Roman vs. American COIN ops

[William F. Owen]

The point I was really trying to get across is that there is always a ration of psychological and physical effects to any operation, although what that ratio is will skew radically, and the "physical" component can, in some instances, literally only be in the "mind" (actually brain) of the receiver. If that is the case, then the PSYOP component has achieved the military objective with little or no kinetic action except that which was conveyed via the PSYOP.

THE BREAKING OF WILL! Yes, that is what I focus on. It's cannot be done by "party political broadcasts" unless you are harming people or threatening to harm them. - That will never change and being good at warfare means being good at creating harm.

[William F. Owen]

No, the message is part and parcel of the means. Humans convinced through IO/PSYOPS did the killing. I never saw a machete decide to kill anyone.

These folk didn't kill other folk because of a couple of broadcasts. They were basically invited to wipe out the "opposition" as part of a policy. They voted with machetes. That may be IO, but it's basically aligning IO with partly political broadcasts and not with - as you have usefully said, "Using information to support policy."

Will is always mental, Wilf. Separating that from the means to apply that will is artificial.

Will is also very context specific and variable in nature. Having said that I'm all for anything that breaks will.

Bush and 1991--yep he did but the Shia lacked the means. Did it have an effect? Yep and the result was the failed revolt.

- so basically useless

PSYOPS is included among fires as as way to address its effects in planning and execution. It works.

So fires breaks will? Makes sense to me. I take PSYOPS to be specific planned and re-sourced operations aimed at damaging the enemy psychologically. It's not new and it's nothing to do with the "internet."

[William F. Owen]

At least I hope so with all the taxpayers $ going to fund it .

Well until they get basics right and understand warfare for what it really is not what they hope it might be, they'll be wasting their money!

[Tom Odom]

These folk didn't kill other folk because of a couple of broadcasts. They were basically invited to wipe out the "opposition" as part of a policy. They voted with machetes. That may be IO, but it's basically aligning IO with partly political broadcasts and not with - as you have usefully said, "Using information to support policy."

In the Rwandan context it was exactly that--30 years stated policy reinforced with IO including a heavy dose of PSYOPS.

In the case of the Shia revolt--it was worse than useless as it sparked a reaction without providing needed support.

influencing will is the goal--breaking will may be the ultimate desired effect. Then again it may not be the immediate desired effect.

I will stick to what works, Wilf, in first hand experience.

Tom

[j earl]

In Charlie Wilson's War, it is observed that one of the great mysteries of the war was that the media virtually ignored US involvement, allowing CIA ops to continue without interference, unlike the Contra operation that was drawing much media coverage.

[William F. Owen]

In the Rwandan context it was exactly that--30 years stated policy reinforced with IO including a heavy dose of PSYOPS.

- So policy, not warfare. Let's call it "Government Propaganda" - and bit like "Smoking Kills" and "Use a Condom." The Rwandan Government sought to set forth a Policy, just like the Nazis. - so how does the West usefully extrapolate from that experience? We know all about Propaganda.

I will stick to what works, Wilf, in first hand experience.

Glad to hear it Tom. As you know I believe only experience and military history can usefully inform practice, and not avant-garde theories!

[Tom Odom]

- So policy, not warfare. Let's call it "Government Propaganda" - and bit like "Smoking Kills" and "Use a Condom." The Rwandan Government sought to set forth a Policy, just like the Nazis. - so how does the West usefully extrapolate from that experience? We know all about Propaganda.

Again, Wilf, you separate to fit your thesis. I did not say that; you did and I still disagree. As for the bumper sticker "Smoking Kills" comparison--try that where you live and see how it flies.

The 30 years prep was also one of execution in the form of periodic massacres. IO and PSYOP can be both kinetic and lethal.

Tom

[William F. Owen]

Again, Wilf, you separate to fit your thesis. I did not say that; you did and I still disagree.

Tom, my thesis purely that IO and PSYOPS have imprecise definitions that alter under scrutiny and like wise are generally based on unclear and not wholly relevant examples of success.
Please tell me, how is IO and PSYOPS are different from "Influence Operations" or EBO?

As for the bumper sticker "Smoking Kills" comparison--try that where you live and see how it flies.

Well if you mean telling an Israeli "not to smoke" is the best to get smoke blown in your face, I agree! - which is why I am sceptical of anything that does not involve force.

