Aviation in COIN (merged thread)

[William F. Owen]

I still have pilot peers of mine who believe we would do better to have an all out airpower strategy than continuing to support ground operations. That somehow airpower in support of and as a force multiplier of ground operations is not true airpower.

As you probably know, that is a problem with pilots. It's Air Support, not Air Power. Air Superiority is merely a means by which Air Support is enabled. Air Support, like artillery support or naval support is vastly important. You must have it to win, but it's still support, not power.

I have asserted that fact several times to UK military audiences and the only negative reaction is from RAF Pilots. RAF officers in general can live with this fact, but Pilots have some level of emotional buy-in that makes it very hard for them to live with.

[slapout9]

Thanks for the tip...I live with the man who actually did that in real life...heard all the stories from him and I get plenty of opportunities to hear how this book and that GO got the story all wrong from his perspective. It will certainly be a good thing to watch with him, as I'm sure I'll get to hear how accurate the portrayal is...

Cheers,
PINT

If he watches the program I hope we will get an After Action Review for it's accuracy.....not that the CIA would lie or anything

[PINT]

As you probably know, that is a problem with pilots. It's Air Support, not Air Power. Air Superiority is merely a means by which Air Support is enabled. Air Support, like artillery support or naval support is vastly important. You must have it to win, but it's still support, not power.

I have asserted that fact several times to UK military audiences and the only negative reaction is from RAF Pilots. RAF officers in general can live with this fact, but Pilots have some level of emotional buy-in that makes it very hard for them to live with.

Hmmm, maybe I am misunderstanding your point but...as an Airman, I believe Airpower is comprised of many components - some kinetic and some non-kinetic. Air superiority missions are a component of Airpower as are CAS, ISR, and airlift missions. There is just a difference in the degree of "sexiness" of those Airpower missions for some Airmen (read: some fighter pilots). BL: Airpower is about delivering effects from the air (kinetic and non-kinetic).

I think one of the problems we have in the USAF is being tied to the machine versus the ideal...what I mean is, some Airmen are more in love with the flying part over the Airpower effects part. While I believe you can't have one without the other, there are some that might sacrifice optimal Airpower effects for the ability to continue flying their aircraft of choice. I could go on about this (and will if I am not clearly articulating my point satisfactorily), but will spare you.

My humble opinion...

[LawVol]

The New Army/Air Police.......Bring The Rain.


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i5Kwi...c-HM-fresh+div

Very nice example of airpower. But can it make a cup of chai and negotiate with a village elder?

[slapout9]

I think one of the problems we have in the USAF is being tied to the machine versus the ideal...what I mean is, some Airmen are more in love with the flying part over the Airpower effects part. While I believe you can't have one without the other, there are some that might sacrifice optimal Airpower effects for the ability to continue flying their aircraft of choice. I could go on about this (and will if I am not clearly articulating my point satisfactorily), but will spare you.

My humble opinion...

That is it in a nutshell! The Airforce could be a lot more germane to the COIN/UW fight then they are at present if they just followed your rather good Intelligence Officer Guidance....you must have been in the Army in another life

[slapout9]

Very nice example of airpower. But can it make a cup of chai and negotiate with a village elder?

Lawvol as I remember I had some off line input on your soft power ideas so I am not about to knock them......but sometimes you have to hit the mule in the head with a 2x4 to get their attention.....then have Corona's and B-B-Que goat get togathers and discuss the nice new village they could have if they cooperate.

[Steve Blair]

Lawvol as I remember I had some off line input on your soft power ideas so I am not about to knock them......but sometimes you have to hit the mule in the head with a 2x4 to get their attention.....then have Corona's and B-B-Que goat get togathers and discuss the nice new village they could have if they cooperate.

But that doesn't always work, either. It's never an "either/or" thing, and that's just one of the issues that we need to work through. Americans seem to have a fixation with one single answer to a problem, no matter how often history shows us that this isn't always a good way to go about business....

[PINT]

But that doesn't always work, either. It's never an "either/or" thing, and that's just one of the issues that we need to work through. Americans seem to have a fixation with one single answer to a problem, no matter how often history shows us that this isn't always a good way to go about business....

Here, here!

[LawVol]

Lawvol as I remember I had some off line input on your soft power ideas so I am not about to knock them......but sometimes you have to hit the mule in the head with a 2x4 to get their attention.....then have Corona's and B-B-Que goat get togathers and discuss the nice new village they could have if they cooperate.

