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Thread: Afghanistan indicators

  1. #21
    Council Member M-A Lagrange's Avatar
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    There seems to be an underlying refrain that in a counterinsurgency effort enabled, as it were, by a foreign power, the enemy centre of gravity is the presence (and related perception) of foreign activity itself. The more insular and, for lack of a better word, xenophobic the society (societies) involved, the more intractable the quandary. A highly xenophobic society seems to view even the most exemplary behaviour of a minimal outside presence as barely tolerable.
    I am not sure that ideology or xenophobia (for a lack of better word) has anything to do with the fact that noone likes a foreigner to come in his home to fix what that foreigner perceives as a problem.
    In most of the cases, the problematic for a foreign power is to find the right individual who will symbolise both changes and legitimacy in the eye of the Host Nation population.
    Even if you tried to install a hardcore islamist government in an environment as Astan (Which could be perceived by an external observer as extremely legitimate and respectfull of population whishes), you would most probably still end up with a strong opposition/insurgency/resistance.
    The foreign power is the center of gravity, for the best or the worst.

  2. #22
    Council Member Backwards Observer's Avatar
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    M-A Lagrange, along the lines of what you're saying, I recall a German-American emigre and Korean War vet referring to Hitler as, "That insufferable Austrian."

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    Council Member Dayuhan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Backwards Observer View Post
    There seems to be an underlying refrain that in a counterinsurgency effort enabled, as it were, by a foreign power, the enemy centre of gravity is the presence (and related perception) of foreign activity itself. The more insular and, for lack of a better word, xenophobic the society (societies) involved, the more intractable the quandary. A highly xenophobic society seems to view even the most exemplary behaviour of a minimal outside presence as barely tolerable.
    How do you think Americans would react to having a bunch of Middle Easterners in full battle dress rolling down their streets in armored vehicles and telling them how they ought to be governed? I suppose one could argue that Americans are as xenophobic and insular as anyone, but I suspect that resentment of armed foreign occupation is not limited to insular xenophobes.

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    Council Member Backwards Observer's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Dayuhan View Post
    How do you think Americans would react to having a bunch of Middle Easterners in full battle dress rolling down their streets in armored vehicles and telling them how they ought to be governed? I suppose one could argue that Americans are as xenophobic and insular as anyone, but I suspect that resentment of armed foreign occupation is not limited to insular xenophobes.
    You seem to be saying that the problem is armed foreign occupation. Is that correct?

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    Council Member Dayuhan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Backwards Observer View Post
    You seem to be saying that the problem is armed foreign occupation. Is that correct?
    A problem, not the problem. A rather large problem. One of several.

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    Council Member Backwards Observer's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Dayuhan View Post
    A problem, not the problem. A rather large problem. One of several.
    In your opinion, is there any activity, short of withdrawal, that the occupation forces can engage in that would have a positive effect?

  7. #27
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Default The problem of intervention/occupation and resistance

    Quote Originally Posted by Backwards Observer View Post
    In your opinion, is there any activity, short of withdrawal, that the occupation forces can engage in that would have a positive effect?
    When we were a couple weeks into the Marjah campaign things we're starting to look a bit better, but the populace was very reluctant to embrace the Coalition. The first week was hell, with everyone literally stuck in the mud within small perimeters barely extending beyond the original LZs. All roadways were heavily planted with IEDs and the muddy poppy fields were a mess and covered by fire from Taliban forted up with innocent civilians in their compounds. Fortunately they changed tactics after a week or so, and stopped challenging the Marines, ANA and SF directly and engagements became more sporadic, with IEDs remaining a major challenge.

    During this period, MG Carter was engaging with commanders and staff about the need to gain the support of the populace of Marjah. The populace, quite reasonably, was concerned that the government would ultimately leave again someday, and that the Taliban would return and punish those who had collaborated. During that talk he made made the comment that "we need to assure the people of Marjah that we will not leave them." To which, my reply was "Actually sir, we need to assure them that GIROA won't leave them, and that we won't stay, and that is a far more difficult thing."

