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Thread: Enhanced MAGTF Operations- USMC's Small Unit Future

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  1. #1
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    Quote Originally Posted by Xenophon View Post
    ...collect all the serialized gear that retreating Army units leave behind and blast their way to the sea.
    Love to bring up that early Korea thing, don't you?
    "Pick up a rifle and you change instantly from a subject to a citizen." - Jeff Cooper

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    Council Member Xenophon's Avatar
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    Love to bring up that early Korea thing, don't you?
    If the situation were reversed, the Army would never let us live it down. It's all in good fun. My 101st Airborne-veteran father makes fun of my Marine haircut every chance he gets.

    I trust that you intended to put an emoticon behind the clearance of fires comment. Or if deliberate, why would come to that conclusion?
    Absolutely not. Having been on both the infantry and the grunt side, the only argument that ever held water when it came to who should clear fires is that the infantry officer better understands maneuver and thus knows where all of the friendly units are located. Three problems with that 1) Maneuver is not some closely guarded secret that no one but a select few understand like infantry officers like to pretend. A good LCpl can track a battalion's movement. It's not rocket surgery. 2) The FO or LNO's main reason for living is to know where his supported units are so that he can do his job. The Co. CO or Bn CO is worried about a million and one things. The FO or LNO is worried about one thing. Who is more focused on getting clearance of fires right? 3) It's irrelevant. The challenge of clearing fires is not knowing where friendlies are, it's knowing what the round is going to do and what it can effect. The maneuver element and it's locations is just a tiny piece of the puzzle that needs to be understood to properly clear fires.

    Obviously the CO is HMFIC and nominally has final say. But it's doctrinally delegated to the Weapons Platoon Commander or the Weapons Company Commander. Both can compare with the 0802 when it comes to tactical fire direction (when, where, how many rounds) but both are rank amateurs when it comes to technical fire direction (the one that actually protects maneuver units). It's irresponsible and born of nothing more than a sharp difference of view. Infantry officers should be handed an SME for indirect fire and it's ludicrous to waste their capabilities like this.

    Now that being said: It's only about half the fault of the infantry community. The other half is caused by the artillery community sending undertrained and unwanted 0802's to the grunts. Some of us are trying to change that, but it would be easier to make the case that we need to send our best and brightest to the grunts if they weren't getting treated like second-class Marines when they get there.
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 02-16-2010 at 08:11 PM. Reason: language led to an edit by Moderator.

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    Council Member jcustis's Avatar
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    So are you saying the FO attached to a Rifle Coy FiST and the LNO OIC attached to a FSCC is the one who should be clearing the fires in support of maneuver? Unless I've missed something the past 15 years, aren't we already handed a SME for indirect fire...who does his current job pretty well and fits within a good fire support structure?

    That's going to require a lot of best and brightest that the arty community does not have. That's why the balance of having that FO or LNO integrated into a team at the FiST and FSCC level is the method that has worked best over the years.

    One of the benefits of that 0802 FO or scout focusing on one thing is that it allows him to be timely in plotting GT lines and battery positions, getting tgt data for the call for fire, and getting that fire direction stuff right. Add in the responsibility for orchestrating mortars and CAS, and you can't do it as well without a team involved, unless you are willing to sacrifice time. That has nothing to do with technical fire direction, which I don't think any infantry officer believes he could do better than an 08, so you are spot on there.

    We rate 0802s in LAR, and I think the same in Tank Bns, as our FSCs. I wouldn't have it any other way, primarily due to our structure and the nature of our mobility. He is not, however, the LNO to the firing battery or battalion, which we still need. Your community does not have the manpower to support what you advocate, even if it were the better way, which I still don"t see.
    Last edited by jcustis; 02-13-2010 at 04:03 PM.

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    Council Member Xenophon's Avatar
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    I'm not proposing any additional personnel, just that maybe the guy with the most knowledge and experience in the field should be the FiST team leader, instead of the guy with the least. The FAC or the Air O comes with years of CAS training and experience. The mortar liaison comes with the same for mortars. The 0802 hits the fleet with the formal knowledge and training to integrate the three and he should, before hitting the grunt unit, have done practical application to reinforce it. Plus, he comes with a team who is doing the coordination and clearance, leaving him free to supervise and train the entire team, instead of a dual-hatted 0302 who can only dedicate a portion of his time and attention. The 0302, if he's lucky, has gotten some OJT mentoring from the previous FiST team leader. Sometimes he was mortar platoon commander, and his platoon may or may not have trained him up. He brings nothing to the table except a requirement for the rest of the team to bring him up to speed. Might as well have your PFC point men in charge of each fire team. Worst case scenario he interferes with the ability of the rest of the team to do their job. Best case scenario it's a complete waste of an 0302 that could be doing other things. You want timely and accurate fires? Get rid of the speed bump in the process. Sure, it has worked for a long time. That's no reason it couldn't be done better.