True enough, but the application of kinetic airpower has to be judicious rather than a first-choice, go-to option. Maybe it's the grunt in me, but I have no problem with helping a bad guy meet his maker. My problem is with the secondary effects it can create. If kinetic airpower is a first-choice then we could create more bad guys than we get. Thus, we have a net-gain in bad guys. To borrow Kilcullen's term: do we create "accidental guerillas" and hurt ourselves over the long term?

Soft airpower is not the only option and I never intended to offer it up as such. It is merely one option among many to generate the desired effects.

As an aside, after enjoying my time up here in Canada, I've missed that BBQ you've mentioned and can't wait to get some of the good stuff. I'll be down south (although not in LA) soon.

[slapout9]

But that doesn't always work, either. It's never an "either/or" thing, and that's just one of the issues that we need to work through. Americans seem to have a fixation with one single answer to a problem, no matter how often history shows us that this isn't always a good way to go about business....

Steve, I agree, it always about the best way to achieve the desired effect. But most often it is some combination of Bullets and Bribes.

[Steve Blair]

True enough, but the application of kinetic airpower has to be judicious rather than a first-choice, go-to option. Maybe it's the grunt in me, but I have no problem with helping a bad meet his maker. My problem is with the secondary effects it can create. If kinetic airpower is a first-choice then we could create more bad guys than we get. Thus, we have a net-gain in bad guys. To borrow Kilcullen's term: do we create "accidental guerillas" and hurt ourselves over the long term?

Soft airpower is not the only option and I never intended to offer it up as such. It is merely one option among many to generate the desired effects.

Absolutely. Soft airpower is just another piece in the whole airpower toolkit. Sometimes it may not be the first option, but there are clearly times when it should be, or when it should at least be among the first options we consider. But depending on the situation the kinetic option may be the first one to consider. Both should be on the table, but we need to develop the intelligence (and courage) to make the proper choice in any given situation.

Of course, we've also discussed some of this stuff at length previously, so no need to ramble on....

[slapout9]

As an aside, after enjoying my time up here in Canada, I've missed that BBQ you've mentioned and can't wait to get some of the good stuff. I'll be down south (although not in LA) soon.

I'll be here.

[Steve Blair]

Steve, I agree, it always about the best way to achieve the desired effect. But most often it is some combination of Bullets and Bribes.

Sometimes yes, but I've always wondered if it ended up that way because we didn't look at other options. In some cases, I suspect the answer is yes (as in we reached for the sledgehammer and wallet without thinking), but in others it's clear that B&B was the best way to go. But if you look at lasting results or effects, I'm not sure B&B has quite the long-term impact we might hope (at least in a positive sense).

[Jesse9252]

There has been some discussion on SWC about the Air Force's move to field low-cost COIN/CAS aircraft for irregular warfare. Folks seem to be generally bullish about the idea, both here and elsewhere, so I thought it interesting to see P.W. Singer take a shot at the program:

Just like the movie, though, this plan may seem appealing because of the guts and glory of the pilots who would fly these fabulous old planes back into battle (indeed, one of the entrants is even a version of the P-51 Mustang). But it doesn't stand up to much scrutiny. It is somewhat questionable to add 100 new planes (if one can describe 50-year-old designs as "new") at the very same time that the Air Force is seeking to accelerate the retirement of about 250 F-15s, F-16s and A-10s. Unlike these proven multi-role aircraft, light propeller planes could only be used at the low end of war, not against China or even Iran.

Moreover, in its haste to show that it is not focused on the next war, the Air Force may be trying to fight the last war. These planes won't be deployable for use in Iraq or Afghanistan until 2013 at best. The plan thus rests on two huge assumptions: 1) that we'll still be fighting counterinsurgencies there or elsewhere for which we'll need 100 more planes, and 2) while we are going back in time militarily, our enemies won't be going forward. Even within insurgencies, various non-state actors like Hezbollah already field anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles; now we would just be providing them with easier targets.

For operations that need planes to fly low and slow in support of troops on the ground, actually new technologies, like the MQ-9 Reaper unmanned system, have already proved to be far more effective. The old planes rely on the pilot's "Mark II eyeballs"; the drone carries Gorgon Stare, a technology that monitors 12 high-powered cameras at once. Reaper also carries almost double the weapons and can stay on the scene four times as long. Drones are admittedly less fun to fly, but that's not how we are supposed to make serious weapons decisions.