    Overcoming the presumptions of illegitimacy of a government placed in power and then protected by a foreign army is virtually impossible. Understanding the criticality of doing so and the natural occurrence of resistance when one does not succeed is the first step.

    Shortly thereafter we delivered the, now notorious, "government in a box" to the people of Marjah. Under the current constitution Karzai simply created a new District and named a new governor, and the USMC then delivered that governor via USMC military aircraft and guarded by USMC personnel. A Dari speaking German none of them had ever heard of before, picked by a President they did not select, and delivered and guarded by a foreign military power.

    I give us an "F-minus" for "Effectively reinforced perceptions of local legitimacy" on that one.

    And the Resistance insurgency continues to grow.
    Robert C. Jones
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    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

  8. #28
    Council Member Backwards Observer's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    And the Resistance insurgency continues to grow.
    Mr. World, by coincidence I was just leafing through a copy of Griffith's translation/interpretation of Mao's, Yu Chi Chan:

    The fundamental difference between patriotic partisan resistance and revolutionary guerrilla movements is that the first usually lacks the ideological content that always distinguishes the second.

    A resistance is characterized by the quality of spontaneity; it begins and then is organized. A revolutionary guerrilla movement is organized and then begins.

    A resistance is rarely liquidated and terminates when the invader is ejected; a revolutionary movement terminates only when it has succeeded in displacing the incumbent or is liquidated.

    Historical experience suggests that there is very little hope of destroying a revolutionary guerrilla movement after it has survived the first phase and has acquired the sympathetic support of a significant segment of the population. The size of this "significant segment" will vary; a decisive figure might range from 15 to 25 per cent. (p.27, italics Griffith's)

    On Guerrilla Warfare - Google books link

  9. #29
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    For what it's worth, I see the insurgency in Afghanistan as breaking into two tiers. The Quetta Shura led, political, ideological revolutionary leadership tier (that is best addressed through reconciliation efforts); and the rank and file, mom and pop, apolitical resistance movement among the people of rural Afghanistan that the bulk of our POP-centric COIN is aimed at. These guys are also paid and motivated by Taliban leadership that comes in from Pakistan, and picks them up once the poppy harvest is in just like contractors picking up illegals outside the Home Depot to do a little cheap labor for them.

    Key to victory lies in reconciliation, but Karzai is safe so long as we are committed to protecting him, so why should he do more than just talk on this topic? We need to force the issue.
    Robert C. Jones
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    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

  10. #30
    Council Member Backwards Observer's Avatar
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    Mr. World, thanks for your insight. Also, I should mention that the Griffith quote in my post #110 is from his introduction and not from the Yu Chi Chan itself. Merry Griffmas.

  11. #31
    Council Member Dayuhan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    Key to victory lies in reconciliation, but Karzai is safe so long as we are committed to protecting him, so why should he do more than just talk on this topic? We need to force the issue.
    How do you propose to force the issue?

    Do you believe that any of the parties involved have any real interest in reconciliation or in sharing power?

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    Dayuhan:

    How do you force the question while insisting that your presence is unending?

    I really worry about the integrity of those, like Bob referenced, that are promising eternity (we will never leave you) when our staying or going is, in reality, no more than a tour, and US strategy can turn on a dime.

    Reality is that these folks have seen all of the huffing and puffing of passing "stronger tribes" for so long that it is in their DNA to make deals as they go, and also be ready to turn on a dime.

    Is that quicksand or a solid foundation?

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    Council Member Dayuhan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Backwards Observer View Post
    In your opinion, is there any activity, short of withdrawal, that the occupation forces can engage in that would have a positive effect?
    That would of course depend on what you would see as a positive effect. If we see "positive" as acceptance or at least toleration of foreign occupation... hard to say. Certainly there will be people and groups who will be quite willing to accept foreign occupation if and to the extent that it serves their interests. Whatever serves the interests of one, though, will be inconsistent with the interests of others, making this a slippery slope.

