Body Counts and Metrics

[William F. Owen]

I started this because I hate to see another useful area of discussion die in the "Journal."
See here.
Sorry, but Body Counts work. That the it has been done it badly in the past by those cannot use the data usefully, does not mean it does not work.
We have to get over rejecting things just because they fail in the hands of people not skilled in their use.

Should it be THE measure of success? No, of course not, but most armies who defeated irregular forces used body counts. They were used in Kenya, Malaya (see my quote), Dohfar and Cyprus - and also Rhodesia!
Historically best practice body counts were based on recorded kills, verified by physical control and recovery of the body AND Weapons - usually for some form of exploitation.

The point is, you do not pursue a score as in judging success by the number you kill, but that you are sure that you are actually killing the enemy, when and as it is required. - that is why Templer used Body Counts, and British Army operations were predicated on "killing the enemy."

Do something well it works. Do it badly and it fails.

[Chris jM]

I guess your right, and that a body count could be a useful measure - but only if it is appropriate to assessing the effectiveness of any strategy, not as a strategy (or even a tactic) unto itself.

I also suspect that any reporting of eny killed will be a near impossible task. Unless your taking the ground after a conflict your unlikely to be able to accurately assess the damage you've inflicted - I think you've highlighted the issues yourself on this forum with regards to Brit actions in Helmand to this end. Additionally, even if you do dominate the battlefield post-contact, their can be massive amounts of warped feedback influencing the statistics (who was enemy, who was carrying a weapon, the need to best a sister company, etc etc).

I distrust the western militaries as a whole (yep, massive generalisation alert!) being able to employ a body count statistic as an effective tool in pursuit of strategis assessment. I fear, as I've outlined elsewhere, that many of today's coalition forces are too orientated topwards minimising their own losses and any data proving that they are killing the eny would only serve to spt/ reinforce current tactics that may inflict loss, but don't work towards a sustainable objective . It may be my own bias but I don't trust tools as easily blinding and misleading as statistics without substantial qualification. That, and I'm a former humanities student who generally distrusts the numbers people

In short Wilf, I agree that there is nothing wrong with the body count as a tool assessing one's strategy in theory, but in practise I oppose it. Knowledge of both FF and enemy forces in any conflict is bound to be imperfect, so we are better off embracing that imperfection than trying to supplant it withthe inevitable, omnipotent excel spreadsheet.

[William F. Owen]

In short Wilf, I agree that there is nothing wrong with the body count as a tool assessing one's strategy in theory, but in practise I oppose it. Knowledge of both FF and enemy forces in any conflict is bound to be imperfect, so we are better off embracing that imperfection than trying to supplant it withthe inevitable, omnipotent excel spreadsheet.

So basically your point is that poor leadership and stupidity is blocker to doing something useful???

What you miss is that has been used successfully in the past!
Be a Clausewitian I very much subscribe to the "work within the Chaos, not against it school" of warfare. You will rarely have the right information on which to base decisions.

I would also submit it is nothing to do with strategy. It is the realm of tactics. Verifiable body counts are an excellent OA tool, when combined with data sets. The Ricks/Kilcullen "don't count bodies" is simplistic, misleading and wrong.

[MikeF]

Sorry, but Body Counts work. That the it has been done it badly in the past by those cannot use the data usefully, does not mean it does not work.
We have to get over rejecting things just because they fail in the hands of people not skilled in their use.

Should it be THE measure of success? No, of course not, but most armies who defeated irregular forces used body counts.

The point is, you do not pursue a score as in judging success by the number you kill, but that you are sure that you are actually killing the enemy, when and as it is required. - that is why Templer used Body Counts, and British Army operations were predicated on "killing the enemy."

Do something well it works. Do it badly and it fails.

Breaking the enemy's will to fight is the real objective. Killing the enemy and the proper application of violence is a big part of that. Ultimately, you want to bring the enemy to the negotiating table at a weakened position. However, it's not a panacea. If the negotiations do not lead to peace, then you have failed. The war to end all wars is a good example of how the accumulation of body counts without formal arbitration instead of retribution can lead to more war.

[Bob's World]

Breaking the enemy's will to fight is the real objective. Killing the enemy and the proper application of violence is a big part of that. Ultimately, you want to bring the enemy to the negotiating table at a weakened position. However, it's not a panacea. If the negotiations do not lead to peace, then you have failed. The war to end all wars is a good example of how the accumulation of body counts without formal arbitration instead of retribution can lead to more war.

