Combat Participation

[Ken White]

As you said it is pretty simplistic and most likely tied to the personal and rather limited experience of your most likely anglophone friend - it does not seem to be a case that he only has other anglophones in mind.

participating in combat in two major wars (not the post 1989 type) with and against over 12 foreign Armies including those Bill Moore mentioned plus the New Zealanders -- the other eight were not anglophone. My observation was that all nations are willing to fight though techniques do vary and that cultural attitudes fall behind training in importance. I do not totally agree with Bill on airborne / SF warrior culture. There is an attitudinal difference but it's more complex than that and many non-airborne units also possess those same attributes.

Nor is Bills' comment simplistic. While I make no brief for it either way and would in fact say that in the eyes of many, it's a deficiency, not an asset, there's a fair amount of research that shows the Anglosphere does tend to be more violent than the other speech-i-phones.

[Chris jM]

Kiwigrunt, Wilf, - unfortunately the document isn't available online, however I do have access to it as a word doc at work. I'll try and get it uploaded early in the week (the worst case being if I can't upload it to the board, I'll email to those interested). I may have access to some other unrestricted docs on the history/evolution of the RNZIR/2NZEF that could be of interest you, too, Kiwigrunt.

With regards to the elite/ aggressive units, Sydney Jary in 18 Platoon (he was a British subaltern for a significant period of WW2 in the ETO - I imagine his name is already known to most here) made an interesting comment towards the end of his book. While I don't have access to the text, he basically disputed the requirement for soldiers to be aggressive and gung-ho. There was a quote I remember pondering where, from memory, Jary stated that he'd prefer a reflective poet in the frontline over an impulsive brawler. I can't attest to the accuracy of that comment, and if anyone had 18 Platoon close to hand I'd be greatly obliged if they could confirm this quote.

[Kiwigrunt]

Kiwigrunt, Wilf, - unfortunately the document isn't available online, however I do have access to it as a word doc at work. I'll try and get it uploaded early in the week (the worst case being if I can't upload it to the board, I'll email to those interested). I may have access to some other unrestricted docs on the history/evolution of the RNZIR/2NZEF that could be of interest you, too, Kiwigrunt.

Thanks for that Chris, I appreciate that very much.

With regards to the elite/ aggressive units, Sydney Jary in 18 Platoon (he was a British subaltern for a significant period of WW2 in the ETO - I imagine his name is already known to most here) made an interesting comment towards the end of his book. While I don't have access to the text, he basically disputed the requirement for soldiers to be aggressive and gung-ho. There was a quote I remember pondering where, from memory, Jary stated that he'd prefer a reflective poet in the frontline over an impulsive brawler. I can't attest to the accuracy of that comment, and if anyone had 18 Platoon close to hand I'd be greatly obliged if they could confirm this quote.

Yes, his book is on my ‘yet to read’ list.
For as far as your quote is an accurate refection of Sydney’s comments, I tend to agree with him. I have never been very impressed with the macho/gung-ho attitudes that we see a lot in the military. I find it more understandable from the younger ones from a testosterone perspective but to still see it with so many older (more mature?) NCO’s and officers is, uhhhm, a different matter.
This reflective poet does IMO need to be able to generate ‘controlled aggression’ but I don’t think that that requires an aggressive/ gung-ho nature per say.
A counter to this could be that the reflective poet may be less inclined to do what ‘needs’ to be done if he is not morally behind it. That would make it harder for him to generate the required aggression as opposed to utilising a level of aggression that is already there.

[Chris jM]

I have never been very impressed with the macho/gung-ho attitudes that we see a lot in the military. I find it more understandable from the younger ones from a testosterone perspective but to still see it with so many older (more mature?) NCO’s and officers is, uhhhm, a different matter.
This reflective poet does IMO need to be able to generate ‘controlled aggression’ but I don’t think that that requires an aggressive/ gung-ho nature per say.

Having never seen nor led soldiers in combat, I'm reluctant to pass judgement on the need for aggression, and how far that need stretches. I have, however, seen the 'dumb' side of aggression come out in low intensity ops that does more harm than good to both the AO and FF.

