Aviation in COIN (merged thread)

[mmx1]

A principal aim of the proposed turboprop platform is that it serves as a vehicle for training partner nations that cannot afford more expensive turbofan or rotary-wing platforms similar to those that we purchase.

A fixed wing platform is inherently more efficient than a rotary winged one, translating into greater range and loiter time for a comparable payload. Fixed wing aircraft also tend to be easier to fly, particularly considering that the models being considered for the IAF are mostly converted trainers.

[Steve Blair]

Here's my question about this whole concept. What exactly are the capabilities DoD thinks it's going to get out of say, an AT-6 Texan II or whatever, that it can't get out of the ARH (speaking of which, is that program canceled, on hold, or what)?

All of the advantages a slow-moving turboprop has over, say, an A-10 or F-16, a good modern scout helicopter (the Kiowa is an old design) would have over that turboprop, right? Loiter time, versatility, hovering and maneuverability capabilties, etc. And the speed of a turboprop wouldn't be that much more in terms of vulnerability to ground fire, would it?

That is, would that turboprop really be less susceptible to SA-7s or RPGS than the ARH, if the chopper was at full speed?

Maybe I'm misunderstanding capabilities, but to me the whole program smacks of the Air Force trying to say "we're relevant in COIN! Really! Trust us!"

Matt

The RAH did get waxed, to the best of my knowledge.

Fixed-wing has a greater loiter time and payload capacity, as well as a larger body in general where more "stuff" can be added at a later date. It can also sustain more damage than a helicopter and remain flyable. It doesn't have the visual recon capabilities of a helicopter (very little does, honestly, if you get down to the full spectrum to include the eyeball and nostril, mark I), so it's not really a question of "one or the other" but rather what's the most effective pairing for COIN (IMO, anyhow).

I tend to prefer the AH/MH-6 family to the Kiowa, but part of that's the old VN preference coming out again (scout pilots there tended to prefer the Loach to the Kiowa).

[jcustis]

I tend to prefer the AH/MH-6 family to the Kiowa, but part of that's the old VN preference coming out again (scout pilots there tended to prefer the Loach to the Kiowa).

I've heard a number of Kiowa pilots say that they in fact prefer the Loach. Something about power, speed, etc., IIRC.

[Steve Blair]

I've heard a number of Kiowa pilots say that they in fact prefer the Loach. Something about power, speed, etc., IIRC.

Yeah...it's got more power, better speed, smaller target...and so on. Problem is that when it came up for re-bid in the late 1960s ('69 I think) Hughes jacked the price. The Army rebid, and ended up with the OH-58.

[MattC86]

A principal aim of the proposed turboprop platform is that it serves as a vehicle for training partner nations that cannot afford more expensive turbofan or rotary-wing platforms similar to those that we purchase.

A fixed wing platform is inherently more efficient than a rotary winged one, translating into greater range and loiter time for a comparable payload. Fixed wing aircraft also tend to be easier to fly, particularly considering that the models being considered for the IAF are mostly converted trainers.

Ok, both the cost thing for developing-type allies and the payload, range, etc. make sense. Although, in response to Steve, I just looked it up (finally) and apparently the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter, based on the Bell 407 design, is currently still being funded. The RAH-66 WAS canceled.

I won't say too much because it's going off topic, but if we're planning on using this turboprop primarily in conjunction with partner nations and indigenous force training, long the realm of Army Special Forces, it just doesn't make sense to me for the Air Force to operate the aircraft. The Army should be operating its close support aircraft just as the Marines do, and that includes the COIN aircraft, should it be procured.

Matt

[pcmfr]

I won't say too much because it's going off topic, but if we're planning on using this turboprop primarily in conjunction with partner nations and indigenous force training, long the realm of Army Special Forces, it just doesn't make sense to me for the Air Force to operate the aircraft. The Army should be operating its close support aircraft just as the Marines do, and that includes the COIN aircraft, should it be procured.

Better tell that to the 6th SOS. SF doesn't do aviation FID, AFSOC does and has, for many years now.

[MattC86]

Better tell that to the 6th SOS. SF doesn't do aviation FID, AFSOC does and has, for many years now.

Fair enough, my mouth (fingers?) got ahead of my knowledge. Sorry.

Matt

[Jesse9252]

If you're still interested, the author of the article on AC-130s is the subject of an interview on the Aviation Week blog. Here are some quotes:

Seifert: I would ask where the insurgents are most likely to be (although I would start figuring it out pretty quickly myself) and I would then fly over those areas as much as possible all the while being on a frequency that all of the ground forces in the triangle knew to call at the first sign of trouble. Sure a lot of insurgents would get away every night but you catch a dozen insurgents every night and you start demoralizing them pretty darn quickly. I've shot dozens of them and they don't even know what's shooting them. AC-130s against insurgents is a total and complete unfair fight. We've made it fair, though, by sitting the gunships in the same spot for hours at a time "defending" whatever ground force happens to be in that location.

