All matters Canadian / Canada

[Michael Shannon]

The so called 'decades of darkness" were the response of both Conservative and Liberal governments to the demise of Canada's only convenetional threat, the USSR. Given the realities of government financing and politics, they had no other reasonable option but to reduce defence spending. The military was still given enough cash to be the second most expensive force per man in the world with total cash outlays 6th in NATO and 16th in the world. The CF made choices on what to spend it's budget on. It could have had more soldiers attend US Army Ranger and SF courses. It could have taught more foriegn languages (it only offers Spanish) at the Royal Military College. It could of had a mountain school. It could have offered COIN as a subject on it's Master of War Studies program. It could of had COIN as a subject at staff colleges. It could of bought suitable aircraft. It did none of these things but not for want of cash and not from interferance from politicians. I suggest that it was because the officer corps could not imagine particpating in a "Viet Nam", found language study difficult (in the CF it still makes far more career sense to perfect French or English than to learn Dari or Pashtu) and found playing tank versus tank war games much more fufilling than thinking about politics, culture, reconstruction and police work.

[John T. Fishel]

Jed--

Thanks for the edit. Being able to locate the books easily will help anyone who is interested in the subject. But I am most grateful for your posting of Chris Madsen's article. It really is relevant to this site.

On the "for fun" aspects, the photo reminded me of the famous photo of the Pershing Punitive Expedition to Mexico in 1916. The US and Canadian uniforms of the era were practically the same; both armies used similar bridles; but they differed with respect to saddles. The US used the McClellan (which I have never ridden but some swear by it while others hate it); the Canadians used the British Universal Pattern (UP). I have a modern version that is supremely comfortable - of course it does use a modern gel cushion for my tired old butt!

John

[Culpeper]

Canada paid a heavy price during WWI. Was cautious and didn't have a hard time during WWII as opposed to the British and Americans. They lost their punch. It is taking nearly a hundred years to get it back. I did see the Snowbirds one time and they were awesome in their slower CT-114 tutor jets. But that group, type of aircraft, and choice of name is typical of Canadian military mindset.

[marct]

All I can say, is that this is typically Canadian

Native reference will not appear in Canadian terror manual

BILL CURRY
From Monday's Globe and Mail

OTTAWA — References to radical natives in the Canadian Army's counter-insurgency manual will not appear in the final version of the document, Defence Minister Gordon O'Connor announced.

The use of "radical Native American organizations" as an example of insurgents in a draft version of the manual has outraged native leaders, who viewed the wording as a threat to their political rights to protest.

More...

There's also a larger version with more details here.

Marc

[FascistLibertarian]

The experince of the Canadian Forces with the natives (specifically Oka) is one of the main domestic examples of how the Canadian military responded. It is very different than what the CF is going now in A-Stan. Regardless, it is a great case study similar to the protection of the Olympics in Montreal and the FLQ October Crisis. It should be in there even if the term "radical" maybe is not used.

[AdamG]

I wonder if these Mohawks complied with Canadian law and had only five-round magazines? Check the photo, their spokesman looks like a real winner

http://www.ottawasun.com/News/Nation...99262-sun.html

DESERONTO — A small group of angry Mohawk protesters made good on their threats to disrupt transportation in Canada’s busiest travel corridor on a national day of action to raise public awareness of native concerns such as poverty, health and land claims.

*

Earlier, the Mohawk protesters near Deseronto who threatened that they had arms and were ready to use them, parked an old school bus across secondary Highway 2, forcing a steady stream of traffic and heavy trucks to turn around.

“We’ve made no secret that we have guns within this camp,” protest leader Shawn Brant told The Canadian Press in an interview. “It’s our intent to go out and ensure a safe day. Unfortunately, previous incidents have shown that aggressive tactics by the police need to be met with equal resistance by the people that they’re bringing those against."

Later, the protesters closed the nearby CN Rail main line, using jumper cables to activate crossing barriers before moving another old school bus onto the tracks.

[William F. Owen]

http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/...6-ee2e33a9a192

This is somewhat disturbing and thanks to Fuchs for pointing it out.

Units are being told to give up their 60mm mortars! And get this for a quote

"But in an e-mail, the army said the grenade launchers will soon take over the role of the mortars. "As the 60mm mortar is nearing the end of its life-cycle, it doesn't make sense to keep it while the CASW will be meeting the same requirement," the e-mail said."

On what planet does CASW (40mm AGL) meet the same requirements as a mortar. The UK already made this mistake at the platoon level and is now reversing it.

IMO, unless a 40mm AGL is on a vehicle and preferably part of a RWS, it has no place in modern infantry.

