Page 3 of 5 FirstFirst 12345 LastLast
Results 41 to 60 of 96

Thread: Afghanistan indicators

  1. #41
    Council Member jcustis's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    SOCAL
    Posts
    2,152

    Default

    The way you avoid the problem is not to break the thing entirely -- eg, in Iraq, go in, get Hussein, and turn the keys over to Tariq Aziz. With a stern warning about not making us come back again. But if you break Afghanistan and leave, what do you think happens? Someone else, who lives in the neighborhood, is going to walk in and impose their vision of what they want the rebuilt thing to look like. Do you want an Afghanistan under the control of Iran? Russia? China?
    i don't know that I care if one of those three assume control. Let an occupation drain THEIR national treasure. There is nothing worth anything there anyway.
    Last edited by jcustis; 12-20-2010 at 07:37 AM.

  2. #42
    Council Member Dayuhan's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2009
    Location
    Latitude 17° 5' 11N, Longitude 120° 54' 24E, altitude 1499m. Right where I want to be.
    Posts
    3,137

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by jcustis View Post
    i don't know that I care if one of those three assume control. Let an occupation drain THEIR national treasure. There is nothing worth anything there anyway.
    Amen. Squared.

    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    I, for one, prefer to hold governments to task. To hold civil authorities to a higher standard that demands that they take responsibility for their actions. To apply the "Crate and Barrel Rule" to them: You broke it, you bought it. For true insurgency the cure comes in the repair of governance. Insurgent violence is a supporting effort problem to be managed while that takes place.
    Hardly appropriate to apply that rule in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the breaking was done before the governments now in power existed. It's more like... "we broke it, then we put you in power and you're supposed to fix it. Now. The way we like it, please."

    I guess there's room for interpretation over what "true insurgency" is and whether any given insurgency is "true", but I suspect that our ability to repair anyone else's governance is very, very limited.

  3. #43
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Apr 2009
    Location
    Maryland
    Posts
    827

    Default

    A lesson from US public transportation.

    If there is a bus accident in an urban area, the driver is directed to lock the back doors fast. Lots of folks try to jump on after the accident to get a piece of the settlement payments sure to be paid to all involved.

    History tells us that Persians have ruled/controlled both Iraq and Afghanistan in the past. Their influence waxes and wanes, played out against both other competing foreign influences, and internal politics.

    Dayuhan's point: stubborn occupation depletes the resources, and, as with Brits, US and Persia, often reaches the decision point of costs/diminishing returns of colonization.

    Look at the Kurds in (From left to right on a map) in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan. If Iranian Kurds (oppressed by Iran, arguably more than in Iraq) become influential to Afghan Kurds, Is that Iranian influence? Is it good/bad?

    Ambassador Crocker tells the story of being in final and productive negotiations with Iran (and the other neighbors) over post-2001 Afghanistan when, out of the blue, the "Axis of Evil" speech hit and knocked the whole cart over. Another road not travelled to a possibly more productive end.

  4. #44
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2005
    Posts
    4,818

    Thumbs up

    Quote Originally Posted by jcustis View Post
    i don't know that I care if one of those three assume control. Let an occupation drain THEIR national treasure. There is nothing worth anything there anyway.
    Now that is some Strategic thinking!

  5. #45
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Mar 2008
    Posts
    1,457

    Default

    That is an extremely perceptive and very import bit of verbiage. I'm sure it is quite accurate with respect to Afghanistan but, far more importantly, that lack of consistency is reflected in the way the US Government does business. That is, in effect, why we're having this discussion (and why Viet Nam was a debacle -- but that's another thread).

    Our political system is based on a series of checks and balances and they all work quite well as each arm of government has over the last two centuries slightly tweaked their ability to check in order to enhance their power and lessen that of the other branches. Add to that problem -- and it is a problem in getting things done coherently -- the electoral system with changes of agendas at 2, 4, 6 and 8 year intervals. Until all the master strategists find workarounds in their plans to compensate for those factors, 'consistency' and 'the US government' will be an oxymoron. Unless an existential war appears; different rules then...
    Ken,

    That is something you frequently say here and it's something I've come to believe is totally true. The implication for wars like Afghanistan, Iraq and Vietnam is pretty obvious to me at this point and goes a long way toward explaining why we suck at them.
    Supporting "time-limited, scope limited military actions" for 20 years.

