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    Default Afghanistan indicators

    (with apologies if someone already posted this)

    Ian S. Livingston, Heather L. Messera, and Michael O’Hanlon, Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-9/11 Afghanistan, Brookings Institution, 21 January 2010.

    No analysis, just numbers/graphs/charts/etc... useful raw material (if used cautiously), updated weekly here.
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    Default Security in Afghanistan Is Deteriorating, Aid Groups Say

    Security in Afghanistan Is Deteriorating, Aid Groups Say

    Adam Ferguson for The New York Times

    By ROD NORDLAND
    New York Times
    Published: September 11, 2010

    KABUL, Afghanistan — Even as more American troops flow into the country, Afghanistan is more dangerous than it has ever been during this war, with security deteriorating in recent months, according to international organizations and humanitarian groups.

    Large parts of the country that were once completely safe, like most of the northern provinces, now have a substantial Taliban presence — even in areas where there are few Pashtuns, who previously were the Taliban’s only supporters. As NATO forces poured in and shifted to the south to battle the Taliban in their stronghold, the Taliban responded with a surge of their own, greatly increasing their activities in the north and parts of the east.

    The worsening security comes as the Obama administration is under increasing pressure to show results to maintain public support for the war, and raises serious concerns about whether the country can hold legitimate nationwide elections for Parliament next Saturday.

    Unarmed government employees can no longer travel safely in 30 percent of the country’s 368 districts, according to published United Nations estimates, and there are districts deemed too dangerous to visit in all but one of the country’s 34 provinces.

    The number of insurgent attacks has increased significantly; in August 2009, insurgents carried out 630 attacks. This August, they initiated at least 1,353, according to the Afghan N.G.O. Safety Office, an independent organization financed by Western governments and agencies to monitor safety for aid workers....
    They mostly come at night. Mostly.


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    Kabul, Afghanistan (CNN) -- The top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. David Petraeus, told CNN Saturday the Taliban's momentum in Afghanistan has "broadly been arrested" in some locations.
    As another fighting season comes to a close, and the rank and file fighters return to their villages and mid-level leaders return to Pakistan, this assessment:

    Petraeus: Progress being made in Afghanistan From Barbara Starr, CNN October 31, 2010

    "My assessment is that the momentum the Taliban enjoyed until probably late summer has broadly been arrested in the country," Petraeus said. "It doesn't mean it's been arrested in every location in the country, but it means by and large that is the case, and moreover, more importantly, the ISAF and Afghan forces have achieved momentum in some very important areas."


    In related news, as Winter draws near, scientists see signs of progress on Global Warming...


    (I actually had an Army 1-star in a very critical position in Afghanistan proclaim that he did not "believe in the fighting season," as clearly the weather was not prohibitive to fighting in the winter in Southern Afghanistan. Now that he has been there a full year his assessment may have changed; or perhaps he is the one who used this natural reduction of OPTEMPO to brief GEN Peraeus on the progress made for his end of tour OER...)
    Robert C. Jones
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    Having sat through the end and beginning of a fighting season and having soldiers with previous tours through the fighting season, I can catagorically state that there is a fighting season in Afghanistan.

    Most Kandaharis I spolke to said that, at least for the greenzones in the south, it was much a factor about the available cover to fight from as it was to the temperature. Afghan insurgents are extremely exposed from the air in the winter, in the summer traditional shoot-and-scoot tactics become easy. The mountains to the east probably feature a bit of a different dynamic.

    Here are photos to illustrate the difference between December and May.
    Attached Images Attached Images

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    MG Nick Carter recently changed command after a great year commanding RC-south. A good man and a great man both, and that is rare. His comments at his change of command are worth the read, and he gave full import to calulating the fighting season effect into any assessments of progress:

    http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/De...OnProgress.htm

    To "General Nick", sir, it was an honor and a pleasure to serve with you.
    Robert C. Jones
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    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    To "General Nick", sir, it was an honor and a pleasure to serve with you.
    +1 to that. Although there was a bit of a gulf between Platoon and Division Commander, I enjoyed the few times I met MGen Carter; he was my guest for an afternoon once. He certainly had a way of getting to the point and certainly felt there was some good direction coming from RC(S); it was nice to see that it wasn't a mailbox as was the case previously.

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    Default How a foreign surge affects a resistance insurgency

    Shared here is a slide from a presentation I am preparing promote a proposal for a more effective way ahead in Afghanistan. Many are cheering the successes of the past year, while calmer heads, notably GEN Petraeus and MG Nick Carter, are taking an optimistic "wait and see what next fighting season brings" approach.

    My position is that this insurgency is best seen in two distinct tiers. The upper tier being a revolutionary insurgency driven by the Quetta Shura primarily, with largely political issues of causation. The rank and file that the brunt of the COIN surge is directed against, are what I call the lower tier, and are in essence a resistance insurgency. This is an effort to depict how increased foreign presence and effort affects a resistance insurgency.