If the American Civil War would have been over an issue was that equally difused across the land it would have manifested as an insurgency if at all. In which case Grant's strategy of crushing the will of the enemy populace would have likely failed. As it was a geographic issue, and a separate nation was formed, it worked.

Body counts? Certainly gained a bad rap in Vietnam. I see this as a measure of performance though, not effectiveness. Many factors go into what it takes to break the will of an opponent, so merely counting bodies only tells you that you are killing people.

In COIN operations, where one is trying to regain the support of their populace WHO, WHERE, WHEN, WHY, and HOW one kills is probably far more important than how many. Again, I still see it as a measure of performance that will often lead to an assumption that more is better, when if fact, the opposite may be true.

[John T. Fishel]

about anything he is on to something here. Mike, there are times when you can't bring the enemy to the negotiating table - Hitler and his henchment committed suicide rather than surrender. It was the thierd or fourth echelon that came to the table and certainly did not represent the NAZI regime. I suspect that Bob's World has put the body count issue in the right context - that it can be an useful measure of performance but not of effectiveness/outcome.

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

And he is in this case.

The key item from his post is this:

"Historically best practice body counts were based on recorded kills, verified by physical control and recovery of the body AND Weapons - usually for some form of exploitation. (emphasis added / kw)

I would add that those figures should not be publicized in any way or released to the media because they will either misunderstand or misuse them -- more likely both -- and that will skew the military application (as it did in Viet Nam after mid 1966).

P.S.

Don't give them to the Departmental bureaucracy or Congress either -- because they will then be 'leaked' and really misconstrued.

P.P.S

John and Bob's world are correct also in that it can be a useful measure of performance but not of effectiveness/outcome.

[Rex Brynen]

Given their undoubted utility when used right--and their tendency to promote sloppiness, be misused, fixated upon, politically manipulated, or pushed to do things they aren't meant to do/indicate--are we then saying that...

body counts are the MRAPs of metrics?

[Ken White]

body counts are the MRAPs of metrics?

'Twould seem so...

[Infanteer]

John and Bob's world are correct also in that it can be a useful measure of performance but not of effectiveness/outcome.

Probably sums it up best.

"Body Count" is just a macabre name for a BDA - something we try to do all the time as a measure of performance.

And I agree with Wilf that it is tactical. I kill 6 of the 9 guys that tried to ambush me. Good. Useful data for the AAR. Doesn't tell me anything about how I diminished the Taliban insurgency (except on that road junction )

[Schmedlap]

We should use touchdowns as a metric. After all, look how many teams that score touchdowns win championships.

[BayonetBrant]

Once you start counting something, the reporting of that count becomes a self-licking ice cream cone, and without a clear understanding of why you counted it in the first place (throughout the command) you're counting just because you always counted, and then it becomes some form or mis-construed performance metric or a continual quest to outdo the old record, or some other useless mutated bit of BS.

Counting something in and of itself is not the problem. Misapplication of the count is the problem.

[Fuchs]

About body counts in general:

There's a tendency to get the numbers wrong even with the greatest efforts to have accurate data.
The Germans had very strict reporting rules, nevertheless they overestimated air/air kills over enemy soil by factor two and the Russian tank production by a factor two as well (counting destroyed tanks as killed despite the fact that the Russians were recovering and repairing them).

This error factor of two almost seems to be a constant of warfare.

Historical occupation wars had their analogies; like reporting killed enemies based on killing suspected enemies. There are psychological issues and organizational defects at work that would be difficult to come by permanently. Maybe you could solve the problems and get accurate data; that doesn't solve the uncertainty about the accuracy, so you would still not know what kind of correction multiplier to apply to your data.


Own WIA/POW/MIA/KIA as well as POW taken are reliable metrics.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Bayonet Brant

Once you start counting something, the reporting of that count becomes a self-licking ice cream cone, and without a clear understanding of why you counted it in the first place (throughout the command) you're counting just because you always counted, and then it becomes some form or mis-construed performance metric or a continual quest to outdo the old record, or some other useless mutated bit of BS.

I'm skeptical of the value of doing this, and believe it will lead to inappropriate behavior. You mentioned the body counts in Malaya and Cyprus, but was the so what of them? How did they contribute to a victory? Maybe it was just something the commander wanted so he could send apparently good news back to his political leadership? Of course anytime a western force engages irregulars in a developing nation the body count ratio is in our favor, but we don't always win.

