Afghanistan indicators

[Dayuhan]

Answer this: What trusted, certain and legal means does the segment of the populace represented by the Taliban have to participate in Afghan politics?? None. The Constitution guarantees they have no legal options; Karzai guarantees they have no legal options; and we protect both of the above.

Do you believe that the Taliban want to "participate in Afghan politics" as anything but a ruler?

The issue isn't why would the Taliban be willing to work with us, the issue is Karzai not wanting us to work with the Taliban. The Northern Alliance likes things just the way they are. They do not want to give up their little monopoly on governance in Afghanistan; and are very happy to have us stay and guarantee it for them.

The issue is that neither side will "work with" the other. They will fight until one loses, and the winner will take all. We're not talking about Democrats and Republicans here; this is Afghanistan. For us, a Taliban win is unacceptable and a Karzai win is not. Silly corner to be in, but we backed ourselves into it when we decided to try to govern Afghanistan by proxy.

We need to refocus on the mission, and the mission is AQ. The Taliban is the key to AQ. Getting to an Afghan government that has room for both Northern Alliance and Taliban "parties" is the key to someday getting to stability in that troubled land.

Do you really believe that if we just find the "right" government structure the Taliban, Karzai, and all other factions will all sit together, play nicely, and morph into good little democratic practitioners? If so, why?

At some point someone needs to take into account the interest of the people who actually live there. The people of Helmand, Kandahar and Uruzgan don't want to be occupied by a Tajik army any more than they do by a US army.

The people who live there don't have one "interest". They have many perceived "interests", and those interests are often conflicting. That's why they fight a lot. Neither Karzai nor the Taliban have any concern for the interests of the people or any segment thereof; they want power, all of it. If they get it they will advance their own interests and crush their opposition until they are overthrown. Again, this is Afghanistan, not the Netherlands. If it was the Netherlands we wouldn't be there.

We picked aside, and then we lost sight of our mission. Time to refocus on the mission and become more neutral in our approach. It's time to learn and practice post-colonial intervention.

We didn't pick a side. We created a side to advance our interests, and now we're shocked and horrified that the side we created is pursuing its own interests. Duh. Time for us to grow a collective brain cell and stop trying to install governments in these places. It's not something we have the tools or capacity to do and it requires more commitment then we are willing to make.

[Bob's World]

I want to make sure I have you straight, are you saying the Taliban is the legitimate representative of the Pashtun people?



It is helpful to remember that "We picked a side" because AQ killed thousands of our people and the Taliban wouldn't give them up. A bit of historical context.

Carl, are you saying that the Karzai government is the Legitimate government of the Pashtun people?? No, certainly not. The Illegitimacy of the Karzai government is legendary. It is "official," but it is not legitimate. Legitimacy comes from the people. It is not some blessing bestowed by the some outside power (ala "the U.S. recognizes the legitimacy of government X"), at least not for purposes of insurgency and COIN. For insurgency and COIN only one flavor of legitimacy matters, and that is the recognition by the governed of one's right to govern them.

I had this conversation with BG Ben Hodges in Uruzgan one day in a discussion about Matiullah Khan. Matiullah is not as official as he could be (though he is a Colonel in the ANP, but he has only been granted Tashkil for a fraction of the men he has in his employ to extend security along Route Bear and around Tarin Kowt); but he enjoys tremendous legitimacy, that expands across tribal lines in ways that most of the "official" government officials do not. He is recognized by the people of Uruzgan. He is legitimate. The Dutch (who were in bed with a hardcore Taliban leader, by the way) and BG Hodges saw him only as a rogue wielding an influence that was not supported by some offical state license or title.

In many areas, yes, the Taliban are legitimate as well, other areas not so much. But my point that you missed is that they have no legal means available to them to compete for official positions of governance.

We picked Karzai.

Karzai Picks all supreme court justices and 34/102 seats in the upper house of Parliament
Karzai picks all Provincial Governors
Karzai picks all District Governors

All of that is very "official", I know this because the Constitution of Afghanistan tells me it is official. None of it is "legitimate" though, and that is the primary reason there is a Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan today. The secondary reason is the resistance to the coalition presence.

