Aviation in COIN (merged thread)

[Cole]

=William F. Owen;92309]Starry mate. For me it comes down the 2 uses rule. Can I use this for regular Warfare and Irregular warfare

Man, just gotta use some imagination. Even an F-22 at supercruise with lots of gun ammo and small diameter bombs could support a COP being attacked with a quick response...at least when they eventually put a Sniper pod on them...and a helmet mounted display...which is why the F-35 is essential.

1. Why do you need OH and AH?

Check out what happened at COP Wanat, COP Zeroc, and COP Keating when AH-64Ds came to the rescue and could use 30mm, rockets, and Hellfire close to troops while other more lethal aerial and artillery systems could not. At Wanat, casualties would not have been evacuated as rapidly without Apaches securing the MEDEVAC LZs. UH/CH often need aerial escorts for security. The Brits have used their stronger-engined AH-64D quite effectively in Helmand, too.

Manned-unmanned teaming is the future, and AH and OH fit it perfectly teamed with UAS. UH can get in the act as well carrying a squad QRF cued by UAS. Reconnaissance and security are still critical AH/OH missions in regular warfare or IW as is close combat attack. IED diggers, builders, and financiers don't like AH and OH aircraft or UAS.

2. Can armed UH fulfil 80% of OH and AH tasks? - door gunners with NVGs and LL-LP?

Think Direct Action Penetrator UH-60. Personally never understood why UH-60 Hellfire in the GPF would not work, or why an AH and UH version of essentially the same aircraft could not exist. We did a lot of scout-like missions in the Sinai using lowly Hueys, while still doing ash and trash at other times. But UH NVGs are not the equal of the latest Apache, OH, or UAS FLIR. Personally never understood why our MEDEVAC could not be more like USAF CSAR H-60s and be armed and armored for self-defense. Every Soldier is a sensor so that should include UH and CH aviators, as well. Company fusion teams?

3. Can A-10 do the rest?

Yeah, A-10s are great as are light attack prop planes with their long endurance. But the value of that endurance somewhat dims when the last of its few bombs are dropped. Then it's slowly back to a distant airfield while AH/OH can visit a much closer FARP at a FOB to arm/refuel, and head back for more. Plus its still hard to see dismounts at 250-350 knots, and diving gun runs at those speeds in mountains can be dangerous.

A lot of the debate about AH that I see outside the US is a general agreement of the need for armed helicopters, but a general rejection of a machine as large, expensive and complex as AH-64 - whose cost being associated with survivability, seems very much in doubt.

The US has lost far fewer helicopters in these conflicts than were lost in Viet Nam or by Soviets in Afghanistan, despite flying over 2.5 million rotary wing hours. Lots of countries have purchased AH-64s to include in the Middle East and Europe. They are not overly complex or unaffordable.

Bottom line is the Quadrennial Defense Review correctly identified the value of rotary wing aircraft of all types to all types of conflict. I may personally believe that the AH/OH guys get too much emphasis vs. UH/CH just as combat arms get all the attention in the new Capstone Concept while logistics and COIN are barely addressed. That's just the nature of the Army beast and why infantry, SF, aviation, MP, and sustainers seem to embrace COIN and full spectrum conflict while armor and artillery branches appear to fear it, IMHO.

[William F. Owen]

Bottom line is the Quadrennial Defense Review correctly identified the value of rotary wing aircraft of all types to all types of conflict. I may personally believe that the AH/OH guys get too much emphasis vs. UH/CH just as combat arms get all the attention in the new Capstone Concept while logistics and COIN are barely addressed.

Cole, I concur.

Yes you need armed helicopters. I am less than convinced that they need to be dedicated Attack types such as the AH-64 - but if you have them, use them.

That's just the nature of the Army beast and why infantry, SF, aviation, MP, and sustainers seem to embrace COIN and full spectrum conflict while armor and artillery branches appear to fear it, IMHO.

Well Armour and artillery have pretty central roles in Irregular Warfare, but basically none once you make all Irregular Warfare into COIN. ....and Armour and Artillery cannot re-role as infantry, you may have the wrong men doing it?