Count the bodies, we're going to do it anyway, but the numbers are just data, and they can and should be interpreted in different ways. If the enemy body count continues to raise you may interpret it as the enemy is more effective at mobilizing the populace to fight us, or on the other hand the remaining leadership is less effective, and there are numerous of other interpretations that may or may not be relevant, so the question comes back to why is it a useful metric for anything other than to support information operations (they killed a 100 of us, but we killed a thousand of them; therefore, we're winning). Wrong headed thinking IMO, but you have to feed the American and British audience something to keep their support.

In WWII did we keep body counts or estimates of KIA? Kind hard to do a body count after you carpet bomb a few cities that are in enemy territory unless they're kind enough to publish the numbers. Better indicators of success may have been the use of child soldiers, during the end of WWII the Germans were throwing younger teenagers into the fight, which probably indicated that less men of fighting age were available, presumably due to casualties.

While the data could be useful, I strongly believe it will be misinterpreted and may drive some commanders to conduct kinetic operations when they're not appropriate to ensure their stats look as good at the commanders in the other AOs, even though he doesn't have significant numbers in his battlespace. We all seen what happens then, everyone is a bad guy after they're dead.

I support the argument that the metric isn't overly useful and potentially very harmful due to Western Officers being competitive. Nothing wrong with competition, but this competition could actually result in a loss.

[Rex Brynen]

Count the bodies, we're going to do it anyway, but the numbers are just data, and they can and should be interpreted in different ways. If the enemy body count continues to raise you may interpret it as the enemy is more effective at mobilizing the populace to fight us, or on the other hand the remaining leadership is less effective, and there are numerous of other interpretations that may or may not be relevant, so the question comes back to why is it a useful metric for anything other than to support information operations (they killed a 100 of us, but we killed a thousand of them; therefore, we're winning).

This is true, however, of almost all data in intelligence assessment--the data rarely has a single unambiguous interpretation. Assessing the validity and reliability of indicators, contextualizing them, and making collective sense of them (and their broader significance) is what analysts ought to be doing for a living.

As a general rule, I would rather have more information than less, even if the information might be inflated or indicative of multiple possible trends.

[Bob's World]

This is true, however, of almost all data in intelligence assessment--the data rarely has a single unambiguous interpretation. Assessing the validity and reliability of indicators, contextualizing them, and making collective sense of them (and their broader significance) is what analysts ought to be doing for a living.

As a general rule, I would rather have more information than less, even if the information might be inflated or indicative of multiple possible trends.

and are typically oblivious to how collecting and counting it might be affecting the very operations they are working to support.

Or just as often, will fight tooth and nail to keep a data source on line when the ops guys want to go turn it off for the negative effects its day to day operational presence has on the mission as a whole.

BL, I would discount the intel community's perspective on this by the "factor of 2 described by Fuchs," I would proably do the same for commanders at any level higher than that which the casualites were actually produced at, say company level.

[Ken White]

However, knowing that you killed 'X' AND got his weapon AND will or even may be able to exploit that is not pointless.

The key is to know your enemy and really understand who you're fighting. Bill Moore makes the valid point that our overly competitive system encourages misuse of such data (and I repeat that public release exacerbates that factor) but that same system with it's forced short rotations (and repetitive deployments deliberately tasked to different AOs) does not allow Commanders or units to get to know their enemy. A body count is then sort of pointless.

However, as Wilf said when he started this thread:

"Historically best practice body counts were based on recorded kills, verified by physical control and recovery of the body AND Weapons - usually for some form of exploitation."(emphasis added /kw)

However, Wilf cited that usage in some Commonwealth campaigns where a three year tour (or longer, particularly in Rhodesia) was the norm. We don't do that (unfortunately) so many do not see the value for us. It was not and is not pointless.

If you know your AO and your enemy. If you do not, then it probably is pointless...

As for Bob's World's comment on the Intel community and their shortfalls, I've seen that. He's right. I've also seen commanders that would not tolerate that attitude as they wanted to do what was right as opposed to doing what they thought their Boss might want...

He also says:

I would discount the intel community's perspective on this by the "factor of 2 described by Fuchs," I would proably do the same for commanders at any level higher than that which the casualites were actually produced at, say company level.

Hmm. That sounds like an indictment of a lot of Field Grade and Flag Officers...

[Bob's World]

If you brief senior leaders on certain stats every day, those stats take on an importance for the sake of the stat itself.