The 30 years prep was also one of execution in the form of periodic massacres. IO and PSYOP can be both kinetic and lethal.

So it was a Government Policy. It clearly wasn't a military capability used to further a policy. Again, if judged not much different from Soviet Russia of Nazi Germany and how do we learn of leverage that for benefit?

[Tom Odom]

So it was a Government Policy. It clearly wasn't a military capability used to further a policy. Again, if judged not much different from Soviet Russia of Nazi Germany and how do we learn of leverage that for benefit?

No it was a government exercise of power that included use of military force.

As for the bumper sticker "Smoking Kills" comparison--try that where you live and see how it flies.

Well if you mean telling an Israeli "not to smoke" is the best to get smoke blown in your face, I agree! - which is why I am sceptical of anything that does not involve force.

No by that I mean try equating the Halocaust with a "Smoking Kills" bumper sticker and see how the audience reacts.

Tom, my thesis purely that IO and PSYOPS have imprecise definitions that alter under scrutiny and like wise are generally based on unclear and not wholly relevant examples of success.

Wilf, you continually go for a one size fits all description of war that ultimately is reductionist in its essence. IO and PSYOP are imprecise but less so that what you offer.

We will have to disagree.

Tom

[OfTheTroops]

Wasn't the Persian empire even more successful at "COIN" co-option than Rome?


Too bad there is not as much source material with which we can understand their building policy.

Of course we ignore Persia because it was eastern.

[marct]

Wasn't the Persian empire even more successful at "COIN" co-option than Rome?

That would really depend on how you define "success" but, on the whole, I'd have to say it wasn't.

Too bad there is not as much source material with which we can understand their building policy.

We have some - if you can read coine Greek . There are some really good discussions of Persian history, revolts, politicing, etc. in Procopius of Caesaria's Histories of the Wars, Books I & II: The Persian Wars. Personally, I cheat and use the Loeb Classic Library version because of the Greek and English texts.

Most of their "build" strategy was really what today we would call Tribal Engagement. For most of its history, Persia was a pseudo-feudal "empire", and a lot of their strategies, the non-TE ones, were adopted from the Assyrians (e.g. mass relocations, forced divisions, etc.).

[marct]

One of the more amazing, and effective, grand strategic objectives that the Romans developed was a code of laws. I'm sure Mike (JMM) knows the history of this better than I do, but imagine, if you will, the insane amount of work necessary to distill the essence of over 100 tribal and city state legal "codes" (including customs and traditions) into a single code. Talk about a "build" strategy!

[Firn]

Irregular warfare was certainly also a big thing in the past and was often intertwined with regular one. It is often very muddy water.

If we take Rome there is certainly a lot food for thought from the Social war, the Civil wars, all those wars for Hispania to a very famous COIN operation gone terribly wrong. The latter example shows that you can not transfer strategy and tactics into a new AO, plug in and play with success.


Firn

[William F. Owen]

No it was a government exercise of power that included use of military force.

OK, so what you sat that exactly fits the classical description of Strategy

No by that I mean try equating the Halocaust with a "Smoking Kills" bumper sticker and see how the audience reacts.

My referencing of "Smoking Kills" was speaking to the banality of Government information campaigns. - the Holocaust, in terms of the "final solution" was never an explicit publicly stated policy.

Wilf, you continually go for a one size fits all description of war that ultimately is reductionist in its essence. IO and PSYOP are imprecise but less so that what you offer.

No, not one size fits all, but useful reductionism, yes! Not silly reductionism!

We will have to disagree.

...and that's not a bad thing!

[Xenophon67]

.....Before I gather my thoughts in order to properly contribute to this very interesting topic I will add a few point off the top of my head.

I recall reading an anecdote in Arrian's Anabasis concerning Alexander's operations in Afghanistan (Bactria?). Rather than engaging these aloof mountain tribesmen in terrain of their choosing, he decided to have a full display of phalanx drill in utter silence. This seemed to have intimidated the tribesmen and they melted back into the mountains.

While the Celts/Cimbri/etc had no car bombs or IEDs, their suicidal charges were meant to break Roman will.

The Romans weren't much for introspection, yet we must imagine that Roman COIN and winning the hearts and minds was based upon their will power and sincere conviction that they were superior and had the duty to civilize the world. This honest approach - not just transparent but in-your-face, "We will follow this COA...do you understand?"