  6. #46
    Council Member Sargent's Avatar
    Join Date
    Apr 2007
    Location
    London
    Posts
    178

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by jcustis View Post
    i don't know that I care if one of those three assume control. Let an occupation drain THEIR national treasure. There is nothing worth anything there anyway.

    It would be grand if they did everything as stupidly as we have, and pour their treasure into the country in search of creating some truly "correct" regime and society. But, let's assume they don't give a crap about how the Afghans live and just decide to call back the Taliban with the sole provision that in addition to allowing AQ to use the hinterlands for training that the regime allow space for the terrorist commandos of the sponsor's choice. That was, after all, the real problem with the Taliban and Afghanistan -- we didn't really care that they were bastards, but when it became clear that they were a training ground for effective enemies. So, in reality, we do care who controls the country, as in when those in control allow the vast spaces to become terrorist NTCs.

    Again, like Iraq, the answer might have been not getting rid of the Taliban but simply compelling the Taliban to get rid of AQ. I'm sure there would have been a route forward on that matter.

    But cheers, and thanks for making me refine my point!

    Jill

  7. #47
    Council Member jcustis's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    SOCAL
    Posts
    2,152

    Default

    But, let's assume they don't give a crap about how the Afghans live and just decide to call back the Taliban with the sole provision that in addition to allowing AQ to use the hinterlands for training that the regime allow space for the terrorist commandos of the sponsor's choice. That was, after all, the real problem with the Taliban and Afghanistan -- we didn't really care that they were bastards, but when it became clear that they were a training ground for effective enemies. So, in reality, we do care who controls the country, as in when those in control allow the vast spaces to become terrorist NTCs.
    After seeing the US become a very efficient counter-insurgent at the outset of OEF, I don't see where the Taliban would find incentive in doing so. The may have learned a functional lesson from that. The other part that I think is irrelevant is the notion that Iran or Pakistan, or Venezuela needs ungoverned spaces to train their terrorist commandos by proxy.

    Doing so would actually make it even easier for the US to dispatch them through kinetic means such as a cruise missile, JDAM, drone, or little black helicopter visit in the middle of the night0.. Now, training them within the sovereign borders of say, Iran itself, poses a totally different problem set for the US or coalition of the willing if it wanted to address the gnats within that border.

    I see your overall point, but I tend to subscribe somewhat to Peter Bergen's recent thesis that Al Qaeda has reached a zenith of sorts and is beginning to dissipate. I don't believe the Taliban, if concentrated again upon a restoration of power, care to taste the blow of our kinetic power because Iranian nut jobs are training somewhere in Nimruz.

  8. #48
    Council Member carl's Avatar
    Join Date
    Nov 2005
    Location
    Denver on occasion
    Posts
    2,460

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by jcustis View Post
    ...I don't believe the Taliban, if concentrated again upon a restoration of power, care to taste the blow of our kinetic power because Iranian nut jobs are training somewhere in Nimruz.
    Speaking solely to the point of the Taliban being afraid of American kinetic power, why on earth would they be afraid of that if they managed to retake Afghanistan? They would have just beaten us having taken everything we could have thrown at them. In any case, little black helos and drones need bases close by, cruise missiles haven't scared them in the past and the Pak Army may object to us overflying their country to get to Afghanistan. The Taliban ain't so scared of us now, if they prevailed I don't see them being afraid at all.
    "We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene

  9. #49
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Mar 2008
    Posts
    1,457

    Default

    Speaking solely to the point of the Taliban being afraid of American kinetic power, why on earth would they be afraid of that if they managed to retake Afghanistan?
    No to pick on you Carl, but this is the kind of statement that annoys me. The Taliban, in the 1990's, could not control Afghanistan despite lots of support from AQ and the Pakistani's and marginal support to the Northern Alliance. If the US withdrew tomorrow, the Quetta Shura would not be running Afghanistan. They would certainly control parts of the "nation" of Afghanistan (quotes are intentional), but they could be kept from complete control through direct assistance to their enemies. Then there is the question of what Haqqani and HIG would do - their support for the Taliban post-US withdrawal is not a sure thing.