So effects are more important. Also way more difficult. I've worked with guys who have developed and sold effects measureing and reporting systems that would crush the biggest computers IBM every built, I know they certainly crushed the staffs they were foisted upon; and in my opinion the results were virtually worthless. This actually drove me to the quote below, as I told my fellow officer that he was 'A master of complexity - able to devine insanely complex solutions to complex problems.' I told him "don't complify - simplicate!"

Body counts are easy. We killed 5 of them, and suffered one WIA in the process. Easy. Sounds like we're winning. I recall as kid in kindergarden watching the news about Vietnam, and they would post the daily box score. US 30, NVA 240. etc. It was like following sports. Except, of course, that it isn't sports, and the score in of itself doesn't mean anything. More "how do you feel" about the score over time...measure that, if you can.

[Ken White]

...I told him "don't complify - simplicate!"

Body counts are easy. We killed 5 of them, and suffered one WIA in the process. Easy. Sounds like we're winning.

You want to simplicate to the point of irrelevance...

You left out "...physical control and recovery of the body AND Weapons - usually for some form of exploitation." I would totally agree that what you posted was foolish -- I do not agree that if you add the important bit about their weapons (give that some thought...) and the potential for exploitation.

I recall as kid in kindergarden watching the news about Vietnam, and they would post the daily box score. US 30, NVA 240. etc. It was like following sports. Except, of course, that it isn't sports, and the score in of itself doesn't mean anything.

While you were in kindergarten I was adding to that box score in a unit that would not allow a KIA to be counted unless there was a weapon to go with it and that diligently tried to exploit each case and successfully did so on a number of occasions. So I know there is value if done properly as opposed to basing my opinion on dimly recalled TV Follies (That's what the MACV Press Briefings were called, with good reason).

The fact that a bunch of staff Colonels prostituted a process originated by the SecDef over the objections of many in-country makes your opening comment above even more poignant (in the painful and pertinent sense of the word):

If you brief senior leaders on certain stats every day, those stats take on an importance for the sake of the stat itself.

As I said, those are your contemporaries and their Bosses you're impugning, not mine.

That said, I do agree that can occur but that is misuse of the information and it amounts to doing what I specifically said should not be done -- and which you apparently ignored as you often do while searching for a riposte. I'll just repeat some of that for you:

""I would add that those figures should not be publicized in any way or released to the media because they will either misunderstand or misuse them -- more likely both -- and that will skew the military application (as it did in Viet Nam after mid 1966).(ADDED:A briefing is publicizing)
. . .
P.P.S

John and Bob's World are correct also in that it can be a useful measure of performance but not of effectiveness/outcome.[/B]""

More "how do you feel" about the score over time...measure that, if you can.

Apparently you changed your mind about the use as a measure of performance:

I see this as a measure of performance though, not effectiveness. Many factors go into what it takes to break the will of an opponent, so merely counting bodies only tells you that you are killing people.

Totally agree now as I did when you first wrote it.

I'm not a Sports fan so don't do scores and didn't get to watch Viet Nam on TV though I'm glad you did, you must've been a precocious little Kindergartener. However, I can measure an inability to determine the difference between appropriate and inappropriate uses of information and the appreciation of that difference...

[Bob's World]

This problem is a big part of my current job. Not so much to devise effective metrics, but to try to ensure that we are emphasizing the right bits of information, drawing the right conclusions, (and questioning the rightness of those), etc.

One unit will go out on a CRP, engage in a daylong TIC, reduce several IEDs, and get confirmed BDA on half a dozen Insurgents (with their weapons) from attack helo's brought in to support them.

Another will swoop into a compound in the middle of the night a discover and destroy a cache of dope or amonium nitrate; or snatch a person or two of interest and swoop back out.

Another will conduct a Medical event at a district center, treat hundreds of locals and engage in meaningful conversations with important local leaders and return to base without firing a shot.

Who was most productive today? Who was most effective today? What do we do more of? What do we do less of? How do I convince conventional commanders to allocate critcal enablers to one form of engagement over another?

I have a counterpart who reads the "scorecard" to the commander every morning. No one ever asks what it means. I try to identify and highlight important nuances that come from all of these various types of engagement; and sometimes I get a "WTF?" look in return. Sometimes you pimp the actions that are easily understood in order to get the enablers to go out and do what might not be quite so obvious.

How does that go, "you sell the sizzle, not the steak?" That's fine. But never forget you will quickly starve eating nothing but sizzle. But boy, to people love sizzle.