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Thread: Aviation in COIN (merged thread)

  1. #201
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    use air power for 'policing' is unlikely. The Afghans are pretty wily and more than willing to shop each other.

    Add to that the lack of infrastructure to target, the dispersion factor (by five categories -- individual, family, clan, tribe, race -- and geographically, that's a big country, about 1.5 times the size of Iraq), the essential rural nature and location of most of the populace and the terrain and I'm doubtful it could be made to work.

    Why do you think it might?

    It might not work but I was thinking Kinda of like an invasion remix. Use SF/or whatever teams to engage the Tribes gain their support. Air power to handle any group that becomes big enough to target or threatens the engeagement teams. Also provide resupply and IRS.

    But we need to get rid of the Political Objective of turning them into a Democracy. Don't think that will happen in my lifetime unless they choose that for themselves. But that is the first question that needs to be answered what is the Political Objective.

    Influencing the Tribes is the key IMO. Air power may be able to pull that off.
    Last edited by slapout9; 06-19-2009 at 03:28 AM. Reason: add stuff

  2. #202
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    Default The Political Objective ....

    appears to be this, based on GEN McChrystal's Guidance:

    Success will be defined by the Afghan people's freedom to choose their future--freedom from coercion, extremists, malign foreign influence, or abusive government actions.
    The course of action appears to be:

    The ongoing insurgency must be met with a counterinsurgency campaign adapted to the unique conditions in each area that:

    - Protects the Afghan people--allowing them to choose a future they can be proud of

    - Provides a secure environment allowing good government and economic development to undercut the causes and advocates of insurgency
    -----------------------
    PS: The Longoria article reminded me of The Lost Patrol (yup, I'm a John Ford - Victor McLaglan fan), where RAF Air Control did not fare too well.
    Last edited by jmm99; 06-19-2009 at 04:25 AM. Reason: add PS

  3. #203
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Actually, I thought this officer did a god job of telling the truth about the RAF's contribution to inter-war small wars, as being practically zero.

    Problem is, that the RAF flat outs lies about history when it suits them. Having less than a 100 years of it, (of which only 3 are serious fighting) it gets spotted pretty quickly, compared to the Army or Navy!
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  4. #204
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Wilf, what would the dead German Guy do in Afghanistan?

  5. #205
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
    Wilf, what would the dead German Guy do in Afghanistan?
    Well he's a dead Prussian, so not quite the same sort of chap as the current Germans... That aside....

    I think, he would say.
    • The war has to be won before anything else happens - and it is a war.
    • That the policy (what ever that is) can only succeed once the Taliban(s) are defeated.
    • All national resources should be harnessed to something that is of national importance.

    .... so if winning in A'Stan is so important, how come the US is using about 1/8th of the resources it put towards WW2 or Vietnam?
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  6. #206
    Council Member LawVol's Avatar
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    I don't know that "air policing" as he defines it would ever truly work. Maybe I'm misreading, but it seems that his examples are more "air substitution." Restoring or maintaining civil order requires much more than a heavy hand. I found it interesting that he used the hammer-nail analogy with respect to land power when his examples imply the opposite.

    Using an air sustitution policy, however, could work in some instances since it is essentially punitive operations. To me the key difference in determining whether air substitution is appropriate is your desired end state. If you simply want to give the equivalent of a spanking in an attempt to dissuade future conduct, it may be appropriate. However, if you want to change or improve an existing government (as in both Afghanistan and Iraq) then it is not feasible.

    Basically, it is Iraq pre and post invasion. Operations Northern and Southern Watch were air substitution operations aimed at containing Saddam's military. After the invasion, the goal became something quite different and while airpower certainly has a role, it isn't as police IMO. Its like the old saying: you catch more flies with honey. Longoria only discusses using airpower as vinegar, but I want to spread a little honey around.
    -john bellflower

    Rule of Law in Afghanistan

    "You must, therefore know that there are two means of fighting: one according to the laws, the other with force; the first way is proper to man, the second to beasts; but because the first, in many cases, is not sufficient, it becomes necessary to have recourse to the second." -- Niccolo Machiavelli (from The Prince)

  7. #207
    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
    naturally Ken got it
    He was a CCT officer,Master Parachutist,with a combat jump obviously a real Air Force Officer. of superior intellect and Strategic Thinking ability.
    But he has no air-to-air kills....so he's clearly NOT a REAL Air Force officer....
    "On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
    T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War