    The 66% increase in violent attacks is clear. What will happen next year is less clear, and I submit will be impacted far more by how we engage the high-level political drivers between Karzai and the Quetta Shura than by any nation building or security efforts in the rural areas.
    Attached Images Attached Images
    Last edited by Bob's World; 12-15-2010 at 03:26 PM.
    Robert C. Jones
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    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    Default Neat slide, Bob...

    Be interesting to show the changing percentages of local vs. foreign forces initiations of contact. I do not disagree with final your point but a higher percentage of ISAF intiations is quite likely to affect the real meaning of your depiction of data.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    Shared here is a slide from a presentation I am preparing promote a proposal for a more effective way ahead in Afghanistan. Many are cheering the successes of the past year, while calmer heads, notably GEN Petraeus and MG Nick Carter, are taking an optimistic "wait and see what next fighting season brings" approach.

    My position is that this insurgency is best seen in two distinct tiers. The upper tier being a revolutionary insurgency driven by the Quetta Shura primarily, with largely political issues of causation. The rank and file that the brunt of the COIN surge is directed against, are what I call the lower tier, and are in essence a resistance insurgency. This is an effort to depict how increased foreign presence and effort affects a resistance insurgency.

    The 66% increase in violent attacks is clear. What will happen next year is less clear, and I submit will be impacted far more by how we engage the high-level political drivers between Karzai and the Quetta Shura than by any nation building or security efforts in the rural areas.
    Lets not dress the Taliban up in clothes that are not theirs. They are primarily a mercenary force being paid (partially out of the proceeds of the drug trade) and using nationalism and a bunch of other reasons to cover this in a shroud of patriotism. The first step would be to put the word out (and to scale up for it) that there will be no poppy crop next year come hell or high water. The failure to address the poppy and drug issues in Afghanistan will go down as the single most insane US political decision of this war. Still waiting to see how far the corruption has spread in this regard.

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    This isn't Sierra Leone, which I would not classify as an insurgency at all, but rather just a power/money grab. There is a difference. Mexico is not insurgency either for similar reasons.

    There is a very real resistance insurgency in Afghanistan. Do many participate in the resistance for a paycheck? Absolutely. They are Pashtun, and to fight an invader is far more honorable than to essentially be a reservation indian back in the village cleaning out irrigation canals for coalition "cash for work" program.

    As to the poppy, I was always taught "never make a rule you are either unable or unwilling to enforce." I assure you, GIORA has no desire to kill this multi-Billion dollar industry, and EVERYONE in power (formal or informal) profits from this; and the Coalition would literally be waist deep in muddy fields of IEDs and sniper fire for little gain. The opening days of the Marjah campaign were like that, and it was ugly.

    No, my assessment is accurate. The way to pull the plug on this is not by eradicating poppy, but rather by focusing on the top tier revolutionary aspect of the insurgency. The key there is reconciliation. Sooner than later this will be what we do. It's not a copout, its just the smart way to solve this type of problem.
    Robert C. Jones
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    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    What will happen next year is less clear, and I submit will be impacted far more by how we engage the high-level political drivers between Karzai and the Quetta Shura than by any nation building or security efforts in the rural areas.
    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    The way to pull the plug on this is not by eradicating poppy, but rather by focusing on the top tier revolutionary aspect of the insurgency. The key there is reconciliation. Sooner than later this will be what we do. It's not a copout, its just the smart way to solve this type of problem.
    Do you believe that either Karzai or the Quetta Shura has any desire for reconciliation, as anything but a transient step toward full control?

    The "high level political driver" between Karzai and the Quetta Shura seems pretty clear. They both want power, all of it. They both can't have it. They will fight until someone wins and the winner will take all. That's how they do it. That may change, likely over a few generations, but we aren't going to change it. I'd really like to believe that the QS are a bunch of reasonable people who would happily settle for representation in government and a share of the power, but I doubt that's the case.

    It takes two to reconcile, and I'm not sure we even have one that's willing. For sure people will be willing to talk about it, and even to make a show of pursuing it, if they see an opportunity to advance their desire for complete power. That doesn't mean there's any real interest.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    This isn't Sierra Leone, which I would not classify as an insurgency at all, but rather just a power/money grab. There is a difference. Mexico is not insurgency either for similar reasons.
    Since when were insurgencies not an attempt to seize power?

    The COIN crowd never want to look at Sierra-Leone and Mexico, because it tramples the model, so they dismiss it as relevant to what they want to study, and talk about. War is War.
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Since when were insurgencies not an attempt to seize power?

    The COIN crowd never want to look at Sierra-Leone and Mexico, because it tramples the model, so they dismiss it as relevant to what they want to study, and talk about. War is War.
    This time I'm with Wilf in the eternal, and ever interesting, Bob-Wilf debate.

