Link is dead (after three attempts over two days). No alternative found on google... anyone have a link to this doc?Originally Posted by baboon6
Link is dead (after three attempts over two days). No alternative found on google... anyone have a link to this doc?
LEADERSHIP, Leadership, leadership!
It is ALWAYS about leadership. Not just the NCO's, although that is my prejudice as I was a Marine Staff NCO.
But if the leadership above the NCO's is weak or corrupt, so will the organization to varying degree's, down to the man. All large organizations will have some lower ranked "good" leaders, but they alone cannot 'save' or make the unit. The same can be said for the quality of the men too.
A good unit must have superior leadership at the top, and most or the majority of the lower ranked leaders must be very good too. No unit of reasonable size has it all.
Some small SPECOPS units may get there occasionally, but they are usu sally to small for major conflict.
I always enjoyed David H. Hackworths example of the peace time "Perfumed Prince's" in the military. Iraq proved it again. The generals we began the war with, were not capable of winning it. Nothing new here. Lucky that 'W' figured it out fired them, and got the guys he needed. In my opinion it just took him to long.
Give me almost any military group in the world. With quality leaders, that will be a good unit in fairly short period of time. Take some of the best units in the world, and give them crappy leadership, and you may be surprised at how long their reputation will have to carry them.
Quality Leadership, the one value, no organization can afford to lose.
Go figure.
Fred
Semper Fi
Semper Fi
"Mind set, Skill set, Tool set." Col John Boyd 'OODA'
There is no security in life, only varying degrees of risk. -- Gen. Douglas MacArthur
“We can evade reality, but we cannot evade the consequences of evading reality” - Ayn Rand
Stupid should hurt
Agreed completely. It's true of any organization. When an organization needs fixing you look to the officers first. They set the standard and the vision. Then the NCO's, they enforce the standard and promote the vision. Joe is last on the list of responsibility and ability to impact the quality of a unit. Joe falls in line when the NCO's are able to guide them. All in all, in the modern force the line units don't have to recruit or conduct the initial training. That means any Joe that shows up is screened and trained to some basic minimum (what that minimum should be is another conversation). That's when the unit takes over and where the leaders make impact. Otherwise it descends into peer training...e.g. hazing.
Interestingly, the SS (presumably Waffen SS, not their political brothers) have been mentioned several times here as an example of effective units. I am in the camp that walks a fine line between respecting the best of the Waffen SS formations without admiring them. I have seen references in literature on the SS of the regular anti-communist indoctrination those units received to make them believe the communists were the arch evil (and incidentally Jews, but my impression is the communist threat was more potent and regularly tied to Jews). Olive Oyl mentioned the moral basis for their effectiveness. Agreed with that, they were ideologically motivated. Ideology is probably the best motivator if it can be sustained. We see that in some of our post-9/11 Soldiers who got into the services to bring democracy and undo wrongs of the world only to have their world-view shattered once they started raiding Iraqi homes with whole families in them and accidentally killing civilians at check points. That ideology motivated them, but it was never the ideology regularly indoctrinated in the services; this fact becoming clear when the answer to their confusion was "war is dirty".
To a great degree, outside some combat arms units, I do believe the US lacks a martial culture in the services. We are perpetually confused as a group (although many of us are to the death certain of our own roles) about what is appropriate culture for us to enable our purpose. Often times we are even confused by our purpose. Are we to protect the nation? Or are we to protect the nation's interests? Are those synonymous? Is our purpose to spread democracy? etc etc etc. And this "greater purpose" is needed by the leaders as a guide for them to set their own guidance for the NCO's and men. So in that confusion we revert to the cave man answer "what makes the grass grow!?" Which sounds great and motivating until 19 yr old Joe is standing next to a 12 yr old girl he just opened up on with a SAW in the dark. And the only person that can make that alright for him is his leader explaining WHY he should be able to live with that. Too often the answer is "war is dirty" and the leader just resorts to the coercion of regulation to enforce discipline.
Just saying....
Scouts Out
Last edited by Sparapet; 03-10-2012 at 04:19 PM.
There was little if any difference between Waffen SS quality and normal Heer quality once you look at equals in terms of type of formation, supply and age structure of personnel.
In fact, the Waffen SS was rather incompetent early on and way too reckless.
My assertion here is that there's no need to look closely at their attributes because you can learn the same from the fast and light troops of the Wehrmacht (Panzer, Panzergrenadier, Gebirgsjger and early Fallschirmjger formations) without most of the political hazzle.