Clearly Thucydides' Melian Dialogue writ large.

Or is it same ol' same - As the Romans moved in so too did trade, commerce, economic prosperity and assimilation.

Therefore, what elements of Gallic or Iberian society were the Romans able to co-opt to get the entire community on board? Did the Romans focus on the lowest of the low to win 'hearts and minds'?

.......a more academic approach next time - great intro topic

[Bob's World]

Roman COIN is as like US COIN; as the much as the Roman Empire is like the US Empire.

If an empire expands and offers full rights of citizenship to all of its newly acquired citizens and allows them to participate fully in their new government; then yes, you will be waging COIN when those citizens revolt; but they will be less likely to do so if you bring goodness with your presence and providing a government who's legitimacy they recognize.

OR, even if you create "separate but superior" enclaves of Roman citizens among the barbarian populace, and create a puppet government of the local flavor of barbarian, or impose your own foreign government onto the barbarians (either one will lack legitimacy in the eyes of the populace); you will be waging COIN, and will certainly have to in due time.

But if you "merely" help select or prop up leaders in other countries in exchange for favorable relations; and then help to sustain those leaders in power when they are faced with insurgency you are not conducting COIN at all. That host nation government is, but the best doctrinal term we have for this is FID. (It's not a great term, the conventional community refuses to recognize it as being "too SOF", and it just isn't sexy, even in the SOF community).

The problem is, that like the legendary Colossus standing guard over the harbor of Rhodes; we stand with one foot in "We're the modern Roman Empire" and one foot in "We're your good buddies and if you work with us we'll take care of you and we'll all be happy together."

We are conflicted. And our Policy and our foreign engagement reflect that conflict. At least the Romans were straight up about their agenda. Even the British were straight up about theirs. We, on the other hand are uncomfortable in the role of oppressor, but it pays well, so we pretend that we are not, but do it anyway. Sort of. But not really. etc.

During the Cold War that worked. What we were offering was better than what these nations and populaces were getting from their previous masters; also the looming threat of what they would get if the Soviets or Chinese prevailed, etc kept everyone swinging their picks and whistling Yankee Doodle.

Then the modern information age destroyed the ability of governments to control information; which in turn destroyed the ability of governments to control populaces. This empowered the people of Eastern Europe, leading to the end of the Cold War. At that point the genie was out of the bottle. The west thought it only affected Soviet oppression of other populaces and began to celebrate our way through the Bush I and Clinton administrations. There were signs that the wheels were coming off, that small countries oppressed by ("allies with") Western governments were beginning to have problems with their populaces as well. That members of these popular uprisings were beginning to target Western interests as well. We saw these as small local problems and random crackpot acts of terrorism.

Bottom line is that the US model of foreign control and exploitation, for all of its friendlier intentions and facade, is no more palatable to the populaces of other nations than were the models employed by the British or the Romans. In some ways, theirs were even superior.

This is not a tale of the demise of the US, or even a tale of the demise of US influence around the globe. What this should be is a proverbial swift kick in the pants to the policy boys and girls in DC that the old model is broken, and a new model that is more respectful of the rights of others must be developed and employed. So that populaces everywhere can see their own governments as "legitimate" in their own eyes and on their own terms. So that they can see the US as not the obstacle to achieving such legitimacy of government, but rather as the enabler of the same.

In simple terms, It is time for the Colossus to close his legs, or suffer the same ultimate collapse...

[Chris jM]

I find something wrong with referring to the Roman empire and COIN in the same sentence - just like it's not useful to judge history with modern ethical standards, I consider it misleading to subject ancient statecraft to modern military perspectives.

The few things that have struck me while reading the occasional book on the classical period is the alien nature of power and perspective. Rome was as much an idea as an empire - in many ways a city-state elevated to regional power through luck of geography. As I understand it they really did believe in a version of Roman might as manifest destiny - and, after the genius of Hannibal had failed to breach their city gates, it is understandable why they had such a view. Believing in inevitable conquest makes for simple strategy, however, and it seems that the Emperor's main obstacle on expansion was domestic distractions. Whenever Imperial Rome's image of invincibility was cast into doubt her response was always strong and resolute. Simply put Rome's honour was the driving force in her ascension to and defence of empire.