    The question to me is whether or not it is in our interest to try and occupy Afghanistan until we can impose the sort of governance we want the place to have. I'm not at all sure that it is, or that we can achieve that goal within an acceptable time frame and with an acceptable resource expenditure.

    Quote Originally Posted by Steve the Planner View Post
    How do you force the question while insisting that your presence is unending?
    I don't see how we could force a lasting compromise unless an unending presence is assumed. If we force a compromise and everyone knows we will leave, the parties involved will either ignore us or pretend to compromise while preparing an effort to seize power when the force is removed. A forced compromise will only last while force is being applied.

  14. #34
    Council Member Backwards Observer's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Dayuhan View Post
    Whatever serves the interests of one, though, will be inconsistent with the interests of others, making this a slippery slope.
    Sad but true. Thanks for taking the time to respond. Maligayang Pasko.

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    Dayuhan:

    Right. It is the paradox. Staying, going.

    I think the only historically valid occupation model is to control the urban places and key routes, and do sporadic grass mowing elsewhere.

    Given the terrain, and the opposition, the force and cost, is unlikely to be survivable over time, even for an Empire, absent substantial host nation support.

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    Council Member Dayuhan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Steve the Planner View Post
    I think the only historically valid occupation model is to control the urban places and key routes, and do sporadic grass mowing elsewhere.
    To me the validity of an occupation model would depend on the policy the occupation is intended to serve... and I think a large part of our problem in Afghanistan is uncertainty over policy goals and the desired end state. If you don't have clear policy goals that are consistent with the time and resources you're willing to commit, it's very difficult to develop effective strategy or tactics.

  17. #37
    Council Member jcustis's Avatar
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    I worked in one of the southernmost districts of Helmand, and probably the poorest at that, and saw an interesting blend of resistance insurgency, narco-insurgency, opportunism, and apolitical apathy at work. I believe that at large, much of the rest of Afghanistan is a complicated blend of the same influences and insurgent problems.

    Our district governor was one of the young turks, installed by Helmand Governor Mangel, primarily because he is Baluch, well-educated, and parrots the party line as is convenient. Make no mistake though, it seemed as though very few of the tribal elders respected or supported him, unless it came down to a scenario where coalition forces or PRT representation was involved, or there was an opportunity for an elder to gain something from demonstrating support.

    Having said this...in the Afghan context, I think you are right on the money Dayuhan that inconsistent policy goals lead to terrible strategy and tactics. One of our greatest problems in doing anything consistent is the simple fact that we and GIRoA are not "same-same" in deciding the way ahead. When we are adrift at the national level, it's no wonder that at the district and provincial level, things tend to fair only slightly better. It's also no wonder that higher-level policy matters aren't easily translated down to the tactical level (where folks tend to forget that strategic compression can have the greatest positive or adverse affect).

    All of the players in that district were governed by self interest and are largely biding their time.

    And no, Steve, those are not good foundations, and the locals all know we won't be there forever. Most of the GIRoA officials I worked with mused that if the coalition left, they would be leaving as well. That is a pretty brutal reality.

  18. #38
    Council Member Sargent's Avatar
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    Default Humpty Dumpty's not just a nursery rhyme

    I, for one, really found Clolin Powell's doctrine of "You break it, you buy it," to be an bizarre bureaucratic concept not at all consistent with history.

    What would have happened if we just broke something and left it for those folks to clean up? Hasn't that strategy been viable and applied many times throughout history without this British/Empirical Model of "Clear, Hold, Build" until the empire has bled itself to death.

    Massive retaliation/intervention with no holding purpose was, after all, used to some effect along the Durand for centuries without too much detriment. Once the climate changes a century ago and the Silk Road broke down, these areas have been marginal/challenging. Shall we fix that little climate stuff, too?

    Is there a field manual for Smash, Grab, Run, then Threaten from a Distance.
    I would point out that "break and leave" is how WWI morphed into WWII, and how post-Soviet Afghanistan morphed into the Taliban, to give a couple of examples of the problems that arise out of abandoned broken societies. As for the notion that it used to be acceptable to muck things off and then do an exit stage left, I would argue that it did not work historically that you could simply go in and break an entire society and walk away. There was usually some hell to pay. On the other hand, once Rome fell, for the centuries until the French Revolution, war was a much more limited affair, so blame Napoleon, not the Brits.