[Infanteer]

I think whether an airframe can "do" any sort of mission is based on how ####hot the pilots are. I loved the Kiowa Warriors in Afghanistan, simply because they would ride right on my shoulder if needed - those pilots are cowboys! We've pressed our utility choppers (Griffons) into armed escorts with miniguns; the plunging fire is pretty handy. Our pilots are starting to get that important experience and are getting pretty aggressive as well.

A-10s rock. Apaches roam around like hunters, but Wilf may have a point on being a very specialized role between an armed helocopter like the ones mentioned above and an attack plane like the A-10.

[Infanteer]

Well Armour and artillery have pretty central roles in Irregular Warfare, but basically none once you make all Irregular Warfare into COIN.

Agreed - anything can have a central role in any sort of conflict; just depends on how smart the commander is. I could employ a platoon of cooks to go out and cook for people as an IO message.

Canada has armour (Leopard 2) and artillery (M777) in Afghanistan and it is employed regularly. One should never confine a tool to a preconceived "type" of conflict (if such a thing exists - he's either shooting at you or he's not, IMO).

Anyways, I digress.

[Cliff]

Man, just gotta use some imagination. Even an F-22 at supercruise with lots of gun ammo and small diameter bombs could support a COP being attacked with a quick response...at least when they eventually put a Sniper pod on them...and a helmet mounted display...which is why the F-35 is essential.

Agreed - F-22 w/ supercruise can cover a much wider area quickly than most fighters.

Manned-unmanned teaming is the future, and AH and OH fit it perfectly teamed with UAS. UH can get in the act as well carrying a squad QRF cued by UAS. Reconnaissance and security are still critical AH/OH missions in regular warfare or IW as is close combat attack. IED diggers, builders, and financiers don't like AH and OH aircraft or UAS.

This is where the real money will be - integrating RPVs/UAS and manned aircraft.

Think Direct Action Penetrator UH-60. Personally never understood why UH-60 Hellfire in the GPF would not work, or why an AH and UH version of essentially the same aircraft could not exist. We did a lot of scout-like missions in the Sinai using lowly Hueys, while still doing ash and trash at other times. But UH NVGs are not the equal of the latest Apache, OH, or UAS FLIR. Personally never understood why our MEDEVAC could not be more like USAF CSAR H-60s and be armed and armored for self-defense. Every Soldier is a sensor so that should include UH and CH aviators, as well. Company fusion teams?

One word - money. FLIR is expensive, and is one of the first systems to be damaged/destroyed in any kind of mishap (happened to plenty of HHs in brownout landings that my folks fixed in my last job). I agree that ideally you'd put some sort of FLIR/imaging/Sniper capability on every plane/helo you can, same with Hellfire/J-series weapons.

Yeah, A-10s are great as are light attack prop planes with their long endurance. But the value of that endurance somewhat dims when the last of its few bombs are dropped. Then it's slowly back to a distant airfield while AH/OH can visit a much closer FARP at a FOB to arm/refuel, and head back for more. Plus its still hard to see dismounts at 250-350 knots, and diving gun runs at those speeds in mountains can be dangerous.

Part of the arguement for the OA-X/AT-6 from the USAF and ACC is that it could be landed and refueled at a FOB... and it can fly at 120 knots to get low and slow. While there is a definite fuel savings, I'll be curious to see what the time difference is between OA-X and A-10... advantage of the A-10 is in a permissive environment I can park the tanker at the top of the CAS stack and just have folks climb up top and refuel when they get low on gas... meaning ordnance becomes your LIMFAC.

I am hoping USAF buys enough OA-X to make it worthwhile. The other interesting thing to see will be whether it ends up in ACC (like Army GPF) or in AFSOC... if it ends up in AFSOC, it will basically mean that COIN will have been walled off in the SPECOPS world. I think that AFSOC would like this, but my personal feeling is it would be good for the USAF to have OA-X be part of ACC.

The US has lost far fewer helicopters in these conflicts than were lost in Viet Nam or by Soviets in Afghanistan, despite flying over 2.5 million rotary wing hours. Lots of countries have purchased AH-64s to include in the Middle East and Europe. They are not overly complex or unaffordable.