I have made a point of avoiding the term 'aggression' or even 'controlled aggression' when it comes to command or tactics. In my mind, 'audacity' is the undefinable quantity we need more than all else. Aggression triumphs action above all else, whereas I see audacity being the corner-stone of thinking, aggressive action coupled with purpose.

[Ken White]

...In my mind, 'audacity' is the undefinable quantity we need more than all else. Aggression triumphs action above all else, whereas I see audacity being the corner-stone of thinking, aggressive action coupled with purpose.

You need some aggression -- and thus some aggressive people; currently, some actions would not be won unless you had at least a few who would go through brick wall if told to do so. More importantly, that aggression needs to be focused by a competent leader who will search for and find a window to go through with everyone else while some batter that brick wall.

Even better is the really sharp audacious leader who finds and uses the door before it can be shut. If there were more of those leaders, the macho BS would disappear as no longer required...

[Chris jM]

You need some aggression -- and thus some aggressive people; currently, some actions would not be won unless you had at least a few who would go through brick wall if told to do so. More importantly, that aggression needs to be focused by a competent leader who will search for and find a window to go through with everyone else while some batter that brick wall.

I completely agree. In an ideal situation the decisions would be smart, logical and demand only minimal courage of those executing. However when the so-called 'fog of war' descends, aggression and the aggressive type would assist in creating action. I like the idea of audacity as it tempers aggression with smart application, however I would always favour aggression over the quiet, non-competitive type alongside me.

And yes, my views on this matter do diverge with that of Sydney Jary. The obvious discalimer is that he's a little more authoritive in this area, given that my CV doesn't include platoon-level command in WW2!

[Infanteer]

I've noticed no hesitation to take part in firefights - everyone wants to get their "TIC", especially the young Privates. After how many of these does the enthusiasm fade? The NCOs, most who have "seen the elephant", seem to enjoy the challenge with that bit of reservation.

Here's a good article by a former CO who fought in Kandahar in 2006.

http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/doc...l10.1_03_e.pdf

Once we had found him, we would attempt to fix the enemy with fires and finish him in close-quarter combat. Neither of these things was easy. It required us to stay within 100-150 meters of the enemy and coordinate fires before physically moving to clear his positions. Doing so was contrary to human nature. The degree of success we had in close quarter combat became personality-dependent. The majority of soldiers, when fired upon for the first time, would seek to disengage back toward the “last safe place” they occupied. After several encounters they repressed this urge but would be very reluctant to advance in contact (especially when separated from their LAVs). Forward movement or sustainment of our presence on the close-quarter battlefield after night-fall depended upon the continued command presence of battalion and company commanders, supported by the “natural fighters” in our ranks. It became evident to me in May that the number of true fighters we had was a small minority. By fighter, I mean those men and women predisposed to keep fighting regardless of violence and danger; those who repressed fear not just because they wanted to remain with their primary group, but because of an overwhelming desire to beat the enemy; those who truly wanted to hunt the enemy and make him the victim. I would estimate that there were only 6 or 7 such individuals in every forty-man platoon. Yet, their stalwartness almost always became the psychological pivot point for the action of a section or a platoon engaged in intensive battle. I believe that the very essence of the western tradition of sections, platoons, companies and battalions (dating as far back as the Marian reforms, which produced Roman maniples, cohorts, and centuries within a legion) was founded on the premise of ensuring a critical number of true fighters were spread throughout fighting forces. I came to rely upon the courage of commanders and this small number of fighters in each platoon and company to override the inherent fear of close-quarter battle and to ensure that we kept the enemy fixed before closing to finish him.

[William F. Owen]

With regards to the elite/ aggressive units, Sydney Jary in 18 Platoon (he was a British subaltern for a significant period of WW2 in the ETO - I imagine his name is already known to most here) made an interesting comment towards the end of his book. While I don't have access to the text, he basically disputed the requirement for soldiers to be aggressive and gung-ho. There was a quote I remember pondering where, from memory, Jary stated that he'd prefer a reflective poet in the frontline over an impulsive brawler.