    Powell was exactly trying to keep people from thinking that breaking was all you had to do, and trying to make people realize that once broken the thing is very hard to put back together.

    The way you avoid the problem is not to break the thing entirely -- eg, in Iraq, go in, get Hussein, and turn the keys over to Tariq Aziz. With a stern warning about not making us come back again. But if you break Afghanistan and leave, what do you think happens? Someone else, who lives in the neighborhood, is going to walk in and impose their vision of what they want the rebuilt thing to look like. Do you want an Afghanistan under the control of Iran? Russia? China?

    Again, the point is to not break the thing in the first place, to take that step only with great care and for spectacularly great reasons. If we hadn't lost focus on Afghanistan for four years, the rebuild might have been a bit easier. Maybe not. But breaking Iraq was an all time stupid idea.

    Jill

  19. #39
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Talking I go out of town for a few days and you go on a rampage (minor variant)...

    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    Insurgency is a unique form of illegal political challenge to government.
    Most are, some are other things couched as such a political challenge. We've written claim and counterclaim on that before so no rehas here, just a note to remind you that many aside from me, here and elsewhere, do not agree with that quite positive statement of yours. *
    The "war is war" crowd is uncomfortable with that idea, as it requires them to have more tools than a hammer and to be a bit more sophisticated than "two up and one back."
    Base canard, there . I and many others in the war is war crowd do not agree at all with that statement. Many have complained about the fact that the attitude you cite does exist but point out that existence is due more to political misuse and desire of the armed forces to comply with the wishes of their civilian taskmasters -- once again, you lambaste the pore ol' GPF wrongly. SF hasn't covered themselves with glory in these latest wars (also due to 'political' misuse and not totally their fault -- though not so much by politicians as by service / congressional / budget / turf politics...).

    As usual, after a couple of hyperbolic statements, you get real:
    But for the COINdinistas, I would offer that going in and building nations while committing oneself to preserving the current government in power is not COIN either; and is highly unlikely to produce any better results than the "war is war" approach as neither addresses the root causes of the problem. One focuses on the symptoms of popular dissatisfaction, and one focus on the symptom of the illegal violent challengers that feed on that dissatisfaction.
    True and that applies not only to insurgencies but to many forms of domestic unrest.
    I, for one, prefer to hold governments to task. To hold civil authorities to a higher standard that demands that they take responsibility for their actions. To apply the "Crate and Barrel Rule" to them: You broke it, you bought it. For true insurgency the cure comes in the repair of governance. Insurgent violence is a supporting effort problem to be managed while that takes place.
    Again true -- also not amenable in many cases to any military solution...

    As any aside, anyone who praises Lyndon Johnson to me is highly suspect of misplacing priorities. I met the man, talked to him, served under him and participated in his funeral. I am not a fan and his passage of what was effectively Kennedy's Civil rights Bill was a piece of crass political opportunism and party politics covered in glowing rhetoric. Give the Devil his due, he did get the Bill passed -- but give him full due; his errors and and blatantly foolish foreign affairs dabbling and terribly flawed Viet Nam engagement created ill effects world wide -- some of that 'American arrogance' and support of Dictators you often decry -- that permeate the world, this country and the Armed Forces to this day. Not favorably, either.

    That's shorthand for "I disagree with your frequent characterization of Johnson as COIN warrior." Fixing a governmental problem long overdue for repair is not always counter insurgency...

    * I'll also point to Backward Observer's quote of Chairman Mao (LINK) -- and the issue of ideology versus spontaneity which Bill Moore and I frequently see you ignore...

