Aussies and Canadians, there is just something in those cultures that produce men who like to fight. While simplistic, there seems to be degree of truth in that statement. Thoughts

As you said it is pretty simplistic and most likely tied to the personal and rather limited experience of your most likely anglophone friend - it does not seem to be a case that he only has other anglophones in mind.

In all fairness, I wonder if it is fair to compare the combat stats from WWII (or the Korean War) where our Soldiers were fighting peer competitors (who had heavy armor, air, artillery and well trained infantry) where the combat intensity and casualty rate was much higher than in the combat we're engaged in today. Suspect that while there are many parallel forms of stress and factors weighing on a man's decision making process, there are also considerable differences that may be worth considering from a leadership perspective.

As you said it depends an a rather large amount of variables and perceptions play a large part too. The German soldiers and commanders in WWII had a rather low regard for the bravery and fighting ability of the American soldier. This might partly be explained on the simple fact that their enemy could rely so much on their vast superiority in all supporting arms, as well as in numbers and material to dominate the battles. It may also play a role, that quite some members of the German army considered themselves to be man to man the finest soldiers of the war. You see, perceptions and the specific point of view are also to be considered.

Shifting gears, is anyone aware of any studies, books, lessons learned that offer "practical" insights on how to inspire the foreign forces we're training in developing nations to develop the same level of fighting spirit that our troops have? I know there are a lot of factors, and in elite units where we can be selective like ISOF and the Afghan Commandos this isn't much of an issue, I'm more concerned about the regular infantry and police we're turning out.

This is an interesting question and some examples come to my mind. Perhaps I will dig a bit.


Firn

[Ken White]

As you said it is pretty simplistic and most likely tied to the personal and rather limited experience of your most likely anglophone friend - it does not seem to be a case that he only has other anglophones in mind.

participating in combat in two major wars (not the post 1989 type) with and against over 12 foreign Armies including those Bill Moore mentioned plus the New Zealanders -- the other eight were not anglophone. My observation was that all nations are willing to fight though techniques do vary and that cultural attitudes fall behind training in importance. I do not totally agree with Bill on airborne / SF warrior culture. There is an attitudinal difference but it's more complex than that and many non-airborne units also possess those same attributes.

Nor is Bills' comment simplistic. While I make no brief for it either way and would in fact say that in the eyes of many, it's a deficiency, not an asset, there's a fair amount of research that shows the Anglosphere does tend to be more violent than the other speech-i-phones.

[Chris jM]

Kiwigrunt, Wilf, - unfortunately the document isn't available online, however I do have access to it as a word doc at work. I'll try and get it uploaded early in the week (the worst case being if I can't upload it to the board, I'll email to those interested). I may have access to some other unrestricted docs on the history/evolution of the RNZIR/2NZEF that could be of interest you, too, Kiwigrunt.

With regards to the elite/ aggressive units, Sydney Jary in 18 Platoon (he was a British subaltern for a significant period of WW2 in the ETO - I imagine his name is already known to most here) made an interesting comment towards the end of his book. While I don't have access to the text, he basically disputed the requirement for soldiers to be aggressive and gung-ho. There was a quote I remember pondering where, from memory, Jary stated that he'd prefer a reflective poet in the frontline over an impulsive brawler. I can't attest to the accuracy of that comment, and if anyone had 18 Platoon close to hand I'd be greatly obliged if they could confirm this quote.

[Kiwigrunt]

Kiwigrunt, Wilf, - unfortunately the document isn't available online, however I do have access to it as a word doc at work. I'll try and get it uploaded early in the week (the worst case being if I can't upload it to the board, I'll email to those interested). I may have access to some other unrestricted docs on the history/evolution of the RNZIR/2NZEF that could be of interest you, too, Kiwigrunt.

Thanks for that Chris, I appreciate that very much.

With regards to the elite/ aggressive units, Sydney Jary in 18 Platoon (he was a British subaltern for a significant period of WW2 in the ETO - I imagine his name is already known to most here) made an interesting comment towards the end of his book. While I don't have access to the text, he basically disputed the requirement for soldiers to be aggressive and gung-ho. There was a quote I remember pondering where, from memory, Jary stated that he'd prefer a reflective poet in the frontline over an impulsive brawler. I can't attest to the accuracy of that comment, and if anyone had 18 Platoon close to hand I'd be greatly obliged if they could confirm this quote.