    Not that I'm advocating the US abruptly pull out tomorrow, but I think the assumption that the Taliban will certainly "take over" absent continued US intervention is a false assumption.
    Supporting "time-limited, scope limited military actions" for 20 years.

  10. #50
    Council Member jcustis's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    SOCAL
    Posts
    2,152

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by carl View Post
    Speaking solely to the point of the Taliban being afraid of American kinetic power, why on earth would they be afraid of that if they managed to retake Afghanistan? They would have just beaten us having taken everything we could have thrown at them. In any case, little black helos and drones need bases close by, cruise missiles haven't scared them in the past and the Pak Army may object to us overflying their country to get to Afghanistan. The Taliban ain't so scared of us now, if they prevailed I don't see them being afraid at all.
    I look at it from the perspective of exactly what you reference, but I don't think that the Taliban would necessarily fear us. In fact, I don't want them to fear us. That causes irrational decision-making. I want them to respect a capability to deliver a blow to a concentrated body of Taliban leaders (and I think concentration would be required if they chose to try to exert power) should we decide to do so.

    Killing the Taliban inside Pakistan tends to pose drama, but in the under-governed expanse of Afghanistan, the challenges become less pronounced to a degree.

    And Entropy brings up a point I was thinking, but did not articulate. The Taliban will be hard pressed to run Afghanistan in the future, so coupling the Taliban with trans-national terrorism presumes that they will have the ability to influence the scenario in the first place. Sooooo...maybe that means we can worry less about the Taliban inviting terrorist commandos in, and get back to basic containment and counter-terrorism.

  11. #51
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Apr 2009
    Location
    Maryland
    Posts
    827

    Default

    Entropy:

    I think Nir Rosen's latest piece in Foreign Policy hits a lot of these points well.

    His focus is on drawing distinctions between Iraqi and Afghan surges, and explains:

    Al Qaeda left Af for Pak several years ago, will never create training bases, etc., that are easily targeted, pr return to Af where they can be wiped out wholesale. He notes that they are probably more dangerous and destabilizing there.

    He points out the lack of population centers/densities which is a fundamental difference/limitation in controlling populations.

    No fan of the Taliban, he, nonetheless, accurately points out that they long ago foreswore allowing AQ into Af, have learned some lessons from the past, but remain Afghans, and members of a substantial minority (40%). They are not "foreign fighters" except for their sanctuaries in Pak.

    Note the continuing refrain: Stop sending/spending money there. It is fueling conflict; we (and our money) are the center of gravity for everyone but US. Very destabilizing.

    As one who has increasingly failed to understand the whole "money as a weapon" thing (from watching too many misfires), I, for one, long ago grew weary of Clear-Hold-Bribe, school building and anything else that creates irrelevant measurables that do not contribute to stability (and all too often achieves the opposite effect).

    I end up in the War is War column, and scratch my head at what the rest of this stuff is.

  12. #52
    Council Member Infanteer's Avatar
    Join Date
    Jul 2009
    Location
    Canada
    Posts
    347

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Entropy View Post
    Not that I'm advocating the US abruptly pull out tomorrow, but I think the assumption that the Taliban will certainly "take over" absent continued US intervention is a false assumption.
    Absolutely; although the ANA cannot really hold down the more unruly areas of the Pashtun belt, the ANA do have quality formations that would, with a bit of support from the west, likely hold off an insurgent surge a la 1995. A half-credible conventional force is a factor that wasn't in play during the last round of civil war.

    As well, I take issue with the statement that "the Taliban have taken everything we can throw at them"; it implies that we cannot defeat them militarily. If they mass, which they must do to affect anything meaningful, we do beat them. Now they don't mass because they know that they will be beaten. The insurgents have dropped down a notch or two in activity and stay below a certain threshold; let's not confuse this determination and patience as some sort of tactical proficiency.

  13. #53
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Apr 2009
    Location
    Maryland
    Posts
    827

    Default

    Infanteer:

    I see a lot of conflicting reports. Here is a recent one from KGS Nightwatch:

    The NATO command's statement implies that the fighting is waged mostly by anti-government groups that are based in Pakistan. That is simply not true, is grossly misleading to the American public and whoever came up with that nonsense should be dismissed. The anti-government forces in Afghanistan are not foreign ers, but are supported from Pakstan. Thus even without support from Pakistan there would still be a fight against outsiders in Afghanistan.

