You seem to be saying that the problem is armed foreign occupation. Is that correct?Originally Posted by Dayuhan
You seem to be saying that the problem is armed foreign occupation. Is that correct?
A problem, not the problem. A rather large problem. One of several.
In your opinion, is there any activity, short of withdrawal, that the occupation forces can engage in that would have a positive effect?
The problem of intervention/occupation and resistance
When we were a couple weeks into the Marjah campaign things we're starting to look a bit better, but the populace was very reluctant to embrace the Coalition. The first week was hell, with everyone literally stuck in the mud within small perimeters barely extending beyond the original LZs. All roadways were heavily planted with IEDs and the muddy poppy fields were a mess and covered by fire from Taliban forted up with innocent civilians in their compounds. Fortunately they changed tactics after a week or so, and stopped challenging the Marines, ANA and SF directly and engagements became more sporadic, with IEDs remaining a major challenge.
During this period, MG Carter was engaging with commanders and staff about the need to gain the support of the populace of Marjah. The populace, quite reasonably, was concerned that the government would ultimately leave again someday, and that the Taliban would return and punish those who had collaborated. During that talk he made made the comment that "we need to assure the people of Marjah that we will not leave them." To which, my reply was "Actually sir, we need to assure them that GIROA won't leave them, and that we won't stay, and that is a far more difficult thing."
Overcoming the presumptions of illegitimacy of a government placed in power and then protected by a foreign army is virtually impossible. Understanding the criticality of doing so and the natural occurrence of resistance when one does not succeed is the first step.
Shortly thereafter we delivered the, now notorious, "government in a box" to the people of Marjah. Under the current constitution Karzai simply created a new District and named a new governor, and the USMC then delivered that governor via USMC military aircraft and guarded by USMC personnel. A Dari speaking German none of them had ever heard of before, picked by a President they did not select, and delivered and guarded by a foreign military power.
I give us an "F-minus" for "Effectively reinforced perceptions of local legitimacy" on that one.
And the Resistance insurgency continues to grow.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Mr. World, by coincidence I was just leafing through a copy of Griffith's translation/interpretation of Mao's, Yu Chi Chan:
The fundamental difference between patriotic partisan resistance and revolutionary guerrilla movements is that the first usually lacks the ideological content that always distinguishes the second.
A resistance is characterized by the quality of spontaneity; it begins and then is organized. A revolutionary guerrilla movement is organized and then begins.
A resistance is rarely liquidated and terminates when the invader is ejected; a revolutionary movement terminates only when it has succeeded in displacing the incumbent or is liquidated.
Historical experience suggests that there is very little hope of destroying a revolutionary guerrilla movement after it has survived the first phase and has acquired the sympathetic support of a significant segment of the population. The size of this "significant segment" will vary; a decisive figure might range from 15 to 25 per cent. (p.27, italics Griffith's)
On Guerrilla Warfare - Google books link
For what it's worth, I see the insurgency in Afghanistan as breaking into two tiers. The Quetta Shura led, political, ideological revolutionary leadership tier (that is best addressed through reconciliation efforts); and the rank and file, mom and pop, apolitical resistance movement among the people of rural Afghanistan that the bulk of our POP-centric COIN is aimed at. These guys are also paid and motivated by Taliban leadership that comes in from Pakistan, and picks them up once the poppy harvest is in just like contractors picking up illegals outside the Home Depot to do a little cheap labor for them.
Key to victory lies in reconciliation, but Karzai is safe so long as we are committed to protecting him, so why should he do more than just talk on this topic? We need to force the issue.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Mr. World, thanks for your insight. Also, I should mention that the Griffith quote in my post #110 is from his introduction and not from the Yu Chi Chan itself. Merry Griffmas.
How do you propose to force the issue?
Do you believe that any of the parties involved have any real interest in reconciliation or in sharing power?
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