Yes, his book is on my ‘yet to read’ list.
For as far as your quote is an accurate refection of Sydney’s comments, I tend to agree with him. I have never been very impressed with the macho/gung-ho attitudes that we see a lot in the military. I find it more understandable from the younger ones from a testosterone perspective but to still see it with so many older (more mature?) NCO’s and officers is, uhhhm, a different matter.
This reflective poet does IMO need to be able to generate ‘controlled aggression’ but I don’t think that that requires an aggressive/ gung-ho nature per say.
A counter to this could be that the reflective poet may be less inclined to do what ‘needs’ to be done if he is not morally behind it. That would make it harder for him to generate the required aggression as opposed to utilising a level of aggression that is already there.

[Chris jM]

I have never been very impressed with the macho/gung-ho attitudes that we see a lot in the military. I find it more understandable from the younger ones from a testosterone perspective but to still see it with so many older (more mature?) NCO’s and officers is, uhhhm, a different matter.
This reflective poet does IMO need to be able to generate ‘controlled aggression’ but I don’t think that that requires an aggressive/ gung-ho nature per say.

Having never seen nor led soldiers in combat, I'm reluctant to pass judgement on the need for aggression, and how far that need stretches. I have, however, seen the 'dumb' side of aggression come out in low intensity ops that does more harm than good to both the AO and FF.

I have made a point of avoiding the term 'aggression' or even 'controlled aggression' when it comes to command or tactics. In my mind, 'audacity' is the undefinable quantity we need more than all else. Aggression triumphs action above all else, whereas I see audacity being the corner-stone of thinking, aggressive action coupled with purpose.

[Ken White]

...In my mind, 'audacity' is the undefinable quantity we need more than all else. Aggression triumphs action above all else, whereas I see audacity being the corner-stone of thinking, aggressive action coupled with purpose.

You need some aggression -- and thus some aggressive people; currently, some actions would not be won unless you had at least a few who would go through brick wall if told to do so. More importantly, that aggression needs to be focused by a competent leader who will search for and find a window to go through with everyone else while some batter that brick wall.

Even better is the really sharp audacious leader who finds and uses the door before it can be shut. If there were more of those leaders, the macho BS would disappear as no longer required...

[Chris jM]

You need some aggression -- and thus some aggressive people; currently, some actions would not be won unless you had at least a few who would go through brick wall if told to do so. More importantly, that aggression needs to be focused by a competent leader who will search for and find a window to go through with everyone else while some batter that brick wall.

I completely agree. In an ideal situation the decisions would be smart, logical and demand only minimal courage of those executing. However when the so-called 'fog of war' descends, aggression and the aggressive type would assist in creating action. I like the idea of audacity as it tempers aggression with smart application, however I would always favour aggression over the quiet, non-competitive type alongside me.

And yes, my views on this matter do diverge with that of Sydney Jary. The obvious discalimer is that he's a little more authoritive in this area, given that my CV doesn't include platoon-level command in WW2!

[William F. Owen]

With regards to the elite/ aggressive units, Sydney Jary in 18 Platoon (he was a British subaltern for a significant period of WW2 in the ETO - I imagine his name is already known to most here) made an interesting comment towards the end of his book. While I don't have access to the text, he basically disputed the requirement for soldiers to be aggressive and gung-ho. There was a quote I remember pondering where, from memory, Jary stated that he'd prefer a reflective poet in the frontline over an impulsive brawler.

I think you may be referring to his opinion that infantrymen need endurance and "sufferance."
I interviewed Jary for 4 hours and a lunch in the Officers mess at Sandhurst back in 2004. Two thing stuck with me:

a.) He mentioned that in a fire fight there will be not shortage of volunteers to tend wounded, and haul ammo. This has been consistently confirmed by others, and I even found Marshall references it.
b.) That the most important component of courage was love of and loyalty to others. - this would speak to good NCOs and strong group cohesion.

Bill Moore

A friend many years ago said there are no better warriors than the Americans, Brits, Aussies and Canadians, there is just something in those cultures that produce men who like to fight. While simplistic, there seems to be degree of truth in that statement. Thoughts?

The UK did a study in the early 1980's to test this hypothesis based on loss exchange ratios from combat. The results are classified, but basically what does seem to get mentioned is "Do not f*ck with the Finns."

[Kiwigrunt]

The UK did a study in the early 1980's to test this hypothesis based on loss exchange ratios from combat. The results are classified, but basically what does seem to get mentioned is "Do not f*ck with the Finns."

Wait for JMM99.

