Enhanced MAGTF Operations- USMC's Small Unit Future

[COMMAR]

Hopefully conceptual development does not end there.

How do the Marines take enhanced companies to sea, and operate from the sea? We have gone from 5 ship ARG to 4 ship ARG to now 3 ship ARG, and over the same period we have gone from Regiment level to battalion level and are now looking at company level.

Consolidation at sea and distribution on land - two trend lines going different directions. What is unspoken here is how moving to a company level operational construct forces a change to the ARG - which I do think is a good thing, but not easy to do when the Navy is already throwing the Marines the minimum level of ships.

This should not be seen as questioning the MEU, rather how to size and shape the MEU when companies need more specific support, like fire support.

Fr/whats being discussed the MEU construct will remain unchanged by EMO.

The place where the EMO will most likely be the Preferred Construct will be in the SC MAGTF Concept which will deploy in conjunction w/the Navy's Global Fleet Stations, & be complementary to the MEU.


The SC MAGTF will deploy Comp-sized Dets aboard Naval GFS widely dispersed thru-out a Theater Command.

These Dets would further deploy Platoons & even Squads to conduct Bi-lateral training mission in neighboring countries coordinated by the MCTAG (small tms of Sr Marines that stay constantly engaged w/Partner Nations, providing a bridge btwn PNs & TComms).

[Galrahn]

The SC MAGTF will deploy Comp-sized Dets aboard Naval GFS widely dispersed thru-out a Theater Command.

These Dets would further deploy Platoons & even Squads to conduct Bi-lateral training mission in neighboring countries coordinated by the MCTAG (small tms of Sr Marines that stay constantly engaged w/Partner Nations, providing a bridge btwn PNs & TComms).

Then I see three issues.

1) A major problem I have with the SC MAGTF planning is the same issue I have with Global Fleet Stations - the dwell time. I am not sure we are going to be able to develop the regional knowledge that makes these missions so valuable if the Marines can't get longer dwell times than the usual 6 month deployments. I have seen some serious discussion on this issue, but it comes and goes.

The Navy has the same problem with Global Fleet Stations.

2) The EMO was developed under conditions of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, but is being applied to organizational developments intended for assured access in peacetime. The EMO is a really good idea IMO, I'd hate to see it not get serious consideration as part of a MEU - construct including ARG elements. COCOMs are requesting solo LPD/LSD assets for GFS. OK, I get it, but the requests started coming because the ships were available while Marines were in Iraq. I've seen this play before, the Navy is expanding the number of JHSVs to meet this COCOM demand for GFS, so Marines should count on EMO ultimately being a JHSV deployed capability.

This will lead to problems down the road. The JHSV doesn't give the Marines their aviation or amphibious capabilities. The Marines need to get in front of this issue. It serves no ones interest (except the Navy) to make SC MAGTF a capability deployed by pier alone - aviation must be a major consideration and sea based capabilities give SC MAGTF increased options as a MEU reinforcement.

I'd prefer to see some serious intellectual energy put into the EMO as a joint Navy/Marine Corps DO concept from the sea beyond the assured access SC MAGTF construct, in particular as part of the analysis of alternatives for forcible entry that are going to be forced upon the Marines over the coming weeks as the Ray Mabus tries to kill the EFV.

3) The Navy has agreed to 33 amphibious ships out of the 38 the Marines wanted. Instead of 11-11-11, the Navy is saying 10 LHA/Ds -11 LPDs -12 LSDs. All kinds of games being played here by the Navy, and the ultimate result is not even 2 MEB assault. I think this represents how the 3 ship ARG no longer works as an effective organizational model from the sea, but there are other observations that can be made.

The Marines are putting a lot of work into new expeditionary organizational elements, but the absence of dedicated sea based capability as part of the discussion is allowing the Navy to control options for the Marines at sea - and the Marines have not made a compelling argument under this pressure.

General Conway telling Congress the Navy needs to buy more DDG-1000s to provide naval fire support as part of the EFV purchase isn't a compelling argument winning the Marines any credibility. EMO on the other hand represents a very attractive concept that resonates with a national strategy focus and as such, represents a much more compelling reason to listen to Marines regarding their sea based requirements.

I am very much interested in all information regarding further development of EMO. All I have really seen is what is in MC Gazette, here and private conversations - very few discussions or opinions online. If there are well known articles otherwise, links appreciated.

[Rifleman]

Maybe I'm getting a little off subject here, but can someone in the current USN/USMC community tell me why the USMC has shown no interest in modern seaplanes?

It seems like they would have a lot of application for dispersed USMC units in littoral and riverine areas in small wars.

[jcustis]

It seems like they would have a lot of application for dispersed USMC units in littoral and riverine areas in small wars.

Most likely because we haven't been working in the littorals the past six years.

Heck, we can't even get the EFV done right.

[schuehle]

Most likely because we haven't been working in the littorals the past six years.

Heck, we can't even get the EFV done right.

You really need to look at the USMC current ops brief if you honestly believe that.

