Roman vs. American COIN ops

[j earl]

Short comparison paper I wrote for a class.

The Accidental Guerilla by David Kilcullen provides a review of modern counter - insurgency operations. Whereas the examples provided by Mr. Kilcullen confine counterinsurgencies to modern phenomena, the Ancient Romans were waging successful COIN operations two thousand years before Petraeus or Kilcullen. Josephus documented one such Roman campaign in his history, Wars of the Jews. Josephus provides an account similar to the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan where the combatants range from religious extremists to those merely trying to exist. Many in modern Iraq and ancient Judea are "accidentally" brought into the fight against the mightiest military powers of their times. One striking similarity is the United States adventure in Iraq and the ancient Jews revolt against the Romans and can serve as an ancient example of the accidental guerrilla syndrome.

Mr. Kilcullen points out that the best way to conduct COIN operations is to not get involved in them. Both the war in Iraq and the war against the Jews were avoidable. In Iraq, Mr. Kilcullen purports that the national security of the United States was not directly threatened by the actions of Sadam Hussein’s regime. He further explains that protracted, costly, conflicts support the extremists overall strategy for global jihad. The Romans, through questionable or ‘bad" governance directly provoked the Jews through insensitivities to Jewish religious law and customs. In Iraq, after Sadam was toppled, the Coalition certainly displayed bad governance in the form of gross misunderstanding of the complex relationships and overlapping authorities of state government, religious institutions and ancient tribal law. Ancient Judea had similar qualities in that Rome oversaw the province, but each city state maintained some autonomy and the temple exerted its influence over the population as well.

How does the accidental guerrilla syndrome apply the siege of Jerusalem? The Roman’s ruled over Judea in relative harmony until various instances of "Bad Governance" turned the Jewish nation against them. Josephus attributes this mainly to Roman insensitivities to Jewish Religious law and corruption under the Rule of the procurator Florus. With the Jewish uprising and subsequent (mysterious) defeat of the Roman General Cestius Gallus, the whole of Judea seems to have descended into chaos. The power vacuum that occurred with the departure of Roman governance lead to Infection by revolutionaries and religious zealots throughout Judea. In Contagion, the revolutionaries or, zealots, spread their ideology and tried to assimilate themselves into the population where they assumed positions of civil, military and religious authority. This Contagion was not absolute, as the moderate population foresaw the coming Roman response and sought peaceful resolution with the Roman authorities, but are somewhat contained by the emboldened factions. Then in the Intervention, the Romans responded by sending the outcast general Vespasian and his son Titus to quell the rebellion. Contrary to the accidental guerilla syndrome, the population, enabled by the power vacuum, and faced with absolute destruction, turned to infighting and civil war to settle old grievances and position their factions for power. The religious zealots performed as many (if not more) blasphemies against the Temple and religious law than the Romans. Ultimately, the guilt of association brought hardships on the entire population of the city, so in a sense the entire city suffers whether the inhabitants are zealots or accidental guerrillas. Then Rejection, the infighting between the moderate forces and zealots ended as they united to face the final Roman advance. The unification was not sufficient to resist the Roman onslaught and victory appeared to be absolute with resistance confined to remote outposts such as Masada. Josephus seems to indicate that the Romans became the instrument through which the punishment of God is delivered to the Jews for their own sins. Finally, the Romans prevail through persistence, brutality, clemency and efficiency.
Whereas the Romans were victorious in their counterinsurgency, Mr. Kilcullen’s book deals in modern reality. The modern combatants wage war via the internet and cable news media as much as they do on the battle field. World Opinion would not tolerate a military power like that of Rome, a superpower that ruthlessly obliterates opposition.

[Pete]

J Earl--welcome to the forum. You've contributed an interesting essay.

[marct]

Hi J Earl,

An interesting piece. Just out of interest, what type of class did you write it up for?

[j earl]

Thanks,

The class is a Master of Arts in Liberal Studies Course at the University of Oklahoma. The topic is comparison of Modern and Ancient Irregular warfare. I plan to post a couple of others that I wrote.

[marct]

Interesting. I'm assuming you have a really tight word limit on these pieces since you didn't get into the other main similarity between 1st century ce Judea and both Iraq and Afghanistan .

Sorry, hit the enter button by mistake....