We throw words around like "legitimate" without really thinking that in many parts of the world "legitimate" and "official" are often worlds apart. We are very spoiled that in the U.S. they usually align. Though one should not down play the degree of concern raised by the hanging chads in the Bush election; or the degree of concern over what President Obama's birth certificate says. If the U.S. ever loses it trust and confidence in the legitimacy of our leaders as other have, we too will find ourselves on the path to insurgency. These are problems best identified, recognized as critically important, and repaired early. That is good COIN.

[Steve the Planner]

Bob:

Latest reports are that DHS's Homeland effort actively monitors the miscreants in the Tea Party and any other groups that challenge the status quo.

Hopefully, this may avoid the need to apply COIN domestically (?????).

On the other hand, Nir Rosen's recent piece prays to not do for Afghanistan what was done in Iraq. Maybe the US would, in fact, be a great place to apply COIN.

Personally, I think there are plenty in the US that would love to have somebody rebuilding their schools, hospitals, handing out cash to businesses, etc... Soldiers could even visit friendly politicians to slip them a little, and assure they got key positions on spending committees. How could any of that create any anger locally?

[carl]

Carl, are you saying that the Karzai government is the Legitimate government of the Pashtun people??

No fair responding to a question with a question. That is a deflection. I will restate the question in an expanded form. Are you saying that the Taliban & company are the legitimate representatives of the Pashtun people, in that in any negotiations they should be seen as speaking for the Pashtun people and their interests?

In many areas, yes, the Taliban are legitimate as well, other areas not so much.

My next question is this. In the areas in which the Taliban & company are legitimate, would they be able to maintain their rule, power, legitimacy or plain old ability to run the joint without the ruthless use of terror? They seem to have killed lots of local leaders and people who have disagreed with their theology in order to establish dominance.

[Infanteer]

+1 to Bob's World's statement about borders and their lack of value in what may be best described as a "pashtun intifada". However, I think it is still important to understand that all insurgents in Afghanistan do not hail from madrassas in Pakistan; a lot of these guys are local - if you get shot at from village A, chances are some of the insurgents are from village A.

This is a huge issue with FM 3-24 that it seems to wish away; if you only separate the insurgents from the poor Afghan civilians, you've solved your problem. I posit that insurgents and the insurgency are so intertwined within the community that hedgeing success on being able to separate the two is bad policy; only the locals seem to have the ability to do this.

Like the NVA officer said, it doesn't matter if we can beat the Taliban militarily. They maybe are winning despite that, without massing. We are far more tactically proficient. But that doesn't matter because determination and patience seem to be serving them quite well. And they are still on the field, having taken everything we can throw at them.

They aren't winning anything, as long as we are there. We can and do go wherever we wish. If we want a town, we will take it and occupy it. If we have the will to stay in Afghanistan for 100 years, than the Taliban will never be more than a minor nuissance. They aren't "in the field"; they take the chance to fire a pot shot when they can.

Defeat in Afghanistan will not be military and will have nothing to do with tactics. It will have everything to do with how we define "victory" and "defeat". It will be a failure of strategy to anticpate and meet policy.

[Sargent]

Dayuhan wrote:

Russia, China, or Iran would have little incentive to coddle AQ, which is not exactly friendly to them. The Russians and Chinese have their own issues with Islamist activity, and the Iranians would have noticed AQ's oft-stated feelings toward the Shi'a. I don't think any of them would be stupid enough to think they could control who the Taliban sheltered.

There are of course problems with break-and-leave, mainly potential reversion to the status quo ante. I wouldn't be terribly concerned with Russian, Chinese, or Iranian influnce.

I honestly doubt that any of those three would want to deal with it. The Russians have been there and done that, and it wasn't good. The Chinese and Iranians have observed the complications. And, as stated before, there's nothing there of any real use to anyone. The Iranians have no trouble training their terrorist proxies in Lebanon, and Afghanistan is an expensive and messy prospect. The Russians and Chinese have little use for terrorist groups who could easily end up terrorizing them.

I doubt that any of those three have much use for AQ either. The only purpose in that bit was to describe a situation wherein the "mentor" country imposed as little as possible upon the domestic policies of the of the "client," thus ensuring the least friction in the relationship and ensuring the greatest success. The only quid pro required would be that the Taliban would guide AQ to keep the mentor state out of their sights.