The ultimate kicker is that the very partners the Air Force claims it is buying the planes to train and fight with don't actually want them. The head of the Iraqi air force reportedly wants F-16s instead, while the head of the Afghan National Army Air Corps wants Predators. Perhaps they haven't seen the movie?

I am inclined to disagree with Singer on a number of points. For one, I think it is pretty patronizing to imply that the Air Force is trying to rekindle their scarf-wearing glory days rather than attempting to realistically tackle a legitimate criticism of their force structure. If anything, even if one disagrees with the program, they should be commended for displaying some 'out of the box' thinking that appeared to be woefully lacking of late (e.g., the efforts SecDef Gates had to go through to increase Predator sortie rates).

I am also skeptical of the idea that Predators are the answer. Drones are expensive--they require an extremely sophisticated C2 network and other high-end infrastructure investments--so if you're looking for a low-cost solution they probably wouldn't be the best choice (also why they would be a terrible idea for the Afghan Air Force, amazing Singer is even taking that argument seriously). And there is something to be said for having two pilots in the loop, on station, peering down from a bubble canopy at the fight (not to mention their FLIR pods).

I am more sympathetic to the arguments about survivability, but those cut against Preds and Reapers too. Also the Columbians seem to do well with their Tucanos against a fairly sophisticated and well-armed irregular opponent.

All in all, the op-ed seems like a cheap and ill-informed shot against the Air Force (with some legitimate arguments). Anyone else think Singer may be going a little 'drone-happy' ever since publishing Wired for War?

[Schmedlap]

I don't get the reference to F-15s and F-16s. I don't know any Soldier who has interacted with one without a JTAC as an intermediary. I mean, maybe it happens, but probably not as the ordinary course of business. For the rest of us, how many JTACs does the AF have available to attach to ground forces down at the platoon level? And even if that were feasible, F-16s brought little more to the fight than a bomb dropped from umpteen thousand feet with a gigantic danger zone and a 30-second delay from the moment that it was requested. It's nice when you need it. But most of the time you just need another set of eyes from a different vantage point and some well-placed fires on a nearby target. Take Kiowas, for example. I communicated in plain English with Kiowa pilots - sometimes with mere hand gestures because they flew so low. And if a Kiowa fired, I didn't need to back up a few hundred meters to avoid being danger close.

Surely there is a happy medium between the firepower and speed of a jet and the responsiveness and precision of a Kiowa. I don't think UAVs are the way to go. They are not responsive. If that problem could be solved, then maybe we would be on to something, but a human in the cockpit is still far more preferable. I also don't think the F-15 or similar jet is the answer. I understand his gripe is that the newly proposed planes won't be useful against China. Yeah, maybe not in the initial HIC. But in the LIC that follows, I suspect it would be. Regardless, aren't we supposed to be focusing on the wars that we're fighting? In that regard, he raises doubt on whether we'll still be fighting in Iraq or Afghanistan by the time these things might be fielded, in 2013. Now there is some wishful thinking.

[Fuchs]

It takes a lot of background to understand the whole COIN aircraft (let's think of the OV-10D+ Bronco as an example) discussion.


1) The Korea and Vietnam story of Skyraider vs. jets.
The propeller-driven Skyraider was slow and rugged, its pilot had enough time to find and identify the target (or marking smoke) and to communicate with the FAC or FO.
This is generally used as an example that it takes slow aircraft for safe and effective CAS. That's where much of the A-10's popularity comes from.
The A-10 had its embarrassing sorties about fratricide as well, though (think of AAV's being misunderstood for BMP's in Iraq).

2) The counter-concept to the slow&low school is the "high, fast & technical sensors with zoom" school. Air forces love the latter (if they have enough money) because the platform is much more versatile. You can attach a FLIR pod to a fighter to make a CAS aircraft. Speed is supposedly no problem because the aircraft can circle at a safe altitude.
I'd like to add that supersonic jets can fly slow as well. Maybe the air forces need a new, alternative high authority autopilot software for slow&low CAS (AOA issues may be a challenge, though).

3) Drones (can) have extreme endurance and a good sensor, but most are slow. Especially the original Predator drones are as slow as a WWI biplane. So that's a kind of platform that you want to use on lasting ops, not as a quick reaction asset.

4) Drones also require bandwidth, and as far as I know it's simply impossible to increase the quantity of drones on station by much. Bandwidth is the critical bottleneck afaik.