I think you may be referring to his opinion that infantrymen need endurance and "sufferance."
I interviewed Jary for 4 hours and a lunch in the Officers mess at Sandhurst back in 2004. Two thing stuck with me:

a.) He mentioned that in a fire fight there will be not shortage of volunteers to tend wounded, and haul ammo. This has been consistently confirmed by others, and I even found Marshall references it.
b.) That the most important component of courage was love of and loyalty to others. - this would speak to good NCOs and strong group cohesion.

Bill Moore

A friend many years ago said there are no better warriors than the Americans, Brits, Aussies and Canadians, there is just something in those cultures that produce men who like to fight. While simplistic, there seems to be degree of truth in that statement. Thoughts?

The UK did a study in the early 1980's to test this hypothesis based on loss exchange ratios from combat. The results are classified, but basically what does seem to get mentioned is "Do not f*ck with the Finns."

[Kiwigrunt]

The UK did a study in the early 1980's to test this hypothesis based on loss exchange ratios from combat. The results are classified, but basically what does seem to get mentioned is "Do not f*ck with the Finns."

Wait for JMM99.

Feast your eyes on a bit of Finn action

[Uboat509]

For the life of me I cannot understand why Grossman is still being seriously discussed. He came to speak to my battalion right before OIF V. At the time what he had to say was interesting but not overly so. He was a pretty good speaker though one of my friends in attendance started referring to him as the Tony Robbins of combat stress lectures. Just the same I decided to read his book "On Combat" for a report I had to write for a Psych 101 class. As was mentioned, his chapters on the physical effects of stress were interesting but hardly profound as most if not all of the information is readily available elsewhere. It goes downhill from there. As was also mentioned, despite being called "On Combat" there is a very clear bias towards Law Enforcement, not that there is anything wrong with that per se but it is not marketed that way. It is marketed as a book about combat stress. Also sprinkled throughout the book are numerous little sales pitches for his other products (lectures mostly). I most certainly would not recommend this book to anyone with a serious interest in its supposed subject matter.

As for which country produces the best soldiers, I can't really say but I imagine that it depends on just what you are talking about. Just like you can find some units that perform certain tasks better than others based on their experience, composition and leadership, I imagine that you will find that whole military forces can vary based on those same factors. I can say this from personal experience, in all the different units I have trained or trained with around the world, I have never yet encountered one that I would consider a top rate force that did not have a strong NCO corps. So if you want to decide who produces the best soldiers then the first thing you have to do is eliminate those countries that do not have a strong NCO corps.

Now I, like Ken, don't buy into the supposed superiority of airborne/air assault units. I have been light infantry and I have been airborne. I never saw that airborne units were more competent than "leg" units though I have noticed that they are far more relentlessly obsessed with uniform regulations and policies. Also from personal experience as OPFOR at the JRTC for 18 months I can tell that my impression was that the 82nd guys tended to be a bit more aggressive, but recklessly so. The 101st apparently believed that their helicopters made them invincible and so tended to air mobile small forces (company size or smaller) deep enemy held terrain where they would be picked apart and destroyed before they could be reinforced. The 10th Mountain, on the other hand always impressed me. They did not train for a MILES fight the way some units did, they trained for war. They were a bit less aggressive than the 82nd units that I saw but ultimately more successful, I believe because they focused less on sexy things like airborne and airmobile ops and more on the basics, after all, it’s what you do on the battlefield that wins wars not how you got there.

[Chris jM]

I can say this from personal experience, in all the different units I have trained or trained with around the world, I have never yet encountered one that I would consider a top rate force that did not have a strong NCO corps. So if you want to decide who produces the best soldiers then the first thing you have to do is eliminate those countries that do not have a strong NCO corps.

This is true from my experiences of ABCA armies, where the NCO corp is required to compensate for the inexperience of the junior officers. Does it hold true, though, in an army that has a different command system - for example the IDF, where the NCO corp directly feeds into the junior officer corp? I also seem to recall that German junior officers spend some time initially as a section commander - someone correct me if I am wrong - so they may hold up as another exception. I'd also be interested in knowing how the Baltic and Scandinavian armies work in this regard, if anyone out there has information on this topic?