Yes... but this environment is much more permissive than Vietnam... I would argue even more permissive than Afghanistan in Soviet times. We don't have China directly supporting the insurgency either, which would make a big difference... so small arms/RPGs are your main AAA threat as opposed to AAA/SAMs/MANPADS. I would also argue that our tactics and improved maintenance help a lot too.

Bottom line is the Quadrennial Defense Review correctly identified the value of rotary wing aircraft of all types to all types of conflict. I may personally believe that the AH/OH guys get too much emphasis vs. UH/CH just as combat arms get all the attention in the new Capstone Concept while logistics and COIN are barely addressed. That's just the nature of the Army beast and why infantry, SF, aviation, MP, and sustainers seem to embrace COIN and full spectrum conflict while armor and artillery branches appear to fear it, IMHO.

Cole and others, I am curious- do you think the AH/OH community has embraced the COIN role?

V/R,

Cliff

[Infanteer]

Cole and others, I am curious- do you think the AH/OH community has embraced the COIN role?

What is "embracing the COIN role" - especially for a guy in a helicopter? I need an OH to shoot a bad guy or look for assholes digging in booby traps. Does it make a difference if the guy is in a uniform or not? By "embracing COIN", should pilots be getting into shuras?

I'll posit this - the infantry defines the pace of events on the ground against both regular and irregular foes; all else should simply do what they do and provide the support inherent to their capability. That capability does not change in an irregular fight.

[Ken White]

...the infantry defines the pace of events on the ground against both regular and irregular foes; all else should simply do what they do and provide the support inherent to their capability. That capability does not change in an irregular fight.

Nor will it change in future MCO due to the comparative expense of other combat elements. Infantry will always have the numbers to achieve economies of scale denied others...

[Cliff]

do the aviation folks take the time to understand the ground scheme of maneuver, and are they taking appropriate consideration for how their ops impact that? IE, are they making sure they don't buzz friendly villages/livestock, are they appropriately restraining use of force, etc.

What is "embracing the COIN role" - especially for a guy in a helicopter? I need an OH to shoot a bad guy or look for assholes digging in booby traps. Does it make a difference if the guy is in a uniform or not? By "embracing COIN", should pilots be getting into shuras?

I'll posit this - the infantry defines the pace of events on the ground against both regular and irregular foes; all else should simply do what they do and provide the support inherent to their capability. That capability does not change in an irregular fight.

Infanteer, I agree with you - most of what aviation is doing will not change. Nevertheless, I think there are benefits to the flyers understanding the ground fight. The same holds true even if it is an MRC, IMHO. Even for air-to-air guys, it sure helps you protect something/someone when you understand the bigger mission.

There may be times where even the infantry is in support of other folks as well, be they the HN forces or OGAs... which is why I think everyone needs to understand their part in the bigger plan.

V/R,

Cliff

[Cole]

do the aviation folks take the time to understand the ground scheme of maneuver, and are they taking appropriate consideration for how their ops impact that? IE, are they making sure they don't buzz friendly villages/livestock, are they appropriately restraining use of force, etc.

Infanteer, I agree with you - most of what aviation is doing will not change. Nevertheless, I think there are benefits to the flyers understanding the ground fight. The same holds true even if it is an MRC, IMHO. Even for air-to-air guys, it sure helps you protect something/someone when you understand the bigger mission.

There may be times where even the infantry is in support of other folks as well, be they the HN forces or OGAs... which is why I think everyone needs to understand their part in the bigger plan.

Can't speak for aviators but do believe they get it and know the ramifications and ROE.

Lt Fuzz, suggest using the ASCOPE table out of FM 3-24.2, Tactics for Counterinsurgency as a start point for an expanded Civil Considerations class and discuss how aviation might influence items in the chart in conjunction with ground forces. Aerial insertions of OPs and patrols on high terrain. Ask infantry units to attach a squad to the TF for an aerial QRF and for sling load hook up. Insert and pickup leaders at shuras to avoid ambushes afterwards while bringing goodies to villagers. Cover routes and known chokepoints using all types of aircraft. Look for illegal checkpoints and take pictures of culvert and bridge areas to look for changes. Cover those areas and if you are an MI analyst or S-2, then have all pilots, including the utility and CH pilots, provide written or oral debriefs after each mission to a TF fusion cell. Give all pilots, or crew chiefs/flight engineers digital and video cameras to take pictures/FMV of items of interest provided to the fusion cell after the mission.

