What Would Byzantium Do?

[Granite_State]

John Robb linked to this short Edward Luttwak piece (he has a book out on the subject as well):

http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/20...-byzantium-do/

Agreed with the central thesis:

Unlike the Romans, the Byzantines wrote official guidebooks on statecraft, foreign relations and espionage: writings I find especially fascinating, as I once helped compose the main field manual of the US army. These ancient techniques centred on a single, paradoxical principle: do everything possible to raise, equip and train the best possible army and navy; then do everything possible to use them as little as possible.

[davidbfpo]

Granite State,

(taken from)a single, paradoxical principle: do everything possible to raise, equip and train the best possible army and navy; then do everything possible to use them as little as possible.

I like that one, that bloke Dr Kilcullen, or was it Colin Powell, have really been around a long time, almost persuades me that re-incarnation is real.

[tequila]

Does anyone else find Luttwak's comparison of the U.S. with Byzantium competely ahistorical? Not to mention the difficulties involved in translating a medieval continental empire's (losing) struggle to maintain imperial territories in competition with rival continental empires and tribal confederations adjacent to it to the strategic position of the United States.

As well contrast the strategic dilemmas of the Song dynasty vis a vis the nomadic challenge --- at least we have reliable written documentation of genuine policy debates from the time.

Then there is the rub that both the Byzantines and the Song, despite some success in both civil and military endeavors, were completely and utterly defeated.

[William F. Owen]

Then there is the rub that both the Byzantines and the Song, despite some success in both civil and military endeavors, were completely and utterly defeated.

Excellent point, but not the point. Rome went the same way and the British Empire is no more.
What I take from this is that they actually taught this stuff and thought about it. They had tools. That they could not always apply them well, because conditions moved beyond their control is another issue.
War and Warfare are incredibly complex and were just as complex back then.

....however, better rather than worse military approaches to warfare, and thus gaining the political state you want, are discernible and are not the product of luck. Where prediction falls down is how the new policy will effect all the other relevant conditions.

• Winning Gulf War 1 just set up conditions for Gulf War 2.
• Same with WW1 and 2.
• The US decided to give up in Vietnam and really lost nothing strategically.

[Firn]

Excellent point, but not the point. Rome went the same way and the British Empire is no more.
What I take from this is that they actually taught this stuff and thought about it. They had tools. That they could not always apply them well, because conditions moved beyond their control is another issue.
War and Warfare are incredibly complex and were just as complex back then.

....however, better rather than worse military approaches to warfare, and thus gaining the political state you want, are discernible and are not the product of luck. Where prediction falls down is how the new policy will effect all the other relevant conditions.

• Winning Gulf War 1 just set up conditions for Gulf War 2.
• Same with WW1 and 2.
• The US decided to give up in Vietnam and really lost nothing strategically.

I agree. Sometimes the sweet grapes of success are out of reach even for the most cunning and wise. Trying hard and smart will often allow for success, but not always. It is not a case that we know concepts like destiny, bad luck or #### happens.

When it comes to the downfall of Empires I often remember the message of the IRA after the Brighton hotel bombing which goes "Today we were unlucky, but remember we only have to be lucky once." For Empires it should go "For many many years we were lucky, but we just have to be unlucky for some time, and ..."


Firn

[RedRaven]

I would like to know: What books is the author refering to in the first paragraph of the article?

[marct]

Hi Red Raven,

I would like to know: What books is the author refering to in the first paragraph of the article?

There are a number of them, but probably the best known is Maurice's strategikon. There are earlier and later works, but he' probably referring to that one.

[marct]

These ancient techniques centred on a single, paradoxical principle: do everything possible to raise, equip and train the best possible army and navy; then do everything possible to use them as little as possible.

It's a good thesis but, unfortunately for Luttwak's argument, it was rarely used after the 9th century, and certainly not after Basil II (The Comnenus dynasty being a partial exception). The real problem with the analogy, at least for me, is that Luttwak totally misses why the Byzantines were able to field the type of army and "diplomatic" corps (I'm assuming that is how he refers to the Office [or Bureau] of barbarians) they did: because they were a highly factionalized autocracy.

[Ken White]

Not least vagaries of the economy and thus the job market, actions of other nations / players, the impact of technology, bureaucracy and reorganizations...

Marc, has anyone done any studies on just how directly the organizational restructuring effort turns on simple personality conflicts creating dysfunction and due to the inability of personnel / HR elements to react, engendering massive reorganizations to shift people about simply to restore function?

[marct]

Marc, has anyone done any studies on just how directly the organizational restructuring effort turns on simple personality conflicts creating dysfunction and due to the inability of personnel / HR elements to react, engendering massive reorganizations to shift people about simply to restore function?

Yup - and I can get you in touch with one of the top people in the field if you want - we've co-authored some stuff together .

[marct]

Ken, just as a note, one of the things that Luttwak forgot was that Byzantium wasn't a monolithic political-military "strategy". His reference to the best army and fleet is, probably, a reference to the thematic system re-organizations of the 7th & 8th centuries (and it was pretty much toast by, say, 1040 or so), but the diplomatic-espionage stuff had been established by Diocletian around 300 ce.

[M-A Lagrange]

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/...trategikon.htm

The Strategikon was written to serve as a manual to assist with the training of the mounted troops of the Byzantine army. The author suggests that this forgotten work has use for today's military organizations. He compares the philosophies of the Strategikon to those of Sun Tzu's The Art of War and discusses their differences. Finally, he notes that it was not until the 20th century that the Byzantine type of warfare returned to the battlefield.
The sources of this excellence lay not in the genius of Belisarious or Narses who, despite the brilliance of their victories, left no lasting imprint on the Byzantine military system, but in reforms enacted a generation later by the soldier-emperor Maurice (582-602) and codified in an outstanding military manual, the Strategikon. So successful were Maurice's reforms that they remained substantially undisturbed for the next five centuries. "Not until well into the nineteenth century," writes J. F. C. Fuller, "were military manuals of such excellence produced in western Europe."(2) Yet, very few copies of this work have survived; a printed version of the Greek text appeared only in 1981; and the first English translation, only in 1984.(3) Published by an academic press, it appears not to have come to the attention of the general military reader and has already gone out of print.(4)

As the author of that article, I have been very much impressed on the modernity of Strategikon and mostly about the advices and guidance given to fight against opponent practicing guerilla like warfare.
Byzantine strategy is one of the too often forgotten strategic reflections.
The advices given on the use of combine cavalry and infantry against opponent practicing “irregular” war is very much echoing what is being practiced in A-stan.
I really wonder why we spend so much time on the Romans and so few on Byzantine Empire.
On the same subject, I really recommend Gerard Chaliand book: Civilization and Strategy. A real source of inspiration and ideas on less known strategic reflections from Eastern civilizations. (It also contains some translations of Strategikon.)

Other links to Strategikon (wiki): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategikon_of_Maurice

Still on Byzantine warfare, there is a second Strategikon, the Startegikon of Kekaumenaus.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategikon_of_Kekaumenos

Once again, it is interesting to have a look on it. This book is advices on warfare and the handling of public and domestic affairs.
Who said COIN (in its large understanding) is a new way of war?

PS: sorry for the editing but I have net restrictions…