Point taken William but I disagree with your presumption that non-kinetic effect is diplomacy; it isn't. Granted diplomacy is a non-kinetic effect but it is not the only non-kinetic effect. For example, an aggressive, ground dominating patrols programme is non-kinetic and yet it is explicit in it's need to be conducted by military forces.Originally Posted by William F. Owen
Commando Spirit:
Courage, Determination, Unselfishness, and Cheerfulness in the face of adversity
In keeping with Steve Blair's suggestion
about the Indian wars, I'd recommend Fred Chiaventone's novel about the Fetterman "massacre" - A Moon of Bitter Cold.
Cheers
JohnT
That is a really good one, John, as is his previous outing about the Little Bighorn.
Mike, if you decide to include anything from this era, let me know. I might be able to kick a couple of source ideas your way.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Sorry Spirit, but that is fine slicing the doctrine cooky to no good effect. Did that come from DCDC?
Patrolling is part of the Core Functions - explicitly, it is a fixing action, predicated on the delivery of lethal force. If you patrol for any other reason than to reduce the enemy's freedom of action, you're a clown. - Reducing the enemy's FOA can and might "reassure" the population. Flying a flag over a FOB might do the same for less risk!
The only actions that can be usefully described as non-kinetic are those not predicated on the use of force - eg: delivery of aid, Medical assistance etc.
If we start calling Patrolling "Non-kinetic" and "Influence," we've lost the plot completely.
The word "Kinetic" only appears in the 2005 UK ADP Land Operations once! - and "non-kinetic" is never used.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Good comments all. Keep 'em coming. I'll try to respond to several posts. I gotta think some more on some of the comments.
You're a lucky man to have that as the first small wars book that you read. That symposium is one of the most influential writings that I've ever read. I just nodded my head the entire time saying "yes, yes, yes" outloud. As each war is different, each war is really the same. All that changes is METT-TC. Small Wars Journal is one of the closest things that we have to reproducing that form of learning.
Great suggestions. I've got to be a bit more picky on my reading list this year, but I want to get smart on the Indian Wars, and Fred seems to be the man to read. First, I gotta focus on one piece of the puzzle that I haven't studied yet- Africa and the role of the Foreign Area Advisor. I'm gonna take a look at Tom Odom and Stan's adventures.
Oddly enough, I can only think of two guys (outside of my SF and Seal brothers) that have worked the same areas in multiple tours. I'd argue that there are advantages and disadvantages to the current system. At a minimum, at least we're deploying as units and not individual augmentees like in Vietnam.
I'm a dry-erase board and map and acetate type of guy. I'll start broad to try and encompass as much stuff as possible, and I'll narrow things down as I go along. Take two of the questions- Why do men rebel? Why do people blow themselves up? Entire books are written on these topics.
In reality, I have a very small area of expertise- working in and around the denied rural areas. My urban experience is limited to the "Thunder Runs" in Baghdad and several weeks of patrols in Baqubah.
Commando Spirit- I'd suggest taking a look at the thread on Presence Patrols here. Bill Moore and JCustis do a good job talking things out. Personally, I'd get rid of the terms kinetic and non-kinetic. As with so many other things in life, these labels are minimizing that makes war seem zero-sum when it's not.
Bob's World- I gotta let your comments simmer for a day. What you wrote is parallel with what I was thinking.
I guess I'll end this part with some of Ken White's mantras. There are many variables in war, but
1. Everything is METT-TC.
2. Well trained combat units can accomplish ANY type of mission.
3. Small wars are best to be avoided.
Mike,
Chiaventone's work is fiction, but he brings a very solid history to it and manages to explore some of the issues in ways that history just can't. For the frontier period, ALWAYS start with Robert Utley and then narrow down. His two books on the Frontier Army are simply outstanding and will give you a good groundwork for further research.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Thanks Steve (and John). When I drove back cross-country, I stopped at some of the Frontier Army battlegrounds and historical sites. I was trying to envision what it was like for them. Now, I got the bug and want to read up on it.
Hi Marc, I'm not sure yet. I've never let the initial parts of the creative or decision-making process be hampered by things like rules and questionsMike, you are in an interesting position planning / teaching this course. One thing that I didn't think about earlier (mea culpa!), was that you have to make a decision on your - let's call it grand strategic - approach. Are you teaching it from a retrospective, analytic framework or from a prospective one? Basically, are you trying to teach them an analytic model to understand insurgencies / COIN or are you trying to teach them how to analyze current situations and come up with (new) solutions to them?. I'm gonna try to push out one more posts on "alternative" approaches, listen to y'alls feedback, and then start thinking critically on design, intent, and process.
Mike
Best way to do it, MikeHi Marc, I'm not sure yet. I've never let the initial parts of the creative or decision-making process be hampered by things like rules and questions! Hey, I'm using this discussion to help design my own COIN course as well, so it really is an "inter-active" process
BTW, let me know if you want an online course site at any point (I run my own courseware and I'd be happy to give you one).
Cheers,
Marc
Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
Senior Research Fellow,
The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
Carleton University
http://marctyrrell.com/
Another way- Part Three
Side Note- my physical therapist decided to induce dizzyness today so she could isolate specific areas of damage. Left inner ear. Check. Now, I gotta wait a day for my brain to unwind.
Another Way- Part Three
After my last deployment, I stepped away from direct involvement in war for the first time in seven years. Just like every warrior going back to the Hellenic wars, I came back trying to re-integrate into the "normal" world. Nate Ficks does a good job in his book describing the differences, the numbess, and the struggle for purpose. I've written about it SWJ, and it was a period of transition, healing, maturation, and understanding. Thankfully, I've walked away from it a better person.
During that time, as I wrestled with the violence I unleashed, my neighbor's hatred towards each other, the seemingly futility of war, and the deep sense of grief that I felt from the loss of my boys, I grabbed a board and went surfing. In that time of solitude, I'd just sit on the board and watch the waves grow, peak, and crash in perpetual flow. Other days, I'd just hike deep into Big Sur, sit on the mountain top, and listen and observe. I began to understand the laws of nature and science, and I started having ideas on how they apply to human nature. I guess I found my Zen moment. I walked down from that mountain understanding several things: 1. Who I am. I was finally able to look myself in the mirror and know that I did the best that I could in every situation, 2. I see the world differently than others and that's okay. 3. I developed a gift on the ability to articulate and describe the realities of war by moving words around on paper.
Simultaneously, I was thrust into the world of small wars through the world view of Special Forces, State Dept, NGOs, missionaries, and academics. I was the hammer in the toolbox; they are the rulers, screwdrivers, pliars, saws, and drills. As I worked on different projects, I started trying to consider how we could build a house if we have to. At the same time, I started understanding that we've been trying to build houses with the wrong tools, no freaking blueprint, and we forgot to order the building supplies. Additionally, we thought we could build these houses overnight and put it on a credit card b/c we live in a nice house. We forgot how long it took our parents struggled to save up for the house, the sacrifices they made to build the house, and the time, effort, and care they took into maintaining that house. We just wanted everyone to have a big house today.
So, I've got some ideas on how to build a house. I'll describe them in a minute. As an officer, I'm a project manager. I don't know have the technical expertise of the plumber, the electrician, the architect, or the carpenter, but I do know where to find them- the NCO corps. I want to brief these experts on these new ideas that I've been introduced to, and I want to give them the opportunity to think it through and determine what will work and what won't work....
In other words, come to a better understanding on our limits of control and constraints on our ability to influence others.
Okay, enough with the analogies and metaphors. That's the background. Here's what I've seen.
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