Aviation in COIN (merged thread)

[slapout9]

From the Airpower Journal..... COIN and Dynamic Targeting. IMO the AF should continue to ehance these capabilities for their COIN mission.



http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/a...n07/brown.html

[Entropy]

You believe that if more ground-centric capability is needed, it should come from the ground-centric branches i.e. USA/USMC. They are the SMEs on all aspects of IW and COIN and are best manned/trained/equipped to do so; gaps can be RFF'd from sister branches as needed but COA 1 is to plus up those existing capabilities.

Essentially yes. The ground forces are always going to be the lead in any COIN effort, pop-centric or otherwise. What I wouldn't like to see is every service with it's own COIN ground force. There is, obviously, going to be some overlap (which isn't a bad thing), but the Air Force and Navy should concentrate their efforts on supporting and enabling the ground forces, not augmenting them.

[slapout9]

And Air Occupation from 1997.


http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/a...7/dippold.html

[slapout9]

And some more stuff from the SBW Target folder, this time by an Army officer on the viability of Air Occupation (1993 paper).


http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_vi...SOBOX=1&REC=12

[Coindanasty]

I can't believe it. I just spent almost two hours formulating a response and when I tried to post it, it all disappeared and said I wasn't logged in. Luckily when I tried to go back with the browser, it wasn't there either. Damn it all.

[Entropy]

That sucks. If you use Firefox (and you really should), you can get a plugin called Lazarus that saves all your web/form/comment data. It's saved me from the gremlins a number of times.

[Coindanasty]

Been punting aound the idea of switching over to Linux for a while now, and yes, I really should be using Firefox. I'll try again tomorrow and maybe my response will be that much more mind-blowing (probably not though).

[Kiwigrunt]

For long posts may I suggest preparing them on a word-doc and then c&p them in here. Then you've got your back-up.

[slapout9]

I can't believe it. I just spent almost two hours formulating a response and when I tried to post it, it all disappeared and said I wasn't logged in. Luckily when I tried to go back with the browser, it wasn't there either. Damn it all.

Just give us the short version

[slapout9]

Newer AF COIN Doctrine.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fiB3vrhPDNs

[StreetF16]

Reading through the three pages of this thread, it appears to me there is a lot of "talking past each other" going on. Yes, the Air Force needs to wake up and realize that we won the "independent Air Service" fight back in 1947--let's move on, we don't need to refight that merge every year.

That said, why is it that none of the entries so far has even mentioned AFDD 2-3 Irregular Warfare (published two years ago) ? Work on this document was started before FM 3-24 was published, in recognition that the Air Force needed more doctrine on this type of warfare--COIN is a large part of that document.

The Air Force does not ignore COIN--today MQ-1 Predator pilots are the second largest group of pilots in the Air Force (this is the primary ISR and light attack platform for this fight). The Air Force has spent a lot of time and effort developing munitions that are both smaller and more precise than the older-generation PGMs, making them more useful for those situations in which kinetic attack is called for. We also say in our own doctrine that, in many cases, non-kinetic roles for Airpower such as airlift, ISR, C2, CSAR, etc., are the best ways that air can help win the fight.

There is also a fundamental difference between air and ground forces regarding COIN and other forms of irregular warfare. Most airpower missions differ only in matters of degree and nuance from COIN to higher-end conventional warfare. CAS is still CAS, for example, even though the ROE is very different and even one bomb landing in the wrong area may have strategic consequences. For the infantryman, the difference between TTP for "Clear/Hold/Build" and for major conventional warfare is much greater. So if it appears that the Air Force is making fewer adjustment for the current fight, that's because fewer adjustments are required.

I'm also not saying there aren't things the Air Force could have done better--of course there are. We could have pushed up the pipeline for JTACs sooner, to better provide control for CAS in a small-unit conflict. We've also let the single CAOC per theater concept override the need to have the primary air planners physically co-located with the rest of the joint planning staff, rather than a thousand miles away at the end of a telephone line.

