Combat Participation

[Sparapet]

LEADERSHIP, Leadership, leadership!

It is ALWAYS about leadership.

Agreed completely. It's true of any organization. When an organization needs fixing you look to the officers first. They set the standard and the vision. Then the NCO's, they enforce the standard and promote the vision. Joe is last on the list of responsibility and ability to impact the quality of a unit. Joe falls in line when the NCO's are able to guide them. All in all, in the modern force the line units don't have to recruit or conduct the initial training. That means any Joe that shows up is screened and trained to some basic minimum (what that minimum should be is another conversation). That's when the unit takes over and where the leaders make impact. Otherwise it descends into peer training...e.g. hazing.

Interestingly, the SS (presumably Waffen SS, not their political brothers) have been mentioned several times here as an example of effective units. I am in the camp that walks a fine line between respecting the best of the Waffen SS formations without admiring them. I have seen references in literature on the SS of the regular anti-communist indoctrination those units received to make them believe the communists were the arch evil (and incidentally Jews, but my impression is the communist threat was more potent and regularly tied to Jews). Olive Oyl mentioned the moral basis for their effectiveness. Agreed with that, they were ideologically motivated. Ideology is probably the best motivator if it can be sustained. We see that in some of our post-9/11 Soldiers who got into the services to bring democracy and undo wrongs of the world only to have their world-view shattered once they started raiding Iraqi homes with whole families in them and accidentally killing civilians at check points. That ideology motivated them, but it was never the ideology regularly indoctrinated in the services; this fact becoming clear when the answer to their confusion was "war is dirty".

To a great degree, outside some combat arms units, I do believe the US lacks a martial culture in the services. We are perpetually confused as a group (although many of us are to the death certain of our own roles) about what is appropriate culture for us to enable our purpose. Often times we are even confused by our purpose. Are we to protect the nation? Or are we to protect the nation's interests? Are those synonymous? Is our purpose to spread democracy? etc etc etc. And this "greater purpose" is needed by the leaders as a guide for them to set their own guidance for the NCO's and men. So in that confusion we revert to the cave man answer "what makes the grass grow!?" Which sounds great and motivating until 19 yr old Joe is standing next to a 12 yr old girl he just opened up on with a SAW in the dark. And the only person that can make that alright for him is his leader explaining WHY he should be able to live with that. Too often the answer is "war is dirty" and the leader just resorts to the coercion of regulation to enforce discipline.

Just saying....


Scouts Out

[Fuchs]

There was little if any difference between Waffen SS quality and normal Heer quality once you look at equals in terms of type of formation, supply and age structure of personnel.

In fact, the Waffen SS was rather incompetent early on and way too reckless.

My assertion here is that there's no need to look closely at their attributes because you can learn the same from the fast and light troops of the Wehrmacht (Panzer, Panzergrenadier, Gebirgsjger and early Fallschirmjger formations) without most of the political hazzle.

[gute]

There was little if any difference between Waffen SS quality and normal Heer quality once you look at equals in terms of type of formation, supply and age structure of personnel.

In fact, the Waffen SS was rather incompetent early on and way too reckless.

My assertion here is that there's no need to look closely at their attributes because you can learn the same from the fast and light troops of the Wehrmacht (Panzer, Panzergrenadier, Gebirgsjger and early Fallschirmjger formations) without most of the political hazzle.

No doubt, non-SS units fought quite well during WWII.

[JMA]

There was little if any difference between Waffen SS quality and normal Heer quality once you look at equals in terms of type of formation, supply and age structure of personnel.

In fact, the Waffen SS was rather incompetent early on and way too reckless.

My assertion here is that there's no need to look closely at their attributes because you can learn the same from the fast and light troops of the Wehrmacht (Panzer, Panzergrenadier, Gebirgsjger and early Fallschirmjger formations) without most of the political hazzle.

Martin van Creveld's book Fighting Power is worthy of study.

He speaks of a formula -

Within the limits set by its size, an army's worth as a militray instrument equals the quality and quantity of its equipment multiplied by what, ... (is) termed its Fighting Power. The latter rests on mental, intellectual and organisational foundations; its manifestations, in one combination or another, are discipline, cohesion, morale and initiative, courage and toughness, the willingness to fight and the readiness, if necessary, to die. Fighting Power in brief, is defined as the sum of the total of mental qualities that make armies fight.

[Fuchs]

That's a pseudo formula. It multiplies two unknowns.
Show me mathematician who can solve such an equation.


Besides, his methodology in the book was popular, but also flawed. He compared two very different forces instead of comparing multiple different formations of different performance from the same force. He's voluntarily looking at datasets that are much farther away from ceteris paribus than necessary, which clouds the whole approach - and he used practically no advanced empirical tools as (which would be required for such a multi-input dataset).
It's a pseudo study that purports to deliver scientific results when in fact it's really only about his opinion.

[JMA]

That's a pseudo formula. It multiplies two unknowns.
Show me mathematician who can solve such an equation.