And quite frankly, while none of the three have a particular use for an AQ directed at them, they might look at it as a "the enemy of my enemy/competitor is my friend" type of opportunity.

Whether the specifics of the scenario work, the point is that broken or failed societies are not often things that can easily be ignored. Even if no other state steps in, the anarchy often has international repercussions -- look at the costs being imposed on international shipping by Somali piracy -- these are former fishermen, and the fact that their activities continue is in the fact that they have a land-based safe haven given that there is no effective authority within the state to deal with it.

Bottom line, just breaking a thing -- the proposed military strategy to which my comment was originally directed -- is a bad idea. Powell was wise to promulgate the Humpty Dumpty Doctrine, and it's only hubris that fuels the notion that the Incredible Hulk Doctrine can succeed.

Jill

[Entropy]

The issue isn't why would the Taliban be willing to work with us, the issue is Karzai not wanting us to work with the Taliban. The Northern Alliance likes things just the way they are. They do not want to give up their little monopoly on governance in Afghanistan; and are very happy to have us stay and guarantee it for them.

Bob, I've been saying for a long time that Afghanistan is still in a civil war in which we picked a side. Yes, for the most part we do support many of the old "Northern Alliance" factions because they opposed the Taliban and AQ. Same reason we supported Karzai - enemy of AQ and the Taliban.

I do agree with you that the over-centralization of Afghan governance (especially the executive authority that Karzia wields) is a problem, but I'm very skeptical of your suggestion that we can somehow get these two sides together through better governance.

You say the Taliban have no legal means to compete for governance. Well, legal by whose reckoning? The Taliban don't recognize the legitimacy of the GOIRA to begin with and, with a few notable exceptions (the dozen or so "reconciled Taliban"), don't show any interest in "legal" competition.

Not that we shouldn't try to promote reconciliation, but I think we need to be realistic.

Secondly, borders do matter. If borders didn't matter we could be sending you SoF guys into Pakistan with a bunch of air support to go after AQ.

Infanteer,

Defeat in Afghanistan will not be military and will have nothing to do with tactics. It will have everything to do with how we define "victory" and "defeat". It will be a failure of strategy to anticpate and meet policy.

Well said.

[Steve the Planner]

Entropy:

Right on all points.

Taliban. For a minority group within a minority group, these sure seem to take up a lot of resources/significance. Have some 150K NATO troops committed and billions and billions (Excuse me, Professor Sagan) of US dollars chasing them.

If they are irrelevant, have we just defined a floor for some definition of victory?

[Bob's World]

Insurgency is illegal politics.

Who I, or any non-Afghan citizen, thinks is legitimate is moot. The question that must be asked is "Does the Pashtun populace see the Taliban as legitimate." Indicators are that more and more the answer to that question is "Yes."

Personally, I do not care who the Afghan people select or even allow (if not given the chance to select) to govern them. That is their business. If allowed legal venues of politics to weigh in on such matters, they will employ them. If denied legal venues to weigh in on such matters, they will opt for illegal ones.

Given the design of the current Afghan constitution; given the manner in which Karzai came to power; given the presence of a foreign coalition dedicated to the preservation of the Karzai government, insurgency is not only natural, it is inevitable. The Taliban are just the flavor of the day stepping up to lead that illegal challenge. If the Taliban were destroyed by some miracle tomorrow, some new group would soon emerge from this same base of the populace to continue the challenge.

This is what FM 3-24 fails to make clear: Insurgents do not start insurgencies, governments do.

Good COIN is not about protecting the populace from the insurgent alone, but also must protect the populace from the government.

Who is protecting the populace of Afghanistan from the government of Afghanistan?? Certainly we are not, as we enable that government's existence.

Who is protecting the populace of Yemen from the government of Yemen??
or
Who is protecting the populace of Egypt from the government of Egypt??
or
Who is protecting the populace of Saudi Arabia from the government of Saudi Arabia??

In the U.S. we are protected from our government by our constitution, and the military then in turn, protects the constitution. In too many other places the military merely protects the government itself.

We enable many governments to stay in power with little concern of consequences from popular challenges. Legal venues are either corrupted beyond credibility, or simply do not exist. Illegal challengers are labeled as "terrorists" and we praise or even assist such government when they act efficiently to suppress such movements.