I'm not trying to be cryptic on the other similarity; it's the establishment of the local government by an outside power

[j earl]

correct, the similarities are numerous and given the short nature of the paper (and the enormous amount material in the two books) I hit on only a couple points. The final paper for this course will be significant enough that I will be able to elaborate some. Yes, local government installed by foreigners is a huge similarity but my interest lies more in actual military response to insurgencies. Thanks for the feedback!

[William F. Owen]

The modern combatants wage war via the internet and cable news media as much as they do on the battle field. World Opinion would not tolerate a military power like that of Rome, a superpower that ruthlessly obliterates opposition.

Not true. No one "wages war on the internet." Nothing done on the internet can deliver decisive military effect. NOTHING!
Baring the simple act of communication, people use the internet to broadcast political views and perspectives. That is it's only relevance. The internet can only set forth policy. At best people do "politics" on the internet - same as with TV, Radio and newspapers.

The diplomatic effects of World opinion existed long before the internet and world opinion is only as good as world opinion posses the means to effect change. Collective opinions only change the policy. They do not change what is and what is not decisive military action.

[Bob's World]

Not true. No one "wages war on the internet." Nothing done on the internet can deliver decisive military effect. NOTHING!

I'm sure that equally competent military pundits said much the same thing a century ago, replacing "on the internet" with "in the air."

No, the tools of the modern communications age( cell phones, internet, etc) have changed the nature of insurgency forever in terms of its viral nature; making many sound military based TTPs devised over the centuries largely irrelevant. (Try to separate a populace from the insurgent in a land with cell and internet technology...)

Of course, I say that that insurgency and COIN are really far more politics than warfare, and best thought of as such, so perhaps WILF is right. These communications tools have however certainly changed how people need to govern at a minimum.

This is why the American founding fathers insured that the populace had both the right to bear arms and a free press. They understood full well that even with checks and balances between the Executive, the Legislative, and the Judical branches, that you also needed an empowered populace to keep those three from getting in cahoots with each other.

Ben Franklin would have grasped the value and the application of the internet for toppling tyrants immediately.

[William F. Owen]

I'm sure that equally competent military pundits said much the same thing a century ago, replacing "on the internet" with "in the air."

Well that doesn't say much for the "equally competent" does it!

No, the tools of the modern communications age( cell phones, internet, etc) have changed the nature of insurgency forever in terms of its viral nature; making many sound military based TTPs devised over the centuries largely irrelevant. (Try to separate a populace from the insurgent in a land with cell and internet technology...)

....and the motor car changed the nature of warfare/insurgency. Cell phones are functionally the same as radios. Unless they are used to deliver military force, they can contribute nothing except in policy terms. TV and Radio never won or lost a battle, but electronic Warfare did! The internet will not either. - and Cyber attacks are merely an EW variant.

Point being, Youtube and blogs only effect policy and its presentation. Warfare cannot be diluted down to the effectiveness of a Party Political broadcast.

[John T. Fishel]

Haven't I seen this somewhere before?

Glad you are publishing the papers here - you might try crafting the final paper as an article for the Journal.

Wilf, are you arguing that PSYOP is not a weapon? Current US doctrine treats PSYOP as it does fires.

Cheers

JohnT

[William F. Owen]

Wilf, are you arguing that PSYOP is not a weapon? Current US doctrine treats PSYOP as it does fires.

Fires cause death and destruction, which is instrumental to the breaking of will. How can PSYOPS do that?
The UK has now started with"Influence Operations" which also equates "Fires" with "PSYOPS".
We need to put a stop to this sophistry and pseudo-science.
Killing and destruction is what breaks will. If an activity is not based on that fact, then it is diplomacy and not warfare. That is what separates the two as instruments of strategy.

[Tom Odom]

Fires cause death and destruction, which is instrumental to the breaking of will. How can PSYOPS do that?

How about 800K to 1 million dead in 100 days due to PSYOPS?

[marct]

Hi Wilf,

You just know that I'm going to jump on this one ......

....and the motor car changed the nature of warfare/insurgency.

Did it change the nature or the form? I could argue, as you do regarding cell phones, that the introduction of motorized transport was just an increase in mobility that was no different from any other form of cavalry.

Cell phones are functionally the same as radios. Unless they are used to deliver military force, they can contribute nothing except in policy terms. TV and Radio never won or lost a battle, but electronic Warfare did! The internet will not either. - and Cyber attacks are merely an EW variant.