[reed11b]

today MQ-1 Predator pilots are the second largest group of pilots in the Air Force (this is the primary ISR and light attack platform for this fight).

Does this mean that since I have played "Flight Simulator" I am a Pilot? Sweet.
Reed

[jmm99]

AFDD 2-3 Irregular Warfare (2007); and AFDD 2-3.1 Foreign Internal Defense (2007).

My dad wore an 8th Air Force patch on his left sleeve and a 30ID patch on the right - obviously before the "War of Divisions". Perhaps, just a little bit of "Back to the Future" would be healthy ?

Merry Christmas

Mike

[StreetF16]

Mike--thanks for posting links to AFDD 2-3 and 2-3.1; I helped write both of those documents. I think they help to show the air side of COIN and the other air aspects of irregular warfare. I would also direct any interested parties to the "Airpower in COIN" appendix to the Army's FM 3-24--this appendix was largely written by me and my staff at the Air Force doctrine center, thanks to the Army being very joint and sharing the draft for review by all of the services.

I think all of our services today suffer from a slice of senior leadership that still doesn't understand what "joint" is all about. As I stated in my first posting, we (the AF) need to get over the need to prove our independence year after year, and get on with the business of being part of the joint team, with both supported and supporting roles to play.

Reed--I guess playing "Flight Sim" makes you about as much of a pilot as my playing "Ghost Recon" qualifies me for Delta or the SEALs.

Happy New Year

[Cavguy]

Mike--thanks for posting links to AFDD 2-3 and 2-3.1; I helped write both of those documents. I think they help to show the air side of COIN and the other air aspects of irregular warfare. I would also direct any interested parties to the "Airpower in COIN" appendix to the Army's FM 3-24--this appendix was largely written by me and my staff at the Air Force doctrine center, thanks to the Army being very joint and sharing the draft for review by all of the services.

I think all of our services today suffer from a slice of senior leadership that still doesn't understand what "joint" is all about. As I stated in my first posting, we (the AF) need to get over the need to prove our independence year after year, and get on with the business of being part of the joint team, with both supported and supporting roles to play.

Reed--I guess playing "Flight Sim" makes you about as much of a pilot as my playing "Ghost Recon" qualifies me for Delta or the SEALs.

Happy New Year

Glad to have you on board. Might want to review a few past threads on the USAF and COIN:

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=2131

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=1225

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=3621

Just a few, search will turn up lots more.

[Entropy]

Glad to have you here StreetF16. As an Air Force guy myself (ok, Air Guard), this is the best forum around in my opinion. Lots of knowledgable folks here - stick around.

[StreetF16]

CAVGUY

Thanks for the three links you posted. I'd like to respond with a general comment that many of the posted replies assumed that anything written by RAND Project Air Force comes directly from the office of the Air Force Chief of Staff and represents the latest official position of the junior service. As one who has worked with RAND on several of these and other studies, I can honestly say that is a common, but often false, perception.

Specifically--the "Learning Lessons Large..." study was not researched in the depth required. The study used "current" AF and Army doctrine as an example of how each service did or did not learn lessons during the post-cold war period. In fact, the authors spent little time actually interviewing AF doctrine developers, and did not even read any of the draft doctrine that was in development during the time of the study. Many of the conclusions in this study as examples of lessons not learned were OBE, as the then-draft AF doctrine included exactly the updates the study recommended. I honestly can't speak to the draft Army doctrine side of the study, but the same may hold true for CADD as was the case for AFDC.

Rather than spending time discussing various RAND reports, some of which are very good and some which are not, a better focus for this forum would be to comment on the current joint and service doctrine that addresses COIN. In AFDD 2-3 "Irregular Warfare," for example, one can find the following quotes:

"Often, the effects desired in COIN will directly support ground operations (military and civilian) requiring proper integration and coordination"

"In order to achieve the JFC’s strategic and operational objectives, traditional approaches to warfare must often be reversed, first weighing the impact on the relevant population and then determining the impact of operations on an adversary’s will and capability. There may be times when a conscious decision not to respond to enemy provocation may be more effective toward achieving strategic goals. In COIN, strategic success is defined by successfully discrediting the hostile ideology rather than by achieving military tactical victories."