We never learn. And by "we" I mean whoever the powerful external party is that exerts its influence over an area in order to serve their own interests.

I was channel surfing a couple days ago and ran across the movie "Gandhi." At one point in the film a frustrated British official challenged Gandhi's efforts, praising the great effectiveness of British government and how that if the British left it would be chaos under Hindu and/or Muslim rule. Gandhi replied "any government of our own choosing no matter how flawed is better than any government forced upon us, no matter how good." This is a generally understood concept of COIN, Lawrence essentially said the same thing in "Seven Pillars."

Then yesterday I am re-reading Delveccio's Vietnam classic "The 13th Valley." In a scene early in the book a few of the guys (Egan the savvy Plt Sgt; Doc the smart, radical black NCO; Cherry, the college educated new guy and some guys from BDE) are smoking a little dope prior to going into the valley the following morning. Le Huu Minh, the company's Vietnamese scout and interpreter says:

"It is time for you all to go," Minh said from the far end of the bar.
"Yeah, I think so too, " George (a BDE guy whose hooch they are in) said. "It's three-twenty. What the F are you guys doing in my AO at three-twenty?"
"No," Minh said. "I mean it is time you all leave my country and let us work out our separate peace."
"Minh," Egan said, "you know, if we were all to leave, even if we negotiate a separate peace, that won't mean peace for your country."
George mumbled, "That's like oh three-hundred and twenty."
"That is true," Minh said. "But my friend Egan, then the war will be a Vietnamese war and not an American war. Your money is too much and now I do not recognize my own home. Your President must have you leave."

This is a lesson that while obviously not learned over and over; is certainly taught over and over.

[jcustis]

I was channel surfing a couple days ago and ran across the movie "Gandhi." At one point in the film a frustrated British official challenged Gandhi's efforts, praising the great effectiveness of British government and how that if the British left it would be chaos under Hindu and/or Muslim rule. Gandhi replied "any government of our own choosing no matter how flawed is better than any government forced upon us, no matter how good." This is a generally understood concept of COIN, Lawrence essentially said the same thing in "Seven Pillars."

You two, eh sir?

Good COIN is not about protecting the populace from the insurgent alone, but also must protect the populace from the government.

Who is protecting the populace of Afghanistan from the government of Afghanistan?? Certainly we are not, as we enable that government's existence.

The one critical thing that observers often fail to note is that the government does not need to even perform an act against the population which can be taken as a grievance. Inaction serves to harm the population as well, as does failing to provide for the common good of the people and limiting the benefits through nepotism.

This hurts the people probably more deeply that any overt aggressive act, and the wound is very, very difficult to heal.

[jcustis]

Why would Taliban leaders have to concentrate to decide anything and even if they did, what would prevent them from holding quorum in a hospital? Or why wouldn't they just do the whole thing by correspondence from scattered locations? That would cut our tron warriors completely out of the picture. In any event you have a lot more confidence in our ability to locate people who don't want to be found, in countries where we aren't on the ground in the immediate vicinity, than I do.

I do place more stock in our capabilities, but having seen exactly what those capabilities are, I am a believer that we could find our targets with the same success that we would were they across a border of a sanctuary country. Sans any border, we could deal with them more easily in Afghanistan.

[M-A Lagrange]

Bob,

The Taliban are just the flavor of the day stepping up to lead that illegal challenge. If the Taliban were destroyed by some miracle tomorrow, some new group would soon emerge from this same base of the populace to continue the challenge.

Which makes the point occuping forces/government/fake supportive government as the centre of gravity of any “insurgencies” even more relevant.

You are opening an open door Bob but it seems that door needs to be open and reopen million times before anyone sees it.
Any successful invasion/occupation was made through keeping in place the former administration and then finding out inside it who will be the puppet.

Good COIN is not about protecting the populace from the insurgent alone, but also must protect the populace from the government.

Actually not that true. Good population centric COIN is to install a government that will protect its people and act accordingly Rule of Law. But that’s a dream somehow.
Good COIN can also be to crush insurgent quick, fast and hard; Leave them no political room to build a propaganda.

Actually, the paradox is: webberian/modern government is a need for modern occupying powers. (Cf Kilcullen). You need someone to talk to and with. Populations do not! Even in West, we cope with governments and do bargain with it.
Establishing the fact that population need post webberian government based on responsability to protect is what we (let say some dreamers) would like.

