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Thread: Aviation in COIN (merged thread)

  1. #221
    Council Member Uboat509's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Entropy View Post
    Humanitarian work is all well and good, but it is, and should be, a secondary mission for a military force. Therefore, if the US wants to create and fund a dedicated "humanitarian" capability, it should not do so under the DoD.
    This isn't going to happen, not in today's political climate. If it was even proposed by President Obama the right would be begin to howl that he was creating another bloated government agency and the left would howl that we are done fighting "wars of aggression" and that we therefore don't need an organization designed to deal with the aftermath of those wars.

    SFC W

  2. #222
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    Default Correct as to "total war's" coiner [*] , but ...

    the old German-Prussian had quite a bit to say about "the mobilization of civilian resources" - Chapter XXVI, Arming the Nation.

    A PEOPLE'S war in civilised Europe is a phenomenon of the nineteenth century. It has its advocates and its opponents: the latter either considering it in a political sense as a revolutionary means, a state of anarchy declared lawful, which is as dangerous as a foreign enemy to social order at home; or on military grounds, conceiving that the result is not commensurate with the expenditure of the nation's strength. The first point does not concern us here, for we look upon a people's war merely as a means of fighting, therefore, in its connection with the enemy; but with regard to the latter point, we must observe that a people's war in general is to be regarded as a consequence of the outburst which the military element in our day has made through its old formal limits; as an expansion and strengthening of the whole fermentation-process which we call war. The requisition system, the immense increase in the size of armies by means of that system, and the general liability to military service, the utilizing militia, are all things which lie in the same direction, if we make the limited military system of former days our starting point; and the levée en masse, or arming of the people, now lies also in the same direction. If the first named of these new aids to war are the natural and necessary consequences of barriers thrown down; and if they have so enormously increased the power of those who first used them, that the enemy has been carried along in the current, and obliged to adopt them likewise, this will be the case also with people-wars. In the generality of cases, the people who make judicious use of this means, will gain a proportionate superiority over those who despise its use. If this be so, then the only question is whether this modern intensification of the military element is, upon the whole, salutary for the interests of humanity or otherwise,—a question which it would be about as easy to answer as the question of war itself—we leave both to philosophers. But the opinion may be advanced, that the resources swallowed up in people's wars might be more profitably employed, if used in providing other military means; no very deep investigation, however, is necessary to be convinced that these resources are for the most part not disposable, and cannot be utilized in an arbitrary manner at pleasure. One essential part that is the moral element, is not called into existence until this kind of employment for it arises. ... [goes on for more paragraphs]
    CvC in Book 8 (the key to the whole) emphasized that the switch of the Allies toward mass mobilization was a key factor in defeating Napoleon. That process began in Prussia with military reform under:

    General Gerhard von Scharnhorst, the future first chief of staff of the new Prussian Army (appointed 1809). Clausewitz, along with Hermann von Boyen (1771–1848) and Karl von Grolman (1777–1843), were Scharnhorst's primary allies in his efforts to reform the Prussian army, between 1807 and 1814.
    The Landwehr was one aspect of Scharnhorst's modernization.

    --------------------------
    [*] "total war" - 1936 publication of General Ludendorff’s World War I memoir Der Totale Krieg.

  3. #223
    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    @Jmm99:
    That was pretty much about manpower mobilization, not really about other kinds of resources. The concern was numbers on campaign, not resources.
    Keep in mind that Wellington's artillery at Waterloo was equivalent to a single Man-o-war's artillery. The only really expensive needs of armies were pay and hay.

    Both WW (and Wilf used a WW2 reference) were coined by a transformation of peacetime economy to a wartime economy; military hardware and consumables became a huge portion of national economic output.

    There was no such thing before 1915. In fact, the share of survival-related production (food, clothes, housing) was too large to allow for any major economy conversion prior to the late industrial revolution.

    Btw; wow, the English translation is a horrible lecture.

    Compared to Viet Nam where we spent almost 9% of GDP average for the build up period, we're spending less than 5% annually today.
    Forget about the 4.x % figure, it's a myth.
    The U.S. has much more military expenditures than the basic DoD's budget.
    One of many additions that point this out: http://preview.tinyurl.com/lnx7rc
    The real military expenditures are close to a trillion USD annually.

