Enhanced MAGTF Operations- USMC's Small Unit Future

[Tukhachevskii]

But as similar as these examples appear on the surface none are near as comprehensive or developed as DO.

Its the level of refinement & attention to detail paid to insisting that DO remain both Comprehensive & Fluid, shifting fr/Aggregated to Dis-Aggregated or vice/versa & back according to: the enemy, the terrain, the flow of battle, etc. that makes DO Light Years beyond any previous example.

One of the Major differences that made the USMC's Amph-Asslt Doctrine more advanced & successful than any before was the recognition/development of mastering of the fluid flow of "controlled chaos" in the shift from 'Landing' to 'Build Up' to 'Breakout'.

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Being a civvie I get the impression, for the above post and a number of Marine Corps Gazette articles I have read on DO, that it is essntially an evolutionary approach to fielding task/mission based units according to METT-T(C) through the exploitation of advanced C4I without which "controlled chaos" would result is just plain, vanilla chaos? To use the example of Wingate, poor and largely irrelevant that it may be, Operation Longcloth suffered from severe C3I problems which resulted in a number of "columns" becoming "unco-ordinated" which led to mission paralysis form the strategic and operational PoV even though, tactically, they performed well (in most instances). How would these "Enhanced Companies" operate in an environment in which C4I would be severely degraded/disrupted say by an EMP? or, in systems terms what if sub-systems were severed from their parent organisation and deprived of battlespace awareness from Bn, Bde and national intel sources....surely then the guides/scouts and their traditional role of "finding" in order to Fix and Kill would become paramount again?

On a different note, I do get that historically the force to space ratio gap has been widening since antiquity with smaller and smaller units (thanks to advances in technology (ISTAR/C3I) and weaponry) being able to hold larger and larger frontages/AOs but it seems to me that this is very much an Weberian "ideal type" refering to ann almost pure expression of Eucledian space. IN WWII Sixth Army prior to Operation Blau held a horizontal front of a few hundred kilometers yet upon entering Stalingrad the entire Army group was swallowed up in the vertical morass comprising a dozen or so square klicks. Excuse my ignorance but as you are more knowledgable than I I am taking this opportunity ask questions that I ordinarily wouldn't be able to (at least not in my local Pub!).

[Xenophon]

How would these "Enhanced Companies" operate in an environment in which C4I would be severely degraded/disrupted say by an EMP? or, in systems terms what if sub-systems were severed from their parent organisation and deprived of battlespace awareness from Bn, Bde and national intel sources....surely then the guides/scouts and their traditional role of "finding" in order to Fix and Kill would become paramount again?

I think the confusion is caused by the Marine Corps overcomplicating the whole issue. All DO is is independent fire team ops. All ECO is beefing up the Company HQ to better support those teams. USMC infantry (and I'm sure US Army infantry) has always had the capability to punch out a fire team if need be. Hell, in the early days of OIF, Marine units would punch out buddy teams or buddy teams (+) to catch bad guys emplacing IEDs. Companies/platoons/squads aren't going to lose their ability to operate as such, we're just going to specifically train the fire teams to act as fire teams and enable them with specific training/wonderful toys. I don't see anything really new or revolutionary in ECO, it's basic just a nice package to get Congress to buy us all those wonderful toys. However, I'm saying this as a Marine, but an outsider to the program. I could be way off. For some reason, they didn't consult me before coming up with this program.

As for what will happen if individual teams get cut off, they'll probably do the same thing a Marine division/battalion/company would do in that situation: collect all the serialized gear that retreating Army units leave behind and blast their way to the sea.

[Rifleman]

...collect all the serialized gear that retreating Army units leave behind and blast their way to the sea.

Love to bring up that early Korea thing, don't you?

[Xenophon]

Love to bring up that early Korea thing, don't you?

If the situation were reversed, the Army would never let us live it down. It's all in good fun. My 101st Airborne-veteran father makes fun of my Marine haircut every chance he gets.

I trust that you intended to put an emoticon behind the clearance of fires comment. Or if deliberate, why would come to that conclusion?

Absolutely not. Having been on both the infantry and the grunt side, the only argument that ever held water when it came to who should clear fires is that the infantry officer better understands maneuver and thus knows where all of the friendly units are located. Three problems with that 1) Maneuver is not some closely guarded secret that no one but a select few understand like infantry officers like to pretend. A good LCpl can track a battalion's movement. It's not rocket surgery. 2) The FO or LNO's main reason for living is to know where his supported units are so that he can do his job. The Co. CO or Bn CO is worried about a million and one things. The FO or LNO is worried about one thing. Who is more focused on getting clearance of fires right? 3) It's irrelevant. The challenge of clearing fires is not knowing where friendlies are, it's knowing what the round is going to do and what it can effect. The maneuver element and it's locations is just a tiny piece of the puzzle that needs to be understood to properly clear fires.

Obviously the CO is HMFIC and nominally has final say. But it's doctrinally delegated to the Weapons Platoon Commander or the Weapons Company Commander. Both can compare with the 0802 when it comes to tactical fire direction (when, where, how many rounds) but both are rank amateurs when it comes to technical fire direction (the one that actually protects maneuver units). It's irresponsible and born of nothing more than a sharp difference of view. Infantry officers should be handed an SME for indirect fire and it's ludicrous to waste their capabilities like this.