[Bob's World]

Actually not that true. Good population centric COIN is to install a government that will protect its people and act accordingly Rule of Law. But that’s a dream somehow.
Good COIN can also be to crush insurgent quick, fast and hard; Leave them no political room to build a propaganda.

This is the fallacy of pop-centric COIN, in that it is a change of "tone" perhaps from threat-centric COIN, but it is still just as deeply rooted in the promotion and preservation of illegitimate governments over the populaces of others as derived from the Colonial roots of our COIN doctrine. It seeks to be just as controlling over the populaces of others as threat-centric approaches.

It is a half-step in the right direction, but a half-step all the same. Doing the wrong thing gently is sadly more apt to get one hurt in the process than doing the wrong thing aggressively. Both produce the same failed results, but the pop-centric approach opens one up to a lot more punishment in the process.

One cannot install a legitimate government over the populace of another. To buy into the belief that we can ties back to what we learned from the Europeans and refined in our own Colonial efforts. Its a lie we tell ourselves, and rationalize by saying that we are "enforcing the rule of law" or "bringing democracy to the people." What brings stability is self-determination of governance and justice under one's own laws; not forced sham democracies and injustice under the laws of some foreign power.

There are good concepts within Pop-centric COIN, but the overall construct as currently defined and as we currently attempt to implement it is fatally flawed.

If we must conduct such interventions to promote and preserve our own national interests, then we must learn to do so in a fashion that does not seek to control specific outcomes, dictate specific leaders and forms of government, or project specific values. Instead we must find ways to empower self-determined solutions within the parameters of broad principles designed to prevent abuses of more universal concepts of human rights than what we currently see as "proper" in U.S. culture. Those who attempt to disrupt such proceedings with violent challenges must be met with even greater violence. No need to buy the support of the people with vast development and charity either. We don't need their support, we just don't want their animosity. Their government needs their support, and they will support a government that they know to be theirs. A government that is constrained by a good constitution tailored to their own culture, but designed to prevent too much efficiency or power in any one man or section of government, and that protects the populace from government abuses of power as well.

Americans may not approve of who is selected to lead, or of the forms of government adopted. So be it. Americans will approve of not being stuck in long, expensive, bloody efforts to force our will unnecessarily onto others; Americans will approve of foreign populaces that do not feel compelled to bring acts of violence to the shores of America as well.

[slapout9]

Americans may not approve of who is selected to lead, or of the forms of government adopted. So be it. Americans will approve of not being stuck in long, expensive, bloody efforts to force our will unnecessarily onto others; Americans will approve of foreign populaces that do not feel compelled to bring acts of violence to the shores of America as well.

And that should be the Center of Gravity of our Foreign Policy.....who gives a flip what kind of government they have so long as they are not going to do us any harm. Hank Williams,Jr. wrote a song about it. It's called "Why don't you mind your own business and you want be minding mine"

[carl]

I do place more stock in our capabilities, but having seen exactly what those capabilities are, I am a believer that we could find our targets with the same success that we would were they across a border of a sanctuary country. Sans any border, we could deal with them more easily in Afghanistan.

I will remain skeptical. There are too many people we couldn't or haven't been able to find, AQ no. 1 & 2, MO, al-Awaki, Saddam, not to mention aspirin factories destroyed and talks with top Taliban commanders who weren't, for me to have confidence that we would know enough to make "death from the air" a credible threat if we weren't on the ground in the area.

[Steve the Planner]

My trouble with the Bob Brief derives from my experience in state/local government in the US.

Somewhere, by focusing overseas, there is an inaccurate underlying myth about the nature of our government.

Federal, state and local governments in the US are, in most substantive applications, a contest for resources, with explicit and implicit decisions about winners and losers---and substantial "spoils" at stake, including by folks who never even know what was at stake, or what was trade away on their behalf.

Democracy is a constant struggle (including by folks like the K-Street lobbyist crowd whose focus is to keep everything behind the scenes), played out since the inception of our democracy, and gridded by rules and protections which often must be enforced through FBI busts (Prince George's County, Maryland), and Congressional Ethics Actions (Rangel). I am not being paranoid---this is the essential reality that has not, and will never change. The price of freedom is ETERNAL vigilance, questioning, verification, and, when needed, enforcement.