One of my more lamebrain ideas would be using National Guard water buckets for forest fires to bring water from a river or lake to drought area village animals. Chinooks could also bring in large village metal pool or engineers could construct shallow concrete pools at locations villagers agreed upon. Perhaps land near farmer's fields with UH (without causing rotorwash damage) and drop off fertilizer bags and animal feed for farmers growing good crops. Get ANA Soldiers to be seen dropping off the bags as they dismount to patrol an area.

LtFuzz and others, I'm sure you guys can think of similar but better ideas.

[NOMAN]

Off the top of my head, check out Fire Force by Chris Cocks. The Fire Force used both air assault and airborne insertion skills to seal an enemy. They had lift birds and C& C birds and K cars (side firing helo gunships). They brought in fixed wing when needed. The Fire Force is base upon the 1/9 Air Cav from Viet Nam. Look up Bremman's War and its two companion books about the 1/9 Air Cav and how they worked. Then look up Checker Boarding and Jitter Bugging two Air Cav tactics.

[StreetF16]

Lt Fuzz--recommend you look up AFDD 2-3 "Irregular Warfare." Although it is AF doctrine, not Army, you'll find a lot of applicable material on both the combat and non-combat use of airpower in COIN and other irregular applications. You might also find some useful material in AFDD 2-3.1 "FID" and 2-7 "Special Operations." Here's a link to the LeMay Center's public site at Maxwell AFB:

http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/?txtS...btnSearch.y=14

Also--you mentioned that you've looked in FM 3-24 already. In case you missed it, there is an appendix on "Airpower in COIN" in that document as well.

Hope this helps!

[LtFuzz]

I appreciate the continued discussion, gentlemen.

I'm currently assembling a small syllabus for my task force and in a few weeks we'll begin some classes.

[Rex Brynen]

Of course, I'm not sure Luttwak has yet met a problem that he couldn't bomb


In Praise of Aerial Bombing: Why terror from the skies still works.

Foreign Policy Magazine
BY EDWARD LUTTWAK | MARCH/APRIL 2010

Ever since the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey cast doubt on the efficacy of aerial bombardment in World War II, and particularly after its failure to bring victory in the Vietnam War, air power has acquired a bad reputation. Nowadays, killing enemies from the skies is widely considered useless, while its polar opposite, counterinsurgency by nation-building, is the U.S. government's official policy. But it's not yet time to junk our planes. Air power still has a lot to offer, even in a world of scattered insurgencies.

...

Most unfortunately, having so often greatly overestimated air power in the past, the United States is now disregarding its strategic potential, using it only tactically to hunt down individuals with remotely operated drones and to support ground operations, mostly with helicopters, which are the only aircraft the Taliban can shoot down. Commanding Gen. Stanley McChrystal, understandably concerned about the political blowback from errant bombings widely condemned both inside and outside Afghanistan, has put out the word that air power should be used solely as a last resort. He intends to defeat the Taliban by protecting Afghan civilians, providing essential services, stimulating economic development, and ensuring good government, as the now-sacrosanct Field Manual 3-24 prescribes. Given the characteristics of Afghanistan and its rulers, this worthy endeavor might require a century or two. In the meantime, the FM 3-24 way of war is far from cheap: President Barack Obama is now just about doubling the number of U.S. troops by sending another 30,000, at an average cost of $1 million per soldier per year, to defeat perhaps 25,000 full-time Taliban.

[William F. Owen]

Actually I can't see much in that I disagree with.

Nothing works well when done stupidly or badly. Anything works well when done by folk skilled enough to deliver and they merely have to be good, not perfect.

[SWJED]

Moderators Note: This was a separate RFI thread and merged 2nd April 2010.