[Tukhachevskii]

Maybe I'm getting a little off subject here, but can someone in the current USN/USMC community tell me why the USMC has shown no interest in modern seaplanes?

It seems like they would have a lot of application for dispersed USMC units in littoral and riverine areas in small wars.

I find it interesting that a lot of the conceptual thinking behind concepts like DO was tried in one form or another by Orde Wingate and his operations in Burma especially with regards to semi-independant operations behind enemy lines relying on air-dropped supllies while briage sized sub-units (deploying as "columns" with strong scout groups) relied on mules (AFIAK an option being reconsidered in some cirlces) and locally made/acquired bamboo boats for riverine operations. Fire support was also mortar and pack howitzer based. Of course, the air component, supplied graciously by the USAF under the innovative thinking of the its commanders (whose names escape me currently) by No.1 Air Commando, also offers interesting lessons learnt if only from an USAF perspective.

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...f&AD=ADA397999

http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/bits...imonThesis.pdf

[COMMAR]

I find it interesting that a lot of the conceptual thinking behind concepts like DO was tried in one form or another by Orde Wingate and his operations in Burma especially with regards to semi-independant operations behind enemy lines relying on air-dropped supllies while briage sized sub-units (deploying as "columns" with strong scout groups) relied on mules (AFIAK an option being reconsidered in some cirlces) and locally made/acquired bamboo boats for riverine operations. Fire support was also mortar and pack howitzer based. Of course, the air component, supplied graciously by the USAF under the innovative thinking of the its commanders (whose names escape me currently) by No.1 Air Commando, also offers interesting lessons learnt if only from an USAF perspective.

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...f&AD=ADA397999

http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/bits...imonThesis.pdf

There are many examples of various units using similar tactics in relatively modern warfare. The HQMC/MCWL often sites the Norwegians use of distributed Line Units against the Soviets & Nazis as the most comparable example.

But as similar as these examples appear on the surface none are near as comprehensive or developed as DO.

It would be like comparing the landing of Gallipoli or any other previous landing to what the Marines spent 10yrs in the 1930s developing.

Something which at the time Military "Experts" of the day said was impossible to conduct in modern warfare. They not only proved them wrong, but also proved that when performed as they designed its nearly impossible to defend against.

Its the level of refinement & attention to detail paid to insisting that DO remain both Comprehensive & Fluid, shifting fr/Aggregated to Dis-Aggregated or vice/versa & back according to: the enemy, the terrain, the flow of battle, etc. that makes DO Light Years beyond any previous example.

One of the Major differences that made the USMC's Amph-Asslt Doctrine more advanced & successful than any before was the recognition/development of mastering of the fluid flow of "controlled chaos" in the shift from 'Landing' to 'Build Up' to 'Breakout'.

Today its still the most complex of Military Maneuvers for that reason.

Its the same w/DO & any of the other examples, the designed recognition of the fluid flow fr/ one form to another, its Comprehensive nature by design & a few other subtle differences in DO... is like comparing Algebra to Advanced Calculus.

[Firn]

There are many examples of various units using similar tactics in relatively modern warfare. The HQMC/MCWL often sites the Norwegians use of distributed Line Units against the Soviets & Nazis as the most comparable example.

It is an interesting discussion, but I think you lost me there. What do you mean by the use of the distributed Line Units by the Nowegians against the "Soviet & Nazis"?

Certainly not the "mobilize and harass a bit as you flee" forced on the Norwegians (and the British) in increasingly large parts of Norway during the Operation Weserübung, in which the German army completely outfought their opponents on each level?

Perhaps you mean the Finns?


Firn

[Tukhachevskii]

But as similar as these examples appear on the surface none are near as comprehensive or developed as DO.

Its the level of refinement & attention to detail paid to insisting that DO remain both Comprehensive & Fluid, shifting fr/Aggregated to Dis-Aggregated or vice/versa & back according to: the enemy, the terrain, the flow of battle, etc. that makes DO Light Years beyond any previous example.

One of the Major differences that made the USMC's Amph-Asslt Doctrine more advanced & successful than any before was the recognition/development of mastering of the fluid flow of "controlled chaos" in the shift from 'Landing' to 'Build Up' to 'Breakout'.

.

Being a civvie I get the impression, for the above post and a number of Marine Corps Gazette articles I have read on DO, that it is essntially an evolutionary approach to fielding task/mission based units according to METT-T(C) through the exploitation of advanced C4I without which "controlled chaos" would result is just plain, vanilla chaos? To use the example of Wingate, poor and largely irrelevant that it may be, Operation Longcloth suffered from severe C3I problems which resulted in a number of "columns" becoming "unco-ordinated" which led to mission paralysis form the strategic and operational PoV even though, tactically, they performed well (in most instances). How would these "Enhanced Companies" operate in an environment in which C4I would be severely degraded/disrupted say by an EMP? or, in systems terms what if sub-systems were severed from their parent organisation and deprived of battlespace awareness from Bn, Bde and national intel sources....surely then the guides/scouts and their traditional role of "finding" in order to Fix and Kill would become paramount again?