Even with a very open fourth (press) and fifth (public info/engagement) estate, we stand on the bring of looming and very serious state/local budget/bond dilemmas (June 30 budget cycles) unprecedented in recent years (but not in US history). Obviously, as in the past, they will threaten the foundations of democracy and public integrity, but does that mean they will end it? No. We, as a people of common purpose, will face the challenges and move forward.

Where are the viable and highly complex checks and balances (the essential DNA) in our pretend "nation-building" if all we do is stand as sentinel to an Afghan national government with so little to offer its people, and so much being looted?

Acceptable representative government means a lot of different things to a lot of different peoples.

If our mission is to really be accomplished in Afghanistan, it must reckon objectively with the actual dilemmas that jcustis has explained. Many confusing, contradictory and self-dealing parties, all in conflict with each other. The "success" in Iraq is, despite substantial instability, removal of a genuine threat to the institution of government, and focus on conflict-resolution through institutions (not warlords and local tribes).

[Dayuhan]

If we must conduct such interventions to promote and preserve our own national interests, then we must learn to do so in a fashion that does not seek to control specific outcomes, dictate specific leaders and forms of government, or project specific values.

National interest may not require that we control the outcome of a given process, but it often requires that we prevent certain outcomes, typically a return to the status quo ante. If that were an acceptable outcome we'd have had no reason to intervene in the first place.

Instead we must find ways to empower self-determined solutions within the parameters of broad principles designed to prevent abuses of more universal concepts of human rights than what we currently see as "proper" in U.S. culture. Those who attempt to disrupt such proceedings with violent challenges must be met with even greater violence.

The process of arriving at a "self-determined solution" often involves violence, especially in diverse societies where different components of society have radically different perceived interests, and where there is no broad consensus on the idea of shared power.

Their government needs their support, and they will support a government that they know to be theirs. A government that is constrained by a good constitution tailored to their own culture, but designed to prevent too much efficiency or power in any one man or section of government, and that protects the populace from government abuses of power as well.

I think you vastly overestimate the power of a Constitution. A Constitution in itself is a pile of paper with words written on it; it cannot protect anyone from anything and it cannot prevent or assure anything. These are accomplished not by the Constitution, but by the basic elements of consensus that the Constitution codifies, and by the will to follow the Constitution. Important to note that the document does not create the consensus, it merely codifies it. If there is no consensus to codify, that doesn't work very well.

Our founding documents represent a set of basic principles on which we've agreed to agree. Without that consensus they can accomplish nothing. Democrats and Republicans may disagree on almost everything, but they agree that power can and generally will be shared, and that the source of legitimacy is the will of the people. If different factions do not accept the idea of shared power, or if they believe that legitimacy is, say, inherited, or derives from the will of God, Allah, or The Great Pumpkin (whose will they alone know), no words on paper will create a foundation for shared power.

Trying, for example, to impose the idea of shared power on a society not prepared to accept it is a form of control, no less so than imposing a dictator.

Americans will approve of foreign populaces that do not feel compelled to bring acts of violence to the shores of America as well.

What foreign populace has ever brought acts of violence to the shores of America?

[Bob's World]

National interest may not require that we control the outcome of a given process, but it often requires that we prevent certain outcomes, typically a return to the status quo ante. If that were an acceptable outcome we'd have had no reason to intervene in the first place.



The process of arriving at a "self-determined solution" often involves violence, especially in diverse societies where different components of society have radically different perceived interests, and where there is no broad consensus on the idea of shared power.



I think you vastly overestimate the power of a Constitution. A Constitution in itself is a pile of paper with words written on it; it cannot protect anyone from anything and it cannot prevent or assure anything. These are accomplished not by the Constitution, but by the basic elements of consensus that the Constitution codifies, and by the will to follow the Constitution. Important to note that the document does not create the consensus, it merely codifies it. If there is no consensus to codify, that doesn't work very well.