    The real percentage in 2010 will be about 7% (if the economy stagnates) - plus supplemental expenses.
    The 'defense' spending is incredibly inefficient in the USA.

  4. #224
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    Default Evidence and sources ...

    from Fuchs
    Keep in mind that Wellington's artillery at Waterloo was equivalent to a single Man-o-war's artillery. The only really expensive needs of armies were pay and hay.

    Both WW (and Wilf used a WW2 reference) were coined by a transformation of peacetime economy to a wartime economy; military hardware and consumables became a huge portion of national economic output.

    There was no such thing before 1915. In fact, the share of survival-related production (food, clothes, housing) was too large to allow for any major economy conversion prior to the late industrial revolution.
    for the above ?

  5. #225
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Wink I have a far better suggestion

    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    Forget about the 4.x % figure, it's a myth.
    The U.S. has much more military expenditures than the basic DoD's budget.
    One of many additions that point this out: http://preview.tinyurl.com/lnx7rc The real military expenditures are close to a trillion USD annually.

    The real percentage in 2010 will be about 7% (if the economy stagnates) - plus supplemental expenses.
    The 'defense' spending is incredibly inefficient in the USA.
    In reverse order, yes, our defense spending is terribly inefficient, no question.

    However your "close to a trillion USD" is possible only if you count the Veteran's Administration, the Department of Energy and a half dozen other things as part of Defense. You may do that if you wish but it will skew your perceptions even more.

    Lastly, the suggestion: IMO, Winslow Wheeler has far less credibility than Sacha Baron Cohen. He's a hack. If you read him a lot and believe what you read, you'll really get a distorted view. You should probably not put too much faith in his writing even if he does say things many like to hear.

  6. #226
    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    His sum was just one of several examples.

    -> PM (offtopic)

  7. #227
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    The Prussian guy would probably have said that the AFG scenario is something that he still had to add to his book (because he didn't think much about insurgencies as the Spanish one when writing his book draft before that stupid epidemic interrupted him).
    ... and that raises an interesting point. A lot of folks go "CvC never mentioned insurgencies." True but that makes no difference. He covers all the issues that pertain to fighting insurgencies, because insurgencies are wars. War is War. There are only differing forms of warfare. That highlights a number of issues that go to how the US understands or talks about insurgencies.
    FM3-24 alludes to this being the case, but that begs more questions than the book can answer, because it starts from the wrong place, answering the wrong question. You get into problems once you start down the "armed social work" and "competition for the soul of the people" malarky.

    CvC would look at any insurgency and say "so what?" or "Dumkopf! Das ist Krieg!"
    An insurgent is a military opponent. He needs to be fought by the ways and means appropriate to his nature, but he must be fought!
    So, you do not use means that defeat or undermine the nature of your policy, but nearly all conflicts see political restrictions in the use of force. Why the US did not use Nukes in Vietnam or Korea? = Politics. No politics, no war.

    NATO will never commit the neccessary level of resources to A'Stan, because,
    • The US experts keeps telling them it's not a military problem ("the solution is only 15% military") - so no need to provide more troops.
    • There is no domestic or international political imperative to win. NATO could be defeated and no one in Europe would care. The US would not be less safe than it already is, etc etc..


    Sorry to ramble, but basically CvC is right again....
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  8. #228
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    • Don't think they can be 'defeated.' Rendered virtually impotent? Probably.
    • I'd paraphrase that; "National resources should be devoted to to something in proportion to their gross importance."


    Carl would not approve --
    Well impotence would equal their defeat, via exhaustion, or irrelevance, so I'd be happy with that end state.
    I'd very much agree on the national resources side. - see my other post.
    ...and Carl would not approve, but he would understand.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  9. #229
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    The New Army/Air Police.......Bring The Rain.


    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i5Kwi...c-HM-fresh+div

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    Quote Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
    The New Army/Air Police.......Bring The Rain.


    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i5Kwi...c-HM-fresh+div
    Ah, that movie was beautiful propaganda for the Air Force. The next one is rumored to be even bigger.