No doubt, non-SS units fought quite well during WWII.
Martin van Creveld's book Fighting Power is worthy of study.
He speaks of a formula -
Within the limits set by its size, an army's worth as a militray instrument equals the quality and quantity of its equipment multiplied by what, ... (is) termed its Fighting Power. The latter rests on mental, intellectual and organisational foundations; its manifestations, in one combination or another, are discipline, cohesion, morale and initiative, courage and toughness, the willingness to fight and the readiness, if necessary, to die. Fighting Power in brief, is defined as the sum of the total of mental qualities that make armies fight.
That's a pseudo formula. It multiplies two unknowns.
Show me mathematician who can solve such an equation.
Besides, his methodology in the book was popular, but also flawed. He compared two very different forces instead of comparing multiple different formations of different performance from the same force. He's voluntarily looking at datasets that are much farther away from ceteris paribus than necessary, which clouds the whole approach - and he used practically no advanced empirical tools as (which would be required for such a multi-input dataset).
It's a pseudo study that purports to deliver scientific results when in fact it's really only about his opinion.
Ah... but you missed where I placed the word 'study' in bold.That's a pseudo formula. It multiplies two unknowns.
Show me mathematician who can solve such an equation.
Besides, his methodology in the book was popular, but also flawed. He compared two very different forces instead of comparing multiple different formations of different performance from the same force. He's voluntarily looking at datasets that are much farther away from ceteris paribus than necessary, which clouds the whole approach - and he used practically no advanced empirical tools as (which would be required for such a multi-input dataset). It's a pseudo study that purports to deliver scientific results when in fact it's really only about his opinion.
I am not that concerned with his comparison between the krauts and the yanks just as I will not be distracted by the crude comparison in Jorg Muth's book Command Culture: Officer Education in the U.S. Army and the German Armed Force, 1901-1940, and the Consequences for World War II (when I finally get a copy) ... I will search for the little (often invaluable) gems that one uncovers in studying these books.
We all know (and it just leaves it for the last of the diehard yanks to accept the truth) that the raw cannon fodder divisions the yanks fed into Europe after D-Day were being chewed up by the resource stretched but combat experienced German formations. It was a case of the problem that even though they could chew up and spit out one of these divisions comprising inspired amateurs today, tomorrow there would be another, new full equipped one to replace it... and so it went. Any decent book on D-Day - Keegan or Ambrose - will tell you that story.
I try to look for items of relevance applicable for today.
Of interest to me is that the following characteristics (which van Creveld lists as components of Fighting Power) have assumed a lower level of importance than academic expertise (for officers) and technical ability (for all) among soldiers (certainly in the US). I will look into this further out of personal interest as it may well lead to where the US led NATO armies are going/have gone wrong.
I have mentioned it a number of times before that the role of the infantry is to "close with and kill the enemy".(Fighting Power) rests on mental, intellectual and organisational foundations; its manifestations, in one combination or another, are discipline, cohesion, morale and initiative, courage and toughness, the willingness to fight and the readiness, if necessary, to die.
Look at any video out of Afghanistan and see that the waddling Michelin men of ISAF and see that this is quite impossible. The go out on patrol... draw fire... call in an airstrike... then waddle back to base. Its all a bit of a sick joke.
van Creveld for all his faults helps us return to first principles and rethink why it is possible for the most technically advanced and supported soldiers ever (yanks and Brits) can get their ass' whipped in combat by guys in sandals carrying an AK (and other basic weapons). For those who are able to think it is an interesting journey.
Last edited by JMA; 03-11-2012 at 01:23 PM.
Here one can disagree:
1) MvC used data sets which were provided by Dupuy, who listed and analysed battles in Italy 1943 and found a higher effectiveness of German forces, independent of type. Have you better data, that refute Dupuy's?
(In hard science I provide better data or shut up :-))
2) The overall approach is valid on base of Dupuy's data. I agree that your approach would give additional insight, but this does not change the valid basic concept and would be IMHO a different project.
3) McC's comparisonon of US forces of 1943/44 and German structures of 1941/42 is flawed, he should have analysed the 1943 units in Italy. Especially the depleted officer/NCO corps.
4) Some of his conclusions are wrong.
5) However, many of the tables and comparisons (secondary data) presented by MvC are still very valuable even when I disagree with some conclusions he draw from them.
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