Feast your eyes on a bit of Finn action

[Uboat509]

For the life of me I cannot understand why Grossman is still being seriously discussed. He came to speak to my battalion right before OIF V. At the time what he had to say was interesting but not overly so. He was a pretty good speaker though one of my friends in attendance started referring to him as the Tony Robbins of combat stress lectures. Just the same I decided to read his book "On Combat" for a report I had to write for a Psych 101 class. As was mentioned, his chapters on the physical effects of stress were interesting but hardly profound as most if not all of the information is readily available elsewhere. It goes downhill from there. As was also mentioned, despite being called "On Combat" there is a very clear bias towards Law Enforcement, not that there is anything wrong with that per se but it is not marketed that way. It is marketed as a book about combat stress. Also sprinkled throughout the book are numerous little sales pitches for his other products (lectures mostly). I most certainly would not recommend this book to anyone with a serious interest in its supposed subject matter.

As for which country produces the best soldiers, I can't really say but I imagine that it depends on just what you are talking about. Just like you can find some units that perform certain tasks better than others based on their experience, composition and leadership, I imagine that you will find that whole military forces can vary based on those same factors. I can say this from personal experience, in all the different units I have trained or trained with around the world, I have never yet encountered one that I would consider a top rate force that did not have a strong NCO corps. So if you want to decide who produces the best soldiers then the first thing you have to do is eliminate those countries that do not have a strong NCO corps.

Now I, like Ken, don't buy into the supposed superiority of airborne/air assault units. I have been light infantry and I have been airborne. I never saw that airborne units were more competent than "leg" units though I have noticed that they are far more relentlessly obsessed with uniform regulations and policies. Also from personal experience as OPFOR at the JRTC for 18 months I can tell that my impression was that the 82nd guys tended to be a bit more aggressive, but recklessly so. The 101st apparently believed that their helicopters made them invincible and so tended to air mobile small forces (company size or smaller) deep enemy held terrain where they would be picked apart and destroyed before they could be reinforced. The 10th Mountain, on the other hand always impressed me. They did not train for a MILES fight the way some units did, they trained for war. They were a bit less aggressive than the 82nd units that I saw but ultimately more successful, I believe because they focused less on sexy things like airborne and airmobile ops and more on the basics, after all, it’s what you do on the battlefield that wins wars not how you got there.

[Chris jM]

I can say this from personal experience, in all the different units I have trained or trained with around the world, I have never yet encountered one that I would consider a top rate force that did not have a strong NCO corps. So if you want to decide who produces the best soldiers then the first thing you have to do is eliminate those countries that do not have a strong NCO corps.

This is true from my experiences of ABCA armies, where the NCO corp is required to compensate for the inexperience of the junior officers. Does it hold true, though, in an army that has a different command system - for example the IDF, where the NCO corp directly feeds into the junior officer corp? I also seem to recall that German junior officers spend some time initially as a section commander - someone correct me if I am wrong - so they may hold up as another exception. I'd also be interested in knowing how the Baltic and Scandinavian armies work in this regard, if anyone out there has information on this topic?

I have always been taught (informally!) to quickly assess other armies with the term of 'swimming' nations vs 'non-swimming' nations. If the average population can swim they will make good soldiers - if not, they're rock-fish and will be more or less operationally ineffective. I'm sure there is absolutely no scientific basis to this criteria, but a swimming status does tend to favor the developed world where quality of life, fitness, individual competency etc pushes families to have their children participate in sports and outdoor activities. Causation vs correlation, or complete irrelevance??

[Rifleman]

For the life of me I cannot understand why Grossman is still being seriously discussed.

I agree. He had some worthwhile things to say but he's still way overrated.

As was also mentioned, despite being called "On Combat" there is a very clear bias towards Law Enforcement, not that there is anything wrong with that per se but it is not marketed that way.

Agree again. He's very popular with cops; the whole "warrior" thing and all that. I don't want to hijack this tread and turn it into a discussion about the role of police in society but maybe that mindset is not all bad, since studies and interviews show that most violent gang members think of themselves as "street soldiers."

Also from personal experience as OPFOR at the JRTC for 18 months I can tell that my impression was that the 82nd guys tended to be a bit more aggressive, but recklessly so.

Curious, did you find the 75th Ranger Regiment to be likewise?

[Chris jM]

I think you may be referring to his opinion that infantrymen need endurance and "sufferance."
I interviewed Jary for 4 hours and a lunch in the Officers mess at Sandhurst back in 2004. Two thing stuck with me:

a.) He mentioned that in a fire fight there will be not shortage of volunteers to tend wounded, and haul ammo. This has been consistently confirmed by others, and I even found Marshall references it.
b.) That the most important component of courage was love of and loyalty to others. - this would speak to good NCOs and strong group cohesion.