[Ken White]

...On what planet does CASW (40mm AGL) meet the same requirements as a mortar. The UK already made this mistake at the platoon level and is now reversing it.

IMO, unless a 40mm AGL is on a vehicle and preferably part of a RWS, it has no place in modern infantry.

Other than as a psychological weapon.

It looks scary, booms nicely and makes more noise than anything else -- with the caveat that the Mk 47 or the CIS AGL make slightly more sense. If one can afford it, it's a nice to have toy; if one cannot afford it and a 60mmm mortar issue, IMO one would be making a really bad mistake to opt for the AGL.

[VMI_Marine]

To contradict the article, tripod-mounted AGLs can be used as indirect fire weapons. The Marine Corps' machine gunnery pub has a tabular firing table in the back for just such a purpose.

But to retire the lightweight company mortars in favor of AGLs is stupid. AGLs can't fire high angle, for starters. The M224 is very easy to set up and quickly put down suppressive fires out to 3.5 km. This sort of baffles me:

Other soldiers say they aren't used that often in Afghanistan, a signal that the weapon's time has come and gone.

Why not? When the enemy frequently engages you from distances near or beyond the max effective range of your small arms, what could be better than an easily portable mortar system for returning the love? (Note: I am assuming a dismounted force w/o vehicle-mounted HMGs.)

[Fuchs]

They seem to have a 81mm mortar in the inventory as well, so maybe it's not as terrible as on first sight.
http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/lf/English/2_5.asp?cat=2
(Slightly confused; 81mm mortar being used by "artillery"?)

It was apparently a 1942 vintage (later equipped with bipod) light mortar.
We're talking about the predecessor of the M224 here.

But it's still madness to have rules like that and to talk nonsense like that.

[Maximus]

Gentlemen,

100% concur with the general sentiment of this thread. The 60mm mortar is an essential weapon in the modern rifle company, if not rifle platoon. As infantry units continue to disperse on the battlefield, they'll need more instantly available--organic--fire support, not less. Check out the article here: http://www.nypost.com/seven/05032008...cry_109193.htm and also review the photo gallery. This is an infantry platoon reinforced operating out of a patrol base, mortars and all. This is 2008. In the book Platoon Leader, the harsh reality on the importance of 60mm mortars was learned the hard way. Initially the infantry platoon did not have it's own lightweight mortars at its patrol base in Vietnam. Soon after commencing operations, the Soldiers quickly realized why they needed a lightweight mortar. For a 2002 perspective, Sean Naylor's Not a Good Day to Die clearly illustrates what happens when "higher" makes the very dangerous assumption that rotary wing and fixed wing close air support are all that's needed for fire support in modern combat. Additionally, the book Phase Line Green, an intensely personal combat story about Hue City in 1968, also hammers home the importance of high angle 60mm mortar fire.

For our Canadian infantry brethern fighting side-by-side with us in Afghanistan, I hope "higher" re-evaluates this decision.

[Norfolk]

This sort of nonsense is par for the course. A decade and a half ago, the Eryx missile was purchased to replace the Carl Gustav; the only real advantage the former had over the latter was that it could be fired from an enclosed space, otherwise it was more or less the Government just trying to make friends with France. Infantry Battalions promptly locked them up in their armouries and tossed away the key for the next half-decade or so and continued to use the Carl Gustav until DND finally realized that the Eryx was not actually being used. Subsequently, DND ordered the Carl Gustavs removed from service and the Eryx actually taken into service.

The 60 mm Mortars in question are the old Mark 19, bought surplus from the US Army around the time of the Korean War. There was one in the Weapons Det of each Infantry Company HQ and Infantry Platoon HQ; there was also a MAG-58 GPMG and one of the above mentioned M-2 or M-3 Carl Gustav RR. The general idea was that each Platoon HQ (plus the Coy HQ) would be able to suppress the enemy through "Triple Jeopardy": the GPMG would force the enemy to take cover; the 60mm Mortar would then force them to seek overhead cover; and the Carl G would subsequently be used to kill the enemy in their bunkers or AFVs; and meantime the Infantry Sections assaulted the enemy positions.

While good in theory, and within certain limits also pretty good in practice, the truth is that this arrangement was forced by the persistent refusal of the Government to authorize and fund proper unit strengths; otherwise a Weapons Platoon would likely have appeared in each Infantry Company, and this was the express preference of many in the Infantry. When tactical circumstances required the detachment of GPMGs, Mortars, and AT Weapons out to the Platoons, that would be no problem. Eventually Light Infantry Companies received them, but it is my understanding that they are probably to be dissolved in the current restructuring, if they have not been already. This includes the final confirmation of the deletion of each Battalion's fourth Infantry Company as well. So it boils down to a personnel funding issue, as usual, with the Government unwilling to fund additional personnel slots for a new weapon, and demanding that some other weapon be deleted in order to provide manpower for the newest weapon.