On a different note, I do get that historically the force to space ratio gap has been widening since antiquity with smaller and smaller units (thanks to advances in technology (ISTAR/C3I) and weaponry) being able to hold larger and larger frontages/AOs but it seems to me that this is very much an Weberian "ideal type" refering to ann almost pure expression of Eucledian space. IN WWII Sixth Army prior to Operation Blau held a horizontal front of a few hundred kilometers yet upon entering Stalingrad the entire Army group was swallowed up in the vertical morass comprising a dozen or so square klicks. Excuse my ignorance but as you are more knowledgable than I I am taking this opportunity ask questions that I ordinarily wouldn't be able to (at least not in my local Pub!).

[Xenophon]

How would these "Enhanced Companies" operate in an environment in which C4I would be severely degraded/disrupted say by an EMP? or, in systems terms what if sub-systems were severed from their parent organisation and deprived of battlespace awareness from Bn, Bde and national intel sources....surely then the guides/scouts and their traditional role of "finding" in order to Fix and Kill would become paramount again?

I think the confusion is caused by the Marine Corps overcomplicating the whole issue. All DO is is independent fire team ops. All ECO is beefing up the Company HQ to better support those teams. USMC infantry (and I'm sure US Army infantry) has always had the capability to punch out a fire team if need be. Hell, in the early days of OIF, Marine units would punch out buddy teams or buddy teams (+) to catch bad guys emplacing IEDs. Companies/platoons/squads aren't going to lose their ability to operate as such, we're just going to specifically train the fire teams to act as fire teams and enable them with specific training/wonderful toys. I don't see anything really new or revolutionary in ECO, it's basic just a nice package to get Congress to buy us all those wonderful toys. However, I'm saying this as a Marine, but an outsider to the program. I could be way off. For some reason, they didn't consult me before coming up with this program.

As for what will happen if individual teams get cut off, they'll probably do the same thing a Marine division/battalion/company would do in that situation: collect all the serialized gear that retreating Army units leave behind and blast their way to the sea.

[COMMAR]

Galrahn: I hear what your getting @ but your kind of putting the cart before the horse.

DO/ECO/EMO are not locked into any construct whether MEU or SC MAGTF or for that matter MEF or MEB. Like most all formations the USMC designs, it's fluid. Every Battalion's Companies will be capable of detaching or not.

Its the Marine Corps version of asking, "Do we have an app for that?"

In other words, if we need to Dis-aggregate have we done all we can to train our Marines for that...? What we need is a rubric to allow us to Dis-Aggregate all the way down to the Squad, if need be, then hit every unit on the way back up.

Constructs like the MEU, the SC & everything else doesnt matter, what matters is say we're in a MEB or whatever & we need a BN to break off can we do it? Of course we do it all the time, BNs are trained for that.. But what about a Co.? ANS is they can, but they have 'not' been trained or structured for that.

OK, how can we both train for that & maximize their utility?? Regardless of if they started the deployment as the 24th MEU, MEB-Afghanistan, or SC MAGTF-Africa... If its to our advantage to Dis-aggregate @ anytime can we do it?

1) A major problem I have with the SC MAGTF planning is the same issue I have with Global Fleet Stations - the dwell time. I am not sure we are going to be able to develop the regional knowledge that makes these missions so valuable if the Marines can't get longer dwell times than the usual 6 month deployments. I have seen some serious discussion on this issue, but it comes and goes.

There are a few reasons why I have to disagree w/that.

In the SC MAGTF Construct its not the Marines of SC MAGTF that are intended to develop the relationships & maintain the constant engagement w/the Partner Nations, that role's intended for the MCTAG.

The SC Dets role is to be a conduit & do what Marines have always done; provide Small Unit Training, build roads/schools/canals, provide Hum-Aid, etc. Difference is fr/now on it'll be according to a coordinated development plan designed by the MCTAG.

It won't sending a whole Comp in per country either. One Comp might have 2, 3, or more Dets in as many countries simultaneously. They'd complete their task & move to the next.. task or country.

The MCTAG maintains the engagement, assesses the progress, & develops the next step.

MCTAG-"How was the marksmanship training?"
PN-----"It was great but our boys are a bit unruly"
MCTAG-"As we plan our next Bi-Lat we can plan-in an NCO Leadership Course"
PN-----"Sounds Great"
MCTAG-"I noticed that the road to the training site isnt that good... I'll attach a team of Engineers & maybe they can also do some repairs to that old hospital"

The MCTAG stays constantly engaged, schmooosing w/the Brass, rubbing elbows w/the diplomats, constantly making the plans & refining the relationships.


As far as everything else again I think your putting the cart before the horse. The Corps has to move ahead w/its development regardless if all the rest of the DOD grasps its point.

The Corps has always proven far ahead of the rest of the Defense Establishment in defining threats, pointing out weakness, & taking actions that appear to make no sense but always prove ahead of their time.

My sense is the lack of DOD foresight in the Amphib matter will prove the same, but the CMC's gonna do what Marines do; Improvise, Adapt, & Overcome.