My concept is no different than how police forces are used. Do cop cars sit in the same spot and defend a neighborhood? Or do they roam around looking for bad guys all the while being on call to EVERY citizen in their jurisdiction. Cops are the best weapon against bad guys and gunships are the best weapon against insurgents. Another example is F-15 employment. Do F-15s sit in the same spot defending a particular army unit against air attack or do they roam the skies looking for MiGs and waiting for AWACS to push them to the first indication of MiGs? The Air Force has perfected the art of air-to-air and is the reason the Iraqi Air Force wouldn't even take off. Put the same effort and expertise into gunship employment and you'd start seeing insurgents that didn't want to leave their houses.

Q: In your article, you posit that the insurgency's center of gravity is the individual fighter and his attacks. I disagree. I say the center of gravity is ideological and infused in the regional populace. Can you address my assessment in light of your proposal?

Seifert: I know what you're saying but I still say that the insurgent shooting at U.S. troops is the center of gravity. Destroy and demoralize him as quickly and efficiently as possible and the war will start going better. The insurgents keep fighting because we haven't made it painful enough for them to stop fighting. Sure there is the politicial aspect to the war but there should be no doubt in anyone's mind that we need to kill as many insurgents as possible, as fast as possible, as cheaply as possible, as unfairly as possible, etc etc. Killing insurgents with M-16s and F-16s is tough, dangerous, complicated, expensive, etc. Killing insurgents with an ammo-laden transport aircraft that can loiter in the Sunni triangle for 10+ hours every night shooting bullets that cost pennies compared to other means of killing insurgents and now we've got a chance of winning the war without bankrupting our country.

I will also say that the Arab culture respects strength. If the gunships were unleashed, the only defense would be to stop attacking US forces. Again, you'd get away with some attacks but it would only be a matter of time before a gunship or another air asset caught you or a US soldier called quick enough to get the gunship in place. How many hours long battles have you read about in the paper. Why? Other air assets respond but only the gunship has the situational awareness and the ability to shoot a single 40-mm round at a time to efficiently kill insurgents and not cause collateral damage. The gunship is the only air asset I know that shows up on scene and quicly has more situational awareness than the ground forces. Too many times I've told ground forces that personnel were sneaking up on them and that we were 10 seconds away from a round on target the second they gave the command. No other asset compares (in a low threat enironment like Iraq). There are CAS aircraft and then there is the AC-130. How many times have you read about other air assets making low passes and dispensing flares to scare away the enemy after they've attacked our forces. Why are we asking our pilots to fly hundreds of feet from the ground to dispense flares? Our pilots' bravery is unquestioned but there has to be a better way. When you have enemy forces attacking your forces, they need to be killed not scared away. I'll say it again, the Arab respects strength.

I hesitate to criticize someone who has "been there, done that" from the comfort of my college dorm, but Major Seifert strikes me as being rather glib and perhaps out-of-touch with the realities of war from the ground level. I hope he's not one of the authors of the Air Force's COIN manual.

The interview can be found here

[Steve Blair]

This sounds like "more of the same" to me, and it's a shame that they just can't change gears. Can the AC-130 crew really identify insurgents from the air with 100% accuracy? If target recognition was that stellar, we'd have no friendly fire incidents. Firepower is a tool, not an answer.

[Cavguy]

I love the USAF. An F-15E drop ended a bad firefight I was in that killed one of my soldiers and wounded two. In Najaf 2004 an AC-130 decimated the Mehidi Army outer lines, killing over 50 in less than an hour, and allowing us to move into the city uncontested.

That said, I can't agree. I love the platforms, as Steve said, as a tool. But the USAF finally seems to have found its COIN narrative - that we need to drop more bombs - and if we were just more "aggressive" somehow that the enemy would get "intimidated" and stop planting IED's. MG Dunlap, Dr. Andress, and this guy are all spouting versions of the same thing.

It falls flat on its face to anyone who has been there, but I guess it is seductive like many airpower theories that it promises big results for little risk, and to the uninformed seems like a much better idea.

It really, truly scares me that this is becoming an institutional view of COIN for the USAF.

[Cavguy]

if we were just more "aggressive" somehow that the enemy would get "intimidated" and stop planting IED's. MG Dunlap, Dr. Andress, and this guy are all spouting versions of the same thing.

As evidence on why airpower won't work as the answer, read Rick Atkinson's Part 2 of his IED piece from the WAPO this morning about trying to secure 20km of road south of Balad from the air.