Now that being said: It's only about half the fault of the infantry community. The other half is caused by the artillery community sending undertrained and unwanted 0802's to the grunts. Some of us are trying to change that, but it would be easier to make the case that we need to send our best and brightest to the grunts if they weren't getting treated like second-class Marines when they get there.

[jcustis]

So are you saying the FO attached to a Rifle Coy FiST and the LNO OIC attached to a FSCC is the one who should be clearing the fires in support of maneuver? Unless I've missed something the past 15 years, aren't we already handed a SME for indirect fire...who does his current job pretty well and fits within a good fire support structure?

That's going to require a lot of best and brightest that the arty community does not have. That's why the balance of having that FO or LNO integrated into a team at the FiST and FSCC level is the method that has worked best over the years.

One of the benefits of that 0802 FO or scout focusing on one thing is that it allows him to be timely in plotting GT lines and battery positions, getting tgt data for the call for fire, and getting that fire direction stuff right. Add in the responsibility for orchestrating mortars and CAS, and you can't do it as well without a team involved, unless you are willing to sacrifice time. That has nothing to do with technical fire direction, which I don't think any infantry officer believes he could do better than an 08, so you are spot on there.

We rate 0802s in LAR, and I think the same in Tank Bns, as our FSCs. I wouldn't have it any other way, primarily due to our structure and the nature of our mobility. He is not, however, the LNO to the firing battery or battalion, which we still need. Your community does not have the manpower to support what you advocate, even if it were the better way, which I still don"t see.

[Xenophon]

I'm not proposing any additional personnel, just that maybe the guy with the most knowledge and experience in the field should be the FiST team leader, instead of the guy with the least. The FAC or the Air O comes with years of CAS training and experience. The mortar liaison comes with the same for mortars. The 0802 hits the fleet with the formal knowledge and training to integrate the three and he should, before hitting the grunt unit, have done practical application to reinforce it. Plus, he comes with a team who is doing the coordination and clearance, leaving him free to supervise and train the entire team, instead of a dual-hatted 0302 who can only dedicate a portion of his time and attention. The 0302, if he's lucky, has gotten some OJT mentoring from the previous FiST team leader. Sometimes he was mortar platoon commander, and his platoon may or may not have trained him up. He brings nothing to the table except a requirement for the rest of the team to bring him up to speed. Might as well have your PFC point men in charge of each fire team. Worst case scenario he interferes with the ability of the rest of the team to do their job. Best case scenario it's a complete waste of an 0302 that could be doing other things. You want timely and accurate fires? Get rid of the speed bump in the process. Sure, it has worked for a long time. That's no reason it couldn't be done better.

[jcustis]

I think you've been misinformed, because coordinating fires is about all that a 0302 Wpns Plt Cmdr does, and is certainly all that a 0302 Wpns Company Cmdr does in the middle of the fight. And remember, it's not as though the Wpns Plt Cmdr just shows up one day and starts the job, he has typically been a rifle company commander for a while before moving up. I've pretty much never heard of 81s Plt Cmdrs bouncing back down to take a spot in a rifle company...the other way around is the desired career path.

FACs do not come to a unit with anything more than the FAC/TACP package under their belt, and instruction in the tactics of other airframes, which he learned at the school. Besides that, there are no "years" of CAS training, and a Cobra guy knows about squat concerning what the fixed wing guys do until he completes the course. And then there are the C-130 FACs. They don't get too much CAS experience before attending the school and hitting the battalion. And unfortunately, if they were so good straight out of the cockpit, we would not see some of the antics that occur when CAS is employed, in both training and peacetime.

I will grant you this...an 0802, with sufficient integration training involving the remaining 0861s he brings with him to serve as the LNO cell at theBn-level, could be the FSC. I'll give you that. In my experience, that is not the case with 0802s sent out to serve as FO tm leads.

[schuehle]

1) Absolutely not. Having been on both the infantry and the grunt side, the only argument that ever held water when it came to who should clear fires is that the infantry officer better understands maneuver and thus knows where all of the friendly units are located.
2) A good LCpl can track a battalion's movement.
3) The challenge of clearing fires is not knowing where friendlies are, it's knowing what the round is going to do and what it can effect. The maneuver element and it's locations is just a tiny piece of the puzzle that needs to be understood to properly clear fires.
4) Both can compare with the 0802 when it comes to tactical fire direction (when, where, how many rounds) but both are rank amateurs when it comes to technical fire direction (the one that actually protects maneuver units). It's irresponsible and born of nothing more than a sharp difference of view. Infantry officers should be handed an SME for indirect fire and it's ludicrous to waste their capabilities like this.

Fascinating.

1) Though I am not certain as to the difference between infantry side and grunt side, I disagree with your thought regarding the "only argument that has ever held water." I would ask that you consider the subject of clearing fires as one of "whom" clears them vice "what MOS." Oddly enough our operations centers are more than one person and the input of several participants is necessary for decisions. And there is a reason that 0802's are not the Operations Officers for infantry battalions.

2) Maybe.

3) As you note, merely tracking movement is only one of many considerations being weighed during the fires process. If you follow this to its logical conclusion I think you answer your own question.

4) If you truly believe that this is an instance a sharp difference of view then we will disagree.