    I'm italian and I'm viewing Mexico like an example of what could have happened in Italy some years ago when our mafia began a "war" with the government with a string of terrorist bombing.

    We followed a completely different strategy: we send in thousands of soldiers in Sicily to help our police in low level actions and we opened the way to covert deals to fracture "cosa nostra".

    The military wing of the mafia, once isolated, was soon arrested and the "business like" wing abandoned terrorism but has become somewhat collateral to the institutions,generating a possible secession with the northern part of the country (an unarmed insurgency??) that is no more willing to accept the burden of the southern economic "black hole".

    Do we obtained a clausewitzian unuseful victory?

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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Since when were insurgencies not an attempt to seize power?

    The COIN crowd never want to look at Sierra-Leone and Mexico, because it tramples the model, so they dismiss it as relevant to what they want to study, and talk about. War is War.
    Identification of what something is is best done by understanding how it came to be, rather than what it looks like as it sits before one in some mature state.

    This is how science identifies and classifies all plants, animals and minerals. It avoids all kinds of confused conclusions that can come from looking at some specific stage of something in isolation.

    Yet insurgency is just one "stage" of the lifecycle of the dynamics between a populace and its government. It does not define that dynamic, one must go to its birth point to understand it most clearly.

    Granted, historically military theorists, historians, political scientists and politicians have dumped all manner of informal conflicts into various buckets with little regard for such scientific approaches.

    As an example, Colombia was a nationalists insurgency that got into the drug business. Mexico is a drug business that is beginning to challenge government. Two very different forms of genesis at work, and therefore two very different problems requiring very different solutions to resolve. Yet people go: "Violence? Check. Drugs? Check. Government on the ropes? Check. Ok toss these in the narco-terrorist insurgency bucket. Next!"

    Insurgency is a unique form of illegal political challenge to government. The "war is war" crowd is uncomfortable with that idea, as it requires them to have more tools than a hammer and to be a bit more sophisticated than "two up and one back."

    Certainly a change of power is common to all. If the insurgent opts to employ violent tactics, then violence is common as well in that stage. We need to look past the commonalities and focus on the differences at the point of inception. Otherwise one is apt to pick the wrong solution for the problem.

    If I am just dealing with some cartel that wants to seize the diamond mines and control their profits; or expand the profit margin of his illegal drug enterprise by reducing governmental obstacles; that is not insurgency.

    But for the COINdinistas, I would offer that going in and building nations while committing oneself to preserving the current government in power is not COIN either; and is highly unlikely to produce any better results than the "war is war" approach as neither addresses the root causes of the problem. One focuses on the symptoms of popular dissatisfaction, and one focus on the symptom of the illegal violent challengers that feed on that dissatisfaction.

    I, for one, prefer to hold governments to task. To hold civil authorities to a higher standard that demands that they take responsibility for their actions. To apply the "Crate and Barrel Rule" to them: You broke it, you bought it. For true insurgency the cure comes in the repair of governance. Insurgent violence is a supporting effort problem to be managed while that takes place.

    For a power grab for profit? Very different. Crush the power grabber and one has likely solved the problem.
    Robert C. Jones
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    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    I'm not at all convinced that the situation in Mexico can reasonably be described as "insurgency", or that the cartels want State power, which in many ways would be awkward for them. They are probably best off with what they've got: a government that is sovereign, limiting opportunities for foreign action against them, but ineffectual, limiting opportunities for domestic action against them. They seem less concerned with seizing state power than with limiting the ability of the state to constrain their business, and with suppressing competing cartels.

    I'm also not at all convinced that the insurgency in Afghanistan is anything other than an attempted power grab. I doubt there's any real concern on either side for quality of governance, both sides simply want to govern, alone and for their own benefit. Seems less a backlash against bad governance (bad governance in Afghanistan is expected), but a simple fight over who gets to impose their own particular brand of self-serving bad governance.

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    I, for one, prefer to hold governments to task. To hold civil authorities to a higher standard that demands that they take responsibility for their actions. To apply the "Crate and Barrel Rule" to them: You broke it, you bought it. For true insurgency the cure comes in the repair of governance. Insurgent violence is a supporting effort problem to be managed while that takes place.
    Bob:

    I, for one, really found Clolin Powell's doctrine of "You break it, you buy it," to be an bizarre bureaucratic concept not at all consistent with history.

    What would have happened if we just broke something and left it for those folks to clean up? Hasn't that strategy been viable and applied many times throughout history without this British/Empirical Model of "Clear, Hold, Build" until the empire has bled itself to death.

    Massive retaliation/intervention with no holding purpose was, after all, used to some effect along the Durand for centuries without too much detriment. Once the climate changes a century ago and the Silk Road broke down, these areas have been marginal/challenging. Shall we fix that little climate stuff, too?