  8. #208
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    Quote Originally Posted by LawVol View Post
    Basically, it is Iraq pre and post invasion. Operations Northern and Southern Watch were air substitution operations aimed at containing Saddam's military. After the invasion, the goal became something quite different and while airpower certainly has a role, it isn't as police IMO. Its like the old saying: you catch more flies with honey. Longoria only discusses using airpower as vinegar, but I want to spread a little honey around.
    Quite so, and that was one of the reasons I really liked your article. The AF needs to remember the Berlin Airlift, and not just as a "feel good" lead-in to their role as an independent service. It's odd that of all the services it's the Navy that seems to have best grasped the humanitarian aid component of military service.
    "On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
    T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War

  9. #209
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    Liked the Longoria paper, the Maguinness was just ok. This line is particularly shallow:

    Many of these arguments are reminiscent of the early airpower zealots who believed airpower’s emerging technical capabilities promised less costs in money, lives, and resources with equal or better results than the use of large armies.
    Perhaps reminiscent in the author's mind, but not everyone's.

    Personally, I don't like the term "air policing." It conjures up the wrong sort of images. One crticisim of the Longoria paper is that I think he defines "policing" much too broadly. By his definition, one could argue the entire Korean war was a policing effort and not a major war. I'm not convinced that OSW/ONW were "policing" operations.

    IMO, true "policing" cannot be accomplished by air power.

  10. #210
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Entropy View Post
    I plan on reading this tonight but in the meantime could you please explain what a "real" Air Force officer is?
    you run the risk of bumping into all kinds of oxymorons when you start mixing terms like "military" and "Intelligence" or "Airforce" and "Officer"...Slap should know better...

    (But just as I would remind my good buddies at PACFLEET when they would come up with their latest scheme to resolve populace based conflicts through naval power: "Insurgency doesn't happen at sea." I would just add here, "it doesn't happen in the air either.")

    It happens among the populace, and one has to operate among the populace to resolve it.
    Robert C. Jones
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    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

  11. #211
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    you run the risk of bumping into all kinds of oxymorons when you start mixing terms like "military" and "Intelligence" or "Airforce" and "Officer"...Slap should know better...
    Spilled my coffee over that one

  12. #212
    Council Member LawVol's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Steve Blair View Post
    Quite so, and that was one of the reasons I really liked your article. The AF needs to remember the Berlin Airlift, and not just as a "feel good" lead-in to their role as an independent service. It's odd that of all the services it's the Navy that seems to have best grasped the humanitarian aid component of military service.
    Admiral Stavridis, recently of Southern Command, has proposed a Humanitarian Service Group which is essentially configured like a carrier group but for humanitarian missions. It could be used in some COIN situations.

    The story is here. It's the fourth one down.
    -john bellflower

    Rule of Law in Afghanistan

    "You must, therefore know that there are two means of fighting: one according to the laws, the other with force; the first way is proper to man, the second to beasts; but because the first, in many cases, is not sufficient, it becomes necessary to have recourse to the second." -- Niccolo Machiavelli (from The Prince)

  13. #213
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    Humanitarian work is all well and good, but it is, and should be, a secondary mission for a military force. Therefore, if the US wants to create and fund a dedicated "humanitarian" capability, it should not do so under the DoD.

  14. #214
    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Entropy View Post
    Humanitarian work is all well and good, but it is, and should be, a secondary mission for a military force. Therefore, if the US wants to create and fund a dedicated "humanitarian" capability, it should not do so under the DoD.
    And I can imagine the screaming when DoD's budget is reduced to fund such an agency.

    Not arguing with you, but pointing out that funds for such an activity have to come from somewhere...and DoD is the most likely candidate (as it should be if a secondary activity is being removed and refocused with a different agency). We should be facing some hard choices like this, but I strongly suspect that we won't, and the military will continue to be tasked with aid missions. Stavridis's proposal is, I suspect, tacit recognition of this reality and an attempt to tailor a force package for it.
    "On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
    T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War

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    Default Wilf, re: this ...