Okay, let's play in Plato's world for a minute. "Military force", in an idealized sense, has two components: a form and an intent. If I was ordered to hold hill X, how (i.e. the form) I do so is irrelevant, so if I can do it by arranging that all of the group attacking me have their cell phones going off (hence indicating their positions), then that is an application of military force.

Point being, Youtube and blogs only effect policy and its presentation. Warfare cannot be diluted down to the effectiveness of a Party Political broadcast.

Don't confuse YouTube, blogs, etc. with the Internet. This is something that most people do, but it is a critical error in perception. Someone like, say, Selil, could use the "internet" to access targeting systems in a whole slew of different combat systems and, in some cases, even arrange for them to spontaneously fire.

What almost everyone misses when they talk about the 'net as a combat environment is that it goes way beyond IO, PSYOPS, EW. It is the 20 ton elephant sitting in the room, and most people just don't like trying to think about the entire thing.

[marct]

Fires cause death and destruction, which is instrumental to the breaking of will. How can PSYOPS do that?

How about 800K to 1 million dead in 100 days due to PSYOPS?

Hmmm, Wilf, how many of the Zealots at Masada were actually killed by the Romans?

[marct]

Glad you are publishing the papers here - you might try crafting the final paper as an article for the Journal.

Ohh! Does this mean we get to critique it !

On a (slightly) more serious note, John, what were the parameters of the assignment? I think you know I'll be teaching a couple of COIN courses this summer (one 2nd year, one 4th/graduate), so I'm collecting ideas and syllabi.

Cheers,

Marc

[William F. Owen]

How about 800K to 1 million dead in 100 days due to PSYOPS?

Radio and newspapers in Rwanda? Sure, but wasn't it machetes and clubs that did the killing? The message is not the means.
Conversely didn't George Bush tell the Iraqis to rise up and over throw Saddam in 1991? That didn't work out too well.

I actually believe in the idea PSYOPS, but I mean real "Psychological Operations" - as in actions designed to break will at the tactical level, and action aimed at harming folks peace of mind.

[William F. Owen]

Hmmm, Wilf, how many of the Zealots at Masada were actually killed by the Romans?

None, but you're going to have to explain that one. Too cryptic for me, as I'm pretty sure they committed suicide once the water ran out. Siege Warfare 101, in my part of the world.

[marct]

None, but you're going to have to explain that one. Too cryptic for me, as I'm pretty sure they committed suicide once the water ran out. Siege Warfare 101, in my part of the world.

If I remember my Josephus correctly, and I'll admit, it's been a while, yes, they committed suicide but not because of the water. I believe it was because they saw the assault ramps getting closer and closer. Basically, a form of combined PSYOPS with infrastructure that would, inevitably, lead to an unstoppable assault. Also, and again I'm relying on memory, the Romans used Jewish POWs to actually construct the assault ramps, so if the defenders in Masada shot them, they were killing their own people.

The point I was really trying to get across is that there is always a ration of psychological and physical effects to any operation, although what that ratio is will skew radically, and the "physical" component can, in some instances, literally only be in the "mind" (actually brain) of the receiver. If that is the case, then the PSYOP component has achieved the military objective with little or no kinetic action except that which was conveyed via the PSYOP.

[Tom Odom]

Radio and newspapers in Rwanda? Sure, but wasn't it machetes and clubs that did the killing? The message is not the means.
Conversely didn't George Bush tell the Iraqis to rise up and over throw Saddam in 1991? That didn't work out too well.

I actually believe in the idea PSYOPS, but I mean real "Psychological Operations" - as in actions designed to break will at the tactical level, and action aimed at harming folks peace of mind.

No, the message is part and parcel of the means. Humans convinced through IO/PSYOPS did the killing. I never saw a machete decide to kill anyone.

Will is always mental, Wilf. Separating that from the means to apply that will is artificial.

Bush and 1991--yep he did but the Shia lacked the means. Did it have an effect? Yep and the result was the failed revolt.

PSYOPS is included among fires as as way to address its effects in planning and execution. It works.

Tom

[j earl]

Interesting points everyone. This is an argument that may make an interesting paper. I am a believer in PSYOPs and know that cyber warfare is becoming a focus of military forces. Kinetic, or not? I think Tom has given some excellent examples. In my opinion a valid form of warfare. At least I hope so with all the taxpayers $ going to fund it .