[slapout9]

Don't sell the guy short yet. The whole article is in Joint Forces Quarterly issue 45,2nd quarter 2007. Don't have time to post the link but I have read the article and what he is suggesting is that they be redeployed in a manner based on reported activity by air or ground commanders as opposed to just blindly flying a specific route all night long. Read if you get the chance cause from an LE perspective it makes a lot of sense. This is how air assets are used in LE except for the shooting part. It is Illegal to arm police helicopters at this time anyway

[carl]

Post #38 of this thread has the link to the AC-130 article and post #41 has an analysis of it by JCustis.

[slapout9]

Part 2 of the interview by the AC-130 pilot has been posted and I just lost the link. I think it was on Danger Room. Point being everybody should read it! If it works out as he would like the Air Force will have a defacto Airborne/Air Cavalry unit to enclude C-130 transport, V-22, and Assault aircraft. Is it a war winning capability? Will it stop IED's? No! but it will be a awsome capability. For Air guys it is not bad thinking for a COIN environment. I said that when the Air Force wrote their new COIN manual you would see a lot of General Gavin's Air Cavalry theory in it. It did not make it into the manual, but their are cetainly Air Force officers doing some heavy thinking along those lines. I didn't realize just how easy and how fast it could be done. Funny thing about Air Force guys is when they start thinking like an Air Army they can come up with some really good stuff IMHO.
So what says the council yes? no? maybe?

[tequila]

http://blog.wired.com/defense/2007/1...-g-1.html#more

Q: Would heavier use of gunships result in more civilian casualties?
Seifert: The gunship ONLY shoots when given permission by the ground force commander. It is easy to think that I am proposing that gunships should be allowed to roam the countryside shooting all the bad guys they can find, but nothing is further from the truth. Read again the situation in the article where I saw tracers in my window, got the sensors on the suspicious guys running away and then called the Army to tell them what had happened. The Army [Command and Control] called the unit at the coordinates we gave them and got word that, yes, they had been attacked. Army C2 then cleared us to shoot, BUT we saw the bad guys getting in cars, so we asked for further guidance. C2 said to keep track of them and they formed a QRF which ultimately resulted in 15 captured and us telling the troopers where to start digging to find the box of AK's and RPGs. Army C2 could have said shoot them on the spot and there would have been zero collateral damage. This would have been the case whether they were in open fields (which they were) or in the center of a town.

Most air assets would not have been able to shoot in a town though because they use 500 lb bombs minimum. The gunship, unlike anything else though, can fire a single 2.5-lb HE 40-mm warhead anywhere you want it. This warhead is the rough equivalent of a hand grenade or the 40-mm grenade our soldiers shoot from their rifles. So, you have an air asset that fires an equivalent weapon as a single soldier. The ability to do this is battle-changing. The gunship's two biggest strengths, in my opinion, are the situational awareness and the low-yield weapons. People think the 105-mm is huge, but it has a 32-lb HE warhead, vs 500-lb warheads [on bombs]. Could you use these weapons to kill lots of innocent people? Yes, and it has unfortunately happened -- but only when ground force commanders and/or gunship crews have made significant mistakes.

Q: So if you were in charge, what would you do to improve Air Force COIN capability?
Seifert: If I were King, I'd have several irregular-warfare wings, but I'd break them down between [Close Air Support] and transport wings. I found no synergy from being part of a wing that had transports and CAS aircraft. For example, I'd have an irregular wing of A-10s, AC-130s, an OV-10-type aircraft -- and I think the small gunship is an awesome idea. Not necessarily for operating out of small airstrips, but for the ability to buy enough of them so they're not hoarded and so they don't cause the Air Force to only have two dozen like they do the present gunships. A small gunship with one or two 30-mm cannons and a crew of about four would be awesome. I also would put the wings in ACC versus AFSOC, as I found AFSOC deep in their heart only wants to support "special ops" ground forces, whereas I have found ACC wants to kill bad guys for whoever was nice enough to point them out. The transport irregular warfare wing would obviously have some C-130s, CV-22s and a small transport. And both wings though would have a ... squadron for training friendly forces on how to operate the various wing aircraft.

[Rob Thornton]

Steve - I'll find and read the whole article this weekend - but my gut tells me CAVGUY has the right of it.

However, a couple of quick comments

I will also say that the Arab culture respects strength. If the gunships were unleashed, the only defense would be to stop attacking US forces. Again, you'd get away with some attacks but it would only be a matter of time before a gunship or another air asset caught you or a US soldier called quick enough to get the gunship in place. How many hours long battles have you read about in the paper. Why? Other air assets respond but only the gunship has the situational awareness and the ability to shoot a single 40-mm round at a time to efficiently kill insurgents and not cause collateral damage. The gunship is the only air asset I know that shows up on scene and quickly has more situational awareness than the ground forces. Too many times I've told ground forces that personnel were sneaking up on them and that we were 10 seconds away from a round on target the second they gave the command. No other asset compares (in a low threat environment like Iraq). There are CAS aircraft and then there is the AC-130. How many times have you read about other air assets making low passes and dispensing flares to scare away the enemy after they've attacked our forces. Why are we asking our pilots to fly hundreds of feet from the ground to dispense flares? Our pilots' bravery is unquestioned but there has to be a better way. When you have enemy forces attacking your forces, they need to be killed not scared away. I'll say it again, the Arab respects strength.