Your right, I was thinking about Jary's concept of sufferance. The quote from page 117 of 18 Platoon is relevant to this discussion:

There is a mathematical formla: aggression increases the further one goes behind the lines. Opposing infantry, with a few exceptions like the SS, are joined by a bond of mutual compassion which but few of the battlefield aristocracy can understand... Had I been asked at any time before August 1944 to list the personal characteristics which go to make a good infantry soldier, my reply would indeed have been wide of the mark.

Like most I would have suggested only masculine ones like aggression, physical stamina, a hunting instinct and a competitive nature. How wrong I would have been. I would now suggest the following. Firstly sufferance, without which one could not survive. Secondly, a quiet mind which enables a soldier to live in harmony with his fellows through all sorts of difficulties and sometimes under dreadful conditions. As in a closed monastic existence, there is no room for the assertive or acrimonious. Thirdly, but no less important, a sense of the ridiculous which helps a soldier surmount the unacceptable. Add to these a reasonable standard of fitness and a dedicated professional competence, and you have a soldier for all seasons. None of the NCOs or soldiers whoc made 18 Platoon what it was resembled the characters portrayed in most books and films about war. All were quiet, sensible and unassuming men and some, by any standard, were heroes.

If I now had to select a team for a dangerous mission and my choice was restricted to stars of the sportsfield or poets, I would unhesitatingly recruit from the latter.

[baboon6]

Kiwigrunt, Wilf, - unfortunately the document isn't available online, however I do have access to it as a word doc at work. I'll try and get it uploaded early in the week (the worst case being if I can't upload it to the board, I'll email to those interested). I may have access to some other unrestricted docs on the history/evolution of the RNZIR/2NZEF that could be of interest you, too, Kiwigrunt.

Hi Chris

This site is an easy place to upload .pdf and .doc files to:

http://www.scribd.com/

For those of you who haven't read Kippenberger's classic memoir Infantry Brigadier it is available here:

http://www.nzetc.org/tm/scholarly/tei-KipInfa.html

[Kiwigrunt]

For those of you who haven't read Kippenberger's classic memoir Infantry Brigadier it is available here:

http://www.nzetc.org/tm/scholarly/tei-KipInfa.html

Thanks for that. I've been looking for this book for years.

[Chris jM]

Apologies for the delay gents, however I have now uploaded the word doc 'Infantry in Battle' for general interest. baboon6, thanks for the heads-up - I would have been at a loss had you not id'd that link for me - thanks.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/26351328/050

Abstract: The training note (1) is the product of battle experience in the New Zealand Divisions in World War II. It is based on research conducted by the New Zealand War History Branch under the direction of the Editor-in-Chief, Major General Sir Howard Kippenberger, KBE, CB, DSO, himself an infantry soldier of wide experience. In 1947, a book (2) was published in the United States, attempting to explain the reaction of the average American to battle experiences. Major General Kippenberger wished to know whether the well-authenticated conclusions reached by the author were of equal application to the New Zealand soldier. Accordingly he addressed a detailed questionnaire, based upon the book, to some fifty officers who had given distinguished service with infantry units of the 2nd or 3rd New Zealand Divisions. Their findings were collated, and are contained in the pages that follow. In order to give point to the opinions stated, many individual examples drawn from all campaigns are quoted in the text. These are set out in italics throughout and are the words of the experienced officers who participated in these events. As the replies to the original questionnaire were not made with a view to publication, personal names have been omitted from all examples.

Kiwigrunt, I've got another few word docs that relate to NZ history. Should you (or anyone else) want to have a look, PM me.

[Eden]

My next-to-last combat job required a lot of driving through Afghanistan, usually in a 'single-vehicle convoy', at most with one other vehicle. I was usually driving with Canadians or Germans in relatively unarmored vehicles, much of the time in urban areas. I did not have to do this every day, or for a year. The reason I bring this up is it made me reflect on the special stress of patrolling in urban areas and how soldiers adapt to it.

Patrolling in an urban area in an environment like Afghanistan presents to the soldier an unending stream of possible threats. Potholes, trash heaps, narrow roads, suspicious looking men in bulky cloaks, single guy driving a trashed sedan a little too close, abandoned acetylene tanks, kid driving crazy on a motorbike - the stimuli are constant. If you are mounted, you may literally be encountering possible danger signals two or three times a minute. Reacting as you have been trained to do is impossible - most times you can't investigate, mark, avoid, survey possible threats if you want to accomplish whatever your larger mission may be.