5) Air support is more than just staring and using guided munitions
* show of force (show yourself, lightshow)
* strafing runs (autocannon, possibly unguided rockets like 68mm SNEB or 70mm Hydra or CRV)

I'd like to add that a 70mm Hydra smoke rocket salvo can at times get infantry out of trouble real quick.

6) New (or re-started) COIN aircraft production takes years. The only quick fix would be to buy and at most refurbish existing aircraft.
Brazil has Tucanos, the USN has T-45's, Broncos sit in the desert, Hawks are available in many places, L-159's are available on the market (even some with almost no flying hours). Such light jets consume only about 1/3 as much fuel as an A-10. They're also two-seaters with superior abilities in communication and sensing (due to shared workload).

7) Normal tactical aircraft cannot easily be operated inside Afghanistan. That takes a lot of ground personnel plus all the fuel and ammo would need to be moved in That would happen either by air (insanely expensive) or on unsafe roads.
The supposed COIN aircraft would be less much thirsty, while the maintenance requirements may be much lower than an A-10's as well.

8) The Taleban don't seem to have effective ManPADS and only occasionally something like 14.5 or 23mm AA weapons. Even WW2 aircraft would be quite survivable (for now - I don't think that the Pakistanis guard their ManPADS systems as well as their nukes).

[IntelTrooper]

Take Kiowas, for example. I communicated in plain English with Kiowa pilots - sometimes with mere hand gestures because they flew so low. And if a Kiowa fired, I didn't need to back up a few hundred meters to avoid being danger close.

I think Kiowas are a perfect example. Being able to get "low and slow" and communicate directly with troops in contact (maybe the ability to survive some SAF or an RPG) seems like an excellent solution to make the Air Force more relevant in LIC/COIN/SFA operations.

I also agree with your point about what the Iraqis and Afghans want. Is it possible that they don't actually know what would be best for them, and are stating their preferences based on the "gee whiz, cool!" factor rather than the usefulness of such aircraft?

[Old Eagle]

Everybody wants the best -- shiniest, fastest, etc., etc., etc. One of the military forces I was assisting wanted a fleet of F-16s, as a "gift" from the U.S. As any of you who have run guns for a living know, the expense isn't in procurement, it's in training, O&M, etc. Partner Air Forces need frames that they can afford and can master the maintenance of. Blessedly, our security assistance program sells full packages (training, spare parts, maint. equip., etc.), but even then, with an initial stock of spare parts, vehicles/airframes still become hangar queens through cannibalization.

So quite aside from what the "COIN" aircraft can do for me, please consider what they can do for our partners. Remember, endstate is being able to exit, leaving behind a reasonably self-sustaining partner.

[Jesse9252]

Everybody wants the best -- shiniest, fastest, etc., etc., etc. One of the military forces I was assisting wanted a fleet of F-16s, as a "gift" from the U.S.

Bingo--which is why Singer is disingenuous (or just ignorant) when he writes, at face value, that the head of the Iraqi air force wants F-16s. Of course he wants F-16s; and they will be about as useful to him as the MiG-29s were to Saddam.

And as far as the Predator going to the Afghan Air Force--what are the odds they will be able to stand up the sort of networked systems necessary to operate them anytime in the next decade? Considering the country's literacy rate, I think I have a better shot of winning the lottery.

On the other hand, could these militaries operate a one or two-engine, two-seat prop plane with some basic avionics and weapons systems, along with the necessary maintenance and training programs? I dunno, but I'd say they had a better shot than with F-16s and Predators.

[Ken White]

I'm often asked why I'm unreasonably and implacably opposed to 'Think' Tanks and academics who are 'Strategists' or military experts. Theoreticians with considerable book knowledge and little experience are particularly bothersome...

Then I read ill-informed, rather ignorant and unduly patronizing articles like that from Singer and I recall why that's the case...

Aside from that pseudo-psychobabble about scarves which demeans the writer, not the aviators, the points made by you and others are all valid. I'll also point out that any turboprops bought won't last long enough due to normal wear and tear to be around if we have a China problem. As for Iran, he apparently is unaware of the moonscape that is Iranian territory...

No question UAVs have their uses but there are many things they cannot do and he misses the point of in-theater availability. He also should be aware that the F-16 and other fast movers can indeed do CAS -- but Troops and the JTACs on the ground in Afghanistan will opt for the A-10, the AH-64 and a Kiowa in that order given the call. I suspect there's a reason for that.

Dippy article that contributes little and demonstrates a lot of arrogance, only slight knowledge and not much else.