All matters Canadian / Canada

[Norfolk]

It was probably best that this document was released under the radar and down in the weeds; in real substance it is little different than Defence in the 70's, except a tenth the size. And the Q&A page is rather embarrassing. As for the $490 billion price tag projected over 20 years, it is a pittance, and the paper grudgingly admits as much when it states that real projected growth in the DND budget over the twenty-year span will only amount to 0.6% (compared to a nominal 2.2%). The only real growth in DND's budget would come from eliminating 2/3rds of the officer corps and at least a similar proportion of the 25,000 DND civilians.

First off, the next Government is unlikely to be Conservative, and as such, the axe will soon swing once again, and probably deeply; Secondly, fuel, M&O, and other costs will eat up many times over whatever growth may be projected; Thirdly, parts of this document, and especially Chapter VII, are nothing other than a sop to the Aerospace and Defence industry; and Fourthly, this document indicates little recognition of the long- (and even medium-) term military impracticality or ineffectuality of most of the stated missions and priorities, given present and anticipated manpower, equipment, and resources. In short, the document (and admittedly it mentions nothing that many, even most, of us did not already know that it would say months ago) may turn out to be little more than a vapour in the wind.

[Stevely]

I can't see how they can cut the DND's budget much more without having to throw in the towel and shutter your military altogether?

[marct]

I can't see how they can cut the DND's budget much more without having to throw in the towel and shutter your military altogether?

That's happened before, unfortunately . I'm not sure what the thinking, if one can call it that, is on the future of our military. We have spent too much time acting as Peace Keepers and with a very limited number of combat troops. This, especially when coupled with the Afghanistan mission, has created a rather polarized, and weird, political image of what our troops should be doing. I'm afraid that Norfolk is probably correct in his assessment that the next government won't be Conservative - then again, the Dion carbon tax proposal may just be enough for the Tories to get back in in a minority situation.

Personally, I would like to see a multi-party discussion and debate over where we, as a nation, believe our military should go. The officer cuts mentioned by Norfolk are a good example, as is the elimination of many of the civilian employees. What are our priority missions? What are our contractual obligations? What do we actually need to fulfill them?

[Norfolk]

Personally, I would like to see a multi-party discussion and debate over where we, as a nation, believe our military should go. [] What are our priority missions? What are our contractual obligations? What do we actually need to fulfill them?

No meaningful multiparty discussion would, or could, ever take place, I'm afraid. The utter ignorance and more or less complete indifference of all parties with regards to military matters is practically invincible; it is effectively likewise for the general public, though for much less distasteful reasons. Being in some ways Metternich's political 5xGreat-Grandson, the lack of any meaningful public interest in or substantive support for the military, while certainly not laudible, must be practically conceded as being something close to inevitable. Pretty hard to be concerned about something that never seems to touch you when it's difficult enough making ends meet day-to-day for many, and increasingly more, people. Especially when it means more money out of your own shrinking pocket. Troops can identify with that much quite well.

As Stevely mentions, there is a point at which the resources (as well as the political conditions and constraints imposed by the Government) reach the point at which a Military is brought to the tipping point between remaining a Military, or degenerating into a Gendarmerie. Since we already have a Gendarmerie, the RCMP, which does indeed have both peacetime paramilitary and wartime military roles, tasks, and missions, then if we are no longer able or willing or both to maintain a proper Military, then it's time to end the pretense and disband DND and the CAF. Re-paramilitarize the RCMP (their Constabulary role under contract to various Provinces has softened them substantially), and paramilitarize the Canadian Coast Guard. At least they will be capable of territorial surveillance as well as border and internal security. They would also be capable of limited overseas LIC missions.

The real cost of such an approach would be a national independence that would literally degenerate into legal fiction. But even as there is strong hostility towards such an eventuality, there is conversely no real will, or even recognition, of this, let alone a will or even recognition of what it would take to substantively reverse it. Unless these are effectively rectified, even asking what our treaty obligations and mission/force requirements are are of little more than interesting but merely hypothetical point.

[Fuchs]

Norfolk; there's next to no likeliness of an invasion of Canada.
I understand very well that/if the nation isn't much interested in the military.

I would only care about the efficiency, not the amount of spending.
Small armies often work pretty well - inventories like 2 Hercules planes work well in small nations even while large nations assert that inventories below a couple dozen or hundred aircraft of a single type would be ineffective.

[Adam L]

The real cost of such an approach would be a national independence that would literally degenerate into legal fiction.

In my opinion, the greatest threat to Canada's sovereignty is its inability to patrol and/or guard its northern territorial claims. With ice receding up north, everyone (especially Russia) has been trying to lay claims to the Arctic seabed. Canada has been unable to perform underwater surveys due to its lack of a powerful icebreaker. Russia has made several expeditions with one of their icebreaker (nuclear powered if I recall) to do so. I know this is a tad off topic, but I feel that it is very related to this issue.

Norfolk; there's next to no likeliness of an invasion of Canada.
I understand very well that/if the nation isn't much interested in the military.

I would only care about the efficiency, not the amount of spending.
Small armies often work pretty well - inventories like 2 Hercules planes work well in small nations even while large nations assert that inventories below a couple dozen or hundred aircraft of a single type would be ineffective.

Although Canada is a "small" country as far as population is concerned, I would think they have many of the logistical issues of a much larger nation due to the shear size of the country. Norfolk, can you give some insight on this?

Adam L

[Fuchs]

I didn't mean logistical challenges, but fleet operation efficiency.
Some officials claim that inventories need to be very large for economies of scale or the equipment could not be supported.
And then you see countries like Belgium, who have iirc two or three Hercules.