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    Council Member jcustis's Avatar
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    I think you've been misinformed, because coordinating fires is about all that a 0302 Wpns Plt Cmdr does, and is certainly all that a 0302 Wpns Company Cmdr does in the middle of the fight. And remember, it's not as though the Wpns Plt Cmdr just shows up one day and starts the job, he has typically been a rifle company commander for a while before moving up. I've pretty much never heard of 81s Plt Cmdrs bouncing back down to take a spot in a rifle company...the other way around is the desired career path.

    FACs do not come to a unit with anything more than the FAC/TACP package under their belt, and instruction in the tactics of other airframes, which he learned at the school. Besides that, there are no "years" of CAS training, and a Cobra guy knows about squat concerning what the fixed wing guys do until he completes the course. And then there are the C-130 FACs. They don't get too much CAS experience before attending the school and hitting the battalion. And unfortunately, if they were so good straight out of the cockpit, we would not see some of the antics that occur when CAS is employed, in both training and peacetime.

    I will grant you this...an 0802, with sufficient integration training involving the remaining 0861s he brings with him to serve as the LNO cell at theBn-level, could be the FSC. I'll give you that. In my experience, that is not the case with 0802s sent out to serve as FO tm leads.

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    Default LOE 4: 1Company Launch fr/SeaBase Conducting 2Missions Simultaneously- 1IW, 1Convnt'l

    War Lab to Apply Seabasing and ‘Three Block War’ to Counterinsurgency: Company to carry out two-part mission

    Date: November 23, 2009

    The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory’s experiment in Oahu, HI, next summer will examine the applications of enhanced company operations and seabasing concepts on a counterinsurgency mission.

    EDITED by SWCAdmin: see http://www.strategypage.com/militaryforums/1-13794.aspx, 3rd article down (as of this posting) for the material that has been removed from this site due to copyright concerns
    Last edited by SWCAdmin; 09-20-2010 at 04:29 PM. Reason: Copyright complaint

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    Quote Originally Posted by jcustis View Post
    Besides that, there are no "years" of CAS training, and a Cobra guy knows about squat concerning what the fixed wing guys do until he completes the course. And then there are the C-130 FACs. They don't get too much CAS experience before attending the school and hitting the battalion. And unfortunately, if they were so good straight out of the cockpit, we would not see some of the antics that occur when CAS is employed, in both training and peacetime.
    The aviators that show up at battalions to do Air O/FAC expertise is going to differ according what airframe they fly and what qualifications they had in that airframe.

    You are absolutly right about the C-130 guys and to that heap I'd throw the Prowler, Frog, and ####ters.

    At the next strata you will find single seat hornet and harrier guys. By virtue of them making it through their first fleet tour they will have a lot of CAS experience, likely combat.

    At the next strata will be two seat hornet/cobra/huey guys. These guys will likely have had a FAC/A qualification which means they have a LOT of CAS experience and more to the point they will have lots of cross-platform CAS experience.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Xenophon View Post
    1) Absolutely not. Having been on both the infantry and the grunt side, the only argument that ever held water when it came to who should clear fires is that the infantry officer better understands maneuver and thus knows where all of the friendly units are located.
    2) A good LCpl can track a battalion's movement.
    3) The challenge of clearing fires is not knowing where friendlies are, it's knowing what the round is going to do and what it can effect. The maneuver element and it's locations is just a tiny piece of the puzzle that needs to be understood to properly clear fires.
    4) Both can compare with the 0802 when it comes to tactical fire direction (when, where, how many rounds) but both are rank amateurs when it comes to technical fire direction (the one that actually protects maneuver units). It's irresponsible and born of nothing more than a sharp difference of view. Infantry officers should be handed an SME for indirect fire and it's ludicrous to waste their capabilities like this.
    Fascinating.

    1) Though I am not certain as to the difference between infantry side and grunt side, I disagree with your thought regarding the "only argument that has ever held water." I would ask that you consider the subject of clearing fires as one of "whom" clears them vice "what MOS." Oddly enough our operations centers are more than one person and the input of several participants is necessary for decisions. And there is a reason that 0802's are not the Operations Officers for infantry battalions.

    2) Maybe.

    3) As you note, merely tracking movement is only one of many considerations being weighed during the fires process. If you follow this to its logical conclusion I think you answer your own question.

    4) If you truly believe that this is an instance a sharp difference of view then we will disagree.
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 02-16-2010 at 08:12 PM. Reason: Last sentence amended and PM to author.

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