Our founding documents represent a set of basic principles on which we've agreed to agree. Without that consensus they can accomplish nothing. Democrats and Republicans may disagree on almost everything, but they agree that power can and generally will be shared, and that the source of legitimacy is the will of the people. If different factions do not accept the idea of shared power, or if they believe that legitimacy is, say, inherited, or derives from the will of God, Allah, or The Great Pumpkin (whose will they alone know), no words on paper will create a foundation for shared power.

Trying, for example, to impose the idea of shared power on a society not prepared to accept it is a form of control, no less so than imposing a dictator.



What foreign populace has ever brought acts of violence to the shores of America?

Dayuhan,

As my team medic used to say "you need to step away from the Crack Pipe."

As a student of human nature and motivations as assessed through behavior, you are a bit of a mystery. I'm not quite sure what it is you are afraid of that you feel compelled to persistently argue any position I make, even when they are ones that you yourself have made and defended previously with equal vigor. I'll give you the benefit of the doubt that you are not some agent provocateur. Perhaps a Dick Cheney adamantly committed to the rightness of US approaches; or equally a Bin Laden who knows his best chances lie in the US holding the course of the past 9 years.... writing under a pseudonym and the cloak of anonymity the web provides.

No, it is you, my friend, who underestimates the power of a proper constitution. It is you that does not appreciate the critical nuance of the difference between national security forces dedicated to protect and preserve the very document that defines governmental powers and popular rights, rather than national security forces dedicated to simply preserving the government itself.

Of course "self-determined" governance is violent. Anything worth having is worth fighting for; and those who currently possess power and wealth are not apt to surrender their selfish and ill-gotten gains in favor of more equitable forms of governance easily. This is why the role of the intervening power as a neutral buffer on such violence is essential. This is why the role of the intervening power as an establisher and enforcer of broad, principled, equitable limits for such self-determination to occur within is so essential.

No, your arguments hold little water. Not intervening at all is indeed often the wisest course. To set and enforce such limits more indirectly, and without the strategic risk and burden of placing it all within a context of a war that must be "won" or interests elevated artificially to the "vital" level that implies a linkage to national survival.

The world is changing, the US must change as well. Currently we resist such changes, as many others similarly situated have before us. But change is inevitable, what the U.S. needs to decide is on who's terms will we change, and in what manner we wish to be perceived when the histories of this era are ultimately written.

[carl]

Dayuhan,

As my team medic used to say "you need to step away from the Crack Pipe."

No, it is you, my friend, who underestimates the power of a proper constitution. It is you that does not appreciate the critical nuance of the difference between national security forces dedicated to protect and preserve the very document that defines governmental powers and popular rights, rather than national security forces dedicated to simply preserving the government itself.

I believe I will join Dayuhan at the crack pipe. It seems to confer a bit of wisdom.

If the adoption of an enlightened constitution alone made certain a good government, should not some of the notably savage police states of the 20th and 21st centuries have been fine places to bring up the children? I read that Red China had a fine constitution, but it didn't do a thing. It wasn't followed. Great Britain doesn't have a written constitution at all, but they do well. Refugees tend to flow into Britain, not out. The Brits do well enough because they have agreed upon "the basic elements of consensus" as Dayuhan said. Because they agree they don't need a written constitution. If they had one it would they be any better, or worse?

I think Dayuhan very well understands the difference between cops and soldiers dedicated to protecting the regime in power and those who protect "the basic elements of consensus" as stated in a constitution. That is a glaring, radical, fundamental difference, not a "critical nuance". That difference comes from more than a piece of paper. In our case anyway, it comes from culture that was shaped over a long time by a lot of people. Things can change for the better most anywhere, but it takes more than waving a piece of paper in front of their face.

[Ken White]

who that Team Medic said that to...

It seems I'm far more in accord with Dayuhan and Carl than with thee, Bob's World. Your somewhat unique take on history and governance -- and on what the US has done and / or should do does have some inconsistencies and people simply tend to point those out -- much as Gian did on the Blog this morning. As Bill Moore and I have done for years -- recall that we both agree with you on some things, disagree on others but, to my knowledge, you didn't construe either of us as agents provocateur...

You may not realize that you sometimes address the expressed concerns in a post by apparently modifying your position slightly and often then proceed to repost the same thing later. Volume and repetition in a sales pitch is good but it can invite more questions or comments...

Still we can discuss all that, hopefully, without rancor or getting personal.

Now I gotta go find my pipe.