  11. #231
    Council Member PINT's Avatar
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    Default Thanks for the comments and discussion.

    I am pleased to see comment and discussion spurred by my paper written and published under duress. I appreciate the substantive comments, both positive and negative. Intent was to spur discussion...

    Entropy - interested in your comment regarding my assertion that the arguments from those who advocate moving to an air centric approach to COIN is similar to those pushed early on in airpower's history (often stating that airpower would negate the need for armies and navies). I see some modern theorists advocating a purely airpower approach to COIN (like Phillip Meilinger) in similar language and for similar reasons (current public opinion does not have the patience or stomach for long-term boots on the ground). What are your thoughts on this?

    Again, thanks for the discussion and comments.

    "Fake" USAF officer out.

  12. #232
    Council Member PINT's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Entropy View Post
    Humanitarian work is all well and good, but it is, and should be, a secondary mission for a military force. Therefore, if the US wants to create and fund a dedicated "humanitarian" capability, it should not do so under the DoD.
    Agreed - should be a secondary effort. Unfortunately, the DOD tends to have the preponderance of the assets, capabilities, personnel and money to accomplish HA/DR. I agree that ideally HA/DR opeations should be handled by "someone else"...however, until this someone else emerges, DOD will likely be the go to support to USAID and other entities for these efforts.

  13. #233
    Council Member PINT's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
    A far better report with a lot of detailed research is linked below. Including actual messages sent to the population as part of the information campaign. Use of 5 pound bombs to limit damage and Bombing to interrupt as opposed to bombing to damage. Written by a real Air Force Officer not an Intelligence Officer.

    http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil/saas_T...a/longoria.pdf
    Slap - good paper by Longoria. Thanks for the link.

  14. #234
    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by PINT View Post
    Agreed - should be a secondary effort. Unfortunately, the DOD tends to have the preponderance of the assets, capabilities, personnel and money to accomplish HA/DR. I agree that ideally HA/DR opeations should be handled by "someone else"...however, until this someone else emerges, DOD will likely be the go to support to USAID and other entities for these efforts.
    And I seriously doubt that DoD will be willing to give up the money needed to fund that "someone else." There's only so much to go around, and if HA/DR does become a major foreign policy factor, then it's almost inevitable that DoD will either need to spin up a structure to deal with it or give up resources to a new (or modified/enhanced existing) organization. That's a condensed version to be sure, but it seems to be the road ahead.
    "On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
    T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War

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    Default Thanks for coming by

    ...and defending your work. It's always nice to get the author's perspective directly.

    Quote Originally Posted by PINT View Post
    Entropy - interested in your comment regarding my assertion that the arguments from those who advocate moving to an air centric approach to COIN is similar to those pushed early on in airpower's history (often stating that airpower would negate the need for armies and navies). I see some modern theorists advocating a purely airpower approach to COIN (like Phillip Meilinger) in similar language and for similar reasons (current public opinion does not have the patience or stomach for long-term boots on the ground). What are your thoughts on this?
    How many modern theorists are actually advocating a pure air power approach to COIN besides Phillip Meilinger? Even General Dunlap does not go that far. Those are the two names I consistently hear about. Who, besides these two, are you talking about when you mention the "many" theorists/proponents in the opening paragraphs of your article?

    In my view most air power "proponents" are instead making arguments about the relative emphasis and value of air power in the combined-arms team, which is far different from modern-day Douhet-ism. And early air power advocates were not always wrong - just look at Billy Mitchell's fight with the US Navy over air power and the capital ship in the 1920's.