And the 81mm Mortar (as well as the 120mm) being placed in the hands of Artillery units is a symptom, after a fashion, of trying to follow the example of the US SBCT TO&E with its composite 81/120mm mortar and mortar/artillery units (something that was attempted in the Pentomic Division). Now, as VMI Marine noted, AGLs can be used in the Indirect-Fire Role, but as he also noted, such fires cannot replace, only augment, the indirect fires of Mortars. Finally, the Canadians are mounted in LAV-IIIs (Strykers with turret-mounted 25mm Bushmaster), and dismounted operations have proven strenous for what are now Mechanized Infantry troops, although ILAVs (M-113A3 with turret-mounted 76mm howitzer) are increasingly replacing the LAV-IIIs for cross-country operations.

The Brits tried to replace the 51mm Mortar with 40 mm UGLs a few years ago; it didn't work of course. The Canadians needed a new 60mm Light Mortar over twenty years ago; we never got them of course, and now we have to get rid of our old ones in order to man the new AGLs, which we also should have had over twenty years ago. Just shake your head.

[marct]

From CBC.ca

Disciplinary charges soar since the push into Afghanistan
Last Updated: Wednesday, July 30, 2008 | 11:06 AM ET

Military charges against Canadian Forces members have risen dramatically in the years since Canada sent troops to Afghanistan, a CBC investigation has found. In fact, the charges have risen by as much as 62 per cent over an eight-year period.

All military forces face discipline and morale issues resulting from soldiers serving in war zones — and from the latest numbers uncovered by the CBC, it seems Canada is no exception.

In 1998-99, just over 1,300 so-called summary charges were laid against Canadian Forces members, for everything from drunkenness to charges of a sexual nature and drug dealing. But that number rose sharply to 2,001 in 2002-03, the year Canada first sent troops to Afghanistan, and stood at 2,100 in 2006-07, the latest year in which stats are available.

More...

Not that this surprises me, but I would really like to see hese numbers tossed into more context.

[J Wolfsberger]

Marc,

After reading the article, and cogitating a bit, I don't think this is anything particularly serious. The rise seems to be in minor infractions, handled at company level. In the US Army these would be Article 15s. The big rise (if I read correctly) is in AWOLs - which could be nothing more than a few hours or a day late in reporting back to duty after leave.

Another aspect, as one commenter pointed out, is the transition form peacetime army to wartime army - guaranteed to surface problems, which diminish over time.

Given the historic record of the Canadian forces, and their current performance in Afghanistan, I don't think there is anything to worry about.

[marct]

Hi JW,

Given the historic record of the Canadian forces, and their current performance in Afghanistan, I don't think there is anything to worry about.

I think your assessment is pretty much spot on. What I suspect, however, is that the story is "breaking" now, in part, as a way to influence our (probable) fall election. Am I correct in assuming that such a rise in infractions is pretty normal in these circumstances?

Marc

[031-Bacon,RG]

They must have gotten the story wrong - an excess of recruits actually choosing infantry, in the midst of a shooting war?

"I am 1,600 infantrymen over my establishment," Lt.-Gen. Andrew Leslie said Thursday, adding that the high numbers of recruits who want to "serve at the tip of the spear . . . completely refuted" any notion that there were problems getting people to serve in a wartime army.

Somebody must have made a mistake, since everything I've been told (over and over and over) is that Canadians are peace-loving and unwarlike friends to everyone, who aspire to nothing more than to don the blue beret and go stand with an empty rifle as an alternative target between warring factions. I mean, at some point someone must have told these recruits that the role of infantry is to close with and destroy the enemy, right?

"I find myself in a unique position in comparison to most of my fellow army commanders across NATO," Lt.-Gen. Leslie said. "I have more volunteers every tour than I have positions. To come to Afghanistan is a competitive process."

Go figure. Teach 'em to read and think, and then they wanna go and extend the same opportunities to others. They must not have got enough hugs as children - the whole lot of them.


http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=2215490

[RJ]

Its genetics 031. Those ressive genes handed down from the Celts and the Norse mixed with the Tribes of Gaul and the martial blood that flows in the veins of of the tribes that inhabitated the Med Basin has always had a component that instinctively sought physical contact with the enemy.

The United States Marine Corps has become very selective in who is retained in the O300 MOS infantry field in the past couple of years. During this whole conflict the Marines never had a problem attracting tip of the spear types. Neither has the Regular US Army had a problem filling the ranks of their Infantry and Airborne Divisions.