Besides, his methodology in the book was popular, but also flawed. He compared two very different forces instead of comparing multiple different formations of different performance from the same force. He's voluntarily looking at datasets that are much farther away from ceteris paribus than necessary, which clouds the whole approach - and he used practically no advanced empirical tools as (which would be required for such a multi-input dataset). It's a pseudo study that purports to deliver scientific results when in fact it's really only about his opinion.

Ah... but you missed where I placed the word 'study' in bold.

I am not that concerned with his comparison between the krauts and the yanks just as I will not be distracted by the crude comparison in Jorg Muth's book Command Culture: Officer Education in the U.S. Army and the German Armed Force, 1901-1940, and the Consequences for World War II (when I finally get a copy) ... I will search for the little (often invaluable) gems that one uncovers in studying these books.

We all know (and it just leaves it for the last of the diehard yanks to accept the truth) that the raw cannon fodder divisions the yanks fed into Europe after D-Day were being chewed up by the resource stretched but combat experienced German formations. It was a case of the problem that even though they could chew up and spit out one of these divisions comprising inspired amateurs today, tomorrow there would be another, new full equipped one to replace it... and so it went. Any decent book on D-Day - Keegan or Ambrose - will tell you that story.

I try to look for items of relevance applicable for today.

Of interest to me is that the following characteristics (which van Creveld lists as components of Fighting Power) have assumed a lower level of importance than academic expertise (for officers) and technical ability (for all) among soldiers (certainly in the US). I will look into this further out of personal interest as it may well lead to where the US led NATO armies are going/have gone wrong.

(Fighting Power) rests on mental, intellectual and organisational foundations; its manifestations, in one combination or another, are discipline, cohesion, morale and initiative, courage and toughness, the willingness to fight and the readiness, if necessary, to die.

I have mentioned it a number of times before that the role of the infantry is to "close with and kill the enemy".

Look at any video out of Afghanistan and see that the waddling Michelin men of ISAF and see that this is quite impossible. The go out on patrol... draw fire... call in an airstrike... then waddle back to base. Its all a bit of a sick joke.

van Creveld for all his faults helps us return to first principles and rethink why it is possible for the most technically advanced and supported soldiers ever (yanks and Brits) can get their ass' whipped in combat by guys in sandals carrying an AK (and other basic weapons). For those who are able to think it is an interesting journey.

[Fuchs]

I have mentioned it a number of times before that the role of the infantry is to "close with and kill the enemy".

...and I will keep resisting this BS maxim.

[JMA]

...and I will keep resisting this BS maxim.

I'm all ears!

Is this what you believe?

The infantry's tasks are therefore almost all of those (line-of-sight) combat missions which can better be accomplished dismounted than mounted.

So what is it that you don't agree with in the 'standard' definition?

'Closing with'? 'Killing'? Both? Neither?

...but we have been through all this before ( here )

You have more you wish to add?

[gute]

Ah... but you missed where I placed the word 'study' in bold.

I am not that concerned with his comparison between the krauts and the yanks just as I will not be distracted by the crude comparison in Jorg Muth's book Command Culture: Officer Education in the U.S. Army and the German Armed Force, 1901-1940, and the Consequences for World War II (when I finally get a copy) ... I will search for the little (often invaluable) gems that one uncovers in studying these books.

We all know (and it just leaves it for the last of the diehard yanks to accept the truth) that the raw cannon fodder divisions the yanks fed into Europe after D-Day were being chewed up by the resource stretched but combat experienced German formations. It was a case of the problem that even though they could chew up and spit out one of these divisions comprising inspired amateurs today, tomorrow there would be another, new full equipped one to replace it... and so it went. Any decent book on D-Day - Keegan or Ambrose - will tell you that story.

I try to look for items of relevance applicable for today.

Of interest to me is that the following characteristics (which van Creveld lists as components of Fighting Power) have assumed a lower level of importance than academic expertise (for officers) and technical ability (for all) among soldiers (certainly in the US). I will look into this further out of personal interest as it may well lead to where the US led NATO armies are going/have gone wrong.



I have mentioned it a number of times before that the role of the infantry is to "close with and kill the enemy".

Look at any video out of Afghanistan and see that the waddling Michelin men of ISAF and see that this is quite impossible. The go out on patrol... draw fire... call in an airstrike... then waddle back to base. Its all a bit of a sick joke.

van Creveld for all his faults helps us return to first principles and rethink why it is possible for the most technically advanced and supported soldiers ever (yanks and Brits) can get their ass' whipped in combat by guys in sandals carrying an AK (and other basic weapons). For those who are able to think it is an interesting journey.

I don't think I would go as far as to say that the U.S. and the Brits are getting their asses whipped.

I like the Michelin man comparison - funny. Our guys definitely wear too much crap.

[jmm99]

Which ones were the "raw cannon fodder divisions" that were "chewed up" ?