    Many of these arguments are reminiscent of the early airpower zealots who believed airpower’s emerging technical capabilities promised less costs in money, lives, and resources with equal or better results than the use of large armies.
    I'm not sure why that belief is so controversial because it's true. It's why we fight wars with combined arms and not masses of infantry. Artillery, armor, air power, etc. actually do reduce costs, particularly lives. If they weren't better in terms of costs, we wouldn't be using them. This is borne-out by experience war. In Afghanistan, for example, there were a few instances that I'm aware of where coalition forces would have been overrun were it not for the intervention of air power and/or artillery. In Afghanistan it's primarily air power that prevents the enemy from massing against us.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Steve Blair View Post
    And I seriously doubt that DoD will be willing to give up the money needed to fund that "someone else." There's only so much to go around, and if HA/DR does become a major foreign policy factor, then it's almost inevitable that DoD will either need to spin up a structure to deal with it or give up resources to a new (or modified/enhanced existing) organization. That's a condensed version to be sure, but it seems to be the road ahead.
    It's not a question of the DoD giving up money. The reality is that the American people are not interested in funding such a capability no matter what department the money comes from. For the same reasons, we won't be seeing a dedicated HA/DR capability within the military anytime soon.

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    Council Member PINT's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Entropy View Post
    I'm not sure why that belief is so controversial because it's true. It's why we fight wars with combined arms and not masses of infantry. Artillery, armor, air power, etc. actually do reduce costs, particularly lives. If they weren't better in terms of costs, we wouldn't be using them. This is borne-out by experience war. In Afghanistan, for example, there were a few instances that I'm aware of where coalition forces would have been overrun were it not for the intervention of air power and/or artillery. In Afghanistan it's primarily air power that prevents the enemy from massing against us.
    You will get no disagreement from me with this. However, my point was airpower cannot be used as the ONLY weapon - it must be a joint fight. I still have pilot peers of mine who believe we would do better to have an all out airpower strategy than continuing to support ground operations. That somehow airpower in support of and as a force multiplier of ground operations is not true airpower.

    Good comments and definitely some things to think on and consider as I continue to learn and reframe.

  18. #238
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by PINT View Post
    I am pleased to see comment and discussion spurred by my paper written and published under duress. I appreciate the substantive comments, both positive and negative. Intent was to spur discussion...

    Again, thanks for the discussion and comments.

    "Fake" USAF officer out.
    Hi Pint, welcome to the council. As part of your reframing I hope you can watch the listed show below on Wednesday 24 Jun 09 on the National Geographic Channel. The title is CIA Confidential The Hunt for Bin Laden, but you could easily call it Airpower and Intelligence in Low Intensity Conflict. Link is below.


    Entropy you should watch this to!

    http://channel.nationalgeographic.co.../4199/Overview

    As for the paper.... the only Air Police are the Sky Marshals that catch hi-jackers.
    I thought The paper was significant due to the targeting concept they used as in they targeted tibal leadership for a Political Effect!!! as opposed to just bombing targets.

    Again, welcome to the council.....you are not to far from Montgomery, if you are ever near this area stop by for some Strategic Education and Dang good Bar-B-Que

  19. #239
    Council Member PINT's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
    Hi Pint, welcome to the council. As part of your reframing I hope you can watch the listed show below on Wednesday 24 Jun 09 on the National Geographic Channel. The title is CIA Confidential The Hunt for Bin Laden, but you could easily call it Airpower and Intelligence in Low Intensity Conflict. Link is below.


    Entropy you should watch this to!

    http://channel.nationalgeographic.co.../4199/Overview

    As for the paper.... the only Air Police are the Sky Marshals that catch hi-jackers.
    I thought The paper was significant due to the targeting concept they used as in they targeted tibal leadership for a Political Effect!!! as opposed to just bombing targets.

    Again, welcome to the council.....you are not to far from Montgomery, if you are ever near this area stop by for some Strategic Education and Dang good Bar-B-Que
    Thanks for the tip...I live with the man who actually did that in real life...heard all the stories from him and I get plenty of opportunities to hear how this book and that GO got the story all wrong from his perspective. It will certainly be a good thing to watch with him, as I'm sure I'll get to hear how accurate the portrayal is...

    As far as coming to Montgomery, thanks for the invite. While I have enjoyed previous experiences there, I am hoping for a change in venue for my next academic experience...maybe I can write another paper, but this time piss off the other three services...and throw the USCG in as well for good measure.

    Cheers,
    PINT

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    Slap, thanks for the link - I'll be sure to watch or, more likely, DVR and watch later.

    PINT,

    Thanks for the comments. Stick around, we can use more intel and AF types around here.

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