    As jcustis wrote:
    Having said this...in the Afghan context, I think you are right on the money Dayuhan that inconsistent policy goals lead to terrible strategy and tactics. One of our greatest problems in doing anything consistent is the simple fact that we and GIRoA are not "same-same" in deciding the way ahead. When we are adrift at the national level, it's no wonder that at the district and provincial level, things tend to fair only slightly better. It's also no wonder that higher-level policy matters aren't easily translated down to the tactical level (where folks tend to forget that strategic compression can have the greatest positive or adverse affect).
    That is an extremely perceptive and very import bit of verbiage. I'm sure it is quite accurate with respect to Afghanistan but, far more importantly, that lack of consistency is reflected in the way the US Government does business. That is, in effect, why we're having this discussion (and why Viet Nam was a debacle -- but that's another thread).

    Our political system is based on a series of checks and balances and they all work quite well as each arm of government has over the last two centuries slightly tweaked their ability to check in order to enhance their power and lessen that of the other branches. Add to that problem -- and it is a problem in getting things done coherently -- the electoral system with changes of agendas at 2, 4, 6 and 8 year intervals. Until all the master strategists find workarounds in their plans to compensate for those factors, 'consistency' and 'the US government' will be an oxymoron. Unless an existential war appears; different rules then...

    Sargent is on the right track(Good post, Jill):
    The way you avoid the problem is not to break the thing entirely -- eg, in Iraq, go in, get Hussein, and turn the keys over to Tariq Aziz. With a stern warning about not making us come back again. But if you break Afghanistan and leave, what do you think happens? Someone else, who lives in the neighborhood, is going to walk in and impose their vision of what they want the rebuilt thing to look like. Do you want an Afghanistan under the control of Iran? Russia? China?

    Again, the point is to not break the thing in the first place, to take that step only with great care and for spectacularly great reasons. If we hadn't lost focus on Afghanistan for four years, the rebuild might have been a bit easier. Maybe not. But breaking Iraq was an all time stupid idea. (emphasis added / kw)
    Indeed. Iraq occurred because the toolbag had been purposely limited in what it could do in order to constrain the Politicians.

    The Politicans didn't play fair and used the only tool seemingly available. We should avoid that in the future. Diplomatic solutions preferred, military involvement only as a last resort, then not in the costly and unsustainable FID / COIN mode but as Strategic raids. Short term, ability to avoid major breakage, economical, adaptable easily to the US political milieu...

  20. #40
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    Sarge:

    The way you avoid the problem is not to break the thing entirely -- eg, in Iraq, go in, get Hussein, and turn the keys over to Tariq Aziz. With a stern warning about not making us come back again.
    Right. What you are indicating is roads not travelled which, had they known what they were going to face, probably should have been considered. Oh, for planning based on relevant facts and reasonable expectations.

    I would not be so quick, however, to say anything different about Afghanistan. We had the option of immediately turning it over to the King to sort out the future through a Grand Loya Jirga.

    Our brilliant crew of half-assed constitution writers jumped in, though, and mucked it up.

    Same bunch as in Iraq--mostly trying to have their cake and eat it too. Let's invade/not invade, but my friend can make a fortune in oil contracts if only we stay around and muck with their country..... (insert the appropriate DoS names (but it was not Cheney or Bush or anybody at DoD)).

    Ken: Sorry we just couldn't survive without you.

    In grad school, even the most impassioned liberal instructors explained that Great Society (Johnson and Nixon) only came about as domestic cover for the war. Cynical?

    Custis: Last Sunday, my WP had 90 pictures of all those young soldiers no longer with us. Pissed me off royally, just like the ones did from Iraq in 2007.

    Difference was that a call went out for people to actually come and change things. I don't know about you folks, but my civ/DoS mission in Nov 2007 was explicitly stated as transfer US responsibilities fast, and set us up for exit. And that's what we did.

    Afghanistan just looks like a log-rolling mission. Everybody knows what is broken, but covering a lot of asses. Give me that revised Iraq problem definition/mission for Afghanistan, and I'll work my ass off to get us out of that one, too.

    I really feel for you and my friends on the ground who just can't get a link between reality and the grand strategy boys.

    Stay safe.

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