A detailed look at AFDD 2-3 "Irregular Warfare," which discusses COIN and other forms of IW, clearly shows a balanced approach. Capabilities such as airlift, ISR, C2, HUMINT, logistics support, medivac, C/SAR, and foreign advisory missions are all included along with kinetic attack, which itself is discussed mainly in the form of CAS. I'm not saying the AF is the expert on COIN or IW, but it does both understand IW and take it seriously (not that there aren't individual Airmen out there who don't). In fact, just as within the other services, there is an on-going debate as to whether the AF is moving too far toward improving COIN/IW capabilities at the expense of more high-threat capabilities (similar to the debate over heavy vs. light force mix for the Army).

Turning to a general discussion of service doctrine, I think there is far too much discussion of service doctrine and not nearly enough on joint doctrine. Service doctrine, BY INTENT AND DESIGN, is intended to capture a specific, service-centric perspective. Service doctrine is also not used to guide actual operations--that's what joint doctrine is for. That's one of the main reasons the joint staff recently published JP 3-24, which looks very similar to FM 3-24, BUT IT IS SIGNED BY ALL OF THE SERVICES. As a Colonel teaching and advising prospective USAF component commanders, at least 90% of what I taught was straight out of joint doctrine.

So far I agree with comments about the forum--"fair and balanced" as they say, with a healthy exchange of (mostly) honest opinions.

[slapout9]

Link to paper on possible AF Doctrine, special section on the Propaganda Triangle.....manpower,money,and media.


http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...c=GetTRDoc.pdf

[LtFuzz]

Moderators Note - moved to RFI thread

Hello,

I'm an analyst with a small aviation TF (UHs, CHs, AHs, no OHs) deployed overseas.

Our battlespace owner is very much committed to Counterinsurgency. Our leadership feels -- and I agree -- that if we don't adopt COIN philosophy and doctrine we will be quickly left behind on the modern battlefield and relegated to a role of air logistician.

I've been tasked with putting together a "COIN Academy" for our soldiers and aircrews. I already know the biggest obstacle will be overcoming the "WTF?" reaction from crews who have been trained in kinetic action since the dawn of their profession.

What I am struggling with right now -- after consulting FM 3-24, among other sources -- is finding (or developing, if I must) a template for the exponential use of aviation assets in a COIN environment. FM 3-24 focuses on the application of combat power via air assets, but that really isn't a relevant role for us in our current battlespace.

We know we can be more than air taxis and sling-loaders. We're already having some success by shifting the role of the AHs, to the profound consternation of the crews who don't yet understand that by "failing" in an operational sense, specific to that airframe, they are in fact "winning" the strategic fight.

Do you all have any thoughts on how aviation can evolve to be a relevant actor in a COIN environment?

[Xenophon]

The bottom line for air support in COIN is to remember that it is air support. You guys are not going to be the main effort on this one, and that's ok. I don't know if your group has ISR capabilities but that's a big money maker. And CAS is still important in COIN, it's just not going to be like firebombing Tokyo anymore.

In fact, I don't think air support in COIN is all that different from air support in any other war. There is just a bigger focus on not blowing up civilians and thus a greater desire for precision (I deal with the same issues as an artilleryman). And really, we should not be in the business of blowing up civilians under any circumstances. A lot of the guidance that gets handed down from on high in the name of "COIN" can be distilled down to "Don't kill innocent people" Well, no kidding. My mom could have told me that, maybe she should write a policy paper. Be a Good Boy, Eat your Green Beans, and Protect the Population: The Application of Nagging in Military Operations Other Than War.

Not sure if this helps you set up your school, but when instructing younger warfighters, I wouldn't focus on the theory of COIN and go into a deep, Powerpoint-assisted lecture on Galula or even FM 3-24. Distill it down to the basics: We're the good guys, act like it, the ends do not always justify means, listen to your mother.