I suspect your Forces see that in Regiments like the Princess Patricia, and some of the Scots connected Regts.

It was rumored that one of Gen. Robert E. Lee's Col.s told one of Gen. U.S. Grant's Colonel's at Appomatox Court House when the South surrendered "The only reason you won, was because you had more Irish fighting on your side!"

In every generation there are segments of the population who are drawn to the military life. Those more in tune than most, select the personal combat with the enemy route to exercise their instincts.

It may be as simple as that.

[Rifleman]

It was rumored that one of Gen. Robert E. Lee's Col.s told one of Gen. U.S. Grant's Colonel's at Appomatox Court House when the South surrendered "The only reason you won, was because you had more Irish fighting on your side!"

Actually, I suspect it was because the Union fielded three million men and the Confederacy fielded one million.

It may be as simple at that.

[031-Bacon,RG]

The United States Marine Corps has become very selective in who is retained in the O300 MOS infantry field in the past couple of years. During this whole conflict the Marines never had a problem attracting tip of the spear types. Neither has the Regular US Army had a problem filling the ranks of their Infantry and Airborne Divisions.

I suspect your Forces see that in Regiments like the Princess Patricia, and some of the Scots connected Regts.

Since I was in, during the '80s, the Canadian Forces have gone from a "unified" service back towards a more discrete Army, Air Force, and Navy. In the forty-year interregnum the CF has been the red-headed stepchild of Canadian federal policy, kept alive with the bare minumum of support. Coincidentally, for much of this time we have been ruled by the Liberal party.

Integration was supposed to create efficiencies, common purpose, and other such nonsense, but the real reason was to diminish the cost of maintaining a standing force in an era of nuclear weapons - especially when our cousins, the Americans whom our Liberals love to malign with such passion - were NATO-bound to defend us. We leaned on America and leaned hard; our Canadian Forces had little ability to project force.

Fast forward to the current era of SmallWar, and the attendant need for the ability to put boots where our political mouths are (oh, how I love the English language). Suddenly, CF members have purpose, the support of the general population (less in Quebec, of course), modern tools to do the job, and the prospects of a career spent serving in a meaningful way.

In short, the CF is reinventing itself to be a completely different Army than the "Force" I was in, and yes, I'm both happy and p-o'd (that I missed my chance).

What the CF becomes, however, is still up for grabs. Canada has possibly the best opportunity of any Western nation to create a modern, SmallWar specialist military - since we really have only the cadre of a military, amost all of whom will find themselves involved in some manner with our Afghanistan commitment, this graduation exercise will shape the future of the CF as it is shaping the lives of serving members. If we choose carefully how to re-grow our military we will have a CF to be as proud of as we were once of our Royal Canadian Army, Air Force, and Navy.

If we do it right, we could end up with an integrated, capable CF that looks very much like the US Marines.

[RJ]

031 - Back in the late 50's I was part of an exercise with the Princess Pats.

Did your intergration eleminate the history and traditions of those proud old regiments. I was shocked when the Brits started combining the old Scots Regiments, but they did retain there kilts and hyphenated the combined units titles.

Canada could do much worse than building the new foreces on the Marine Corps pattern. Look deep and copy the Navy Medical Service and Chaplin's seconded to the Marine Divisions to provide comfort and solace.

The US Navy Corpsmen who serve with the Marines are held in awe by the Marines and those sailors who have not served in the Fleet Marine Forces.

Rifleman - The south did fairly well with the 1:3 ratio. They did a fair amount of recruiting Irish from the "Ald Sod" and fielded Irish Brigades of their own. Savannah GA was a large port of entry for the Irish and today boasts the second largest St. Patricks Day Parade in the world. And New Orleans, drew many Irish immigrents from a section of the City called Algeirs situated across "The Irish Channel" for City of New Orleans Regiments. I had a great, great uncle who wore a Fez and Pantaloons for the City of New Orleans and a great, great grandfather who was with the 88th NY Infantry Vol. Regt. ("The Devils Own") from lower Manhattan and Brooklyn, NY of the Irish Brigade formed by the State of New York. A lot of that Regiments first soldiers were veterans of and Irish Light Infantry Regiment of the British Army The 88th Connaught Rangers. Rifleman - It is all in the gene pool. Good Stock, as a gentleman from Atlanta, GA said, once upon a time.

I've heard of an Irish Brigade Regiment from Georgia who's knickname was "The Jaspers". It might be time for someone to write a history of the Irish contribution to the Southern side of the War between the States.