I have always been taught (informally!) to quickly assess other armies with the term of 'swimming' nations vs 'non-swimming' nations. If the average population can swim they will make good soldiers - if not, they're rock-fish and will be more or less operationally ineffective. I'm sure there is absolutely no scientific basis to this criteria, but a swimming status does tend to favor the developed world where quality of life, fitness, individual competency etc pushes families to have their children participate in sports and outdoor activities. Causation vs correlation, or complete irrelevance??

[Schmedlap]

I think that pondering which country produces the best Soldiers is kind of like pondering who would win in a fight between Captain America and the Punisher or, to use a more common example, whether Soldiers are "more elite" than Marines or vice versa.

[Rifleman]

For the life of me I cannot understand why Grossman is still being seriously discussed.

I agree. He had some worthwhile things to say but he's still way overrated.

As was also mentioned, despite being called "On Combat" there is a very clear bias towards Law Enforcement, not that there is anything wrong with that per se but it is not marketed that way.

Agree again. He's very popular with cops; the whole "warrior" thing and all that. I don't want to hijack this tread and turn it into a discussion about the role of police in society but maybe that mindset is not all bad, since studies and interviews show that most violent gang members think of themselves as "street soldiers."

Also from personal experience as OPFOR at the JRTC for 18 months I can tell that my impression was that the 82nd guys tended to be a bit more aggressive, but recklessly so.

Curious, did you find the 75th Ranger Regiment to be likewise?

[Ken White]

They also have said that the 82d is a pain in the tail due that aggressiveness and because they don't necessarily follow the script. Decapitating the 'leadership' with the God Gun doesn't work to slow 'em down, either...

LGOP.

[Olive Oyl]

I know Grossman's work. Personally I think it's just plain wrong. ...

For the life of me I cannot understand why Grossman is still being seriously discussed. ...

Besides 18 Platoon, does anyone have additional recommendations as alternatives to Grossman's work on "killology"?


Also, regarding:

William,

In my experiences in first person interaction with American men of the last three Generations (roughly: WWII, Viet-Nam, GWOT, for sake of example), I find that their personal Christian, or other, faith has in the aggregate fallen off ...

Predictions; cowardice, self-preservation to the detriment of Nation-State, malinvestment, creditory depletion, corporate greed, poor stewardship, poor planning, wasteage, faithlessness, non-church attendance, marital infidelity & suicide
will continue to increase.

Does that make sense to anyone in regards to combat participation, or the lack thereof?

Huh!?!
...

The Waffen SS was also not famous for church going....

I am really, really missing something here....

"...faith has fallen off..." Rather than a direct decrease in combat participation, it sounds like Bullmoose might have been referring more specifically to a decrease in moral bases (derived from religion, or "church-going," or, in the Nazis' case, from an ideology) for combat participation. Perhaps alluding to a similar conjecture?:

This reflective poet does IMO need to be able to generate ‘controlled aggression’ but I don’t think that that requires an aggressive/ gung-ho nature per say.
A counter to this could be that the reflective poet may be less inclined to do what ‘needs’ to be done if he is not morally behind it. That would make it harder for him to generate the required aggression as opposed to utilising a level of aggression that is already there.

Emphases added and truncations imposed on quotes.

My own speculation abundant throughout. Please correct any misinterpretations!

[carl]

Agree again. He's very popular with cops; the whole "warrior" thing and all that. I don't want to hijack this tread and turn it into a discussion about the role of police in society but maybe that mindset is not all bad, since studies and interviews show that most violent gang members think of themselves as "street soldiers."

They may think of themselves as "soldiers" but I think most of them act like what they are-street criminals. I read the by-laws of a NM prison gang once and they were scary. If the members had adhered to the by-laws they would have been extremely dangerous to everybody. But they didn't. They acted and re-acted like the hoods they were.

I always preferred officers who, above most everything, were calm in the face of confusion and provocation. The last thing you needed was somebody who was going to make situation worse. Calmness, ability to think under stress and determination to get the thing done, and done the right way, those are the best cop qualities I think.