Got this via e-mail from an Army aviator:

Ladies and Gentlemen:

My brigade is attempting to assemble a briefing on counterinsurgency for dumm...erm, aviators in preparation for a deployment to Afghanistan. I know we all feel strongly about teaching troops about the fundamentals of counterinsurgency--protecting the population, isolating the insurgents, providing security and civil services, etc.

Yet, we aviators are kind of a special case--we typically don't participate in tribal engagements. Aviators have minimal interaction with the population, and we aren't rebuilding infrastructure. Start teaching pilots about Galula or economic inequality and their eyes will inevitably glaze over. Eventually, some joker will raise his hand and say, "I just want to know if they have surface-to-air missiles". (Aviation units do have ground elements attached to them for logistical purposes and aircraft security, however, they generally won't be taking part in leader engagements and the like. Although anything can happen.)

Still, shooting up the countryside like cowboys works against our counterinsurgency efforts. Based on your experience, what advice would you have for aviators preparing to go to Afghanistan? What impact might they have on the local population? How do air crews better interact with ground troops? Do you have any information on how aviation contributes to our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan? What are the best COIN lessons for an aviator about to deploy to Afghanistan?

I greatly appreciate any help you can give me in this matter. Any lessons you can give me would help immeasurably.

Thank you for your time

Captain xxxx
Fort Drum, NY

[davidbfpo]

Have a look at the 'COIN Academy' for Aviators, a RFI thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=9605 and maybe contact its author LtFuzz (Who I have tried to make contact with).

[slapout9]

Yet, we aviators are kind of a special case--we typically don't participate in tribal engagements. Aviators have minimal interaction with the population, and we aren't rebuilding infrastructure. Start teaching pilots about Galula or economic inequality and their eyes will inevitably glaze over. Eventually, some joker will raise his hand and say, "I just want to know if they have surface-to-air missiles". (Aviation units do have ground elements attached to them for logistical purposes and aircraft security, however, they generally won't be taking part in leader engagements and the like. Although anything can happen.)

I would say there is your problem and your solution. You should (the pilots)be doing tribal engagement......you should go on the ground and on patrol to see the AO in intimate detail before you go flying if possible. That is how the original concept of "Air Policing " was done. They did the most detailed studies of Tribal leaders before and after any Air Strikes to see what effect they were having.....positve or negative.

[davidbfpo]

hat tip to Abu M:

One of the resident aviators at CNAS, "Herbal" Carmen, weighs in with the following advice.

Complete with a nine point list.

Link: http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawam...-aviators.html

[JMA]

Concur about the excellence of the Rhodesian Air Force. Legendary skill and innovation !
However I think we need to be aware that the Fire Forces had almost no ROE, as we would accept them today, and the equipment limitations they coped with are unlikely to be relevant today - well the Americans anyway!

Wouldn't it be wonderful to have the opportunity to take a bunch of enthusiastic aviators not yet mentally conditioned into the straight jacket of the conventional mindset and see how a "Fire Force" operation adopted to cater for local enemy and terrain could work. It would be a blast. Maybe the Marines would be up for it?

[JMA]

Off the top of my head, check out Fire Force by Chris Cocks. The Fire Force used both air assault and airborne insertion skills to seal an enemy. They had lift birds and C& C birds and K cars (side firing helo gunships). They brought in fixed wing when needed. The Fire Force is base upon the 1/9 Air Cav from Viet Nam. Look up Bremman's War and its two companion books about the 1/9 Air Cav and how they worked. Then look up Checker Boarding and Jitter Bugging two Air Cav tactics.

Chris Cock's book is a "troopers eye" view of the Fire Force concept in action. A book worth the read though.

The key to the the effectiveness of the air effort used in Fire Force (after the initial fixed wing strike if there was one) was that close air support was close.

How close is close in Afghanistan?

In Rhodesia 50m was possible because the Lynx (Cessna 337 Skymaster) had 'small weapons' such as 38mm SNEB rockets and a 16 gal Frantan (Napalm). The gunship could fire closer as at 800 ft the gunner could be deadly accurate. The closest troops were just told to keep their heads down. It must be said that these air crews did the vast majority of their flying on Fire Force and became very experienced.