There is a distinct difference between SA (Situational Awareness) and SU (Situational Understanding). SA is about seeing as much of the environment as possible that is relevant to you (immediacy is another matter), SU is about understanding how it is relevant to you so you can make good decisions that place friendly forces at an advantage and the enemy at a disadvantage (also a question of immediacy based on who and where you are). While an eye in the sky is a fantastic tool - particularly when manned by thinking humans with a weapons suite that allows for flexibility - there are limitations from a ground perspective. The primary inter-action is on the ground - the consequences are on the ground - the people are also on the ground. Many times we've had aviators, air crews and UAV operators come to the wrong conclusions about what they saw - they have a unique perspective, but it is only one. That is why the leader on the ground who lives with the consequences has to make the call - he delegates that responsibility at the risk of abdicating future opportunities and flexibility.

I've found many things other then just strength that Arab peoples respect - the comment lends itself to the interpretation that the only thing Arab peoples understand and respect is strength - that would tend to reinforce the stereotype brash "air warrior" mentality we often get concerned about on the ground. Are we going to say that about any peoples we find ourselves involved with a Counter-Insurgency? I'll agree that people at war - employing violence to a political end respect strength and develop options as they consider their relative strengths vs. their opponents to decide how to proceed, but I won't agree that any one set of people only respond to brute force and ignorance.

I do want to preserve and enhance our advantage from the air. I'm a fan of technology, but only as it enhances the human warrior - may seem short sighted on my part - but that is my call - and how I prioritize importance. When people get consumed in looking for targets - more things start looking like targets and we get intellectually and morally sloppy - the technology provides the image - but as good as it is, the significance of the image and its interpretation is on us. For all the picture perfect moments portrayed on video and print of our technological competence - "#### happens" remains a bumper sticker - on the ground we have to always keep that in mind when deciding on what level of force to employ - there are always consequences we could not foresee - its the nature of war. I'm all for a good air-ground team - its a effective combination that provides us an advantage, but in a COIN campaign I want the ground team making the call, and the air team in support.

Best Regards, Rob

[slapout9]

Rob, when you read the article and the whole interview I think you'll see he makes alot of the same points you bring up for the same reason, especially the ground force commander making the call.

[Rob Thornton]

Cool - in which case we'll be in violent agreement - Have a good weekend - I'm about to hit the beltway to make the drive back to PA
Best Regards, Rob

[slapout9]

Rob, there are some points you want agree with and neither do I, but the guy is trying to do better with what he has.

[carl]

I just had this idea for a small wars CAS airplane today and I want to see what you guys think of it.

The idea revolves around a twin engine turboprop of moderate size and guided bombs. The airplane would be something like an ATR-42-500 and the weapon would be, say, 250 lb. small diameter bomb JDAM's. You would mount the weapons vertically in the fuselage, nose down distributed around the aircraft center of gravity. Each bomb would be in its separate chute, sort of like the arrangement ASW aircraft have for sono-buoys, and each could be released one at a time or in small groups. Figure 20 or so weapons.

The airplane would fly around at around 15,000 feet and wait to be called. 15,000 should be high enough to avoid most shoulder fired missiles or at least give the countermeasures systems a good chance to work. It is also hard to pick out medium sized airplane visually when it is that high especially if it has a good camouflage paint job.

An airplane like that can cruise at about 300 ktas so it should be able to get to any place within 150 nm in about 1/2 hour in no wind. In a Iraq, you could put one over Ramadi, Baghdad, Samarra, Kirkuk and Mosul and you should have fairly short response time in the hot sections of of the country.

The idea is it could do the same thing a B-1 JDAM carrier does at a fraction of the cost and it would have much greater endurance. You would need whatever systems you need to launch JDAM's and minimal additional sensors. Perhaps some kind of video/ir ball that the some of the uav's use, not something good enough to target with but something to give the crew some situational awareness. In addition to JDAM's you could use guided 120 mm mortar shells too.

The aircraft couldn't do a supersonic low level fly by to scare the bejabbers out of the bad guys and it could not put 20 mm cannon shells within feet of engaged troops but it should be able to do most everything else.

Since it wouldn't be a jet and couldn't zoom around doing exciting things, the Air Force might be less inclined to pitch a fit if the Army operated it. The Army already operates many many turboprops.

There, tell me what you think. How far off base am I?