    Pakistan is the origin of and channel for all supplies that support the anti-government forces. Afghanistan has no arms or explosives industries. Everything that explodes comes from the US or Pakistan. Thus, if IED events reached a new high in November 2010 -- as they did -- that means the US and Coalition forces utterly failed to stop the supply of fertilizer, explosives and detonators from Pakistan or stolen from or sold by US and Coalition forces.

    The most powerful country in the history of the world cannot seem to seal a border, In Mexico or Pakistan. This is curious because it indicates that this 2010 generation of hi-tech US soldiers and generals have been enormously less able to disrupt the supply line from Pakistan than an earlier generation of American war fighters did to disrupt the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos.
    Again, the refrain---Taliban are Afghans. What doesn't kill you leaves a scar?

  14. #54
    Council Member Infanteer's Avatar
    Join Date
    Jul 2009
    Location
    Canada
    Posts
    347

    Default

    I don't see anything wrong with your snippet and see nothing that contradicts what I wrote.

    Insurgents cannot march on Kabul with IEDs.

  15. #55
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
    Join Date
    Nov 2008
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    2,706

    Default

    The border is a false issue. It means something to states, who play by state rules, so it does become a component of sanctuary for anyone who can put one between them and the state that is after them.

    But for the Pashtun populace the AFPAK border means little, nor should it. Borders are coming to mean a lot less to everybody as globalization continues to expand its influence on our day to day lives. It's just a reality that this time honored metric of "sovereignty" just isn't what it used to be.

    We just need to maintain our perspective on the Taliban, as they are not a U.S. problem. It is only our whacked out European Colonial-based COIN doctrine in 3-24 that makes them a problem as we have committed ourselves to preserving the Northern Alliance in power.

    Answer this: What trusted, certain and legal means does the segment of the populace represented by the Taliban have to participate in Afghan politics?? None. The Constitution guarantees they have no legal options; Karzai guarantees they have no legal options; and we protect both of the above.

    The issue isn't why would the Taliban be willing to work with us, the issue is Karzai not wanting us to work with the Taliban. The Northern Alliance likes things just the way they are. They do not want to give up their little monopoly on governance in Afghanistan; and are very happy to have us stay and guarantee it for them.

    We need to refocus on the mission, and the mission is AQ. The Taliban is the key to AQ. Getting to an Afghan government that has room for both Northern Alliance and Taliban "parties" is the key to someday getting to stability in that troubled land. Half a dozen outside state parties will continue to work to manipulate the situation to support their national interests, just as the US seeks to manipulate it to seek our national interests. At some point someone needs to take into account the interest of the people who actually live there. The people of Helmand, Kandahar and Uruzgan don't want to be occupied by a Tajik army any more than they do by a US army.

    We picked aside, and then we lost sight of our mission. Time to refocus on the mission and become more neutral in our approach. It's time to learn and practice post-colonial intervention.
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

  16. #56
    Council Member carl's Avatar
    Join Date
    Nov 2005
    Location
    Denver on occasion
    Posts
    2,460

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Entropy View Post
    No to pick on you Carl, but this is the kind of statement that annoys me.
    I don't mind if you pick on me. I probably deserve it.

    Notice though that I said "if" the Taliban managed to retake Afghanistan. I didn't say "when". But that is just a quibble. The main point remains. They aren't afraid of us now and as they become more successful they will be less so.

    The Taliban didn't manage to take all of Afghanistan before 2001, but they came pretty close. If I remember correctly, their last big obstacle, Massoud, was removed just before 9-11.

    You are right there is no certainty the Quetta Shura would take the place over if we bugged out. I suspect they would but it would probably depend upon who of the three entities you mentioned the Pak Army/ISI threw its' weight behind. It seems logical they would go with the Quetta Shura as they did before. It also seems logical they have kept the other two around just to hedge their bets.
    "We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene

  17. #57
    Council Member carl's Avatar
    Join Date
    Nov 2005
    Location
    Denver on occasion
    Posts
    2,460

