Hello Adam,Originally Posted by Adam L
Perhaps even more so than the U.S., in its own way Canada is dependent upon Airpower for its strategic defence and operational mobility. The recent acquisition of C-17s was a step in the right direction, but 4 were not remotely enough; the planned acquisition of 17 C-130Js is nice, but given the choice between having a full squadron of a dozen+ C-17s on one hand, or the planned force of 4 C-17s and 17 C-130Js, the former would be better. Canada requires strategic airflift just for its own defence, whether that's airlifting and sustaining a Battalion to deal with an enemy lodgement in the High Arctic or along one of the Ocean Coasts, or doing the same with a Battle Group on the other side of the world. It is practically inconceivable that anything larger than a Regiment/Brigade airlift would ever have to be mounted, not least, obviously, because any enemy would find it difficult or impossible to mount and sustain anything larger than a Battalion-level operation. For tactical operations, something akin to the good old DHC Caribou STOL transports would do; they were originally designed to provide Divisional-Level supply and transport in nuclear war conditions, but unfortunately there has been no replacement. Obviously, Air Superiority is critical to enable any of this.
As to Canada's territorial water claims in the Arctic and especially the North-West Passage, they are misconceived. They are not generally recognized internationally, and of course do not in any way meet the 12-mile limit under International Law. As to the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone that International Law provides for, that's a legitimate claim Canada can hold on to. But to enforce in practice would require a modest, but noticeable militarization of the Arctic, particularly along the NorthWest Passage. In general terms, think a few AIP subs, a Fighter Squadron, and a reinforced Infantry Battalion/Battle Group either in the region or able to get there, intact and sustainable, fiarly rapidly.
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Perhaps it would do to address Marc's question of what are Canada's defence obligations, requirements, and resources. In another thread, Marc mentioned that Canada required forces of very high quality, and it should go without saying that he is entirely correct. The problem is that the disparity between political will and willingess to allocate resources on the one hand, and international obligations and military requirements on the other is vast, to say the least.
At the end of WWII, the General Staff determined that the Army required 6 Infantry Divisions (1 Regular Army, 5 Reserve Army) and 2 Armoured Brigades (both Reserve Army) for the defence of Canada. The Navy Staff determined that it required 2 Aircraft Carriers along with Escorts and the like (one on each Coast), and the Air Staff determined a requirement for something like 600 Fighter aircraft (IIRC, my memory is hazy here).
They actually got an Army of 3 Infantry Battalions, 2 Armoured Regiments (Battalions), and a Regiment (Battalion) or equivalent each of Artillery, Field Engineers, and IIRC (again memory hazy) an AA Regiment, plus an SAS Company. The Navy got 1 Aircraft Carrier - plus Escorts on both coasts, and the Air Force received something like a handful of the Fighter Squadrons it was looking for. That's probably about what Canada can afford now, if it had the will do do so, though a CV or LHD is probably beyond the country's will and resources. AIP Subs and Coastal Patrol/ASW aircraft are best for coastal defence, leaving surface ships to Expeditionary and Convoy operations.
As to requirements, that's a different story. Canada is most unlikely to ever commit a force much larger than either a Battalion, Frigate Squadron, Fighter Squadron, some Logistics and Ancillary elements, or a full-fledged Battle Group or Joint Task Force. In this sense, we still possess the traditional Imperial mentality of "A Battalion, a Battery, and a Frigate". Think up to an MEU for all practical purposes. Except if a general war breaks out, then nothing short of entire Divisions, Naval Battle Groups, and Air Divisions will do. Canada attempted something like this on the cheap in the 1950's, and gave it up by the mid-1960's. Not politically sustainable then, and certainly not now.
But as to "quality" and training, that's harder now; the Human Rights Commission in the early 90's imposed requirements upon the Armed Forces that were prejudical to training, order, and good discipline, to put it mildly. The Armed Forces have tried to work around this, in some cases with quite some success. But the albatross is still there. Without the ability to demand and enforce the highest standards of selection, leadership, training, and discipline, a "small but high-quality force" is more of a wish than an achievable objective. When Infantrymen, as an example, are required every 90 days (at least) to perform the 2x10 (marching 10 miles within 2 hours with full kit, on back-to-back days), one day immediately crossing an Assault Course after the 10-miler before directly proceeding on to a Live-Fire Section Attack with no rest; and the other day peforming a Casualty-Carry immediately after the 10-miler, and then proceeding directly without rest to a Live Shoot out to 300-400m where each must achieve a Marksman's rating, then a "small, high-quality force" is practically achievable. The basics must be strictly enforced, otherwise the "small, high-quality force" is rather less than it appears on paper.
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