[Chris jM]

I think you may be referring to his opinion that infantrymen need endurance and "sufferance."
I interviewed Jary for 4 hours and a lunch in the Officers mess at Sandhurst back in 2004. Two thing stuck with me:

a.) He mentioned that in a fire fight there will be not shortage of volunteers to tend wounded, and haul ammo. This has been consistently confirmed by others, and I even found Marshall references it.
b.) That the most important component of courage was love of and loyalty to others. - this would speak to good NCOs and strong group cohesion.

Your right, I was thinking about Jary's concept of sufferance. The quote from page 117 of 18 Platoon is relevant to this discussion:

There is a mathematical formla: aggression increases the further one goes behind the lines. Opposing infantry, with a few exceptions like the SS, are joined by a bond of mutual compassion which but few of the battlefield aristocracy can understand... Had I been asked at any time before August 1944 to list the personal characteristics which go to make a good infantry soldier, my reply would indeed have been wide of the mark.

Like most I would have suggested only masculine ones like aggression, physical stamina, a hunting instinct and a competitive nature. How wrong I would have been. I would now suggest the following. Firstly sufferance, without which one could not survive. Secondly, a quiet mind which enables a soldier to live in harmony with his fellows through all sorts of difficulties and sometimes under dreadful conditions. As in a closed monastic existence, there is no room for the assertive or acrimonious. Thirdly, but no less important, a sense of the ridiculous which helps a soldier surmount the unacceptable. Add to these a reasonable standard of fitness and a dedicated professional competence, and you have a soldier for all seasons. None of the NCOs or soldiers whoc made 18 Platoon what it was resembled the characters portrayed in most books and films about war. All were quiet, sensible and unassuming men and some, by any standard, were heroes.

If I now had to select a team for a dangerous mission and my choice was restricted to stars of the sportsfield or poets, I would unhesitatingly recruit from the latter.

[baboon6]

Kiwigrunt, Wilf, - unfortunately the document isn't available online, however I do have access to it as a word doc at work. I'll try and get it uploaded early in the week (the worst case being if I can't upload it to the board, I'll email to those interested). I may have access to some other unrestricted docs on the history/evolution of the RNZIR/2NZEF that could be of interest you, too, Kiwigrunt.

Hi Chris

This site is an easy place to upload .pdf and .doc files to:

http://www.scribd.com/

For those of you who haven't read Kippenberger's classic memoir Infantry Brigadier it is available here:

http://www.nzetc.org/tm/scholarly/tei-KipInfa.html

[Kiwigrunt]

For those of you who haven't read Kippenberger's classic memoir Infantry Brigadier it is available here:

http://www.nzetc.org/tm/scholarly/tei-KipInfa.html

Thanks for that. I've been looking for this book for years.

[Chris jM]

Apologies for the delay gents, however I have now uploaded the word doc 'Infantry in Battle' for general interest. baboon6, thanks for the heads-up - I would have been at a loss had you not id'd that link for me - thanks.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/26351328/050

Abstract: The training note (1) is the product of battle experience in the New Zealand Divisions in World War II. It is based on research conducted by the New Zealand War History Branch under the direction of the Editor-in-Chief, Major General Sir Howard Kippenberger, KBE, CB, DSO, himself an infantry soldier of wide experience. In 1947, a book (2) was published in the United States, attempting to explain the reaction of the average American to battle experiences. Major General Kippenberger wished to know whether the well-authenticated conclusions reached by the author were of equal application to the New Zealand soldier. Accordingly he addressed a detailed questionnaire, based upon the book, to some fifty officers who had given distinguished service with infantry units of the 2nd or 3rd New Zealand Divisions. Their findings were collated, and are contained in the pages that follow. In order to give point to the opinions stated, many individual examples drawn from all campaigns are quoted in the text. These are set out in italics throughout and are the words of the experienced officers who participated in these events. As the replies to the original questionnaire were not made with a view to publication, personal names have been omitted from all examples.

Kiwigrunt, I've got another few word docs that relate to NZ history. Should you (or anyone else) want to have a look, PM me.