This seems qualitatively different from patrols in other terrain. Danger signals occur less often, or are less intrusive on your conscious mind, or are easier to avoid. Moreover, when you are humping through the jungle/swamp/hills, the physical challenge soon preoccupies and dulls the mind to danger. You don't have that distraction riding in a vehicle in an urban environment.

It seemed to me that soldiers coped with this constant low-level stress in one of two ways. They either became very aggressive - driving fast, waving their weapons, shouting, wearing their war face - or they adopted a 'Buddah will decide' attitude and basically ignored the danger signals. The best ones remained alert while accepting the tension, like a soldier who stays functional during an extended barrage. But, as I said, I wasn't trapped in that environment day-after-day for months on end.

Any thoughts?

[JMA]

For those of you who haven't read Kippenberger's classic memoir Infantry Brigadier it is available here:

http://www.nzetc.org/tm/scholarly/tei-KipInfa.html

Link is dead (after three attempts over two days). No alternative found on google... anyone have a link to this doc?

[Chieftain]

LEADERSHIP, Leadership, leadership!

It is ALWAYS about leadership. Not just the NCO's, although that is my prejudice as I was a Marine Staff NCO.

But if the leadership above the NCO's is weak or corrupt, so will the organization to varying degree's, down to the man. All large organizations will have some lower ranked "good" leaders, but they alone cannot 'save' or make the unit. The same can be said for the quality of the men too.

A good unit must have superior leadership at the top, and most or the majority of the lower ranked leaders must be very good too. No unit of reasonable size has it all.

Some small SPECOPS units may get there occasionally, but they are usu sally to small for major conflict.

I always enjoyed David H. Hackworths example of the peace time "Perfumed Prince's" in the military. Iraq proved it again. The generals we began the war with, were not capable of winning it. Nothing new here. Lucky that 'W' figured it out fired them, and got the guys he needed. In my opinion it just took him to long.

Give me almost any military group in the world. With quality leaders, that will be a good unit in fairly short period of time. Take some of the best units in the world, and give them crappy leadership, and you may be surprised at how long their reputation will have to carry them.

Quality Leadership, the one value, no organization can afford to lose.

Go figure.

Fred

Semper Fi

[Sparapet]

LEADERSHIP, Leadership, leadership!

It is ALWAYS about leadership.

Agreed completely. It's true of any organization. When an organization needs fixing you look to the officers first. They set the standard and the vision. Then the NCO's, they enforce the standard and promote the vision. Joe is last on the list of responsibility and ability to impact the quality of a unit. Joe falls in line when the NCO's are able to guide them. All in all, in the modern force the line units don't have to recruit or conduct the initial training. That means any Joe that shows up is screened and trained to some basic minimum (what that minimum should be is another conversation). That's when the unit takes over and where the leaders make impact. Otherwise it descends into peer training...e.g. hazing.

Interestingly, the SS (presumably Waffen SS, not their political brothers) have been mentioned several times here as an example of effective units. I am in the camp that walks a fine line between respecting the best of the Waffen SS formations without admiring them. I have seen references in literature on the SS of the regular anti-communist indoctrination those units received to make them believe the communists were the arch evil (and incidentally Jews, but my impression is the communist threat was more potent and regularly tied to Jews). Olive Oyl mentioned the moral basis for their effectiveness. Agreed with that, they were ideologically motivated. Ideology is probably the best motivator if it can be sustained. We see that in some of our post-9/11 Soldiers who got into the services to bring democracy and undo wrongs of the world only to have their world-view shattered once they started raiding Iraqi homes with whole families in them and accidentally killing civilians at check points. That ideology motivated them, but it was never the ideology regularly indoctrinated in the services; this fact becoming clear when the answer to their confusion was "war is dirty".

To a great degree, outside some combat arms units, I do believe the US lacks a martial culture in the services. We are perpetually confused as a group (although many of us are to the death certain of our own roles) about what is appropriate culture for us to enable our purpose. Often times we are even confused by our purpose. Are we to protect the nation? Or are we to protect the nation's interests? Are those synonymous? Is our purpose to spread democracy? etc etc etc. And this "greater purpose" is needed by the leaders as a guide for them to set their own guidance for the NCO's and men. So in that confusion we revert to the cave man answer "what makes the grass grow!?" Which sounds great and motivating until 19 yr old Joe is standing next to a 12 yr old girl he just opened up on with a SAW in the dark. And the only person that can make that alright for him is his leader explaining WHY he should be able to live with that. Too often the answer is "war is dirty" and the leader just resorts to the coercion of regulation to enforce discipline.

Just saying....


Scouts Out