    Is there a field manual for Smash, Grab, Run, then Threaten from a Distance.

    Dahuyan's point is well said: Not every actor has the same traditional power structure focus that some do. Most just want to keep their riches flowing and could care less about "the people" or anything else. To assume they share our visions is a mistake.

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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    Lets not dress the Taliban up in clothes that are not theirs. They are primarily a mercenary force being paid (partially out of the proceeds of the drug trade) and using nationalism and a bunch of other reasons to cover this in a shroud of patriotism. The first step would be to put the word out (and to scale up for it) that there will be no poppy crop next year come hell or high water. The failure to address the poppy and drug issues in Afghanistan will go down as the single most insane US political decision of this war. Still waiting to see how far the corruption has spread in this regard.
    Well, you're dressing the Taliban up in clothes that aren't theirs with this statement. None of the insurgent profiles, intsums, or debriefs I saw ever indicated that this was a narco-uprising/narco-insurgency. Remember, this movement is run by the same people who a decade ago nearly ended the poppy harvest - to claim that their existence parallels the poppy market is inaccurate.

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    Default Steve, I was probably unclear.

    Quote Originally Posted by Steve the Planner View Post
    Bob:

    I, for one, really found Clolin Powell's doctrine of "You break it, you buy it," to be an bizarre bureaucratic concept not at all consistent with history.

    What would have happened if we just broke something and left it for those folks to clean up? Hasn't that strategy been viable and applied many times throughout history without this British/Empirical Model of "Clear, Hold, Build" until the empire has bled itself to death.

    Massive retaliation/intervention with no holding purpose was, after all, used to some effect along the Durand for centuries without too much detriment. Once the climate changes a century ago and the Silk Road broke down, these areas have been marginal/challenging. Shall we fix that little climate stuff, too?

    Is there a field manual for Smash, Grab, Run, then Threaten from a Distance.

    Dahuyan's point is well said: Not every actor has the same traditional power structure focus that some do. Most just want to keep their riches flowing and could care less about "the people" or anything else. To assume they share our visions is a mistake.
    What I meant is that insurgencies happen when governments lose the bubble on their populace. A series of neglects over years, leading to the growth of conditions of insurgency among some segment(s) of the society which are then expolited by some internal or external actor to rise up, organize and challenge the government. At which point the civilians tend to punt the problem to the military to fight the "war" to "defeat the insurgent" so that the same civilians can get back to doing the same stuff that led to the insurgency in the first place. This is why I am all for dropping COIN from the "war" rolls, and addressing it as a civil emergency with civilian leadership being held to task to solve the problems they created. To fix themselves. They broke the country, they must fix the country.

    Now, a resistance insurgnecy in an other matter. An external country invades, destroys the government of that country, releasing all of the suppressed insurgent movements caused by the government they took out; and inititating a whole new batch of resistance insurgents caused by their very presence as occupiers. (think IRAQ as the textbook example of this). A good plan going in would have been designed to maintain sufficient aspects of the HN government to keep the existing insurgencies in check until changes of governance can be developed and implemented to address the causal conditions. As to the resistance? It can be mitigated through good actions, good messages, but one needs to expect it as a fact. Zinni had such a plan for Iraq on the books, but it got tossed for the one we employed.

    BL is to hold civil governance to task. Also to recognize those in civil government who are the great COIN warriors.

    One such was Lyndon Johnson. All anyone talks about is Vietnam and how he escalated the conflict there. True. But his real COIN legacy is how he knowingly destroyed his own personal political career to pass three landmark pieces of civil rights legislation that actually may well have unleashed some racial violence to begin with (Watts came on the heals of one bill passing), but ultimately changed the domestic policies that were leading America into insurgency. That kind of moral courage is rare in a politician. The lack of recognition for his work, combined with the misplaced adoration on Kennedy contributed to his rapid decline upon leaving office.
    Robert C. Jones
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    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    (think IRAQ as the textbook example of this). A good plan going in would have been designed to maintain sufficient aspects of the HN government to keep the existing insurgencies in check until changes of governance can be developed and implemented to address the causal conditions.
    Given the depth and intensity of the sectarian and ethnic antipathies that made up the causal conditions, I'd say a better plan going in would have been to not go in, or at least to have gotten out as soon as Saddam was removed. That was never a situation that was going to be resolved simply by coming up with the right structure or constitution. Pull the lid off a pot like that, and it's going to boil over, no matter what you do. Only way to avoid getting burned is to not be there.

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    There seems to be an underlying refrain that in a counterinsurgency effort enabled, as it were, by a foreign power, the enemy centre of gravity is the presence (and related perception) of foreign activity itself. The more insular and, for lack of a better word, xenophobic the society (societies) involved, the more intractable the quandary. A highly xenophobic society seems to view even the most exemplary behaviour of a minimal outside presence as barely tolerable.

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