I tried to tell that a small military does not need to be underfunded. It just needs to adapt to its budget and can be fine with little budget.
I see no real reason for a large Canadian military. They should at a minimum keep their army/navy know-how, NORAD participation and fighters just in case, though.

[Norfolk]

In my opinion, the greatest threat to Canada's sovereignty is its inability to patrol and/or guard its northern territorial claims. With ice receding up north, everyone (especially Russia) has been trying to lay claims to the Arctic seabed. Canada has been unable to perform underwater surveys due to its lack of a powerful icebreaker. Russia has made several expeditions with one of their icebreaker (nuclear powered if I recall) to do so. I know this is a tad off topic, but I feel that it is very related to this issue.

Although Canada is a "small" country as far as population is concerned, I would think they have many of the logistical issues of a much larger nation due to the shear size of the country. Norfolk, can you give some insight on this?

Adam L

Hello Adam,

Perhaps even more so than the U.S., in its own way Canada is dependent upon Airpower for its strategic defence and operational mobility. The recent acquisition of C-17s was a step in the right direction, but 4 were not remotely enough; the planned acquisition of 17 C-130Js is nice, but given the choice between having a full squadron of a dozen+ C-17s on one hand, or the planned force of 4 C-17s and 17 C-130Js, the former would be better. Canada requires strategic airflift just for its own defence, whether that's airlifting and sustaining a Battalion to deal with an enemy lodgement in the High Arctic or along one of the Ocean Coasts, or doing the same with a Battle Group on the other side of the world. It is practically inconceivable that anything larger than a Regiment/Brigade airlift would ever have to be mounted, not least, obviously, because any enemy would find it difficult or impossible to mount and sustain anything larger than a Battalion-level operation. For tactical operations, something akin to the good old DHC Caribou STOL transports would do; they were originally designed to provide Divisional-Level supply and transport in nuclear war conditions, but unfortunately there has been no replacement. Obviously, Air Superiority is critical to enable any of this.

As to Canada's territorial water claims in the Arctic and especially the North-West Passage, they are misconceived. They are not generally recognized internationally, and of course do not in any way meet the 12-mile limit under International Law. As to the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone that International Law provides for, that's a legitimate claim Canada can hold on to. But to enforce in practice would require a modest, but noticeable militarization of the Arctic, particularly along the NorthWest Passage. In general terms, think a few AIP subs, a Fighter Squadron, and a reinforced Infantry Battalion/Battle Group either in the region or able to get there, intact and sustainable, fiarly rapidly.

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Perhaps it would do to address Marc's question of what are Canada's defence obligations, requirements, and resources. In another thread, Marc mentioned that Canada required forces of very high quality, and it should go without saying that he is entirely correct. The problem is that the disparity between political will and willingess to allocate resources on the one hand, and international obligations and military requirements on the other is vast, to say the least.

At the end of WWII, the General Staff determined that the Army required 6 Infantry Divisions (1 Regular Army, 5 Reserve Army) and 2 Armoured Brigades (both Reserve Army) for the defence of Canada. The Navy Staff determined that it required 2 Aircraft Carriers along with Escorts and the like (one on each Coast), and the Air Staff determined a requirement for something like 600 Fighter aircraft (IIRC, my memory is hazy here).

They actually got an Army of 3 Infantry Battalions, 2 Armoured Regiments (Battalions), and a Regiment (Battalion) or equivalent each of Artillery, Field Engineers, and IIRC (again memory hazy) an AA Regiment, plus an SAS Company. The Navy got 1 Aircraft Carrier - plus Escorts on both coasts, and the Air Force received something like a handful of the Fighter Squadrons it was looking for. That's probably about what Canada can afford now, if it had the will do do so, though a CV or LHD is probably beyond the country's will and resources. AIP Subs and Coastal Patrol/ASW aircraft are best for coastal defence, leaving surface ships to Expeditionary and Convoy operations.

As to requirements, that's a different story. Canada is most unlikely to ever commit a force much larger than either a Battalion, Frigate Squadron, Fighter Squadron, some Logistics and Ancillary elements, or a full-fledged Battle Group or Joint Task Force. In this sense, we still possess the traditional Imperial mentality of "A Battalion, a Battery, and a Frigate". Think up to an MEU for all practical purposes. Except if a general war breaks out, then nothing short of entire Divisions, Naval Battle Groups, and Air Divisions will do. Canada attempted something like this on the cheap in the 1950's, and gave it up by the mid-1960's. Not politically sustainable then, and certainly not now.

But as to "quality" and training, that's harder now; the Human Rights Commission in the early 90's imposed requirements upon the Armed Forces that were prejudical to training, order, and good discipline, to put it mildly. The Armed Forces have tried to work around this, in some cases with quite some success. But the albatross is still there. Without the ability to demand and enforce the highest standards of selection, leadership, training, and discipline, a "small but high-quality force" is more of a wish than an achievable objective. When Infantrymen, as an example, are required every 90 days (at least) to perform the 2x10 (marching 10 miles within 2 hours with full kit, on back-to-back days), one day immediately crossing an Assault Course after the 10-miler before directly proceeding on to a Live-Fire Section Attack with no rest; and the other day peforming a Casualty-Carry immediately after the 10-miler, and then proceeding directly without rest to a Live Shoot out to 300-400m where each must achieve a Marksman's rating, then a "small, high-quality force" is practically achievable. The basics must be strictly enforced, otherwise the "small, high-quality force" is rather less than it appears on paper.