    .... so if winning in A'Stan is so important, how come the US is using about 1/8th of the resources it put towards WW2 or Vietnam?
    I expect the dead German guy would deliver a little lecture on the reality of allies delivering lesser input than when they are the principal targets. In terms of national interests, the relative importance to NATO countries is far different from the "national" interests of the Karzai government.

    I expect that this is a general rule in insurgencies (as well as in allied coalitions in the more conventional arena). The HN has a vital interest (survival interest to the incumbant government); whereas the assisting nation does not have as vital an interest. The insurgency often has a survival interest. Lots of different trinities - the little magnets are far from being the same.

    Thoughts ?

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    Steve,

    The military will always be a go-to player when necessary, but there's a big difference between preparing to do humanitarian missions on an ad hoc basis with capabilities primarily designed for military roles and creating a dedicated humanitarian capability within the military.

  17. #217
    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Entropy View Post
    Steve,

    The military will always be a go-to player when necessary, but there's a big difference between preparing to do humanitarian missions on an ad hoc basis with capabilities primarily designed for military roles and creating a dedicated humanitarian capability within the military.
    I understand that, but as the need or policy need for humanitarian ops increases, there will be hard choices to be made. That was my point. The military may have to give up a bit of the resource pie to make room for a new organization.
    "On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
    T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War

  18. #218
    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Well he's a dead Prussian, so not quite the same sort of chap as the current Germans... That aside....

    I think, he would say.
    • The war has to be won before anything else happens - and it is a war.
    • That the policy (what ever that is) can only succeed once the Taliban(s) are defeated.
    • All national resources should be harnessed to something that is of national importance.

    .... so if winning in A'Stan is so important, how come the US is using about 1/8th of the resources it put towards WW2 or Vietnam?
    Actually, Total War theory isn't as old as the Prussian guy - it appeared with Luddendorff. I don't recall that the Prussian had paid much attention to the mobilization of civilian resources.
    A Chinese had some remarks about this, though. He emphasized that states must not exhaust themselves or else they would make themselves vulnerable to other foes.

    The Prussian guy would probably have said that the AFG scenario is something that he still had to add to his book (because he didn't think much about insurgencies as the Spanish one when writing his book draft before that stupid epidemic interrupted him).

    Besides, he might have pointed out that it's not very fruitful to fight against the friend of an enemy even though this friend is far away and no threat in himself.

  19. #219
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Somehow, I missed this earlier

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    I think, he would say.
    • The war has to be won before anything else happens - and it is a war.
    • That the policy (what ever that is) can only succeed once the Taliban(s) are defeated.
    • All national resources should be harnessed to something that is of national importance.

    .... so if winning in A'Stan is so important, how come the US is using about 1/8th of the resources it put towards WW2 or Vietnam?
    • Agree.
    • Don't think they can be 'defeated.' Rendered virtually impotent? Probably.
    • I'd paraphrase that; "National resources should be devoted to to something in proportion to their gross importance."
    ... I think that's being done and I'd guess the Afghanistan and Iraq efforts through 2015 at about 30-33% of the WW II dollar cost (for the US, estimated at about 40%+ of GDP annually for over ~$6.1T total IIRC. Other Nations had it far rougher). No sense even trying to compare human totals and costs.

    Compared to Viet Nam where we spent almost 9% of GDP average for the build up period, we're spending less than 5% annually today. In dollar terms, VN cost ~$518.B (in then dollars, ~$2.5T today) and Afghanistan and Iraq will come in at slightly less than that, I expect. Again, no comparison on personnel and casualty numbers. While Afghanistan is more complex than was Viet Nam, it's importance to the US is about the same and we're applying resources in proportion.

    Carl would not approve -- I don't approve -- but we have little other choice in our response to things from South Asia or the ME due to pathetically poor planning on our part, said poor planning induced by an electoral system that moves the deck chairs every 2 years to at least some extent.

    That and a culture that tries to ignore things (and places. And methods...) it does not like in hopes they will go away...

    Eet's hokay -- we cobble while hobbled well. Be nice if we didn't have to do that but...

    (Yes, that's inefficient guvmint but we like it. Usually. )

  20. #220
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default True but

    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    Besides, he might have pointed out that it's not very fruitful to fight against the friend of an enemy even though this friend is far away and no threat in himself.
    fruitfulness is not one of our important tenets...

    Payback is one.

    And yes, that means we get trapped in messy situations.

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