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by jcustis View Post
    I want them to respect a capability to deliver a blow to a concentrated body of Taliban leaders (and I think concentration would be required if they chose to try to exert power) should we decide to do so.
    Why would Taliban leaders have to concentrate to decide anything and even if they did, what would prevent them from holding quorum in a hospital? Or why wouldn't they just do the whole thing by correspondence from scattered locations? That would cut our tron warriors completely out of the picture. In any event you have a lot more confidence in our ability to locate people who don't want to be found, in countries where we aren't on the ground in the immediate vicinity, than I do.
    "We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene

  18. #58
    Council Member carl's Avatar
    Join Date
    Nov 2005
    Location
    Denver on occasion
    Posts
    2,460

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Infanteer View Post
    Absolutely; although the ANA cannot really hold down the more unruly areas of the Pashtun belt, the ANA do have quality formations that would, with a bit of support from the west, likely hold off an insurgent surge a la 1995. A half-credible conventional force is a factor that wasn't in play during the last round of civil war.

    As well, I take issue with the statement that "the Taliban have taken everything we can throw at them"; it implies that we cannot defeat them militarily. If they mass, which they must do to affect anything meaningful, we do beat them. Now they don't mass because they know that they will be beaten. The insurgents have dropped down a notch or two in activity and stay below a certain threshold; let's not confuse this determination and patience as some sort of tactical proficiency.
    In 1995 there was not a half-credible conventional force, but in 1989 there was and that force was defeated. Your statement "with a bit of support from the west" is key. I am convinced there won't be critical support from the west. We left the ARVN in a position to hold off the enemy with a bit of critical support and we didn't give it to them. If we bug out this time, after doing so we will convince ourselves that the morally superior position will be to hold ourselves above the fray and we won't give them a dime.

    Like the NVA officer said, it doesn't matter if we can beat the Taliban militarily. They maybe are winning despite that, without massing. We are far more tactically proficient. But that doesn't matter because determination and patience seem to be serving them quite well. And they are still on the field, having taken everything we can throw at them.
    "We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene

  19. #59
    Council Member carl's Avatar
    Join Date
    Nov 2005
    Location
    Denver on occasion
    Posts
    2,460

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    Answer this: What trusted, certain and legal means does the segment of the populace represented by the Taliban have to participate in Afghan politics??
    I want to make sure I have you straight, are you saying the Taliban is the legitimate representative of the Pashtun people?

    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    We picked aside, and then we lost sight of our mission. Time to refocus on the mission and become more neutral in our approach. It's time to learn and practice post-colonial intervention.
    It is helpful to remember that "We picked a side" because AQ killed thousands of our people and the Taliban wouldn't give them up. A bit of historical context.
    "We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene

  20. #60
    Council Member Dayuhan's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2009
    Location
    Latitude 17° 5' 11N, Longitude 120° 54' 24E, altitude 1499m. Right where I want to be.
    Posts
    3,137

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Sargent View Post
    But if you break Afghanistan and leave, what do you think happens? Someone else, who lives in the neighborhood, is going to walk in and impose their vision of what they want the rebuilt thing to look like. Do you want an Afghanistan under the control of Iran? Russia? China?
    Quote Originally Posted by Sargent View Post
    It would be grand if they did everything as stupidly as we have, and pour their treasure into the country in search of creating some truly "correct" regime and society. But, let's assume they don't give a crap about how the Afghans live and just decide to call back the Taliban with the sole provision that in addition to allowing AQ to use the hinterlands for training that the regime allow space for the terrorist commandos of the sponsor's choice. That was, after all, the real problem with the Taliban and Afghanistan
    Russia, China, or Iran would have little incentive to coddle AQ, which is not exactly friendly to them. The Russians and Chinese have their own issues with Islamist activity, and the Iranians would have noticed AQ's oft-stated feelings toward the Shi'a. I don't think any of them would be stupid enough to think they could control who the Taliban sheltered.

    There are of course problems with break-and-leave, mainly potential reversion to the status quo ante. I wouldn't be terribly concerned with Russian, Chinese, or Iranian influnce.

    I honestly doubt that any of those three would want to deal with it. The Russians have been there and done that, and it wasn't good. The Chinese and Iranians have observed the complications. And, as stated before, there's nothing there of any real use to anyone. The Iranians have no trouble training their terrorist proxies in Lebanon, and Afghanistan is an expensive and messy prospect. The Russians and Chinese have little use for terrorist groups who could easily end up terrorizing them.

Bookmarks

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts
  •