Of interest is the way the Principate saw the world - until Christianity kicked off, evidence suggests that the Romans didn't employ maps or cartography. It was rather the idea of a foreign culture that drove the empire's various expeditionary undertakings - contemporary knowledge of the world in writing, including who lived where and what the geography was like. Even when military campaigns were undertaken, the employment of geography appears solely as a tactical consideration rather than what we would see as a strategic or operational consideration. This could be seen in the conquests of Britain, where the idea was to prove the superiority of Romanitas over the British tribes, and all else - including a not too inconsequential channel! - was merely an obstacle to this end. In many ways (and the weakness of this metaphor is that I'm using modern parlance to draw the metaphor) the Roman's practiced an exclusively population-centric strategy. Where barbarians lived and when opportunity was afforded, the legions marched.

Sidetracking briefly: Tactically I've seen some interesting theories that propose the legions as being almost exclusively engineers and the auxiliary forces being the line infantry. The main issue here is that there is good evidence that the legions fought successfully as heavy infantry in the Civil War period, which suggests they were trained and experienced grunts. I do find, though, the idea that Rome exported her occupying legions as engineer forces rather than combat soldiers very interesting.

What I would argue as being beyond doubt is that the Romans were militarily very ordinary, and it was the continuation of successful strategy (the belief in Rome as the civilised power favored by the gods) that was bequeathed to them through a very brutal evolutionary process that made them successful. Tactics can get you so far, but nothing is as strong as a solid strategic foundation. Even the incompetence a hereditary command system or the brilliance of your opposing generals can't undermine solid strategy.

Thus they didn't 'oppress', 'practise FID' or conduct foreign relations as we know it - they rather saw their world as a continuum between Roman and yet-to-be-Roman, and they served that agenda.

As effective as the Roman phenomenon was, I don't see the lessons from her glory days as containing lessons directly applicable to the current state of play.

To quote Colin Gray, strategy is an eternal part of human affairs, and as a contributing (possibly even starting foundation) of strategic knowledge, the lessons of Rome can be applied to America. But that's where the utility ends - direct comparison with Pax Romana doesn't really add much to an understanding of Pax Americana.

In this way Bob's World I agree with everything you have said in about the contemporary world as being of merit. However, your classical linkages (and likewise the entire field of classical-contemporary comparisons) are in my mind flawed as an over-reached argument of minimal benefit. Let historical experience inform us, but don't let it dictate or alter our own reality for historical precedence.

[Chris jM]

Then the modern information age destroyed the ability of governments to control information; which in turn destroyed the ability of governments to control populaces.

A minor point - I would argue that government's can only harness and not control populations. Information can shape, but the sentiment or environment has to support the government. In many ways the population gets the government they deserve (not morally or ethically speaking, but rather one that embodies or reflects the state of affairs).

Roman government, for example, I would view more as a manifestation of the Roman ideal of honour and an enabler of the Romanitas concept of inevitable expansion.

German sentiments, likewise, enabled the Nazi regime. Ditto the political, social and economic situation that allowed for Russian totalitarianism. Granted the flow of information was heavily controlled in both cases, however I don't see informational control as a pre-requisite for the establishment of either regime.

And, if 'information flow' did destroy the Soviet edifice, then what is it doing to tear down the Putin state or the Chinese government?

I know that this is a very small part of your post and doesn't change your central argument... I'm just thinking out loud here.

[Bob's World]

Governments that control information, control populaces. That is why they seek to control information first, so that the other might follow. If you are also willing to ruthlessly crush any pockets of dissent that dare to arise in this disconnected populace, you can control them very well. History shows this over and over.

History does not show many cases of populaces that desire to be controlled in such ways, but many who, not knowing any better, tolerated it for generations.

As to history, I believe the human dynamics of populaces and their governances is timeless. The facts change, the dynamics stay the same. Its a matter of degree and perception.

[Chris jM]

As to history, I believe the human dynamics of populaces and their governances is timeless. The facts change, the dynamics stay the same. Its a matter of degree and perception.

I agree. The facts do change, and I see a lot of historical comparison trying to directly relate the facts of Roman/ Vietnam/ Iraq etc to another parallel. If history informs dynamics, theory or understanding, then that understanding will probably be more robust and relevant.

America is not Rome and Roman facts do not apply to America as a direct import - they do, however, have salient relevance to the conduct of politics and war.