2nd Armored
3rd Armored
5th Armored
7th Armored
8th Armored
2nd Infantry
8th Infantry
28th Infantry
29th Infantry
30th Infantry
35th Infantry
78th Infantry
79th Infantry
83rd Infantry
84th Infantry
95th Infantry
102nd Infantry
104th Infantry

Show and Tell Facts Time.

Regards

Mike

[ganulv]

We all know (and it just leaves it for the last of the diehard yanks to accept the truth) that the raw cannon fodder divisions the yanks fed into Europe after D-Day were being chewed up by the resource stretched but combat experienced German formations. It was a case of the problem that even though they could chew up and spit out one of these divisions comprising inspired amateurs today, tomorrow there would be another, new full equipped one to replace it... and so it went.

I might be misunderstanding what is implied by your use of ‘full equipped,’ but the Allies had logistics issues of their own on the way to the Rhine.

[JMA]

I might be misunderstanding what is implied by your use of ‘full equipped,’ but the Allies had logistics issues of their own on the way to the Rhine.

Yes you are... compared to what the Germans had to make do with at that time.

[Fuchs]

I might be misunderstanding what is implied by your use of ‘full equipped,’ but the Allies had logistics issues of their own on the way to the Rhine.

The insufficient German fuel production was crashed to about 10% of its former output during that period and German truck productions had been smaller than truck losses for three years in a row by mid-'44...

I’ll give you that if you’ll give me that zee Germans did have the defensive advantage. The drive to the Rhine was about rooting them out, not facing them in pitched battle.

You do understand that the fully motorised Western allies took six months in 1944 to reconquer against the numerically inferior shambles of an army what the Germans had conquered in 1940 against a numerically equal opponent in six weeks, having only a 15% motorised force?
This doesn't even take into account the 10:1 versus 1:1 air power ratios and multiplied overall air power effectiveness.

There's little doubt that given the circumstances, the Allied advance through France was slow.

[Ulenspiegel]

Besides, his methodology in the book was popular, but also flawed. He compared two very different forces instead of comparing multiple different formations of different performance from the same force. He's voluntarily looking at datasets that are much farther away from ceteris paribus than necessary, which clouds the whole approach - and he used practically no advanced empirical tools as (which would be required for such a multi-input dataset).
It's a pseudo study that purports to deliver scientific results when in fact it's really only about his opinion.

Here one can disagree:

1) MvC used data sets which were provided by Dupuy, who listed and analysed battles in Italy 1943 and found a higher effectiveness of German forces, independent of type. Have you better data, that refute Dupuy's?
(In hard science I provide better data or shut up :-))

2) The overall approach is valid on base of Dupuy's data. I agree that your approach would give additional insight, but this does not change the valid basic concept and would be IMHO a different project.

3) McC's comparisonon of US forces of 1943/44 and German structures of 1941/42 is flawed, he should have analysed the 1943 units in Italy. Especially the depleted officer/NCO corps.

4) Some of his conclusions are wrong.

5) However, many of the tables and comparisons (secondary data) presented by MvC are still very valuable even when I disagree with some conclusions he draw from them.

[Fuchs]

He may be correct or wrong; his approach is a poor one and was likely based with the reception among anglophone readers in mind.*

As a general principle you should use datasets that have as few as possible secondary influence factors. He basically took totally noisy samples instead of using much less noisy samples as would have been available if he had used exclusively U.S.Army-related or exclusively German army-related sources.

I do not remember any of the advanced empirical tools from his books, nothing as complicated as the statistical suff used in econometrics on comparably noisy datasets, for example. Nowadays you wouldn't get a diploma in economics if you made an econometric diploma dissertation with a noisy dataset and as simple statistical analysis. It would be considered as a no-show job.

In short, he wrote at best an inspiring popular science book. His other works weren't more advanced either.

*: A criqitue of the methodology does not require a counter-argument or -analysis concerning the facts.

[Ulenspiegel]

He may be correct or wrong; his approach is a poor one and was likely based with the reception among anglophone readers in mind.*

As a general principle you should use datasets that have as few as possible secondary influence factors. He basically took totally noisy samples instead of using much less noisy samples as would have been available if he had used exclusively U.S.Army-related or exclusively German army-related sources.

I do not remember any of the advanced empirical tools from his books, nothing as complicated as the statistical suff used in econometrics on comparably noisy datasets, for example. Nowadays you wouldn't get a diploma in economics if you made an econometric diploma dissertation with a noisy dataset and as simple statistical analysis. It would be considered as a no-show job.

In short, he wrote at best an inspiring popular science book. His other works weren't more advanced either.

*: A criqitue of the methodology does not require a counter-argument or -analysis concerning the facts.

Sorry, I think you miss the point:

MvC did not use own data, but ones provided by Dupuy, so he lives or dies with the quality of Dupuys data. Do you assume or have evidence that Dupuys data are fawlty?

Frankly, why should Dupuy use only US or German data, that would be poor methodology. You use reliable US data for the US side and German for the German side.